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Preface
In June 2011, the Heinrich Böll Foundation hosted an international conference on 
transnational organized crime (TOC). It was the first time that the Foundation ad-
dressed the issue of transnational organized crime in such a comprehensive man-
ner. The intention of this event was to raise awareness about the interdependency 
of international criminal structures, legal economic processes, and the respective 
political orders. A further aspect that was addressed was the interwovenness of 
drug, arms, human and organ trafficking, and money laundering. 
With our conference we also intended to contribute toward overcoming the 
well-established stereotype of organized crime as being a marginal problem. And 
we tackled another dominant stereotype in Germany, namely that TOC only exists 
in other countries and that Germany is not much involved, affected, or respon-
sible. The conference was a big success and well documented in the national and 
international media.
Organized crime is not a new phenomenon; however, it has become fatal for 
more and more people. Violence and the violation of human rights have become 
almost ordinary occurrences. Since democracy is one of the central concerns, it is 
important that TOC be recognized as a structural element of international rela-
tions. Internationally as well as nationally, the price that a society and its individu-
als must pay as a result of the infiltration of TOC should be much more transpar-
ent. The international conference was not meant to be a one-time event but the 
beginning of a deliberate process that links the policy field of (transnational) orga-
nized crime to the issue areas of our daily work – such as freedom, democracy, hu-
man rights, anti-racism, ecology, and gender equality. We should expect those in 
politics, media, and civil society – on a global scale – to focus on the problem and 
act rather than ignore it. Therefore, we are currently strengthening civil society 
engagement against TOC in various countries and are fostering networking and 
knowledge-exchange on the issue. 
We are especially interested in the dialectics between committing and combat-
ing (transnational) organized crime. We are also interested in civil engagement as 
a means to protect civil, political, and economic life against infiltration by TOC. 
We want politicians and lawyers to assess those interdependencies with a new vi-
sion and assert their responsibilities within the context.
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Who shapes our current role models? And where does our general orienta-
tion come from? How can we define the fine line between a successful business-
man earning millions a year through financial speculation on staple foods and a 
unscrupulous Mafia boss dealing with drugs and women? Who consumes such 
drugs and women, and who is involved in money laundering in our societies? 
The answers are difficult and it is our responsibility to work them out! With 
this book we hope to contribute toward the responsible handling of the questions. 
Hopefully, many interested readers across the whole world will feel enriched by its 
offerings and will benefit from our having assembled so many authors to address 
transnational organized crime from many different countries and perspectives, 
to analyze it, and to elaborate on policy recommendations. Many thanks for their 
commitment.
This book was only possible thanks to the energy, the knowledge, and the net-
works of Regine Schönenberg; the engagement and the enthusiasm of Annette 
von Schönfeld, Head of the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s Regional Office for Mexico 
and Central America; the valuable contributions and interview skills of Verena 
Zoppei; and the efforts of Daniel Backhouse, who maintained the overview of all 
partners involved and contributed with his always reliable project management.
Berlin, January 2013
Barbara Unmüßig
President of the Heinrich Böll Foundation
I. Introduction 
Today, transnational organized crime is an inherent feature of economic globa-
lization and represents more than just the dark side of that development path. 
It is increasingly difficult to distinguish light from shadow in this context, and 
the fine line between legal and illegal forms of economic exchange is becoming 
increasingly blurred. There are networks operating in both legal and illegal sec-
tors, depending on what brings them the greatest benefit. Currently, few experts 
can claim to have comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the laws and 
regulations governing the international flow of trade. International companies 
rely increasingly on intermediaries and arbitrage agencies for much of this trade, 
and thereby cede a certain amount of their overall responsibility for the specific 
circumstances of the international and local handling. 
A further source of uncertainty is the cultural specificity of concepts of legal-
ity and illegality, as well as their local implementation. In most parts of the world, 
ideas about the legitimacy of activities have a greater influence than written law; 
customary law plays at least as large a part as trade legislation, and the legitimacy 
of ensuring one’s own survival has an undisputed place alongside the state’s in-
ability to guarantee just that.
The goods transported within the context of TOC are the same worldwide – 
arms, narcotics, people, as well as other goods, depending on the region: rare 
animals, plants, medicines, (toxic) waste, all types of counterfeit goods, and, in 
general, any goods that can be traded illegally because legal access to them is pre-
cluded by legislation or borders. In addition, global trends toward the homogeniza-
tion of the norms governing the production of – and trade in – goods and access to 
capital, land, and natural resources create imbalances and injustices in accessing 
markets, which are then typically circumvented by means of corrupt practices.
The intermediary stages described above create gray areas, which are essential 
for the entire process to keep going, and which are entirely removed from any 
legal or democratic control. Since TOC involves huge sums of money, these gray 
areas are increasingly the place where direct influence is exercised over authorities 
and the political establishment. Thus, TOC becomes a direct threat to democratic 
decision-making structures. We maintain that the global economic system would 
be unable to survive without these gray areas, since it is geared exclusively toward 
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short-term profit rather than inclusive, sustainable development. The ends justify 
the means, and democratic decision-making structures, transparency, and civic 
participation disrupt both legal and illegal profit-seeking in equal measure.
These forces, which have long since escaped any kind of control, are now com-
pounded by problems of legitimacy in our cultural sphere. This is, for example, 
true for speculating with staple foods, which, although it remains legal, is now 
regarded in most contexts as socially unacceptable. Seeking profit at the expense 
of the natural world is equally frowned upon, although it has not yet been fully 
defined and regulated by consumer law.
An understanding of the causes of the complex and growing dimensions of 
TOC in the context of the global market economy can be greatly facilitated by 
adopting a wide range of different perspectives and analyses. However, this will 
require a rejection of traditional considerations in terms of academic disciplines, 
professional responsibilities, and (party) political formulas in order to rise above 
such divisions and enter into a new dialogue.
This book offers contributions from 12 countries around the world authored by 
academics from a wide range of academic disciplines, representatives from civil 
society organizations, journalists, politicians and representatives from private in-
dustry, as well as activists. They offer 25 views on the causes, historical develop-
ment, forms, and effects of TOC. Combined, we intend to construct a holistic 
picture that, among other things, shows:
• where and how organized crime can establish itself and spread within socie-
ties; 
• how a globalized definition of legality or illegality does not necessarily corre-
spond to local experiences, cultures, and traditions;
• how the worldwide social orientation toward the market as the sole regulatory 
force also promotes illegal money-making, while destroying other values of 
social life to such an extent that corrective social forces no longer exist;
• that the concept of national sovereignty, and therefore also of national security 
and police forces, as well as national legislation, are pushed to their limits by 
TOC;
• that TOC is quick to exploit lucrative loopholes, particularly in connection with 
new technologies – and has long since learned how to benefit from this busi-
ness until each loophole is discovered and closed.
Assessed from such multidisciplinary (e.g., political science, sociology, economy, 
history, law, criminology, anthropology) and cross-cultural perspectives, the inter-
dependent complexity of TOC and global loss of social cohesion will hopefully be-
come increasingly ascertainable to our readers and to us through a multi-facetted 
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network. Hence, we intend to initiate a debate on our thesis within that network 
and beyond.1
This book is divided into two parts. In the first part, authors from various aca-
demic and institutional backgrounds provide a view of some of the current global 
challenges posed by transnational organized crime. These range from money 
laundering, cybercrime, and inadequate reforms of the international justice sys-
tem to the enormous difficulties in fighting corruption effectively.
This first part starts with Christine Jojarth of Stanford University, who ana-
lyzes the origins of money laundering, as well as the motives behind it and the 
methods employed. She also examines international instruments to combat mon-
ey laundering – and their aims and effectiveness – from the perspective of indus-
trialized and developing nations.
John Christensen, a Jersey-based tax expert, speaks in an interview about the 
role of tax havens, tax evasion, and the way corruption is deeply embedded in the 
international finance system.
Steffen Salvenmoser, legal expert at PricewaterhouseCoopers, offers an in-
sider’s view of the company’s operations in Germany from the time of its estab-
lishment, and comments on the role of the private sector in preventing corrupt 
practices.
Tatiana Tropina provides an introduction to the growing field of online crime, 
also called cybercrime. Her contribution includes an examination of the way cy-
berspace can become both a medium for traditional organized crime and an emi-
nent space for new forms of organized crime.
Finally, the legal expert and economist Edgardo Buscaglia describes possible 
best practices for the fight against organized crime. Taking as his basis the results 
of surveys carried out in many countries, the author analyzes the possibilities of 
transferring legal systems between countries and transforming international law 
into national law. The basic hypothesis is that legal reforms must be met with 
social approval and acceptance among the stakeholders of civil society if they are 
to be successful. Social support and monitoring must be complemented by strict 
financial controls that are able to identify and prosecute criminal economic activi-
ties.
In the second part of this book, contributions from Asia, Africa, Latin Amer-
ica, and Europe offer insights into the very different regional aspects of transna-
tional organized crime, showing that, despite the diversity of local conditions and 
features, they have much in common and thus similar structures. The reasons 
for TOC gaining leeway in many regions of the world are deeply rooted in history 
and dependent on important historical moments favoring the evolution of new 
criminal structures. Detailed and well-described case studies allow readers from 
different backgrounds to understand thoroughly abstract terms describing trans-
national organized crime. We provide a kaleidoscope of vivid examples of the role 
1 | See list with author’s profiles and contact details in the back of the book.
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and deep-rootedness of organized crime in many societies of our world and make 
the case driven by that all these stories are connected by powerful processes of 
social transformation, invisible global economic flows and accompanying cross-
effects.
Florian Kühn, Christoph Reuter, and Yama Torabi report from Afghanistan. 
With different methodological approaches, the political scientist Florian Kühn 
and the journalist Christoph Reuter consider the impact of the transformation of 
the Afghan state and its economy under foreign influence on the structures and 
routes of organized crime and the illegal economy. Yama Torabi, who heads the 
NGO Integrity Watch Afghanistan in Kabul, describes the connection between 
poorly controlled international funding and widespread corruption, and describes 
the community-based anticorruption monitoring sponsored by the NGO to ad-
dress the situation. 
The economist Arun Kumar describes many aspects of the Indian shadow 
economy (illicit economy) and the extent to which it permeates society. He makes 
a connection to the emergence of corrupt structures under British colonial rule.
The Nigerian criminologist Etannibi Alemika describes the activities of or-
ganized crime in West Africa and places these in relation to the regional condi-
tions of poverty, weak institutions, civil conflicts, and political crises. Referring 
to empirical examples from Nigeria, the article deals with drug smuggling and 
human trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism. The author analyzes the 
effectiveness of legal and political measures, including international pressure, to 
put a stop to the organized criminal groups in the region. Charles Goredema from 
South Africa, head of the program against organized crime and money laundering 
at the Institute of Security Studies office in Cape Town, gives a fascinating insight 
into his daily work.
The contributions on Latin America are from Mexico and Brazil. The jour-
nalists José Reveles and Marco Lara Klahr deal with the impact of the growing 
presence of organized crime in Mexico. On the one hand, Reveles describes the 
official policy on combating drug trafficking and places the influence of TOC in 
the context of the socioeconomic conditions and the prospects for young people 
in the country. He also refers to the repressive policies that target social players in 
the country, under the pretext of combating the drug trade. Lara Klahr provides 
an insight into the interplay of extortion, violence, and impunity, and its impact on 
everyday life and social relations in the country. 
Ingrid Spiller, who headed the Mexico office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation 
until mid-2012, reports on the difficult paths that Mexican civil society must take 
to define its own role in the efforts to create security and justice in a weak state that 
is permeated by criminal structures.
Ignacio Cano works at the Observatory on Violence at the University of Rio de 
Janeiro. He explains in his article the different structures of organized violence in 
Brazil, especially the fluctuating illegal power structures in Rio de Janeiro, where 
local gangs – be they drug cartels or hybrid militias, all of whom are deeply in-
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volved in the drug trade in the city – work against any positive developments in 
marginal neighborhoods.
The political scientist Regine Schönenberg hearkens back to her Amazonian 
laboratory where she has been doing research for decades. In her article she de-
scribes how organized crime draws on local traditions of informality that have 
been successively criminalized by legislation, and thus can also connect to estab-
lished paternalistic loyalty structures. Due to political centralization and the sheer 
size of the region, the state is often absent and only one actor among many others, 
especially on the local level.
The state prosecutor Aurelio Rios describes in an interview the challenges in 
the proactive struggle of his institution for dialogue and civil rights in Brazil.
From the practitioner’s perspective, Wolfgang Hees shows alternatives to 
strong-arm policies on the local level, which usually go hand in hand with the 
criminalization of drug users, by giving examples for the reconstruction of local 
social structures.
We have two contributions from the Balkans: The political scientist Berit 
Bliesemann de Guevara explains how closely the constantly changing economic 
opportunities and the political and administrative structures are intertwined in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. She also describes the collateral damage of foreign interven-
tions.
The police officer Ivana McIlwiane reports in an interview about the routes 
and practices of organ and stem-cell trafficking in Balkan countries. In this con-
text she relates how the long-running war changed views of living without certain 
body parts, thus facilitating the spread of illegal practices in the medical sphere.
And, finally, articles concerning Italy, Germany and the European Union show 
that structures favouring the extension of organized crime are also imminent in 
Western European societies. Wolfgang Hetzer and Vincenzo Militello explore 
in their articles the political and legal views of the deficiencies of the European 
Union’s actions on TOC.
The articles by Claudio La Camera from the Museo della ndrangheta and by 
Lorenzo Bodrero, head of the FLARE organization, both from the “traditional” 
country of the Mafia – Italy – describe the opportunities and experiences con-
nected with the way the interplay between state and civil society can seriously af-
fect TOC by, for example, confiscating illegally acquired property in a targeted way 
and allocating it to other purposes. Moreover, Bodrero emphasizes the necessity of 
tackling the problem of TOC at the European level in a concerted effort.
It was important for us not to leave readers with the impression that TOC is 
something that exists only in distant and exotic parts of the world. For this reason 
the final regional contribution deals with Germany. In his detailed and critical 
description, the journalist and author Jürgen Roth gives an insight into how or-
ganized crime operates, is perceived, and is combated in Germany; moreover, he 
points out the role that Germany plays in the international – and in particular 
European – network of criminal groups.
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To guide the reading of this volume, we advise our readers to observe the in-
terwovenness between legal and illegal economic activities and the underlying 
normative conflicts regarding the legitimacy of action. It is this broader debate 
that makes TOC politically relevant.
Regine Schönenberg, Political Scientist, Free University, Berlin
Annette von Schönfeld, Head of the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s Regional Office 
for Mexico and Central America
II. Transnational Issues of Organized Crime
1. MONE Y L AUNDERING: MOTIVES, ME THODS,   
 IMPACT, AND COUNTERME ASURES
by Christine Jojarth* 
1.1 Introduction
Money laundering is big business. An estimated 2–5 percent of global gross do-
mestic product – corresponding to $1.3–3.2 trillion in 2010 (Camdessus 1998; 
World Bank 20111) – are being laundered annually. Demand for money launder-
ing is driven by the need to create a false legitimate appearance for funds that are 
tainted by their illegal origin or indented purpose. All sorts of underworld figures, 
such as drug traffickers, tax evaders, corrupt officials, and terrorists, feel this need 
out of fear that their money trail will lead to detection and confiscation.
To obfuscate their transactions, money launderers use an ever-widening range 
of methods to first conceal dirty money, then to convert it into other forms of as-
sets, and finally to integrate the funds into the licit economy. 
The threats posed by money laundering are just as diverse as the people and 
organizations engaging in it and the methods used. The most immediate threat 
is the undermining of efforts to combat crime and terrorism with negative con-
sequences for a country’s security and political stability. More indirect, but by no 
means less severe, is the threat money laundering poses to economic development 
as a result of its distorting effect on investment decisions and competition.
It was only in the late 1980s that policy makers started to become aware of 
these threats and to discover the importance of “follow the money” and confisca-
tion as a policing and a crime deterrence strategy. The United States was the first 
country to criminalize money laundering and the initiator of the internationaliza-
1 | The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes estimates that around $1.6 trillion, or 
2.7 percent of global GDP, was laundered in 2009 (UNODC 2011).
* Christine Jojar th teaches at Stanford University, USA, and is an expert on transnational 
organized crime.
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tion of these norms. Other Western nations followed suit and adopted a series of 
anti-money laundering measures that spread rapidly around the globe. The under-
lying institutional approach represented a novel way to foster international coop-
eration in terms of the type of actors involved, the legal form chosen for codifying 
the norms, and its treatment of state sovereignty.
The motives, methods, impact, and countermeasures related to money laun-
dering will all be discussed in turn in this chapter. The goal is to provide an over-
view2 of these four central aspects of money laundering and to build a foundation 
for the other chapters in this part of the book.
1.2 Motives
While the legal concept and criminalization of money laundering is a fairly recent 
invention, the motives for engaging in this practice date back a long time. 
Throughout history, people deployed a variety of tactics to ensure that enjoy-
ing the proceeds from their criminal activities would not lead to prosecution and 
the confiscation of their assets. A villager who had stolen his neighbor’s cow most 
likely did not keep it. Instead, he led it out of the village to sell it or to exchange it 
for some other livestock in order to disassociate himself from the theft. He might 
even have felt the necessity to fabricate a story about an unexpected inheritance 
to create a seemingly legitimate rationale for the sudden increase in his wealth. 
Back then, as much as today, the extent to which criminals feel a need to de-
ploy techniques to conceal their loot, to convert it into other forms of assets, and 
to create a legitimate appearance depends directly on the extent to which they face 
a real risk of detection and sanctions by law enforcement officials or by their com-
munity. In the absence of criminalization and effective sanctions, money launder-
ing is nonexistent, simply because criminals feel no need to turn on the “washing 
machine” when they know that they can enjoy their loot with impunity.3
Over the past decades, a widening range of practices have been outlawed and 
moved toward the top of law enforcement priorities. This development led to an 
increase in the diversity of individuals and organizations that resort to money 
laundering as a means to evade these control efforts.4 Initially, money laundering 
was most relevant to networks engaged in blue-collar crime – in particular drug 
2 | For a more in-depth discussion see Jojar th (2009).
3 | Guatemala’s President, Otto Pérez Molina, is thus correct when arguing that by decrim-
inalizing drug trafficking, one would largely get rid of money laundering (Economist 2012).
4 | Another reason for this increase is of purely definitorial nature. Money laundering is a 
derivate crime, that is, it is predicated on other criminal endeavors. The list of predicate of-
fenses for money laundering has expanded significantly over the past two decades so that 
today, the crime of money laundering is associated with most serious offenses.
1. Money Laundering: Motives, Methods, Impact, and Countermeasures 19
traffickers5 – as they were in the spotlight of law enforcement. In the context of 
this book, the most important “newcomers” to the money laundering scene were 
corrupt government officials, sanction busters, and terrorists.
In the 1990s, international corruption gained significantly in salience. Cor-
ruption scandals like those involving the former Philippine President Ferdinand 
E. Marcos6 or Nigeria’s former military ruler Sani Abacha7 propelled Western lead-
ers into action. They established national and international8 regulations, making 
it considerably harder for companies to bribe foreign officials. Until then, many 
Western companies had openly declared how much they had paid in “facilitation 
fees” to win overseas contracts, as such payments were not only deemed legal 
in their home countries but often even made tax deductible.9 The introduction 
of these new regulations forced companies to either compete fairly or to turn to 
techniques to conceal the flow of bribes. Similarly, corrupt government officials 
started to engage in money laundering in order to reduce the risk of having their 
(overseas) assets seized.10
Sanction busters present another type of money launderers of particular rel-
evance to the democracy focus of this book. The end of the Cold War enabled 
the United Nations to agree on the imposition of economic sanctions much more 
frequently than in the past. This increase in the frequency and geographic reach 
of international sanctions strengthened the need for sanction busters to device 
schemes that would obfuscate their dealings with a quarantined state or group 
and thereby boosted the demand for money laundering. The trend toward smart 
sanctions, and in particular targeted financial sanctions, has accentuated the 
5 | In fact, the legal concept of money laundering was initially exclusively tied to gains 
from the illicit drugs business. See United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Nar-
cotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (Article 3 paragraph 1) or FATF (1990). 
Over the past two decades, the list of so-called predicate offenses for money laundering 
has been – and continues to be – expanded with the effect that it now encompasses most 
categories of serious offenses. See Interpretative Notes to Recommendation 3 of the FATF 
Recommendations of 2012.
6 | Marcos and his associates are alleged to have illicitly accumulated an estimated $5–
$10 billion through a variety of corrupt schemes (World Bank 2010).
7 | Abacha, together with his family and accomplices, allegedly siphoned off $4 billion 
from his poor country (Olson 2002).
8 | For example, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention of 1997; United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000; United Nations Convention against Cor-
ruption of 2005.
9 | For example, Germany only barred this practice in 1997, in response to the OECD’s 
1996 Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials.
10 | For a recent example of an overseas asset freeze involving an allegedly corrupt of-
ficial, see Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, a son and likely successor of Equatorial Guin-
ea’s incumbent President (BBC 2012; Silverstein 2011). 
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importance of money laundering further (Cortright et al. 2002). For example, 
Swiss authorities accuse associates of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad of trying 
to launder the more than $50 millions Syria’s first family holds in Switzerland in 
an attempt to circumvent international sanctions and the freezing of their assets 
(NZZ 2012).11 
Already before – and with an even greater sense of urgency after – the terror-
ist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and many other countries and 
international organizations increased their efforts to disrupt the flow of money to 
terrorist organizations.12 Within the same month of the attacks, the United Na-
tions Security Council adopted resolution 1373, which requires all member states 
to freeze funds and assets controlled by people or entities with links to terrorism.13 
This and other initiatives targeting terrorists’ soft financial belly made money 
laundering14 essential for terrorists to continue their operations.
In sum, every individual or organization – including criminals, corrupt gov-
ernment officials, sanction busters, and terrorists– with a reason to fear detection 
and forfeiture has a motive to engage in money laundering. The broader the scope 
of criminalization and the stronger the law enforcement offensive, the harder 
these wrongdoers will try to launder their assets.
1.3 Methods
Penal codes and law enforcement efforts determine the categories of individu-
als and organizations that will resort to money laundering and the intensity with 
which they will do so, as discussed in the previous section. In addition, policing 
strategies also shape the methods criminals will deploy in order to evade detection 
and forfeiture. Not unlike air in a balloon, money laundering adjusts to those 
areas with the lowest pressure. When policing initially focused on the banking 
sector, money launderers shifted to the insurance industry. When anti-money 
laundering (AML) efforts were broadened to include the insurance sector, crimi-
11 | The overwhelming majority of the $1.5 bn Bashar al-Assad has allegedly amassed 
for his family and his close associates is kept in countries that have not adopted economic 
sanctions against his regime, notably Russia and China (Inman 2012).
12 | For example, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism of December 1999 (entered into force on April 2002); Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
Patriot Act) of October 2001.
13 | United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, Paragraph 
1(c).
14 | Nb., in contrast to most other money launderers, terrorists resort to money laundering 
primarily in an effor t to conceal the intended illegitimate purpose of their assets while the 
origin of those assets is often legitimate, for example, donations to charitable organiza-
tions (Greenberg 2002; Naím 2005; United States General Accounting Office 2003).
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nals intensified laundering operations in real estate. The cat-and-mouse game 
continues, and money laundering keeps expanding into ever more sectors. In the 
process, criminals and their intermediaries have invented a myriad of different 
money laundering schemes. All these various schemes have in common that they 
seek to disassociate funds from their dirty origins (or purposes) and to create a 
false legitimate appearance through a series of transactions that are usually cat-
egorized into three distinct stages: placement, layering, and integration (cf. Za-
garis 1992). This categorization serves primarily as a heuristic tool and does not 
represent some fixed “natural law”: Not all money laundering transactions run 
through all three stages, and additional layers of complexity are sometimes added. 
These transactions are usually, but not necessarily, carried out involving a number 
of different countries.15 
During the placement stage, money launderers deposit their illicit cash into 
bank accounts, usually in the same country where the illicit profits were generat-
ed. They typically break up their funds into smaller amounts so that each individ-
ual deposit remains below the designated threshold level,16 above which financial 
institutions are required to perform customer due diligence.17 Money launderers 
will likely involve a number of trusted people and companies to make these depos-
its on their behalf over the course of some time. 
The purpose of the second stage – the layering or moving stage – is to disas-
sociate the “dirty” money from its source or intended purpose. Money launderers 
seek to achieve this through a complex series of financial transactions, such as the 
wiring of funds through a globally scattered network of bank accounts.
In the third and final stage – integration – the launderer integrates the pro-
cessed funds and inserts them into the legitimate economy. Any legal investment 
vehicle (in the broadest sense) that generates some financial return – even if that 
return is smaller than the initial investment – can serve this purpose. The harder 
it is for outsiders to verify the declared sums spent on or earned from that enter-
prise, the better suited it is for money laundering purposes.
Following are a few examples illustrating the immense diversity of schemes 
devised by creative money launderers.
In one case, an individual raised suspicion with his unusual betting strategy. 
Over a long period of time, he deployed the very same betting strategy, which, 
with a high degree of certainty, made him win relatively small sums but resulted 
in an average net loss of 7 percent. To receive his payouts, he had checks issued 
to a total of 14 different bank accounts in the names of 10 third-parties. Some of 
15 | For example, 80 percent of the money laundering operations detected in Canada 
(Beare and Schneider 1990) and 90 percent of those detected in Belgium (Stessens 2000) 
involved money that had been brought in from abroad.
16 | The FATF recommends a threshold of $/EUR 15,000 (FATF 2012a).
17 | This process of breaking up larger sums into small individual deposits is also called 
“smurfing.”
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these recipients turned out to be armed robbers or their immediate families. The 
money launderer had funneled a total of approximately $3.3 million through this 
system (FATF 2002).18 In another cases, criminals establish front companies with 
the purpose of creating a cover for the dirty origins of the money they invest in 
the enterprise. Probably the most notorious illustration of this phenomenon is the 
Mafia’s dabbling in gastronomy (e.g., “Pizza Connection” of the 1980s). More sin-
gular examples include laundering operations run through horse racing stables 
(Koppel 2012) and soccer clubs (FATF 2012b). By establishing overseas subsidiar-
ies, a front company can also launder money internationally through trade-based 
operations. It can move value across borders by over-invoicing and under-invoicing 
commodities that are imported or exported around the world, often in several iter-
ations (carousel transactions) (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2012). 
A front company officially engaged in the trade of exotic leather can, for instance, 
move drug money from the United States back to Colombia by overpaying for a 
shipment of caiman leather it received from Colombia. It would then later return 
that shipment, claiming some defect, but never receive a refund.
While by no means comprehensive,19 the discussion above provides a sampling 
of some of the most common money laundering techniques and illustrates the 
boundless creativity criminals develop to evade the ever-tightening net of anti-
money laundering regulation.
1.4 Impact
If left unchecked, money laundering can cause significant economic and political 
harm as will be discussed in this section.
1.4.1 Economic impact
The negative economic impact money laundering exerts is hard to quantify but 
can be significant.20 There are two main channels through which money launder-
ing can suppress economic growth: the weakening of crime control and the distor-
tion of market mechanisms.
First, successful money laundering operations weaken the fight against the 
offenses that generated the illicit cash or that use funds for illicit purposes. The 
policing tactic of “follow the money” to find the perpetrator is rendered ineffective 
when the money trail is successfully obfuscated through a web of complex transac-
tions. Criminals, terrorists, and corrupt government officials – among many other 
18 | See FATF (2009a) for an in-depth analysis of how casinos and the gaming sector can 
be abused for money laundering. 
19 | The FATF’s annual typologies reports provide a wide range of case studies on dif ferent 
money laundering schemes.
20 | The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that every $1 billion laun-
dered reduced overall economic growth by 0.04 to 0.06 percentage points (UNODC 2011).
1. Money Laundering: Motives, Methods, Impact, and Countermeasures 23
money launderers – remain undetected and continue to operate with impunity. As 
a result, households and businesses face increased expenses for private security. 
Jobs are lost when businesses relocate to safer places and investments are stalled. 
Tax money is squandered when public contracts are awarded to non-competitive 
– but well-greased – bids. And there are many more causal mechanisms linking 
high levels of crime with economic losses. 21
Second, money laundering can impose significant economic losses on a soci-
ety by distorting the licit economy. Money laundering undermines the effective-
ness of the market mechanism in allocating investment money to projects that 
yield the highest expected returns, and thus, on aggregate, the strongest economic 
growth. In the licit economy, investment projects compete with one another for 
capital on purely economic grounds. To generate competitive returns and to at-
tract sufficient capital, businesses face ongoing pressure to increase the efficiency 
of their operations and to move into segments with strong growth potentials. It is 
through this competitive pressure that an economy sustains growth. In contrast, 
in the shady world of money laundering the “investment grade” of competing proj-
ects is predominantly determined by non-economic factors. Dirty money is not 
invested in projects that offer the highest returns but in those with the lowest risk 
of detection and forfeiture. In exchange for reducing this sort of risk, underworld 
figures and organizations are even willing to accept a negative payback, as illus-
trated by the betting example in the previous section. The greater the risk of get-
ting caught the greater the willingness of criminals to pay for laundering services. 
The greater the obfuscation and conversion potential, the more attractive the in-
vestment project. Well-regulated and transparent sectors will be shunned in favor 
of investment targets that offer sui generis transactions with profits that are harder 
to quantify for an outsider (see section on “Methods” above). In addition to this 
inter-sector distortion of investment flows, money laundering also distorts com-
petition within the sectors that attract dirty money. Businesses that accept shady 
investments may eventually crowd out businesses that raise their capital in legal 
ways. How can a law-abiding pizzeria owner who needs to generate competitive 
returns compete with a pizzeria that can stay afloat even if it never turns a profit 
on its official gastronomic operations?
1.4.2 Political impact
In addition to economic losses, successful money laundering operations and the 
crimes and terrorist activities they allow to flourish also undermine the chances 
for democratic transition and consolidation. Three aspects are worth highlighting.
First, high levels of crime or terrorist attacks undermine a democratic gov-
ernment’s legitimacy, as citizens expect their government to provide security (cf. 
Pérez 2003–04) and conditions favorable for economic growth. Public support 
21 | For a more in-depth discussion see Pinotti’s (2012) analysis of how the Mafia’s strong 
presence in Sicily stifled the island’s economic development.
II. Transnational Issues of Organized Crime24
for democracy is further eroded when authorities misuse their offices for private 
gain. The dangerous promise of a “strong leader” unfettered by constitutional or 
parliamentary restrictions in his or her relentless fight against these evils gains 
much appeal at the expense of the democratic process. Second, money laundering 
can also pose a threat to democratic by helping to cover up financial transactions 
related to crimes that unlawfully alter the conditions for political competition – 
ranging from violations of campaign financing laws to contract killings of oppo-
nents. Third, successful money laundering undermines the effectiveness of inter-
national sanctions against dictatorial regimes and thus the prospects of military 
containment or regime change.
In sum, by obfuscating financial flows associated with a wide range of illegal 
activities money laundering allows these crimes to flourish at the expense of eco-
nomic and political development.
1.5 Countermeasures
The international coordination of the fight against money laundering and terro-
rist financing is remarkable, both in terms of the great speed with which the new 
norms were diffused around the globe and its underlying institutional approach.
Money laundering was not illegal anywhere until the mid-1980s. The United 
States was the first country that dedicated a national law exclusively to the launder-
ing of illicit proceeds (Money Laundering Control Act of 1986). From the outset, 
the US government was keen to convince other countries to follow suit. It realized 
that given the international mobility of capital a unilateral approach to combat 
money laundering was doomed to fail and risked jeopardizing the international 
competitiveness of its financial sector. These efforts first bore fruit in December 
1988 with the adoption of the Basel Statement of Principles for the Prevention of 
Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and 
– only a few days later – with the inclusion of anti-money laundering provisions 
in the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances.22 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was formed 
in the summer of 1989. Less than a year later, the Paris-based institution released 
the most important of all international agreements on money laundering: the first 
version of the so-called Forty Recommendations.23 A number of additional inter-
22 | Ar ticle 3, paragraph 1. See also the 1998 Political Declaration and the related Ac-
tion Plan (“Countering Money-Laundering”), which details the money laundering-specific 
obligations under the 1988 Convention.
23 | These recommendations were fully revised in 1996, 2003, and most recently, in 
February 2012. In October 2001, the FATF also issued the Eight (later expanded to Nine) 
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, which were incorporated into the 2012 
version of the Recommendations.
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national agreements24 on money laundering have since been created with regional 
or global reach; and a number of specialized private sector25 and governmental 
organizations26 have been established specifically to focus on this issue. 
The FATF is an intergovernmental body that functions largely as a loose policy 
forum in which government officials (typically from the finance ministry) deliber-
ate on legally non-binding measures to counter money laundering. It thus repre-
sents a prototypical example of Slaughter’s (2004) concept of “government net-
works,” which she contrasts with the “old world order” characterized by formal 
international organizations and binding international agreements negotiated by 
career diplomats of foreign ministries. The central normative document produced 
by the FATF are its Recommendations. After their first release in 1990, these Rec-
ommendations were fully revised in 1996, 2003, and most recently, in February 
2012. In October 2001, the FATF also issued the Eight (later expanded to Nine) 
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, which were incorporated into 
the 2012 version of the Recommendations. Each revision expanded the scope of 
the money laundering offense: first from only drug-related crimes to all serious 
crimes – with one recommendation specifically dedicated to high-level corruption 
– later also terrorism and terrorist financing, and, most recently, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. These revisions also brought about an expansion of 
the circle of addressees from governmental authorities to the private sector, includ-
ing financial institutions and a growing list of designated non-financial businesses 
and professions.27 The private sector is thereby assigned the main responsibility for 
preventive measures.
However, despite of their legally non-binding nature the FATF Recommen-
dations are far from toothless. Quite to the contrary – the FATF has been very 
successful in not only imposing its standards on its members but also, and most 
remarkably, on non-members. In violation of the traditional understanding of the 
sovereignty of nations, the FATF set out to monitor and sanction nations for non-
compliance with standards that they had never officially endorsed, and in the cre-
ation of which they had not been granted any official say. Most countries found the 
24 | For example, Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Con-
fiscation of the Proceeds of Crime of 1990; United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime of 2000; United Nations Convention against Corruption of 2003.
25 | For example, the Wolfsberg Group was formed in October 2000 as an association of 
12 global banks.
26 | For example, the Egmont Group was established in 1995 as an informal group of Fi-
nancial Intelligence Units to facilitate international cooperation. At present, the Egmont 
Group has 128 members (Egmont Group 2012).
27 | Namely, casinos; real estate agents; legal professionals; accountants; dealers in 
precious stones and metals; trust and company service providers.
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reputational and financial28 costs of being classified as a “Non-Cooperative Coun-
try or Territory”29 to be too high and felt compelled to subscribe to these norms 
(Sharman 2008). While highly successful in spreading the anti-money laundering 
norms, this approach earned the FATF considerable criticism for being imperial-
istic, biased against the “small fish” (Palan, Murphy, and Chavagneux 2010), and 
methodologically weak. The FATF has reacted to this criticism by strengthening 
its methodology for assessing compliance (FATF 2009b) and through the expan-
sion and diversification of its membership base. The initial 16 Western members30 
were complemented by 20 members31 from every continent. To further strengthen 
is geographic reach, the FATF grants eight so-called FATF-Style Regional Bodies 
the status of associated members.32 
1.5.1 Intended effects
The most remarkable success of the FATF is the rapid diffusion of its norms for 
anti-money laundering (AML) and the combating of the financing of terrorism 
(CFT). Only a decade after its first appearance on the international stage, the legal 
concept of money laundering was adopted by more than 130 jurisdictions (Myers 
2001). Today, the criminalization of money laundering is virtually universal, with 
more than 180 jurisdictions around the world endorsing the FATF Recommen-
dations (FATF 2012c). The extent to which the global criminalization of money 
laundering and terrorist financing has helped reduce the underlying crimes re-
mains disputed.33 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that 
maybe only 0.2 percent of global illicit financial flows are being currently seized 
and frozen (UNODC 2011). While this number is certainly low, it would be overly 
28 | Johnson (2001) finds evidence that blacklisting led indeed to financial flows to these 
countries being constricted or even severed.
29 | The practice of labeling non-compliant countries as NCCT was in place between 2000 
and 2006 and stirred up the most controversy. The FATF has since changed its monitoring 
process and terminology.
30 | The G-7 members plus the European Commission and Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
31 | Thir ty-four jurisdictions and two regional organizations (namely the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and the European Commission) (FATF 2012d).
32 | Namely the Asia/Pacific Group Against Money Laundering; the Caribbean Financial 
Action Task Force; the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group; the 
Financial Action Task Force of South America; the Inter-Governmental Action Group against 
Money Laundering (covering West Africa); the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of 
Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (covering Central and 
Eastern Europe); and most recently, the Eurasian Group in Central Asia; and the Financial 
Action Task Force for the Middle East and North Africa (FATF 2012d).
33 | For a critical discussion of the effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures in 
suppressing crime, see Levi and Reuter (2006) and Sharman (2008). 
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hasty to conclude that AML/CFT efforts are worthless. For one, measures against 
money laundering and terrorist financing may be no less cost-effective than other 
strategies to fight crime. Also, the confiscation of criminal proceeds is of symbolic 
importance, as it signals to law-abiding citizens that crime does not pay, at least 
not always (Levi and Reuter 2006). Finally, the arsenal of laws and regulations to 
fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism has proven to be useful 
in the investigation and prosecution of certain criminals and in the recovery of 
ill-gotten assets in instances where it would have been difficult to win a case oth-
erwise (Levi and Reuter 2006).
1.5.2 Unintended effects
As with any policy intervention, the drafters of AML/CFT regulation need to ana-
lyze possible direct costs34 and unintended negative side effects of their proposal, 
identify mitigation measures, and balance the remaining unmitigated effects with 
the expected benefits. The following paragraphs highlight four examples of how 
AML/CFT legislation can unintentionally harm developing nations and vulner-
able members of society.
First, the cost of establishing and maintaining a designated anti-money laun-
dering office – as required under international money laundering regulations – 
can be disproportionately high for small countries with an infant banking sector.35 
The international community acknowledged this problem in 2000 and created 
donor-supported trust funds at the IMF to finance technical assistance in the im-
plementation of AML/CFT regulation (IMF 2009).
Second, AML/CFT provisions can make it harder for marginalized people to 
access the formal banking sector. Compliance with these provisions results in 
higher administrative costs, which banks tend to pass on to customers. Further-
more, “know your customer” requirements for proper identification can present 
a serious obstacle for undocumented immigrants or people living in countries 
where identification papers are not readily available or prohibitively expensive to 
obtain for the poor.
Closely related to this second point, is a third mechanism through which 
AML/CFT regulation can harm poor people and nations by increasing the trans-
fer costs of remittances. The money immigrants send back to their families in 
their home countries constitutes an important source of income not just on the 
family level but also in terms of many nations’ overall economies. In 2011, global 
flows of remittances were estimated to amount to a staggering $372 billion, almost 
34 | Financial firms in Europe and America spent more than $5 billion on tackling mon-
ey laundering in 2003 (The Economist 2004). These costs have risen sharply since then 
(KPMG 2011). See also Levi and Reuter (2006).
35 | See Sharman and Mistry (2008) for a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits for 
three small developing nations – namely Barbados, Mauritius, and Vanuatu – from global 
AML/CF T initiatives.
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three times higher than official development assistance, contributing more than 
15 percent to the total gross domestic product of a dozen developing countries 
(World Bank 2012a). In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
international community strengthened controls over money transfers,36 realizing 
that even relatively small sums can cause unimaginable harm.37 These efforts to 
curtail the flow of funds to terrorist activities need to carefully take into account 
that even small changes in money transfer costs can have a big impact on the abil-
ity of immigrants to support their families in their poor home countries.38
Fourth, the experience of the small Pacific island nation of Nauru illustrates 
how tightened international AML/CFT regulation can dash the hopes of develop-
ing nations to establish themselves as international financial centers. Nauru’s “no 
questions asked” approach to banking had transformed the tiny island nation of 
about 10,000 people from being entirely dependent on its almost depleted phos-
phate deposits into an international financial hub. At its peak, it registered a total 
of 400 banks – virtually all without a physical presence on the island itself (“shell 
banks”) (US State Department 2002). These banks allegedly helped to launder 
about $70 billion of illicit proceeds from Russian criminals in 1998 alone (Hitt 
2000). In response to Nauru’s lacking willingness to implement tougher over-
sight of its banking sector, the Financial Action Task Force black-listed39 Nauru 
in 2000. Financial institutions in FATF member states were requested to apply 
enhanced surveillance and reporting procedures of financial transactions involv-
ing Nauru. These measures robbed Nauru of its appeal for money laundering 
and international finance in general, resulting in the bankruptcy of all its banks. 
With the depletion of its primary reserves of phosphates and the loss of its only 
alterative strategy for future income generation – banking – Nauru depends today 
almost exclusively on aid transfers from its far away neighbor Australia.40 Nauru 
represents unquestionably an extreme case. However, it illustrates how efforts to 
ensure global implementation of minimum AML standards and a level playing 
36 | The focus of particular interest became so-called alternative remittance systems or 
value transfer systems like hawala or hundi (see Cao 2004 or US State Department 2005).
37 | The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004) esti-
mated that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, cost Al Qaida a total of $400,000 
to $500,000 to execute, of which only $270,000 was spent within the United States on 
inconspicuous expenses such as lodging, flight training, and airplane tickets. The Madrid 
train bombings in 2004 cost as lit tle as $15,000 (Levi and Reuter 2006).
38 | The World Bank estimates that a reduction of five percentage points in money trans-
fer costs can save up to $16 billion annually (World Bank 2012b).
39 | The official terminology used by the Financial Action Task Force in its first assess-
ment round in 2000 and 2001 was to designate Nauru (along with 23 other nations) as one 
of the “Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories.” 
40 | The Australian government budgeted aid transfer of Aus$31.6 million to Nauru for the 
Fiscal Year 2012–13 (DFAT 2012).
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field can deprive newcomers of one of the few attractive selling propositions they 
can offer, namely light-touch regulation and ease of business.
The above discussion highlights four important mechanisms through which 
global AML/CFT efforts can unintentionally harm developing countries and mar-
ginalized members of society, and the drivers of this agenda – mainly the govern-
ments of developed nations – should take this into account.
1.6 Conclusion
Globalization – the increasing cross-border circulation of goods, funds, and people 
– offers important opportunities for economic and political development. By the 
same token, globalization offers criminals, corrupt officials, sanction busters, and 
terrorists a myriad of ways to obfuscate the trail of their dirty money and thus 
enjoy the rewards of their illicit activities or fund their terrorist cause. The chal-
lenge policymakers face is to devise mechanisms that reduce this dark side of 
globalization without unduly jeopardizing its positive aspects. On the one hand, 
prevalent money laundering keeps crime – including corruption and the violation 
of international sanctions – undetected and financially rewarding and terrorist at-
tacks and weapons proliferation funded, thereby undermining economic and po-
litical development. On the other hand, overly zealous anti-money laundering and 
anti-terrorist financing efforts risk marginalizing vulnerable members of society 
and imposing unduly high implementation and opportunity costs on developing 
nations. Efforts to control illicit financial flows face an uphill battle, as money 
launderers are highly innovative, the volume of proceeds laundered through the 
international financial system is massive, and even small sums of money can 
cause major harm in the hands of terrorists. The Financial Action Task Force can 
pride itself on driving the rapid global diffusion of regulation to combat money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism. However, the effectiveness of these 
measures in suppressing crime and terrorist activities remains disputed. Making 
headway on this front requires the closing of remaining loopholes and, a fortiori, a 
shift away from a compliance system that is too heavily focused on whether recom-
mended policies and procedures have been adopted – and instead a shift toward 
an assessment of whether the intended results of those policies and procedures 
have been achieved. 
References
General literature 
BBC. 2012. Judges seek warrant for Equatorial Guinea leader’s son. March 28. 
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17535634.
Beare, M. E., and S. Schneider. 1990. Tracing of illicit funds: Money laundering in 
Canada. Ottawa: Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada.
II. Transnational Issues of Organized Crime30
Camdessus, M. 1998. Money laundering: The importance of international counter-
measures. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/0210
98.htm.
Cortright, D., G. A. Lopez, L. Gerber, and International Peace Academy. 2002. 
Sanctions and the search for security: Challenges to UN action. Boulder: L. 
Rienner Publishers.
DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government). 2012. 
Nauru country brief. Available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/nauru/nauru_
brief.html.
Economist. 2004. Coming clean: Banks must fight money-laundering, but they need 
some help. October 14. Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/3292933.
———. 2012. Burn-out and battle fatigue: As violence soars, so do voices of dissent 
against drug prohibition. March 17. Available at: http://www.economist.com/
node/21550296.
Egmont Group. 2012. The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units: About. 
Available at: http://www.egmontgroup.org/about. 
FATF (Financial Action Task Force). 1990. The Forty Recommendations. Paris: 
FATF.
———. 2002. Report on money laundering typologies 2001–2002. Available at: 
http://www.apgml.org/frameworks/docs/5/FATF%20Typologies%20rpt%20
2001-02.pdf.
———. 2009a. Vulnerabilities of casinos and gaming sector. Available at: http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Vulnerabilities%20of%20
Casinos%20and%20Gaming%20Sector.pdf.
———. 2009b. Methodology for assessing compliance with the FATF 40 Recom-
mendations and the FATF 9 Special Recommendations. Available at: http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/methodology.pdf.
———. 2012a. International standards on combating money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism & proliferation – the FATF Recommendations. Paris: 
FATF. Available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/docu
ments/fatfrecommendations2012.html.
———. 2012b. Money laundering through the football sector. Available at: http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/name,1587,en.html.
———. 2012c. Countries. Available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/.
———. 2012d. Financial Action Task Force mandate (2012–2020). Washing-
ton, DC: FATF. Available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%202012-2020.pdf. 
Greenberg, M. R. 2002. Terrorist financing: Report of an independent task force. 
New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
Hitt, J. 2000. The billion-dollar shack. New York Times. December 10. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/10/magazine/the-billion-dollar-shack.html? 
pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
1. Money Laundering: Motives, Methods, Impact, and Countermeasures 31
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2009. Topical trust fund: Anti-money laun-
dering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). Available at: http://
www.imf.org/external/np/otm/2009/anti-money.pdf. 
Inman, P. 2012. Bashar al-Assad has amassed fortune of up to £950m, analysts 
estimate. The Guardian. July 19. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2012/jul/19/bashar-al-assad-950m-fortune.
Johnson, J. 2001. Blacklisting: Initial results, responses and repercussions. Journal 
of Money Laundering Control 4(3): 211–225.
Jojarth, C. 2009. Crime, war, and global trafficking: Designing international coop-
eration. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Koppel, N. 2012. Alleged drug cartel members arrested in raid. Wall Street Journal. 
June 12. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023039015
04577462693244370140.html. 
KPMG. 2011. Global anti-money laundering survey 2011: How banks are facing up 
to the challenge. Available at: http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndIn
sights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/anti-money-launderingv2.pdf
Levi, M., and P. Reuter. 2006. Money laundering. Crime and Justice 34: 289–375.
Myers, J. 2001. International standards and cooperation in the fight against money 
laundering. Economic Perspectives 6(2): 9–10. Available at: http://www.usem
bassy-mexico.gov/bbf/ej/ijee0501.pdf.
Naím, M. 2005. Illicit: How smugglers, traffickers, and copycats are hijacking the 
global economy. New York: Doubleday.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. The 
9/11 Commission report. Available at: http://www.9-11commission.gov/
report/911Report.pdf.
Olson, E. 2002. Nigeria to recover $1 billion from the family of a late dictator. New 
York Times. April 18. 
Palan, R., R. Murphy, and C. Chavagneux. 2010. Tax havens: How globalization 
really works. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Pérez, O. J. 2003–04. Democratic legitimacy and public insecurity: Crime and 
democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala. Political Science Quarterly 118: 4, 
627–644.
Pinotti, P. 2012. The Economic costs of organized crime: Evidence from Southern 
Italy. Rome: Bank of Italy Working paper # Number 868. April. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2057979. 
Reuter, P., and E. M. Truman. 2004. Chasing dirty money: The fight against mon-
ey laundering. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Sharman, J. C. 2008. Power and discourse in policy diffusion: Anti-money laun-
dering in developing states. International Studies Quarterly 52: 635–656.
Sharman, J. C., and P. S. Mistry. 2008. Considering the consequences: The de-
velopmental implications of initiatives on taxation, anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. 
II. Transnational Issues of Organized Crime32
Silverstein, K. 2011. Teodorin’s world. Foreign Policy (March/April). Available at: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/teodorins_world.
Slaughter, A.-M. 2004. A new world order. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Stessens, G. 2000. Money laundering: A new international law enforcement mod-
el. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2011. Estimating illicit 
financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational orga-
nized crimes. Vienna: UNODC. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
frontpage/2011/October/illicit-money_-how-much-is-out-there.html.
US General Accounting Office. 2003. Terrorist financing: U.S. agencies should 
systematically assess terrorists’ use of alternative financing mechanisms. Re-
port to Congressional Requesters (GAO-04-163). Washington, DC: US General 
Accounting Office.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2012. Trade-based money laundering. 
Available at: http://www.ice.gov/cornerstone/money-laundering.htm.
US State Department. 2002. International narcotics control strategy report. Wash-
ington, DC: US State Department. Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/
nrcrpt/2001/c6085.htm.
———. 2005. International narcotics control strategy report. Washington, DC: US 
State Department. Available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
42881.pdf. 
World Bank. 2010. Ferdinand Marcos. Available at: http://www1.worldbank.org/
finance/star_site/documents/Case_Studies_02.pdf.
———. 2011. World Development Indicators database. Available at: http://sitere
sources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf.
———. 2012a. Migration and remittances. Available at: http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/0,,contentMDK:21924020~pagePK:5105988 
~piPK:360975~theSitePK:214971,00.html.
———. 2012b. Remittance prices worldwide. Available at: http://remittancepri
ces.worldbank.org/.
Zagaris, B. 1992. Money laundering: An international control problem. In: Inter-
national handbook on drug control, ed. S. B. MacDonald and B. Zagaris. West-
port, CT and London: Greenwood Press.
1. Money Laundering: Motives, Methods, Impact, and Countermeasures 33
Legal documents
United Nations
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United Nations Convention against Corruption of 2003
United States
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) (2001)
Other
Basel Statement of Principles for the Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking 
System for the Purpose of Money Laundering (1988)
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds of Crime of 1990
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Recommen-
dation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials of 1996
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
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2. WHAT DO A TA X EVADER AND A MONE Y L AUNDERER  
 HAVE IN COMMON? THE ROLE OF SECRECY   
 IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
Interview with John Christensen, Director of Tax Justice Network
John Christensen from the island of Jersey, a tax haven – which is how he de-
scribes his home island – worked for 11 years as senior economic advisor in Jersey. 
One of the reasons why he knows so much about tax havens is that he has been 
studying this subject for his entire 35-year career.
Q: How is transnational organized crime related to the current global financial system?
Corruption and criminality are deeply embedded in the global financial system. 
The global financial system acts as a supply side for corruption and criminality; 
it encourages and facilitates these phenomena because of its secretive nature. Fi-
nancial structures that permit secret activities behind walls of non-disclosure of 
information encourage criminality.
Secrecy is the supply side of corruption and transnational organized crime. It 
would be far less easy for individuals or organizations to carry out criminal activi-
ties if they were required to disclose what they are doing in offshore companies, 
offshore trusts, offshore foundations, and in secrecy jurisdictions. I use the term 
“secrecy jurisdiction” rather than “tax haven” because what those countries are 
selling to their clients is secrecy. Why secrecy? Because within a secrecy jurisdic-
tion, it’s very easy not to disclose who they are, what they do, and with whom they 
work. Behind the offshore system, transnational criminal organizations can carry 
out a wide range of criminal and corrupted activities with little fear of investiga-
tion or prosecution. 
Jurisdictions like Switzerland, Jersey, Bermuda, and Cayman Islands guaran-
tee effective secrecy.
These days capital can move across borders without impediment; this includes 
capital from any kind of illegal actives, like drug trafficking, insider trading, cor-
ruption. It’s very easy to move money arising from criminal activities and hide it 
behind secrecy and offshore structures. Globalization has created what I describe 
as a “criminogenic environment,” which encourages criminal activities.
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Q: Do criminal organizations and private investors who want to avoid taxes use the 
same tools?
The tools used for money laundering are exactly the same tools used for tax eva-
sion and similar economic crimes and practices. These tools involve creating elab-
orate structures, which guarantee in almost all circumstances to inhibit or prevent 
effective investigation and prosecution.
In the global illicit economy, laundering money is typically organized through 
secrecy jurisdictions. This suits criminals very well, for two reasons: First crimi-
nals like the guarantee of impunity from prosecution, and they want to be confi-
dent that their profits are secure. Therefore, criminals use offshore companies, 
offshore foundations, and trusts – all tools used also in the commercial world. 
Criminals are helped by prominent law firms, major banks, and accountants, all 
of which are very happy to manage their money through these structures, though 
they don’t want to directly handle narcotics or arms trafficking.
In conclusion, we can say that, yes, criminals are using the same tools and 
secrecy jurisdictions used by major multinational companies to avoid taxes.
Q: So, tax evasion is part and parcel of money laundering?
The good news is that tax evasion is becoming a predicate for money laundering 
in many countries, like in the United Kingdom, which recognizes tax evasion as 
the motive for a great deal of cross-border financial flows. Tax evasion sustains 
secrecy jurisdiction systems, since tax havens make a lot of business by attract-
ing tax evading capital. Many lawyers, bankers, and accountants agree to support 
tax evasion: By making tax evasion a predicate crime for money laundering, they 
would feel less comfortable in creating offshore structures that are used for crimi-
nal purposes.
This solution would be appropriate, but in order to really tackle the supply side, 
we have to mount campaigns to tackle the lack of transparency in the global finan-
cial markets and not only banking secrecy. Secrecy is protected under national 
laws – as with banking secrecy in Luxembourg, Austria, and Switzerland – or 
through secretive trusts created under Common Law. By deepening transparency 
and creating a much less secret environment, we can tackle this problem.
Q: Is it more urgent to tackle the phenomenon at a national or at an international level?
It is not a question of either/or – action is needed at both levels. There is a lot that 
can be done at a national level. Australia, for instance, has set up combined op-
erations that involve not just tax authorities, but also the police, judiciary, secret 
services, and intelligence services, because they recognize that the culture of tax 
evasion seriously degrades tax compliance and is a threat to democracy.
But tax evasion is an international phenomenon, so there is a need for global 
standards of information-sharing across borders. There are already a few exam-
ples: The EU is applying a directive that allows automatic exchange of tax informa-
tion across the Union. It’s not a perfect system, but it’s already a beginning, and 
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this is a work in progress. Africa, Latin America, and Asia should consider adopt-
ing automatic information exchange as their preferred standard for tackling tax 
evasion. We consider the standards promoted by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development far too weak and ineffective. We need to move be-
yond the OECD, which is effectively a rich man’s club, and we need to involve the 
UN in pushing these standards.
Q: But how can one deal with corrupted governments and the lack of political will to 
make reforms?
This is an amazing challenge. It is the challenge they gave me when they appoint-
ed me as director of the Tax Justice Network in 2003 to create a global campaign 
of almost unprecedented scale to generate public awareness and momentum to 
counter the huge political lobbying power of the tax haven complex. There are 
too many countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Austria, and 
the United States, that have an interest in keeping the status quo because they 
are themselves secrecy jurisdictions and receive huge inward flows of capital as a 
result of providing this secrecy.
Q: What is the role of civil society in this?
There are many tools we can use – boycotting is one of them and can be very effec-
tive. In my early life, I campaigned against the apartheid movement in South Af-
rica, boycotted companies supporting the apartheid system, and protested against 
apartheid. Boycotts were effective, but “naming and shaming” also works very well. 
There’s a whole variety of tactics that can be used: I’ve been very much involved 
in the Occupy movement. There is no question that this movement has opened 
up debates that senior politicians and powerful companies certainly didn’t want 
to have opened up. It’s been very successful in doing that. Taking to the streets in 
mass mobilization is very important. The Tax Justice Network is already involved 
in public awareness-raising programs – with the publication of books, through 
online media – in order to raise public interest and build political momentum.
Q: Is there much social awareness of this issue in Africa?
Because of the extremely high importance of exporting minerals and agriculture 
products, Africa is particularly prone to illicit financial flows and tax evasion.
The Tax Justice Network is present throughout sub-Saharan Africa. There is 
a well-established secretariat in Kenya. Public awareness is rising and there’s still 
a long way to go, but it’s a good starting point. Shaping tax policies that promote 
sustainable and equitable growth is probably the most important political task 
facing African leaders in the coming years.
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Q: In “Treasure Islands”1, it is mentioned that Ghana was on the way to becoming a tax 
haven. Can you give us more information about that?
Ghana is a good news story in so far as the plans to create an offshore financial 
center in Accra have been put on hold. The bad news, however, is that Kenya and 
Rwanda are exploring the possibility of moving in that direction. The impetus fre-
quently comes from banks, law firms, accounting firms, and multinational com-
panies, which use offshore centers to avoid taxes. For the bankers, lawyers, and 
accountants, there are huge fees to be earned from supporting tax dodging, so this 
is a very tempting and contagious activity. Botswana already has an established 
offshore financial center and Mauritius has emerged as a key secrecy jurisdiction 
in the southern hemisphere.
Q: How is the population of a tax haven affected?
We should avoid generalizing on this question. I can talk about my experience 
in Jersey, which is where I grew up and practiced professionally for many years. 
When I decided to investigate tax havens, this was an obvious starting point. I 
spent 12 years – from 1986 to 1998 – working in Jersey to investigate how a tax 
haven works from the inside.
For a small island like Jersey, hosting a large and sophisticated offshore bank-
ing sector involves huge risks because it is dealing with very dynamic and power-
ful companies that can rapidly capture political processes and use that captive state 
to push for low taxes and lax regulations. At the same time, the dynamic growth of 
the banks, law firms, etc., “crowds out” the other industries by pushing up prop-
erty prices and labor market costs, which makes the local government even more 
dependent on the tax haven activity. In many respects, this process of political 
capture is similar to the “resource curse” that afflicts mineral exporting countries, 
which is why we talk about tax havens suffering from the “finance curse.”
Jersey is an interesting case study, but the City of London shows similar fea-
tures of the “finance curse.” This is particularly dangerous not only for Britain, 
but for the rest of the world, because the City is stimulating a race to the bot-
tom in terms of both regulation and taxes, which is undermining other countries. 
Sadly the G-20 countries haven’t recognized the severity of this problem, and the 
measures they’ve taken against tax havens since 2009 just don’t go far enough to 
tackle the problem.
As far as the local population is concerned, most people in Jersey don’t see 
the big picture of how the island’s role as a tax haven impacts on other countries. 
Sadly, in many cases they don’t want to see the complete picture, and there’s a lot 
of media propaganda about how tax havens stimulate economic growth and create 
jobs when in fact they do the exact opposite.
1 | Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure islands – Tax havens and the men who stole the world, 
2011.
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Q: What is the situation in South Africa?
South Africa has weaknesses in its disclosure regime, for example relating to 
trusts and offshore companies, which support tax evaders. But at the same time, 
the scale of mineral production and exporting makes South Africa prone to illicit 
financial outflows. As a G-20 country, South Africa has an important part to play 
in shaping new policies to tackle tax havens, for example pushing for automatic 
information exchange as the international standard for tackling tax evasion, and 
a country-by-country financial reporting standard for transnational companies. 
Cape Town, March 14, 2012
Verena Zoppei2
2 | Verena Zoppei is a PhD student at the Law faculties of the University of Milan and Hum-
boldt-Universität zu Berlin.

3. “PEOPLE SHOULD NOT BE PUNISHED FOR BEING HONEST!”
Interview with Steffen Salvenmoser, 
Forensic Services of PricewaterhouseCoopers,1 Frankfurt am Main
Q: Would you describe briefly your portfolio and the typical profile of your clients?
The portfolio of our services ranges from fraud investigation to all kinds of an-
ticorruption policies. These include preventive compliance services, compliance 
reviews, the setting up of codes of conduct, guidelines for employees, whistle-
blowing hotlines, and the implementation of rules. Rules will only be followed if 
people know there is a risk that non-compliance will be detected and sanctioned. 
Q: When was the PWC “forensic services” division established – including compliance 
services, fraud risk-management, and the above-mentioned services?
In Germany the current labeling of services using this name was adopted in 1999. 
In the Anglo-Saxon countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, 
these services have been in effect for at least 20 years. But if you go back, PWC 
always offered such services: In Germany the first Statement of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (IDW – Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer) covering the is-
sue was published in 1934 under the title Ordnungsgemäße Durchführung von Un-
terschlagungsprüfungen (How to properly lead a fraud investigation). So, it is not 
totally new that auditors deal with those issues – but naming them “compliance 
services” dates back 10 to 20 years. Austria, for example, only introduced them 
five years ago.
Q: What is the typical profile of your clients? And are they more interested in dealing 
with difficulties inside their companies affecting their company culture, or, for instance, 
dealing with foreign businesses in countries that are not very transparent?
We advise all kinds of companies and even the public sector is requesting such 
services. This is mainly due to the initiative of the respective boards or supervisory 
boards – depending on the relevant jurisdiction under which the company oper-
ates. Obviously, it is more the case for larger entities, although lately it is becoming 
more relevant for smaller companies. For the markets that I am working in – 
1 | See http://www/pwc.de
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mainly Germany and Austria, but it is probably the same in Western Europe – the 
emphasis is on external affairs. In respect of prevention of corruption, the worries 
are focused on risks abroad. In terms of internal misconduct like embezzlement, 
the focus is more on the home turf, the home country, the head office, and com-
pany structures abroad. This is a bit surprising if you consider the corruption per-
ception index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI): Most companies should 
observe the risk of corruption in their own country, but they want to see the risks 
as existing abroad rather than accepting that the risk is probably almost equally 
present in their home country. 
It’s a kind of “blind spot” effect, with people assuming that the risks are high 
in foreign countries, where bribery and fraud are thought to be common. But if 
we look at the information from TI showing how high the risk of corruption is in 
Western Europe, we have to recognize that the risk is not always by the “others” 
– and that we must look to ourselves, too. A lot of companies worry a great deal 
about the damage originating from outside, from third parties, suppliers, etc. But 
we know from research – and the figures have been steady for a long time – that 
50 percent of economic crimes originate internally, within the company. That’s a 
fact that is often ignored, for understandable reasons, but it is one that we must 
face up to.
Q: You participated in various studies on economic crime in Germany. Which are the 
most common and which are the most destructive features of organized crime in Ger-
many? How about the interconnections of transnational crime networks?
I think that’s one of those questions I can’t really answer because the studies don’t 
really cover the issue of organized crime. It depends on how you define it. If you’re 
talking about the classical definition of organized crime, then the usual kind of 
economic crime is well-organized crime, but not organized crime in the police 
sense.
Q: And if we take the definition given by Cartier-Bresson (1997) of crime networks – 
that is, the seamless transition from legal to illegal systems of social exchange?
Of course, there is a lot I could say about it according to that definition. Some of the 
cases where we helped larger clients would fit into that definition. It is not possible 
to identify such structures in the studies, which are mainly quantitative. So it is 
still difficult to judge how representative our operative experiences are.
A debate we could have every day is the one about how far economic resource-
fulness goes before it becomes criminal – and when does crime become orga-
nized, in the sense of companies consciously choosing it as a business model.
The study we published at the end of 2011 includes some figures on this. We 
asked companies that were victims of economic crime what the causative factors 
were. There were two responses that were shocking: More than 50 percent said 
that the practices in question were part of the other company’s business model 
and that they were supported by management. That’s a pretty clear indication that 
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efforts to get the compliance message across have not been successful everywhere. 
Cases where employees act on their own initiative due to a misunderstanding of 
what is good for the company are less frequent than is generally assumed. Rather, 
these illegal practices are actually part of company policy. Corporate culture is a 
very important aspect here. 
Q: What is quite intriguing is the connection between society’s tolerance of criminal 
practices and the leeway criminal networks enjoy. Talking about Germany, do you think 
economic crime has become more acceptable over the past 10 years? If so, why?
I don’t believe the situation has deteriorated seriously over that time period. There 
are various reasons for that. The legal framework has changed. Things that were 
legal 10–15 years ago – such as paying bribes abroad, for example, which were even 
tax-deductible until 1999 – are now punishable under the law. Things that were 
common practice and legal for more than 100 years have been changed with the 
stroke of a pen. It takes a while for people to understand the fact that something 
that used to be legal and was seen as a legitimate practice is now against the law. 
Social attitudes have also changed rapidly. Things that no one would have treated 
as a problem or as corrupt or questionable 15 years ago are now suspected of being 
a crime – no matter whether a regulation has actually been broken or not.
To judge by the newspapers, there would appear to have been an increase in 
these kinds of crimes. We see reports every day about people lining their own 
pockets or about the crazy bonuses that executives are being paid. But not ev-
erything that civil society sees as scandalous falls into the category of economic 
crime. At least, as long as we concentrate on the question whether a law was bro-
ken or not.
Taking into account the increased level of awareness in society and the in-
creased reporting on things that, only recently, were not considered newsworthy, 
we see that we are at about the same level as 10–15 years ago. 
Q: Globalization resulted in legal loopholes regarding international trade, which is be-
ing mediated, in the better cases, by international arbitrage firms and, in the worse 
cases, by transnational crime networks. Two questions: Do you think those gaps are 
inherent to the system? And, as a consulting company, which instruments do you utilize 
to prevent criminal involvement to help your clients?
Let me answer the second question first: A consulting company is dependent on 
what its client actually wants. Is this someone who does not want to exploit every 
option because of moral concerns, or is it someone who sees anything that is not 
expressly forbidden in writing as allowable and therefore open to exploitation? A 
consultant can also choose to espouse one or the other of these schools of thought. 
I, or rather we, always raise a finger and say that although something is not ex-
pressly forbidden, from a business point of view it would be better to leave well 
enough alone because of its potentially damaging effect on the client’s reputation. 
If I think about our daily work as consultants, there are things that are not ille-
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gal and so not forbidden under anti-corruption law, but we advise clients to avoid 
them because they are difficult to explain to the public and can cause outrage.
One example is the case of the “pleasure trips” at the ERGO insurance com-
pany. I am in a position to talk about them even though I have been an adviser to 
ERGO – in this case, as ERGO itself published our findings. The fact that sales 
personnel were invited to a spa in Budapest where, it is beyond doubt, prostitutes 
were provided, does not constitute a crime in any way. The trips were properly 
described in the tax documentation – the necessary tax was paid on the non-cash 
benefits for the participants. And so you could say, everything was fine from a le-
gal point of view. The CEO of ERGO said in a news conference that there was noth-
ing wrong with the trips in the eyes of the law, but they did break the company’s 
code of conduct and were simply unacceptable.
A consultant can work toward such a statement, but he can also support the 
exploitation of such legal loopholes. When it comes down to it, all employees are 
judged according to whether they meet their sales targets or the business targets 
of the company they work for. If an employee were to say “We didn’t reach our 
business targets but our morals are impeccable,” then you have to ask yourself 
whether that is something that the company’s investors, which could include any 
one of us, want to hear.
This raises the important question of how we can incentivize moral behavior. 
This is a debate that is only just getting underway in Germany. We are gradually 
realizing that it is not enough simply to have a code of conduct that says something 
like “We don’t support corruption,” and then to tell employees to go and keep sell-
ing, because the salespeople will go to countries that are low on the CPI list and 
where there is absolutely no way of doing business without paying bribes. So, if 
some of these salespeople come home at the end of the year and say they did not 
reach their sales target because they complied with the guideline that forbids pay-
ing bribes, they should not be disadvantaged. However, companies where that is 
implemented are few and far between. People should not be punished for being 
honest! 
It is easy to take the moral high ground when you are doing well financially. 
Yet, when a company is facing bankruptcy, it will be interested in exploiting all le-
gal and all thinkable loopholes. I don’t know how far personal integrity will stretch 
in such a crisis situation. And how can I criticize a company that has identified 
business opportunities to do with a legal loophole when we live in a world that is 
based on market principles? What are the sources of development and change? 
Someone tries something, and that results in a legislative response according to 
the positive or negative reaction of society. This is the way legal loopholes that have 
developed in the past are closed. In an ever more interconnected and globalized 
economy, different regulatory systems are in competition – and lack the necessary 
corrective force. And that’s why it is so difficult to come to a global consensus.
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Q: Which further governmental and non-governmental actors and instruments would 
be important to prevent economic crime?
That depends on the cultural context. In the case of central Europe or Germany, 
we have initiatives that come from civil society: Transparency International is a 
good example. Collective actions like the UN Global Compact also offer opportu-
nities for companies and other social groups to get involved. TI has just published 
its national integrity report, for which I was on the advisory council. It is based 
on a survey of 27 European countries. One question, for example, was, “To what 
extent do companies strive to put in place measures to deal with corruption?” and 
“Which measures originate explicitly from companies?” In Germany there are no 
major company initiatives. There are some companies that are involved with TI 
and others are involved in collective actions, etc. However, Germany does have a 
legal framework for combating corruption, so there is less cause for criticism than 
in other countries in the study. But there remains a question about what is actually 
being compared here. Should Germany receive a negative evaluation because of 
the lack of civil society initiatives, even when other countries do not have a legal 
framework comparable to the one in Germany?
Of course, there are a couple of critical issues in this country, too. Germany 
has not yet ratified the UN Convention against Corruption, because the issue of 
bribes to members of parliament is not regulated. But no one can blame commer-
cial companies for that. 
It is very embarrassing for Germany, especially in view of the fact that the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit is involved in projects 
abroad aimed at promoting the implementation of the Convention against Cor-
ruption.
Q: Are there any moves in Germany to implement that Convention?
There are now two initiatives in the German parliament, the Bundestag, to in-
troduce new regulation on the issue of bribes paid to members of parliament, 
which would fulfill the requirements for ratification of the Convention. The gov-
ernment’s attitude to all matters concerning the regulation of members’ rights is 
that such initiatives can only be raised by parliament itself. That has to do with 
the constitutional basis of democracy in our country and with the separation of 
executive and legislative powers.
In this respect it is interesting to note that Austria has ratified the Convention, 
although its regulations dealing with bribes paid to parliamentarians is almost 
identical, word-for-word, to ours in Germany. So Germany is exposing itself to 
criticism here, but that is because it is being open and honest and saying it cannot 
yet ratify the Convention because it has not yet implemented its provisions.
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In a world organized according to the principles of the market, is it realistic to ex-
pect companies to miss business opportunities because of moral considerations? 
Probably not, since such qualms would obstruct the pursuit of profit. On this is-
sue, individuals must decide for themselves how far they are prepared to go. On a 
few occasions clients approached us and wanted advice on how to pay bribes with-
out being caught, or they wanted help in identifying legal gray areas. I don’t accept 
such commissions. My advice is always to keep a safe distance from the limits of 
legality so you can always be assured of being on the right side of the law, even 
when the issue is a matter of legal interpretation. It is not a good idea to exhaust 
every last possibility because that can be very damaging to a company’s reputation 
– you can easily go too far, and the cost of dealing with the resulting problems can 
be very high. But not everyone agrees with me. There are people who believe that 
any business opportunity that exists should be exploited.
You may consider that morally reprehensible – arms-dealing is an example: 
As long as no law is broken, arms-trading is permitted. As a moral individual, 
you can decide not to be involved in it, because arms can be abused, used to kill 
people, etc. So the consensus in society and the letter of the law may be at odds 
here. Sometimes a similar tension exists because the consensus in society is that 
a given law may be broken – for example regarding honesty in dealings with the 
tax authorities.
Conclusion
Tax evasion is accepted by social consensus. How often do tradesmen ask whether 
we require an invoice? Almost always! If such companies can only survive by evad-
ing taxes, the situation is not one that warrants protection and the legal framework 
must be revised. There is always a certain amount of understanding for the “little 
fish,” but the “fat cats” are often condemned even when they avoid paying taxes 
by ostensibly legal means. I have worked as a civil servant for so long that I find it 
difficult to judge these two identical cases by different standards.
May 31, 2012 
Regine Schönenberg 
4. ORGANIZED CRIME IN C YBERSPACE 
by Tatiana Tropina
Introduction
The growing importance of information and communication technologies in all 
facets of business and everyday life has dramatically changed our way of living. 
With its anonymity, ease of use, communication speed, and the possibility to share 
information across borders and reach a large audience, the Internet has become 
a key enabler both for legitimate users and for those who wish to exploit all the 
benefits of global information networks to commit crimes. 
The problem of cybercrime is clearly evident and is now one of the biggest 
international concerns. However, while the number of crimes committed in 
cyberspace is constantly growing and criminal activities are becoming more 
sophisticated, the combination of a lack of reliable sources of information, the 
international character of cybercrime, and continually evolving tools used by cy-
bercriminals makes it difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the “dark side” of 
the information networks. In this regard, one of the ongoing debates is whether 
cybercriminality can be attributed to organized criminal groups. Though there 
are some clear indications that organized crime groups are getting increasingly 
involved in cybercrime (Commission of the European Committees 2007, 1), it is 
still not clear to what extent online crime is organized (BAE Systems Detica 2012, 
1). Do organized crime groups use the Internet to facilitate crimes in the same 
way that they use any technologies, such as mobile phones or, earlier, the tele-
graph? Or does cyberspace create a new form of organized crime with new types 
of structures and interactions between members as well as new business models 
and criminal supply chains? Does the international community face a new and 
evolving form of criminality in global information networks? 
This article examines the issue of the possible transformation of cybercrime 
into a global, fast-expanding, profit-driven illegal industry with a new form of 
organized criminal groups thriving behind it. Firstly, the paper provides some 
insights into the debate around cyberspace being either a medium for traditional 
* Tatiana Tropina works at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal 
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organized crime or a perfect environment for the creation of a new form of or-
ganized crime. Then it analyzes the structure of the online criminal groups and 
defines the business models used by those operating in the underground economy 
in cyberspace. Finally, the article identifies the possible future trends of organized 
crime in cyberspace and the problems of tackling this phenomenon.  
1. Organized crime and cyberspace: A new medium or a new form? 
It is already evident that the current era of cybercrime is no longer dominated 
by young “computer geeks” committing attacks and stealing data just for fun as 
demonstrations of their technical skills or for peer recognition (BAE Systems De-
tica 2012, 5; POST 2006, 2). The development of the digital economy and the 
increasing dependence of many financial services on the information networks 
has changed dramatically both the criminal landscape and the motivation of of-
fenders. High rewards combined with low risks have made digital networks an 
attractive environment for various types of profit-driven criminals, who, accord-
ing to some research, might shape the new form of organized criminal networks 
(Ben-Itzhak 2008; BAE Systems Detica 2012; Rush et al. 2009; KPMG 2011, 5; 
Council of Europe 2004). 
There is an ongoing discussion about how organized crime groups can – and 
already – use global information networks. The main assumption that initiated 
this discussion was that, in the non-digital era, organized crime sought “safe ha-
vens” offered by countries with weak governments and unstable political regimes 
(Williams 2002, 2). With the possibility to commit cybercrimes across national 
borders and without needing to be physically present at the crime scene, organized 
crime groups can benefit from national jurisdictions that do not have proper legal 
frameworks nor the technical capabilities to fight cybercrime (Williams 2002, 2; 
Rush 2009, 3; Goodman 2010). 
Though it is obvious that traditional organized crime and terrorist groups can 
gain significant advantages from the use of information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) (Shelley 2003, 307; Williams 2002, 2) and “safe haven” ju-
risdictions, the discussion revolves around the question of whether cybercrime 
can be ascribed to organized crime. This debate is characterized by McCusker 
(McCusker 2006, 257) as a tension between logic and pragmatism, where logic 
postulates that traditional organized crime will engage in criminal activities in 
cyberspace as they would in any low-risk and high-reward illegal business in the 
physical world; pragmatism, in turn, questions the necessity for traditional orga-
nized crime to step into this area and its capacity to secure a return on investment 
and to produce the desired financial benefits.  
A decade ago Williams (2002, 1) suggested that although there was growing 
evidence that organized crime groups use the Internet, organized crime and cy-
bercrime would never be synonymous because organized crime will continue to 
operate offline, and most of the cybercrimes will be committed by individuals 
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rather than criminal organizations. Brenner (2002, 25) highlighted the same fact 
of not having an indication that online crime was reaching the gang level of orga-
nization. During the past 10 years, the criminal landscape has changed dramati-
cally, but there is still no clear concept of the synergy between organized crime 
and cyberspace. Analytical reports now produced by security companies reveal 
the professionalization and sophistication of cyber attacks and financial crimes 
committed in global networks, suggesting that cybercrime represents a new type 
of organized crime with different, constantly evolving structures, and new ways of 
using hi-tech tools to attain criminal goals. The scholarship research in this field 
is somewhat confusing because of the existing concept of transnational organized 
crime. It is very hard to fit cybercrime, even when committed in the traditionally 
organized way, into this concept. 
To avoid confusion in the debate on organized crime in cyberspace, it is per-
haps necessary to make a distinction between the migration of traditional orga-
nized crime to the virtual world (as well as the synergy between traditional orga-
nized crime and online crime) and the organized groups focused on committing 
cybercrimes. 
Cyberspace has already become a tool for facilitating all types of offline or-
ganized criminality, including child abuse, illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in 
human beings for sexual exploitation, illegal migration, different types of fraud, 
counterfeiting, and the firearms trade. It provides anonymity in communication; 
greater possibilities for advertisement and product placement as well as money 
laundering via online gambling; and allows for trade in virtual currencies and vir-
tual precious metals (Europol 2011, 5; Goodman 2010, 313). However, some studies 
suggest that we are entering the new era of organized crime, where the exploi-
tation of cyberspace by traditional organized crime groups coexists with a new 
phenomenon, namely, organized structures operating solely in global information 
networks (BAE Systems Detica 2012, 2; Ben-Itzhak 2008). 
It should be noted that the two afore-mentioned tendencies – organized crimi-
nality moving into cyberspace and the emergence of a new form of organized 
crime – are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they complement each other, giving 
rise to the synergy between traditional organized crime and criminal structures 
operating online. However, while the first phenomenon – namely, the use of cy-
berspace by traditional crime to facilitate its activities – has already been widely 
discussed in the academic literature, there is a lack of research concerning this 
new form of organized crime online. This article concentrates more on the latter, 
providing analysis of the structures of the new online groups and the models of 
their operation. 
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2. Underground economy in cyberspace: Model of operations
Recent studies of organized crime in the hi-tech era point out that, with the con-
vergence of offline and online worlds, the information society has arrived at a 
point where new digital crime is being organized, though it has not yet been con-
solidated (BAE Systems Detica 2012, 2; Symantec 2008). The new groups operat-
ing in cyberspace enjoy more rewarding and less risky operations and represent 
newer types of criminal networks that operate only in the area of e-crime. 
Illegal activities online, such as credit card fraud, trading compromised us-
ers’ accounts, selling banking credentials and other sensitive information, have 
given rise to the increasingly sophisticated and self-sufficient digital underground 
economy (Europol 2011, 4). Specific Internet forums and communications chan-
nels are used as underground marketplaces for the trading of illegal goods and 
services (Fallmann et al. 2010, 1). Any data traded on these shadow platforms has 
its own monetary value.1 This value represents an illicit commodity, intangible 
and easily transferrable across borders. It drives the development of illegal mar-
kets: Specific criminal activities have been developed and are being constantly 
improved to steal sensitive information (e.g., phishing, pharming, malware, tools 
to attack commercial databases). Online criminality includes a broad spectrum 
of economic activity, whereby various offenders specialize in developing specific 
goods (exploits, botnets) and services such as malicious code-writing, crimeware 
distribution, lease of networks for carrying out automated attacks or money laun-
dering (Cárdenas et al. 2009, 1; Europol 2010, 4). 
Criminals in global information networks borrow and copy business models 
from legitimate corporations. Cybercrime business models were similar to those 
of high-technology companies in the early 1990s, when digital criminality was 
still in its infancy. Since the early 2000s, cybercriminals have developed patterns 
imitating the operations of companies such as eBay, Yahoo, Google, and Amazon 
(Kshetri 2010, 190). One factor indicating the current maturation of the cyber-
crime industry is the degree of professionalization of the IT attacks, for example 
fraudulent activities such as classic phishing, which is becoming the greatest 
identity-theft threat posed to professional businesses and consumers (BSI 2011, 4). 
Another factor is the increasing specialization of perpetrators (BKA 2010), which 
means that cybercrime involves a division of labor. Other factors include the so-
1 | For example, according to Symantec (2008, 12), the advertized prices for bank ac-
count credentials ranged from $10 to $1,000, with prices depending on the amount of 
funds available, the location, and the type of account (corporate accounts might cost more 
than double the price of personal bank accounts; EU accounts are advertised at a consid-
erably higher cost than their US counterparts).
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phistication, commercialization, and integration of cybercrime2 (Grabosky 2007, 
156). 
Technological developments, research, innovation, and the transformation of 
value chains into value networks has driven the globalization of the legal sector 
and has affected the organizations, making them more decentralized and collab-
orative, with regard to external partners. In the same way, innovation has fueled 
the creation of new patterns in criminal ecosystems, with regard to product place-
ment, subcontracting, and networking (Rush et al. 2009, 37). Cybercriminals em-
ploy schemes similar to the legitimate B2B (business-to-business) models for their 
operations, such as the highly sophisticated C2C (criminal-to-criminal) models, 
which make very effective crime tools available through digital networks (Ben-
Itzhak 2008, 38). Computer systems’ vulnerabilities and software are exploited 
to create crimeware: “malware specially developed with the intention of making 
a profit and which can cause harm to the user’s financial well-being or valuable 
information” (ESET 2010a, 4). These crimeware tools such as viruses, Trojans, 
and keyloggers offer criminal groups the flexibility of controlling, stealing, and 
trading data. 
It is argued, though, that there is a difference between cybercrime business 
models and legitimate business in terms of core competencies and important 
sources: While the latter is aimed at creating the most value for customers, cyber-
crime involves defrauding prospective victims and minimizing the risk of hav-
ing illegal operations uncovered (Kshetri 2010, 189). However, if one considers 
cybercrime as a model establishing a relation between the supplier of illegal tools 
and services and the customer who uses these tools to commit the crime against 
the victim, this difference does not have much significance: Cybercrime business 
models are focused on providing the most value for the “consumers,” who are not 
the victims of crimes but of the criminals using the tools. 
Automation plays a significant role in the development of C2C models. Au-
tomation tools use technology to avoid the operational requirement for physical 
groupings and force of numbers (Europol 2011, 6). In this regard, botnets – net-
works of compromised computers running programs under external control – 
were one of the main factors in transforming some types of cybercrimes, such 
as phishing, into a worldwide underground ecosystem, run, supposedly, by orga-
nized groups (Barroso 2007, 7). With a botnet, cybercriminals can make use of 
many computers at the same time to automate attacks on private and corporate 
systems, distribute spam, host phishing websites, disseminate crimeware, launch 
denial of service attacks, and scan for system vulnerabilities: Without one, they 
must target victims and machines manually and individually (Europol 2011, 6). 
2 | Offenses subsequently lead to other offenses, for example, attacks result in informa-
tion theft, and then stolen information can be sold and used by those who bought it to 
commit fraud.
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The estimated financial gains of crime groups using botnets range from tens 
of thousands to tens of millions of dollars. The trading of botnets has also become 
a high-revenue C2C activity. Criminal organizations offer botnets for relatively 
low costs, profiting from the turnover based on the number of “customers.” For 
example, a server with stored malware, exploit kits, or botnet components costs 
anywhere from $80 to $200 a month; the botnet administration pack, known as 
the Eleonore Exploit Pack, has a value of $1,000; hiring a botnet of between 10 and 
20 computers, if administered using the pack mentioned above, costs an average 
of $40 a day; Zeus kit v1.3 costs $3,000 to $4,000 (ESET 2010b, 7). These costs are 
relatively low compared to the criminals’ financial gains. But the damage to indi-
vidual consumers and businesses, as well as to the financial health, reputations, 
and trust in online transactions as a whole is extremely high. 
Crimeware is also used to deploy Crime-as-a-Service business models that 
represent the system of trading and delivering crimeware tools. Data-supplying 
models are also used to share the tools to commit cybercrimes. For instance, by 
creating “customer” systems where instruments are available on demand, “us-
ers” just log into the server and choose from the range of tools suitable for fraud, 
phishing, and data-stealing and then download them. When user data is stolen, 
criminals can use crimeware servers to commit organized attacks. Crimeware 
servers allow for controlling compromised computers and managing the stolen 
data (Ben-Itzhak 2008, 38). 
Monetization of the intangible commodity – data – nowadays seems to be the 
main “bottleneck” for cybercrime groups. One major problem with any type of 
cash-out operation involving money mules is that there are not enough of them in 
service. Mules typically work only for a very short time before they are either aban-
doned by their handler or are captured by law enforcement. The ratio of stolen ac-
count credentials to available mule capacity could be as high as 10,000 to 1 (Cisco 
2011, 9). Money mules are typically recruited via employment search websites and 
social networking sites. Their goal is to “cash in” stolen personal and financial 
information, very often in different jurisdictions than those in which the crimes 
have been committed. The mules are the visible “face” of the organized cyber-
crime since they are particular individuals turning the data into money (Europol 
2011). Often the money is put into their personal accounts before they transfer it 
(Kshetri 2010, 177). As the cybercrime economy continues to expand, it will be in-
creasingly challenging for scammers to maintain an adequate supply of these tem-
porary “employees” to profit fully from their illegal activities. Many sophisticated 
techniques have already been developed to hire the mules, including masking the 
supposed illegal activities as legitimate services, such as help in a job search (Cisco 
2011, 9), and these techniques very likely are going to continue evolving. 
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3. Organized crime in cyberspace: Changing structure
Since cybercrime has moved away from individual, fragmented activities to the 
models that are mimicking modern corporate business (Rush et al. 2009, 42), it is 
inevitable that it has changed the structure on the operational side. The most com-
mon view on the structure of organized criminal groups is that they are formed 
by high-skilled, multi-faceted virtual criminals (UK Home Office 2010, 12). This 
is in contrast to traditional organized crime groups, which are ethnically homo-
geneous, formally and hierarchically structured, multi-functional, bureaucratic 
criminal organizations (Council of Europe 2004, 2). These networks mark “the 
cleanest break to date from the traditional concept of Organized Crime groups as 
hierarchical” (Europol 2011, 5). 
In fact, the Internet represents the platform where new and old forms of orga-
nized groups can coexist without disturbing each other because of the very spe-
cific characteristics of Internet crime. It is known that traditional organized crime 
groups violently maintain a monopoly over their assets and territory to control 
certain scarce or illegal commodities on the black market (Rush et al. 2009, 35). 
With stolen, intangible data, which represents a commodity for the shadow digital 
economy (Europol 2011, 5), cybercriminals do not require control over a geographi-
cal territory; need fewer personal contacts and less enforcement of discipline be-
tween criminals; and, in the end, there is less necessity for a formal organization. 
Moreover, the classic hierarchical structures of organized crime groups may even 
be unsuitable for organized cybercrime (Council of Europe 2004, 7). This new 
type of organized crime in information networks is non-competitive and allows 
collaboration across criminal networks (UK Home Office 2010, 13). Another major 
difference between traditional organized crime groups and cybercrime groups is, 
again, the automation technique. In other words, the power of the group is in 
the strength and sophistication of its software, not in the number of individuals 
(Brenner 2002, 27; Choo and Smith 2007, 41). 
Criminal groups operating in cyberspace are believed to be more flexible as 
compared to traditional organized crime groups, allowing for the incorporation 
of members for limited periods of time due to their flexibility (United Nations 
2010, 10). These networks are structured on a “stand alone” basis, as members of 
the groups are often not supposed to meet (Choo 2008, 7) – or, very rarely, meet 
in person – thereby relying solely on electronic communications and sometimes 
not even having virtual contact with other colleagues. Supposedly, the majority 
of them function using a number of web-based forums devoted to online fraud 
(Symantec 2008, 5; Rush 2009) or Internet Relay Chats (Fallmann et al. 2010, 1), 
channels where members know each other only by their nicknames. 
The higher the degree of sophistication of these networks, the more cautious 
its operators are about potential members to ensure that only trusted people get 
access to the illegal goods and services traded on the underground markets (UK 
Home Office 2010, 12). This complex structure – together with access to the core 
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operations granted only to trusted associates – prevents organized cybercrime 
groups from being detected and infiltrated by law enforcement agencies. In this 
regard, though, both web forums and IRC channels are operated by administra-
tors and serve the same goal, forums seem to be more advanced ways of organiz-
ing criminal activity online, because web forums have a peer-review process that 
every potential vendor needs to go through before status is granted. In contrast, 
virtually anyone can use IRCs for advertisement, which makes them more acces-
sible to law enforcement agents or unreliable criminals. As a solution, IRCs offer 
services to check the validity of the data offered for sale (Rush et al. 2009, 50).
Online forums serve as a vital introduction and recruitment medium for the 
digital shadow economy, since they facilitate cooperation within and between the 
groups and exhibit a certain degree of organization at the administrative level, 
enabling offenders to get together to work on specific projects. At the same time, 
online marketplaces represent the platform for advertising, learning, and infor-
mation-sharing (Europol 2011, 5). 
Speculation and debate as to the professionalism and organization of crimi-
nal groups online are fueled by the nature of such forums, because they can be 
considered more as tools for collaboration between individuals loosely connected 
to each other than as platforms for highly organized groups (Symantec 2008, 5). 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that there is a certain level of organization occurring on 
these platforms, at least on the administrative level. 
It should be noted that recent research argue that there is an incorrect assump-
tion that organized crime in global networks relates only to distributed non-hierar-
chical “networks” with no links to traditional organized crime families, which are 
assumed to be lacking technical capacity and relying on physical and geographical 
proximity as well as violence; rather, there is a movement toward long-term orga-
nized crime activities online (BAE Systems Detica 2012, 6). Symantec states that 
there is significant evidence that organized crime is involved in many cases involv-
ing the online underground economy (Symantec 2008, 5). 
The main problem of assessing the structure of cybercrime groups and their 
level of organization is that there is much more information about what they are 
doing – or can possible do – than about who is behind those groups (Rush 2009, 
49). Moreover, a single individual or group of perpetrators can play separate or 
simultaneous roles (developers of malware, buyers, sellers, enablers, administra-
tors) in the cybercrime economy, which makes the structure of the illegal market 
“complex and intertwined” (Trend Micro 2006, 6). 
In addition to the discussion within the framework of the analysis of supposed 
cybercrime structures, there are also controversies in assessing the possible so-
cial and demographic characteristics of the members of these groups. On the one 
hand, according to Europol, the demographic profile of members of online crime 
groups is very different to what is traditionally associated with transnational or-
ganized crime: More than 60 percent of hackers are under the age of 25 (Europol 
2011, 6). On the other hand, some studies, such as the BAE Systems Detica re-
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port, challenge the assumption of digital criminal organizations being related to 
their network types, trans-jurisdictional natures, and the type of member, who 
is normally perceived to be a young, technically literate individual (BAE Systems 
Detica 2012, 6). In contrast, the results of the research show that there are more 
organized digital crime group members over 35 years of age (43%) than under 25 
years of age (29%). This might be explained by increased levels of computer lit-
eracy and the availability of different tools to commit crimes, which can be easily 
distributed or purchased online without special, high-level skills (BAE Systems 
Detica 2012, 5). 
As to the size of the networks, the estimates vary from 10 to several thousand 
members, when the affiliated networks are incorporated into the structure. Re-
gardless of the number of members and affiliates, virtual criminal networks are 
usually run by a small number of experienced online criminals who do not com-
mit crimes themselves, but act rather as entrepreneurs (UK Home Office 2010, 
12). The criminal structures collaborate in teams where the roles are defined and 
the labor is divided (Rush et al. 2009, 42). For instance, the first group writes ma-
licious code, such as the “Trojan”; the next group is responsible for the distribution 
and use of malicious software on the Internet; while another group collects data 
from the illegal platforms and prepares everything for the identity theft. This data 
may then be used by other groups of offenders (BSI 2011, 4). The leading members 
of the networks divide the different segments of responsibility (spamming, con-
trolling compromised machines, trading data) among themselves. Some “elite” 
criminal groups act as closed organizations and do not participate in online fo-
rums because they have enough resources to create and maintain the value chains 
for the whole cycle of cyber-offenses, and therefore have no need to outsource or to 
be active in other groups. 
4. Addressing the problem 
Fighting cybercrime has always been a complex task due to the number of ICT 
network users, the transnational nature of the Internet, and its decentralized ar-
chitecture (Gercke 2011). Organized criminal groups in cyberspace, both tradi-
tional ones and those operating solely online, remain – and probably will continue 
to remain – several steps ahead of legislators and law enforcement agencies. C2C 
networks are very likely to continue benefiting from anonymous communications, 
automation of attacks, and the difficulties that law enforcement agencies experi-
ence in determining locations: Servers with crimeware could be in one country, 
while members of the network could be in another one targeting victims across 
the world. 
In addition to strengthening the current legal frameworks, updating old leg-
islation, and harmonizing laws on an international level, what is needed is also 
cross-sector cooperation on the national level as well as international cooperation 
in detecting, investigating, and preventing e-crimes committed by organized 
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criminal groups (Europol 2011). The development of a comprehensive understand-
ing and a forward-looking approach are required, since organized cybercrime 
seems to be a moving target. 
International collaboration between states is the key, since the problem has a 
trans-border nature. Some states just do not have the necessary tools to respond 
to the activities of the organized cybercriminals, or they may lack the technical 
skills or face legal drawbacks (Goodman 2010). The development of a common 
understanding that no country can be safe alone in the global ICT network is 
very important. The problem of the legal harmonization can be solved only on the 
global level (Sieber 2008).
With the absence of a global strategy to counter organized cybercrime, the 
problem is very likely to deepen in the foreseeable future. With the development 
of ICT networks and the opportunities they offer, organized criminal groups will 
benefit from the entire range of tools and models available to legitimate economy 
sectors. The information’s availability makes it easier for organized groups to fos-
ter and automate their fraud-committing activities. It will also probably tie more 
opportunistic criminals to existing criminal networks. 
Cybercrime might be going through a transformation into an organized il-
legal industry, where syndicates are highly sophisticated and very hard to iden-
tify. Soon, some cybercrime industries may be run solely by organized criminal 
groups that are constantly seeking the newest technical solutions and the creation 
of new markets. As a result, it is likely that the cybercrime ecosystem will soon be 
dominated by criminal organizations, as cybercrime networks that have already 
become international will multiply the opportunities and reach to a global scale by 
exploiting the weaknesses of legal frameworks while searching for safe havens in 
countries with fewer resources to detect and fight them. This will make fighting 
cybercrime an even more difficult task for law enforcement agencies. 
Conclusion
Though it is still not clear how organized networks in cyberspace are structured 
and how they operate, it is evident that this new form of organized groups is 
emerging in cyberspace, although it is not yet consolidated but dangerous none-
theless. As markets and trading itself have always attracted organized criminal 
groups seeking benefits from illegal activities, the growth of digital operations 
and services in legitimate markets are key enablers for organized cybercriminals, 
both for committing traditional crimes and for developing new types of illegal 
activities. Using business models that have proved their effectiveness in the legal 
business sector, organized cybercrime groups deploy highly sophisticated tools 
for online criminal activities. The risks to individuals, businesses, and govern-
ments grow with the further digitalization of the economy. E-criminal activities 
are conducted as long-term sustainable operations. Due to the borderless nature of 
the Internet, the problem of organized cybercrime has truly global consequences 
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when a country can only ensure safety within its borders. The way to address the 
problem is to develop long-term responses that would include coordination and 
harmonization of efforts on both the national and international levels.
Glossar y
Botnet – a network of Internet-connected computers whose security defenses 
have been breached and control ceded to an unknown party. Their owners are 
unaware that computers have been set up to forward transmissions, which also 
include malicious programs or spam, to other devices over the Internet. Each 
compromised devices is also known as a “bot” (short for “robot”), or “zombie.” 
The controller of the botnet is able to direct the activities of these compromised 
computers and perform automated attacks that include large numbers of bots. 
Crimeware – malware specially developed with the intention of making a 
profit and which can cause harm to the user’s financial well-being or valuable 
information.
Denial of service attack (DoS attack) or  distributed denial-of-service attack 
(DDoS attack) – an attempt to make a machine or network resource (website or 
service) unavailable to its intended users. By targeting a computer and its net-
work connection, or the computers and network of the sites people are trying 
to use, an attacker may be able to prevent users from accessing email, websites, 
online accounts (banking, etc.), or other services that rely on the affected com-
puter. The most common type of DoS attack occurs when an attacker “floods” 
a network with information and requests to view the website or to access the 
services. The server can only process a certain number of requests at once. 
Thus, an attacker overloads the server with illegally generated requests and the 
server cannot process requests from legitimate users.
Exploit (from the verb “to exploit”, in the meaning of using something to one’s 
own advantage) – a piece software, or data, or sequence of commands that 
takes advantage of computer security vulnerabilities in order to cause unin-
tended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer software or hardware. 
This frequently includes such things as gaining control of a computer system, 
or allowing illegal access to data, or launching denial of service attacks.  
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) – a protocol for real-time Internet messaging (chat) 
and conferencing, mainly designed for group communications in discussion 
forums, called channels. However, one-to-one communication is also possible 
via private message and chat. 
Keylogger – software that tracks the keys struck on a computer keyboard, typi-
cally in a covert manner so that the person using the keyboard is unaware that 
their actions are being monitored. 
Malicious code – any code in any part of a software system or script that is used 
to cause undesired effects, security breaches, or damage to a system.
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ables users to secure cash deposits against precious metals held offshore. 
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5. JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS FOR THE CONTAINMENT 
 OF ORGANIZED CRIME: A BEST PR ACTICE ACCOUNT
by Edgardo Buscaglia
Introduction 
Organized crime represents a pernicious outgrowth of social, political, and eco-
nomic dysfunctions within states and societies. These crime groups are character-
ized by the presence of individuals (politicians, businesspeople, union members, 
or simply gunmen) who are embedded at the regional, local, national, and trans-
national levels. They are part of an underworld governance to provide services 
(e.g., protection) to those who pay for and commit serious crimes. In order for 
these groups to grow, they need political and social protection. This definition 
of organized crime touches on the social and political roots of organized crime 
and is based on the fact that stable criminal groups do more than just commit 
serious crimes. Authors from Shelling to Milhaupt and West have pointed out 
the multidimensional social and economic roles of criminal groups in the provi-
sion of “protection” to individuals and legal persons (i.e., legal businesses) within 
environments where the state fails to provide adequate law and order in an effec-
tive and non-corrupt manner, resulting in social, economic, and political power 
vacuums (Schelling 1967; Milhaupt and West 2000). In this context, organized 
crime provides an imperfect governance social structure when the state fails and 
becomes absent in people’s lives.
In the average person’s perception, organized crime is associated with serious 
and complex predatory crimes, such as human and organ trafficking and many 
other types of economic crimes (including arms trafficking, smuggling, gam-
bling, and cybercrime). To the extent that organized crime is allowed to engage in 
the most serious types of crimes (e.g., trafficking in humans, organs, arms, and 
migrants, as well as support for acts of terrorism), it becomes a threat to interna-
tional human security.
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Illegal trafficking in biological, radioactive, and chemical materials for weap-
ons of mass destruction is only possible with the explicit or tacit support of cor-
rupt state authorities.1 These transnational criminal organizations manage all this 
with the help of corrupt public officials at the highest levels and enjoy considerable 
levels of social protection from marginalized groups (e.g., groups subject to ethnic 
discrimination seeking protection) (Buscaglia 1997). In these contexts, it is often 
the case that the state has failed to provide the most basic public goods in the form 
of health, education, and justice, making it easier for organized crime to exploit 
the voids left open by the states.
At the same time, it must be recognized that organized crime’s involvement 
in complex crimes, such as human trafficking, does not always have the pyramid-
shaped “mafia” organizational structures, some imagine.2 Criminal organizations 
are more frequently dynamic networks with loose horizontal structures and in-
ternational connections among sometimes autonomous cells, which makes law 
enforcement evidence-gathering much more difficult (Williams 2001). Moreover, 
the links between organized crime and corruption in the public sector also consti-
tute a clear threat to the development of democracy and to international peace and 
security. Criminal groups hamper the development of democracies to the extent 
that they “bias and buy” electoral processes to their advantage and hamper peace 
when arms trafficking feeds regional wars. 
This chapter focuses on best judicial and civil society practices to prevent and 
combat organized crime. It should not be forgotten that law enforcement and ju-
dicial channels are necessary – but far from sufficient – conditions for eradicating 
the social and political roots of organized crime. 
In short, transnational organized crime and corruption are shaped by the lack 
of political strength, social dysfunctions, and lack of international coordination 
between states to generate adequate public polices, as well as by the lack of civil 
society’s preventive mechanisms. In this framework, corruption and organized 
crime are much more than a behavioral phenomenon linked to criminal law. In 
this regard, social and political phenomena such as organized crime need to be 
addressed through social and political international policy instruments above all. 
Empirical research supports this assertion. For example, the analytical results 
found in Buscaglia and van Dijk (2003) and in Buscaglia (2008; 2012) are based 
on a sample of more than 67 and 108 countries, respectively, and attest to the deep 
links between the growth of organized crime and the growth of public sector cor-
ruption within a large number of countries. 
1 | See Buscaglia and Gonzalez-Ruiz (2002).
2 | Ibid.
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The empirical foundation of policy recommendations
This chapter aims to delineate the best ways to contain (combat and prevent) or-
ganized crime and public sector corruption in order to reduce serious crimes in-
volving political, economic, and armed actors within criminal enterprises. The 
empirical analytical foundation of supporting policy recommendations in this 
chapter are based on prior calculation of an index of high-level corruption for 108 
countries developed in Buscaglia (2008). Corruption is defined in this chapter as 
the abuse of public power for private gain. 
To assess the prevalence of street-level corruption, previous empirical stud-
ies used an indicator compiled by the International Crime Victimization Survey, 
which measures the frequency at which citizens personally experience requests 
for bribes (Buscaglia and van Dijk 2003) – mainly through street-level and me-
dium-level corruption – as part of the interaction between average citizens and 
public agencies of the state in 108 countries. The extent and frequency with which 
organized crime penetrates public institutions and biases public policies in their 
favor (i.e., high-level corruption) was not measured in any prior corruption index. 
To survey the prevalence of high-level corruption, Buscaglia (2012) measures vio-
lations of the clauses contained in the United Nations Convention against Corrup-
tion (Mérida Convention).3
In order to assess organized crime, this chapter also relies on the results of ap-
plying an index of organized crime found in Buscaglia and van Dijk (2003, 7–12), 
which was further improved and expanded upon in Buscaglia (2008) by adding 
objective factors linked to complex crimes. 
Organized crime is defined by Article 2 of the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention) as a group of 
three or more individuals committing serious crimes for profit or material ben-
efit.4 Buscaglia (2008) seeks available country data on the core activities of orga-
nized crime groups such as credit card fraud, drug trafficking, human trafficking, 
arms trafficking, stolen cars, and smuggled cigarettes. A composite index is later 
built that includes indicators of seven core activities (including: trafficking in hu-
man beings, trafficking of migrants, arms trafficking, counterfeiting, smuggling, 
extortion, and credit card fraud) and five secondary aspects (the cost of organized 
crime on business, informal economy as a percentage of gross domestic product, 
money laundering, and tax evasion). 
Based on the above, public policies that reduce both complex crimes – high-
level corruption and organized crime indicators – are branded by Buscaglia (2012) 
3 | See http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ and Buscaglia (2012).
4 | United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols 
thereto at: http://www.odccp.org/odccp/crime_cicp_convention.html
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as “best practice.” As explained below, only 13 countries5 out of a sample of 108 
have been able to develop best practices across the board and thus contain both 
types of crimes.
Organized crime and high-level corruption
Successful national and international experiences in containing high-level cor-
ruption have been identified in past studies (Buscaglia 2012). In all these cas-
es, effective public policies (i.e., with the capacity to reduce both indicators of 
corruption and organized crime as explained above) were developed from the bot-
tom up, with civil society networks deeply involved throughout the delineation 
and implementation stages. Buscaglia (2008, 2012) confirms a very strong level 
of association between high levels of organized crime and high levels of public 
sector corruption. 
It is well known that public officials provide a logistical base for organized 
crime to expand and that these officials provide protection from prosecution. In 
this corrupt process, organized crime fragments the state when several criminal 
groups compete for power (e.g., Mexico). Therefore, policy recommendations to 
address organized crime containment need to simultaneously address the high 
levels of corruption within states as well as the private sector of countries where 
organized crime is present. Given that organized crime disregards political bor-
ders, the prosecution and judicial processing of organized crime should be an 
internationally coordinated matter. Results found in Buscaglia (2012) show that 
only 13 countries (in a sample of 108 UN member states) coordinate judicial action 
adequately. In this context, one crucial premise is that, on its own no state can 
tackle organized crime successfully.
There are five levels of organized crime-related penetrations of the state that 
need to be addressed by policymakers (Buscaglia and Gonzalez-Ruiz 2002). On 
the first level, we consider isolated acts of abuse of public office at the lowest op-
erational levels of government agencies. On the second level, we take into account 
acts of corruption that occur on a very frequent basis within the lower payroll 
ranks of the state. On the third level, organized crime penetrates the mid-level 
management of public agencies in order to bias law enforcement operations, neu-
tralize the regulation of financial markets, and place members of organized crime 
on the state’s payroll. A fourth level of penetration of the state involves capturing 
the leaders of public agencies directly or indirectly who are in charge of containing 
organized crime (e.g., drug czars or chief of customs). By capturing this fourth 
level, organized crime is able to freeze entire institutions of the state, making 
them useful to the purposes of criminal enterprises. Finally, a fifth level of pen-
etration involves the capture of political appointees at the highest level, such as 
5 | The 13 countries are Austria, Botswana, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Germa-
ny, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom (Buscaglia 2012).
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deputies, ministers, senators, supreme court justices, and presidents, all in order 
to generate a bias in policymaking and policy implementation. This fifth level 
of penetration of the state goes hand-in-hand with organized crime’s financing 
of political campaigns. Buscaglia (2012) focuses on this fifth level of infiltration, 
which explains why – despite their ratification of international UN conventions – 
countries do not: seize and confiscate assets linked to organized crime; allocate 
state funding for social prevention of organized crime; allow for judicial indepen-
dence and judicial accountability to develop judicial effectiveness; develop political 
cultures within which high-level corrupt officials acting within organized crime 
groups are brought to justice. 
Administration of criminal justice: Laws in action vs. laws on the books
In order to address organized crime and high-level corruption, it is always neces-
sary (though not always sufficient) to rely upon state-of-the-art legal instruments 
and institutional capacities to implement these laws. Buscaglia (2012) affirms 
the existence of legal instruments in 86 percent of countries worldwide (within 
a sample of 108 UN member states) – instruments that are fully compatible with 
the United Nations anticorruption and organized crime conventions mentioned 
before. Yet, only 13 of these UN member states fully implement laws against cor-
ruption and organized crime. The 86 percent of countries complying “in theory” 
versus the 14 percent of countries actually meeting practical compliance require-
ments represents a gap between the laws on the books and the same laws in action.
For example, very few nations are pioneers in the enactment of legal instru-
ments addressing conspiracy to commit a crime. Among the 13 best-practice coun-
tries, membership or active participation in organized crime is criminalized, 
as well as illicit association with criminal activities. Legal transplants from the 
United States and France to developing countries inspired these criminal statutes 
around the world, especially within Latin America. Other nations have passed 
collective criminal statutes such as the so-called Mafia-type laws in Italy and in 
the United States, where legislators have enacted the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (known as RICO), which addresses patterns of crimi-
nal activities (or racketeering) within enterprises. In the latter, judicial authorities 
are required to indicate that an alleged RICO organization has a structure aimed 
at committing economic crimes and that there is a high probability that similar 
criminal activities will be committed in the future. These highly effective statutes 
have led to the dismantling of criminal groups.6
6 | French Criminal Code, Title V, Ar t. 450-1 to Ar t. 450-4; Italian Penal Code, Regio De-
creto 19 Oct. 1930, N.1390, Ar t. 416 (Associazione a Delinquere) and Art. 416-bis (as-
sociazione a delinquere di stampo mafioso) and Spanish Criminal Code, Association Illicit 
Ar t. 515 y 516 Codigo Penal.
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The analysis in this chapter addresses the most serious expressions of “trans-
national” organized crime in cases where international criminal organizations 
compete to corrupt high-level public officials with the sole purpose of avoiding 
punishment and acquiring market power to conduct illicit transactions within 
markets. Under weak public sector governance environments, traditional judicial 
deterrence frameworks (i.e., jail time) will simply not work and levels of orga-
nized crime and corruption within the public sector will increase. Under such 
a low-governance institutional environment (where public corruption is high), 
increasing economic resources that are aimed at expanding policing and expand-
ing prosecutorial domains – or simply increasing sentencing on the books – will, 
paradoxically, translate into higher levels of organized crime. This occurs because 
high-level public officials receive incentives to extend and expand protective cor-
ruption rings, resulting in gain greater impunity and reducing actual expected 
punishment. This is known as “the paradox of expected punishment” (Buscaglia 
2008), wherein added state punishment has the effect of increasing payments 
to public officials to avoid this punishment and/or increase violence; as a result, 
the state’s good intentions of added punishment generate more criminal activi-
ties. Hence, in order to avoid this “paradox,” public authorities should first aim 
to enhance asset forfeitures of criminal enterprises; undertake more successful 
prosecutions of illegal political campaign financing; and achieve more successful 
convictions of high-level corrupt officials. These preliminary actions will create 
a much more effective institutional framework for the successful prevention and 
dismantling of transnational crime (Buscaglia 2012).
The preventive, law enforcement, judicial, and intelligence tools contained in 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime provide a compre-
hensive set of policy measures to address private and public sector corruption. 
However, one needs to discover if these provisions have lived up to their potential 
in those states that have ratified the Convention. Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 
(2003) show that countries transplant international legal frameworks into their 
domestic legislations with varying degrees of success concerning actual imple-
mentation of these laws. Success in transplanting these frameworks is mostly 
determined by the nature of the process used to adapt the legal instrument to 
the existing national institutional structure as well as to the legal traditions of 
the importing country. Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003) have also shown 
that prior familiarity and cultural affinity with the transplanted legal instrument, 
regional proximity, gradual adaptation of the transplant to the local legal context, 
and frequent use of the legal instrument by legal intermediaries (e.g., judges and 
prosecutors) will lead to more effective implementation of the transplanted legal 
instruments over time. 
Transplanting legal rules and standards found in the Palermo Convention 
(and Protocols) into domestic legislations and legal practices can be expected to 
follow this general pattern. In this context, a state framed within a rule-of-law 
consists of a social environment within which laws are socially delineated and per-
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ceived as legitimate before later being enacted, interpreted, applied, and enforced 
by a judicial system in a coherent, consistent, and predictable manner. In other 
words, within the rule of law, the judicial and legal systems need to enjoy popular 
support. Hence, after enactment, the law is enforced through effective and ef-
ficient adjudication systems that citizens perceive as socially legitimate. In this 
kind of environment, a culture of legality prevails and lower crime rates emerge 
as a result. In contrast, systemic organized crime and corrupt practices constitute 
the outgrowth of a lacking rule of law. In these pernicious environments, corrupt 
“rings” of public officials emerge as a direct result of a partial or total breakdown 
of the rule of law within a society. Within society, public institutions are perceived 
as being divorced from people’s lives and individuals break laws on a continual ba-
sis, justifying their behavior with the logic that “everyone does it.” In such perni-
cious contexts, those who operate inside national political structures and electoral 
systems benefit from criminal contributions to their campaigns. 
Many developed and developing countries have attempted to reform their laws 
and judiciaries through partial or total transplants in their efforts to strengthen 
democracy, to enhance the protection of human rights, and to foster private-sector 
investment. Yet, within the civil and criminal justice domains, an international 
comparative analysis demonstrates that legal and judicial reforms have shown 
mixed results around the world (Buscaglia and Dakolias 1999) due to their in-
ability to build a widespread social and political consensus around these trans-
planted reforms. In this context, criminal infiltration of public agencies occurs on 
a frequent basis and is orchestrated by transnational organized crime groups. For 
example, high levels of human trafficking are always associated with high levels 
of corruption at the political level. The correlation between political corruption – 
coupled with a lack of international coordination among judicial systems and high 
levels of organized crime – and low human development indicators produces a 
“perfect storm” (Buscaglia 2008). 
Institutional feasibilit y of democratic legal transplants
A democratic political system goes hand in hand with democratic law-making. 
International legal and judicial reform transplants cannot be labeled as demo-
cratic when they do not enjoy a widespread social and political consensus within 
the importing countries (e.g., Mexico). To a greater or lesser degree, actual imple-
mentation of the UN Palermo Convention and its Protocols requires the under-
standing of how feasible it is to transplant its clauses democratically into a mul-
titude of domestic legal jurisdictions. The adoption of a common international 
legal definition of organized crime is not a necessary condition for addressing 
transnational crimes, yet it will make judicial and legal international coopera-
tion less complex. When addressing specific cases of complex crimes – such as 
transnational human trafficking, transnational arms trafficking, transnational 
fraud, or transnational human smuggling of migrants – a common framework 
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for legal and judicial cooperation is required in order for prosecutors, police, and 
judges to cooperate across borders. As an example, before the signing of the UN 
Palermo Convention in December 2000, only 17 percent of all UN members in-
cluded proper organized crime definitions on their criminal codes and statutes. 
By late 2011, 86 percent of all UN member states had adopted legally adequate 
definitions of organized crime. Moreover, member states established interna-
tional coordination mechanisms contained within the Palermo Convention with 
a mandate to improve their capacity to combat and prevent private and public 
sector corruption through the monitoring and international technical assistance 
measures provided by of the Convention. This represents a carefully coordinated 
institutional framework to help ensure the international transplant of legal in-
struments. Nevertheless, coordinated mechanisms within the Palermo frame-
work cannot explain the success of actual policy implementation within 13 of the 
108 states assessed. The key element shared by this small group of states can be 
found in how these legal transplants were implemented. In all cases, legal and 
judicial reforms enjoyed widespread political and social support, which explains 
the success in implementing these legal and judicial reforms. In other words, the 
delineation and approval of the laws in the 13 country-group were based on the 
existence of legislative consultation channels seeking actual consensus with the 
largest number of civil-society stakeholders. This prior political and social work 
explains why – from an international pool of laws available for transplant – cer-
tain laws and institutions are more respected in best-practice countries. 
Yet, legal and judicial reform transplants can also be effeted by the most pow-
erful economic actors within a society through the political supply and demand 
exercised by lobby pressure groups. In other words, public/private interest groups 
(licit lobbyists or criminal groups) may feel threatened or benefit from alterations 
in the legal system that ultimately determine whether there is effective legal en-
forcement of these new laws. For example, Mexico’s civil asset forfeiture laws were 
drafted and enacted to satisfy international pressures to identify and neutralize 
criminal assets. Yet, the Mexican asset forfeiture laws were designed by lobby 
groups. These private sector lobby groups exercised pressure on Mexican legisla-
tures to include legal clauses aimed at making it very complex and costly for the 
state to seize and forfeit criminal assets. 
Involving civil societ y
The criminal justice systems with the highest degrees of effectiveness in fighting 
organized crime and public sector corruption need to rely on citizens’ support 
and on the willingness of citizens to collaborate with the state’s law enforcement 
efforts in an operational manner. Without citizens’ collaborative efforts, it is not 
possible for a judicial system to function. 
Reforms of the criminal justice systems in best practice countries were not 
achieved without the help and support of non-state actors. Civil society groups are 
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required to monitor the degree of independence and accountability of the crimi-
nal justice system and its capacity to fight organized crime and public sector cor-
ruption.7 In most countries, civil society networks lack the technical capabilities, 
and judicial systems do not allow civil society to exercise its monitoring role (e.g., 
Mexico and Russia). Having recognized the civil-society monitoring requirement 
early on, the 13 country-group following best practices have sought to build bridges 
between the public sectors and civil-society stakeholders. In this context, soft mea-
sures alone – such as civil-society demonstrations, speeches by leaders of civil-
society, meetings between such leaders and high-level state officials, and integrity 
awareness campaigns – do not make much of a difference in containing criminal 
groups. Moreover, limiting civil-society participation to symbolic gestures without 
tangible results and tangible products (in terms of saving lives and providing ser-
vices that make people’s lives better) will just increase the public’s levels of cyni-
cism and result in lower levels of public participation in all future efforts. 
As stated in Buscaglia (2008), organized crime and high-level corruption need 
to be addressed through a simultaneous two-pronged approach. Civil society-
based operational social control networks that prevent organized crime and cor-
ruption (e.g., civil-society networks undertaking social audits of public local and 
central budgets) are needed. However, the capacities of judicial and intelligence 
officials to dismantle the vast networks of economic assets allowing for the trans-
portation, production, and distribution capacities of organized crime within all 
types of markets need also be enhanced. 
The relative success in fighting the Mafia-driven capture of the Italian state 
and the social fabric of Palermo has shown that public, school-based education 
campaigns – coupled with the recovery of public space by bringing together civil 
society networks and local governments – have been essential in hampering the 
pernicious effects of organized crime and public sector corruption.8  
In addition, civil society actors such as victims’ associations, bar associations, 
and law schools can play an important role in legitimizing and implementing 
legal and judicial reform processes. For example, establishing civil society bodies 
– each composed of a panel of lawyers and other members of the public acting as 
“court watchers” focusing on organized crime and public sector corruption cases 
– has proven to enhance the legitimacy of the judiciary in Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Indonesia, Italy, and the United States (Buscaglia 2012, 1997). In this context, for 
example, a network-based approach to civil-society monitoring of state institutions 
would go a long way to improve public sector performance, and reduce corruption. 
In this kind of scenario, specialized panels of civil-society networks focusing on 
public health providers (e.g., hospitals) would generate periodic reports addressed 
to a health ministry and followed by a monitoring process. Furthermore, special-
7 | These elements were all present in legal and judicial reforms implemented in Chile and 
Costa Rica (Buscaglia 2012).
8 | See Orlando (2001).
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ized panels of civil society focusing on justice providers (courts) would generate 
periodic reports aimed at legal institutions. Specialized panels of civil society net-
works focusing on public education would generate periodic reports aimed at as-
sessing the performance of schools and proposing mechanisms to improve such 
performance.
Countries that have been successful in containing organized crime and public 
sector corruption also incorporated state-of-the-art economic and financial poli-
cies, going far beyond the legal and judicial measures stated above. It is clear by 
now that in order to tackle organized crime, regulatory measures are required. 
Following are some measures required within the economic-financial domain 
to contain organized criminal groups: 
(i) addressing social vacuums left by state failures that create a “distance” be-
tween the state and the population’s access to basic public services due to 
geographical, ethnic, economic, and political repression;
(ii) reducing the incidence and dimension of informal markets (which provide 
the economic inputs and human resources to criminal enterprises) by reduc-
ing the complexity and corruption in registering new companies or paying 
taxes;
(iii) improving the distribution of income and wealth;
(iv) introducing regulation of labor within markets previously declared illegal by 
the state (e.g., prostitution) and discarding the “illegality” approach to drugs 
by regulating the drugs market through the same type of food and drug ad-
ministration laws applied to medicines;
(v) identifying, monitoring, seizing, and confiscating financial assets linked to 
the production and distribution of smuggled and counterfeit materials are 
part of a key strategy in any organized crime containment program. This re-
quires moving far beyond money laundering statutes. Many illegal transac-
tions forced upon average citizens (such as the forced-notarized transfer of 
land to organized crime) occur outside the financial domain, where finan-
cial intelligence units possess no jurisdiction. Yet, one could claim that the 
world’s political landscape has been transformed within a decade, as, today, 
an increasing number of UN member states is enforcing disclosure of assets 
statutes and mutual legal assistance programs. In this context, bank secrecy 
has become less of an option. 
The final impacts of non-punitive regulatory approaches to prevent organized 
crime have been very “modest” at best. Operational constraints remain due to 
the lack of operational capacities of police, prosecutors, and judges when required 
to handle cases involving financial investigations. At the same time, civil society 
networks are still operationally underdeveloped in most countries, as they have 
limited capacities to save lives and to monitor public officials through well-fund-
ed networks. In this scenario, the development of democratic means to prevent 
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and contain organized crime requires improvements in both state and non-state 
mechanisms.
Conclusions
Based on the analysis presented in previous sections, one can conclude that the 
most effective policy measures against transnational organized crime mainly 
rest on three pillars: (i) the introduction of more effective judicial decision-mak-
ing controls in the hands of civil society networks that can lead to reductions in 
the frequency with which the discretion of procedural and substantive criminal 
courts is abused; (ii) the higher frequency of successful asset forfeitures of legal 
businesses and individuals linked to criminal enterprises – all based on effective 
financial intelligence systems that can generate evidentiary material to ensure the 
systematic dismantling, confiscation, and recovery of assets in the hands of legal 
firms providing the transportation and production infrastructure needed for the 
exploitation of human trafficking; and (iii) the presence of government and/or 
non-governmental preventive programs addressing the health, labor, and educa-
tional needs of high-risk groups of youth falling under the influence of criminal 
enterprises.
Furthermore, if one hopes to eliminate the social and economic roots of crimi-
nal enterprises, public policies should be much more focused on filling the social 
vacuums (e.g., lack of social investment in public health, lack of education options 
for youth, lack of social infrastructure, and lack of adequate job training) and less 
concerned about repressive operations. In addition, disrupting the operations of 
organized crime requires civil asset forfeitures, thus reducing the illicit funds that 
can expand public corruption rings within the public sectors. At the same time, 
developing a state infrastructure to address civil service reforms as well as devel-
oping auditing capacities of public institutions and public sector officials have also 
shown unparalleled power to reduce corruption. Finally, regulatory approaches to 
markets that are in the hands of organized crime (e.g., drugs and prostitution) 
need to be addressed through food and drug regulation and labor laws, coupled 
with social prevention in order to obtain the desired containment.
Certainly, it would be quite naïve to think that ratifying and enacting United 
Nations conventions (and their protocols) will be enough to successfully combat 
organized crime. Moreover, one should have no illusions that all 22 types of or-
ganized crimes can be contained, given the scarcities of human and financial 
resources that all nations face. In this context, public policy must give priority 
to reducing the most predatory organized crimes (e.g., human trafficking and 
kidnapping) through the criminal justice systems, while better regulating non-
predatory crimes (e.g., gambling and adult prostitution) through economic and 
labor policies. 
The reforms to the judicial and intelligence systems described in the previous 
sections – as applied in best practice countries – have always required a consen- 
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esus prior sociopolitical consensus that encompasses legislative, executive, judi-
cial, and civil society domains and with actors willing and able to design, imple-
ment, and support “politically painful” reforms. The afore-mentioned gaps be-
tween the Palermo Convention-related domestic laws on the books and the same 
laws in action will be reduced whenever the political will to enact legal reforms 
coexists with the technical capacities to implement these reforms. Failures to fully 
implement much-needed institutional improvements have been mostly linked to 
the lack of a governmental long-term commitment within authoritarian regimes 
(e.g., North Korea, Russia, and Syria) or in political systems with scarce politi-
cal competition (e.g., Jordan and Venezuela), or in environments with political 
instability characterized by chronic social inequities (e.g., Mexico and Paraguay), 
in failed states subject to armed conflicts (e.g., Afghanistan and Somalia), and in 
countries undergoing political transitions (e.g., Mexico, Nigeria, and Pakistan). 
These state and political failures have also been characterized by legal transplants 
of the Palermo Convention into domestic legislations without true implementa-
tion (i.e., huge gaps between laws on the books and laws in action). 
The above lessons from international experience must be taken into account 
whenever national and international authorities plan strategies to address trans-
national crime and public sector corruption. Yet, it is crucial to remember that 
combating and preventing organized crime requires first and foremost addressing 
state failures in ensuring the exercise of human (civil, political, economic, social, 
and cultural) rights while, at the same time, eliminating the fragments of crimi-
nal enterprises operating within the state. In this context, when governments use 
the term “war” against organized crime, many public officials may be unaware 
of the fallacy involved: A repressive “war” of the state against organized crime is 
equivalent to a war of the state against itself. 
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III. Regional Perspectives
1. INTRODUCTION 
In an introductory first part of the book, we sought to establish some general 
understanding of the current features and cornerstones in the debate on transna-
tional organized crime. 
Money laundering, cybercrime, as well as possible forms and pathways toward 
containment of national and transnational organized crime were explained and 
discussed. Additionally, the fine line between legality and illegality of economic 
transactions was raised and discussed regarding compliance and business ethics.
Whereas, in this first part, some frame conditions that enable the current out-
reach of transnational organized crime were set, in the second part of the book we 
intend to travel around the world to stress the highly differentiated nature that or-
ganized crime may assume. Whether in Afghanistan, India, Mexico, Brazil, West 
Africa, the Balkans, or in countries of the European Union, historic and local 
specificities of societal organization lead to different features of organized crime. 
The following map visualizes roughly the current crime routes we are dealing 
with in this book and puts them in a global context.
Internationally crime networks, the state, and the locally dominant economic 
actors are closely interconnected. By considering the academic, practitioners’, and 
civil society perspectives, organized crime is being situated in the center of other 
societal conflicts.
The question whether transnational organized crime is currently an intrinsic 
feature of a globalized economic life or an indicator of its collateral conflicts will 
be taken up again in the Outlook at the end of this book.
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World Map of Organized Crime
Source: www.wired.com/magazine/2011/01/ff_orgchart_crime
2. Afghanistan
2.1 TWO SIDES OF A COIN? STATEBUILDING AND TR ANSNATIONAL 
 ORGANIZED CRIME NE T WORKS IN AFGHANISTAN 
by Florian P. Kühn*
I. Multi-disciplinar y and cross-cultural perspectives 
The analysis of state-building in Afghanistan as a political endeavor to end Taliban 
support for the international terrorist network Al Qaida needs to take into account 
the political economy of state-building as an international policy. Many books and 
articles have been written about the cultural and procedural differences that inter-
ventionists as well as Afghans have been experiencing since 2001 with Western 
involvement (Rashid 2008; Bergen 2011). However, many of the intrinsic and – in 
their own logic – consequential developments during the political stabilization and 
support missions have been counter-productive, not least because of what Astri 
Suhrke has termed an “aid-and-war economy” (2011, 233). This perspective focuses 
on the extensive funds given to the Afghan government – coupled with demands 
for “good governance” and reforms – as well as on the enormous cost of the syn-
chronous military engagement. What started as a mission to scare off spoilers and 
win the hearts and minds of the population for supporting the new government, 
which, in turn, ought to rule Afghanistan in a manner consistent with the norms 
of the international system (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn 2010), over time 
turned into a full-fledged fighting mission tactically termed “counter-insurgency.” 
In both approaches, political and kinetic, the outcome of political institution and 
norm-building has been prescribed; it is merely the way to achieve these ends 
that has differed (Kilcullen 2009). During this period, Afghanistan slipped into 
a small war while under Western influence. It is nearly impossible to distinguish 
between civilians and combatants, sketchy or non-existent frontlines, and what to 
make of the eroding effects a long-term engagement with the insurgents has on 
Western constituencies (Daase 1999).
* Dr. Florian P. Kühn is Senior Researcher and Lecturer at the Institute for International 
Politics at Helmut Schmidt University in Hamburg.
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The aspects this article analyses cover a range of factors: cultural ones that 
provoke a questioning of established understandings of states as default actors 
to define what is lawful and what is not; political-economic ones that point to 
unintended consequences of international policy; security-related ones that raise 
questions about what the differences are between state-sponsored security agents 
and private ones; network and social connectivity-related ones that indicate that 
the social fabric of an intervention society is, if not complicit in, then at least con-
ducive to, transnational organized crime, because it links high-value markets in 
the West with low-value labor that is involved in the production of illicit but much-
demanded goods. In Afghanistan, which is often termed a “global opium monopo-
list,” several layers of organized crime networks unfold from the rentier class and 
opium traders. Due to the precarious nature of a society in conflict, other fields 
have become equally important, such as weapons trade, transport of goods of all 
sorts, as well as smuggling of refugees trying to evade the chaos that is assumed 
will take hold after Western troops have withdrawn.
II. Causes — histor y and analysis 
The history of state formation is, according to Charles Tilly (1992), one in which 
violent actors engage in a Janus-faced endeavor to provide cover against assaults 
that originate from this very actor. In Tilly’s words, war-making and state-making 
are comparable to organized crime, in that protection rackets have to be paid by 
citizens for the state to protect them. In this model, the state taxes citizens for 
services that may serve their interest – for example, providing access to and guar-
anteeing the endurance of markets – and defends its existence against internal as 
well as external competitors. In an ambiguous process, this leads to the formation 
of a state system, as any ruler depends on external recognition for legitimacy. 
This state formation model, then, explains how the institutionalization of armed 
forces, including the police, requires funds to support them. This necessitates tax-
ation of economic gains achieved under the cover of protection provided by such 
forces. Both of these, in turn, lead to the development of a formal administrative 
apparatus that collects taxes and organizes the means of violence.
While this model goes a long way toward shedding light on European state for-
mation, the already existing state system, which later was exported and expanded 
on global scale, led to different results in non-European contexts. Most states were 
formed mimicking the ideal of a state prescribed by the system and its demands 
for accessibility and interoperability of state institutions (Schlichte 2005). Begin-
ning with diplomatic exchanges such as state representatives in other capitals, to 
binding rules of trade, human rights, or military relations, it is always the state 
that is at the ideational center of social relations. Hence, the preconditions of form-
ing states were distinctly different outside what is (roughly) today’s OECD world; 
the circumstances further deviate if external actors meddle with internal state for-
mation dynamics (Kühn 2012). However, it is worthwhile for analytical purposes 
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to salvage the connection between the state and organized crime to illustrate the 
mutual dynamics of trying to establish a state and hybrid economic and politi-
cal developments that may or may not support the state (Bliesemann de Guevara 
2009).
In Afghanistan, this hybridity of state-stabilizing economic connectors, which, 
at the same time, have kept the state at bay from social figurations in the country 
to allow free economic conduct, date back very far. After establishing a nominally 
modern state in the late 18th century (as opposed to dynastic empires, periodically 
expanding and shrinking by way of conquest and retreat, but only periodically 
establishing a formalized order), Afghanistan’s kings struggled to implement 
central rule. Until formal independence in 1919, the Afghan state was riddled by 
internal strife, periodically interrupted by unity against outside invaders like the 
British, who, in trying to keep the Russian Empire away from the warm seas of the 
Indian Ocean, sought to establish a buffer state (Ewans 2002, 43). It was, however, 
internal politics that lead to the consolidation of statehood, partly respecting the 
social norms of local tribes, partly mimicking the form of statehood now demand-
ed by the evolving international system (Barfield 2010, 110–130). 
Even after independence, however, the state was so weak in its normative le-
gitimacy and economic base that whatever state agents had in mind, they needed 
funding from outside donors. In other word, the economic power of Afghanistan 
– currently a country with one of the lowest productivity rates worldwide – never 
warranted the consolidation of rule. Instead, whoever was willing and able to fund 
groups competing internally for power and influence may have found it easy to 
acquire access to internal political negotiation processes. As a result, different 
groups were empowered – or, if funds dried up, disempowered, in cases where 
social heft may have differed vastly from political influence. A case in point is the 
political influence of the communists, who – while internally feuding – took over 
the state in 1978. While public resistance against their policies grew, epitomized 
by co-educative literacy courses and reforms of land-ownership, the Soviets had 
to make a decision and risk losing influence and all they had already invested in 
those “indigenous communists.” Instead of handing Afghanistan to a growing 
tide of Islamist actors, who, it was feared, would establish a counter-model of a 
faith-based system on the Soviet Union’s southern border (which was the route the 
Iranian revolution was taking), Soviet leaders decided to become directly involved 
(Feifer 2009).
The well-established structure of a rent-dependent elite trying to expand state 
rule and implement policy was thus radicalized, especially when the US admin-
istration started to covertly fund opposition Islamist forces through Pakistan’s 
military intelligence branch, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). By deciding which 
of the insurgent groups should receive aid in money and arms, the ISI decidedly 
shaped the future political landscape of Afghanistan, which was molded by the 
empowered mujahedin groups, who consolidated their leading political role by 
virtue of their military fighting skills and charisma (see Schlichte 2009). The so-
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called Peshawar Seven, seven mujahedin groups favored by a large flow of funds, 
thus became leaders in the fight against the Soviets, whereas other, sometimes 
politically opposed groups had to get in line with them in order to access funds. 
The rentier structure thus became divided into two branches – one of the state 
and one against the state. As Barnett Rubin wrote, “A rentier state produced rent-
ier revolutionaries” (2002, 81). The rentier state was mirrored by consolidating po-
litical-military figurations, which tried to resist the forced modernization efforts, 
and both depended on the continuous inflow of foreign funds. Needless to say, 
external donors tried to influence internal politics by providing these funds. How-
ever, they failed to actually determine the course of events. It is in this light that 
the Afghan wars since 1979 cannot simply be viewed as proxy wars; fighting fac-
tions had their own agendas to follow, which were often quite detached from what 
Cold War opponents assumed them to be fighting for. When the Soviets withdrew 
their troops in 1989 – subsequently triggering the end of the Soviet empire and 
diminishing the interests of the United States in the region – funds stopped fuel-
ling the war economy. This increased incentives to capture the remaining state 
structures in order to secure a share of the funds that were still available. 
Increased mujahedin infighting – which included the shelling of Kabul, the de-
struction of some of the main areas of agrarian production such as in the Shomali 
plains, and massacres against populations of different ethnic affiliation – can be 
largely explained in such economic terms. That the fighting led to an increased 
ethnicization of the conflict is clear, therewith establishing firm rifts between 
members of different groups whose animosities and sometimes open enmities 
date back a long time. However, Schetter points out the problems of analyzing the 
war in Afghanistan after 1990 as being ethnically motivated: “Ethnic groups and 
conflict parties are being viewed as congruent entities [...] Generally, society ap-
pears as being dominated in its societal segmentation by monolithic ethnic blocks” 
(Schetter 2003, 580; paraphrased, FK). This lacks a grasp of the differentiation 
within Afghan society and reifies ethnic stereotypes to a status of indisputable 
truths. In buying into these categories, according to Schetter, the UN cemented 
such ethnic categories by mandating a “multi-ethnic” government after 2001.
Importantly, societal segmentation ran along the lines of economic interests. 
Of course, what might be viewed as organized crime was virtually in all cases 
transnational. The economic networks of cooperation only existed due to their 
transnational component. Most notably, opium production and trade, which dates 
back several decades and has undergone several accelerating phases, makes Af-
ghanistan the single biggest producer of opium in the 21st century (see below), 
and it has been useful in supporting elites over the last decades. The same applies 
to the mostly southern trade syndicates, who have an oligopoly on goods imported 
from Pakistan into Afghanistan. Since this is the lion’s share of goods consumed 
in Afghanistan, one may imagine the importance – and, consequently, the power 
– such a position brings. Similarly, but structurally different, is the position of 
those local strongmen, often misleadingly called “warlords,” who have established 
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semi-statehood in provinces by controlling political, military, and economic af-
fairs. Embodying the merging of political activity with what would usually be seen 
as criminal activity, these actors manage to unite social services and economic 
activity as well as military power in one hand – thus providing an often welcomed 
function in an area where the state fails to provide justice and reliable governance 
(Giustozzi 2009).
The opium economy is the focus of the following section. This is merited by 
the importance opium has in economic terms – in Afghanistan it amounts to 
about one-third1 of gross national product. It is argued that it is precisely its trans-
nationality that makes huge profits possible – and at the same time, profits reach 
the observed amounts precisely because of the international criminalization of 
opium products. To get a clear picture of the nature of opium-related transnational 
crime, one needs to distinguish between opium producers and opium rentiers. 
The international policy to reduce opium production, it is argued, is counterpro-
ductive in that it actually provides incentives to get involved. Finally, I attempt to 
relate the networks of opium trade to other illicit goods trade. However, I argue 
that drawing a line between licit and illicit goods may be misleading, as it is the 
same groups from profiteers who gain most from the international military pres-
ence in Afghanistan.
III. Forms, cases, and interfaces 
During the international presence in Afghanistan over the last 10 years, opium 
production has been named the most important problem countless times. This 
section illustrates that this is misleading, mostly politically motivated, and a clear 
case of focusing on the wrong target. In retrospect, after 2001, the international 
intervention provided the grounds for a surge in opium production in Afghani-
stan. The Taliban had stopped opium production (though not its trade!) in 2001, 
assumedly to strengthen their international reputation, which was tarnished due 
to their treatment of women (and the Afghan population in general) and for host-
ing Osama bin Laden. When the Taliban disappeared, the amount of opium pro-
duced skyrocketed. What had happened? 
Much of the infrastructure was damaged after more than two decades of inter-
nal war. Few influential actors had capital to lend to poor farmers. Those who had 
to rely on loans in winter were forced to grow poppy in order to repay their debts. 
Poppy is a very useful crop in a country like Afghanistan, as it is relatively robust 
and may be grown in areas where irrigation is impossible or non-existent. Also, 
1 | Opium revenues can hardly be calculated reliably, and dif ferent ways to estimate them 
leads to very dif ferent results – for example, taking opium revenue as part of gross national 
product changes its relative share as opposed to calculating it outside licit economic activ-
ity. Also, trade-offs, such as profits from increased consumption of opium producers, may 
be understood as stemming from the opium economy or analyzed separately.
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unlike wheat, it works as a cash crop; farming for subsistence on small fields often 
fails to produce a surplus, limiting the maneuverability of families dependent on 
money. In global comparison, poppy farming works in Afghanistan as it is very 
labor-intensive. 
Farmers harvest the sap [...] by scoring the buds with a curved scraping knife and collecting 
the sticky brown resin that dries on the buds. In rudimentary “laboratories,” often nothing 
more than a mud hut with metal mixing drums and a brick stove, raw opium is mixed with 
lime and boiled in water to make morphine base. Once poured into molds and sun-dried 
into hard bricks, it is reduced in weight and volume by a factor of 10, making it easier to 
smuggle. (Peters 2009, 30) 
Later stages of refining into heroin require cleaner facilities, clean water and char-
coal filters, and chemicals such as anhydride or hydrochloric acid. The supply of 
these base materials is also part of the network of transnational organized crime.
Afghanistan has a history of producing drugs, especially opiates. Because 
medical treatment was impossible in the remote villages, it used to be consumed 
against pain and illness. It was, however, the Soviet war that catapulted Afghani-
stan to the forefront of opium production: On one hand, the revenues paid the mu-
jahedin’s fight against the Red Army, and on the other, the CIA thought it might 
be a great idea to undermine the morale and health of Soviet soldiers by fostering 
vast supplies of harmful drugs to them through ISI channels (Napoleoni 2004, 
147–148; Feifer 2009, 183). The Taliban, when in power, attempted to enhance 
their international reputation by stopping the production of poppy – but not the 
trade. Although this caused social hardships for farmers, the traders – relying on 
full stocks – compensated for decreased trade with higher prices. This illustrates 
that market fluctuations do little harm to traders, as the morphine base is durable 
and can be stored for lengthy periods of time. However, this policy enforced by the 
Taliban rendered them unreliable in the eyes of traders – namely the few families 
who traditionally organized exports using far-reaching networks (Buddenberg and 
Byrd 2006). These structures, predictably, survived the fall of the Taliban and 
persons involved became active in rebuilding the Afghan state.
The economic edge traders had traditionally had, including lending money to 
producers (called salaam), put them in powerful social and economic positions. 
While political leadership was shifting, traders remained in their positions – not 
directly involved in politics but silently able to structure and influence the compo-
sition of political arrangements.
In the course of the Western intervention, a significant professionalization 
and concentration of the opium trade has taken place. What Janet Kursawe has 
termed “vertical integration” is a consolidation of market relations between the 
producers, the traders at different levels, and the buyers, all of whom are valves 
for funneling the opiates onto the world market. According to her assessment, it is 
this integration that merits talk about organized crime, which has a higher degree 
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of institutional capacity than the local/regional tribe and kin-based trading rela-
tionships that existed in the past. Those loosely organized cells have now become 
more concentrated, forced to counter repression – resulting in the disappearance 
from the market of those who are unable to fend off law enforcement – and take 
advantage of the economies of scale. The ever more influential groups have in-
creasingly managed to gain access to state institutions, either through cooptation 
of officials or strategically positioning their own straw men. While this results in 
symbiotic relations between parts of the government and the opium economy, it 
also serves to keep contenders off the market; the opium business is no longer 
open for competition (Kursawe 2010, 127–140). This is important, as the ongoing 
war in Afghanistan – where opium competitors can be turned into targets for the 
United States and other Western militaries by pointing out their affiliations with 
the Taliban – has diminished the positions of those traders close to the insurgen-
cy, thereby leaving the market to those close to the government. Whether this is a 
good thing leading to future control and subsequent regulation of the illicit opium 
sector, or a bad thing resulting in the state of Afghanistan being turned into a full-
fledged narco-state, remains to be seen2 (Kühn 2011, 121–122).
Thus, in several ways, Western intervention is supportive of – or even com-
plicit in – exacerbating the Afghan drug problem: By fighting on the side of the 
government, the Western military helps oligopolize the opium market for the 
benefit of those drug entrepreneurs who are well connected with – or, indeed, 
part of – the government. Frequent denunciations of the most prominent case 
of drug involvement (Hamid Karzai’s brother Ahmad Wali, who was governor 
of Kandahar and killed in July 2011) was only intended to pressure the president 
publicly, but it did little to help tackle the consolidating professionalization of 
opium politics. Indeed, cooperating with him – and other powerful figures of his 
kind – seemed more attractive for Western actors as this was calculated to facili-
tate an orderly exit.
Another way to help the opium traders is to keep resisting Afghan moves 
to join the pharmaceutical producers of opiates. While regulation is of concern 
(Which poppy types would be legal? Which ones illegal?), there is also a market be-
ing protected by countries like Turkey, Australia, and the Netherlands – countries 
that, understandably, have little incentive to share the lucrative business of medi-
cal opiates demanded by palliative medicine in Western countries. 
Finally, as some in the field of development have observed, a “dual use” prob-
lem exists: Processing of heroin moves closer to the source of production (poppy), 
which is a sign of the capital saturation that Afghan traders have now reached. 
While heroin was formerly processed downstream on trading routes, for example 
in Pakistan or Iran, it is increasingly processed in Afghanistan. Laboratories profit 
from more widespread access to clean water – which is often facilitated by Western 
2 | Author’s phone interview with member of Western intelligence service, March 5, 
2011.
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development agencies. Mobile laboratories are quick to relocate upon detection, 
and in many cases they enjoy the support of local strongmen, who, simultaneous-
ly, are often commissioned by the military and aid agencies for protection.3 Close 
cooperation of Western military and local units, who are patrolling side-by-side, 
fosters the flow of information, wherefore violent encounters that were frequent 
in the first years, when Western military sometimes stumbled upon drug deals, 
have ceased to happen: Information about the military’s whereabouts allows for 
avoidance of detection. While roads lower the cost of transporting agricultural 
goods, they also support the concentration of deliveries of opium; transporting 
huge bulks rather than small portions of opiates has helped concentrate business 
in a few hands. Likewise, the crossing of borders has become more dangerous 
when goods have more value (heroin vs. opium base) and when batches are bigger; 
this raises the incentive to involve border guards and bribe security agents, thus 
tightly entwining state agents and the opium economy.
In this light, it is hard to tell who is gaining the most: In a state dependent on 
rents, which are now mainly supplied by Western donors, elites are likely to secure 
all sorts of rentier income. The numbers supplied by the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime over the years indicate that income generated by drugs supports 
state agencies; in a general mood of war-weariness and dwindling foreign funds, 
opium income will likely be vital for many state functions. Following the logic of 
the rentier state, Afghanistan may well have found a political-economic equilib-
rium that secures minimum legitimacy of the state (as a supposed source of order) 
but that is also highly productive in terms of opiates and, increasingly, hashish 
(Kühn 2008, 323; 2012). The question is how this could be made legally and so-
cially acceptable within existing structures. At the moment, rather than following 
a coherent strategy, Western countries are hiding behind the Afghan state, which 
is officially in charge of drug policy. For example, there are virtually no attempts to 
implement demand reduction in Western countries (Kühn 2012, 127–128). 
Overall, as opium is a cash crop, Afghan producers are unlikely to change to 
other agrarian produce in the near future. Since the illegality of opium and its de-
rivates guarantees fluctuating but comparably high returns, and since traders are 
also involved in other economic sectors, thereby giving them an edge in manipu-
lating markets, the eradication policy based on the fiction that the problem might 
be solved in Afghanistan has proved to be futile. Traders have secured consider-
able influence over government institutions, partly funding the state, which ought 
to enforce opium bans. Many of those involved in the security branch – police, 
law enforcement, and border guards – are in reality often complicit in its export. 
Likewise, global networks provide very reliable structures to distribute supply, 
while demand in Western states remains virtually constant. It is this international 
dimension and its social and political consequences that the next section covers.
3 | Author’s interview, development agency staff, February 25, 2011.
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IV. Processes of social transformation, 
 global economic flows, and routes 
Drug-exporting networks are the largest profiteers of opium and hashish in Af-
ghanistan. Because of their involvement with the state – either as authorities or 
tightly connected to those in office for the sake of stability – they are able to adapt 
to and survive countermeasures for combating the opium trade. These have led to 
the consolidation of the exporting groups, as traders associated with the Taliban 
and other insurgent groups have been targeted, whereas those close to the state 
have not. After some years of dysfunctional anti-drug policies, attempts to tackle 
the producers have finally ceased. This came after realizing that these measures 
disenfranchise the population and that volatile structures of production allowed 
for the growing of poppy to shift from one province to another. The sheer amount 
of capital that can be accumulated by the domestic traders (numbering about 150–
200), but even more so by those exporting the drugs (now down to about 15–20 
families, as compared to higher numbers 25–30 years ago) allows for the financing 
of a policy of specialization and consolidation of the traders: 
Coordination (including across ethnic groups); close association between government, 
business, and criminal operators; exclusion of new entrants especially at upper levels; dy-
namic responses to law enforcement (including higher levels of secrecy); and development 
of more systematic and well-organized mechanisms of criminal protection.4 (Buddenberg 
and Byrd 2006, 17)
In terms of social transformation, paradoxically, that may mean that the drug 
economy may have become more predictable for those involved. Consolidating 
structures brings a certain level of reliability; the escalating fight against insur-
gents during the intervention has funneled resources and attention away from 
eradication and the enforcement of counter-narcotics policy. International capital 
networks work well and are indistinguishable regarding their “content of crimi-
nality”: Afghan elites have tended to remain in contact with diaspora communi-
ties, and those able to mobilize capital have profited from imports of everyday 
commodities such as cars and food; also, the transport of military supplies has 
been a profitable industry in recent years. The capital gained is often sent from Af-
ghanistan to investment havens like Dubai, from where money is invested in other 
sectors of the global economy. These economic activities may partly involve money 
laundering. Also, the mainly trust-based system of hawala has been widely used 
to transfer funds (Napoleoni 2004, 205–207; Kursawe 2010, 139–140), making it 
impossible to calculate the economic impact of the drug economy. The grey area 
in which virtually all economic activity takes places is well described by Cockayne: 
4 | Author’s phone interview with member of Western intelligence service, March 5, 2011.
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Organised crime and corruption are central to the social experience in violent and insecure 
communities – especially those affected by wholesale armed conflict. What is labelled “or-
ganised crime” may at times manifest a deeper politico-economic system that satisfies the 
survival, dispute-resolution and other basic needs and interests of extensive constituen-
cies straddling the state-society boundary. […] the lines between legality and illegality, 
and between legitimacy and illegitimacy, do not run along parallel tracks. State-backed 
laws may lack popular legitimacy, and state officials – or outside peacemakers – may risk 
losing local legitimacy by enforcing law. Alternatively, state official may engage in activi-
ties – such as corruption and bribery – that are illegal but entirely normalised or legitimate 
in the local context. A similar disconnect can emerge between international norms and 
local legitimacy. (2010, 201) 
For Afghanistan, in its social and local heterogeneity, it is all of the above. This 
is exacerbated by some historical continuity, in which borderlands – that is, ar-
eas of disputed rule such as the mountainous areas around the virtual border to 
Pakistan – play a role as “spaces of avoidance.” In the example of the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas, the ethical differences between those Pashtuns under 
state control (and paying taxes: qalang) versus those living according to the ideal 
of freedom and honor (nang) is very important for people’s identities. There, the 
local economy profits from re-importing tax-free goods into Pakistan brought to 
Afghanistan under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (Goodhand 2008, 234, 
241). Violence, as part of the greater economic pattern, depends to a significant 
extent on the “temporal scope of its rationality and assessments of its expected 
payoffs” (Scofield 2011, 47).
In addition to being an illustration of the “all politics is local” idea, this indi-
cates what happens with other borders such as those shared with Central Asia 
or Iran: Select groups cooperating in transnationalizing trade patterns are re-
quired as counterparts to organize the export (and import) of goods. While the 
Iranian influence is distinct for its state-like approach – in which support was 
given to the comparatively stable province of Herat through substantial econom-
ic exchanges – Iran still serves as the main route to export opium products from 
Afghanistan to Turkey and on to markets in Europe. Despite the Iranian state’s 
interest to keep hostile Sunni segments of Afghan society at bay and control the 
drug market, work and refugee migration on the scale of 2.5 million people is 
of social significance. Such sub-state relations also affect ties with Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan. 
In effect, one may identify three layers of politics and political-economic ties: 
The first is on a local scale, from kinship-based politics in villages and districts 
or provinces, as in the case of consolidated provinces such as Herat or Balkh. The 
second is between provinces representing larger, internally connected economic 
patterns and – as in the case of the opium trade, where goods easily cross Afghan 
domestic fault lines of conflict (Kursawe 2010, 134) – neighboring countries. Eth-
nic and linguistic ties as well as kinship and migration contacts may foster these 
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ties, for example, between Badakhshan and Tajikistan; Herat and Iran; and Kan-
dahar and other predominantly Pashtun areas on Pakistan’s side of the border. On 
a third level, there are global economic connectors, with trade ending downstream 
on the streets of London or Hamburg (in case of drugs), but also in other centers 
of the capitalist West in the case of carpets and refugees. Afghanistan, on the 
other hand, is an importer of chemicals to refine opium into heroin, but also of 
small weapons from the former Soviet states and Africa. In monetary terms, as 
already described, Afghanistan is a major recipient of rents, of which there is the 
economic rent for the illegal goods, a political rent paid mainly by the Western in-
tervention to the state of Afghanistan and its elites (see Kühn 2008) but also to op-
position groups by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and others. Money from Afghanistan, 
in turn, is being invested on global markets via, for example, Dubai. Finally, and 
not to be underestimated, there are migration rents, which are transfers between 
diasporas and Afghan constituencies, with the latter often relying on these pay-
ments for survival. 
V. Consequences and impacts on the state, 
 the rule of law, and victims’ accounts 
Ten years and counting into the Western intervention, and with the withdrawal of 
a significant number of forces looming large, there is little one can predict for the 
future of transnational organized crime. There are, however, some indicators that 
need to be considered and that shed some light on the categories that are applied 
to defining transnational organized crime. Since the Afghan state, and indeed 
Afghan society, is very dependent on the inflow of money in the form of economic, 
political, and migration rents, criminal activity – or what might be understood 
as such – is likely to remain in place. Depending on the economic opportunities 
opening up for actors, these will be used: In political terms, this means that even 
though Western donors have pledged huge sums for the funding of state institu-
tions until 2024, opportunities for others who are willing to pay those with do-
mestic political interests are likely to increase. The influence, however, should not 
be overestimated: Afghan rulers have mostly managed to keep the donors at bay 
when it comes to the substance of decision-making. To gain legitimacy, however, 
rulers have to be viewed as independent of foreigners (Barfield 2010, 341–342). 
Absent the significant internal sources of finance, the legitimacy of an Afghan 
state is likely to remain weak. 
This relates to another, possibly bleak perspective: If security cannot be pro-
vided by the state, people – in the case of Afghanistan ethnic factions along tribal 
and kinship lines – will feel they have to organize militarily. To fund this, they 
will make use of opportunities that themselves are contingent upon the random 
distribution of goods and may serve to finance such basic sub-state functions: for 
example, the smuggling of lapis funded the Panjir resistance against Taliban rule 
in northern Afghanistan; Aymak copper deposits near Kabul sent along favor-
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able trade routes to neighboring markets; or, drugs. Because they are impossible 
to centralize, migrant rents are politically irrelevant but provide a vital source of 
income to many. Because they strengthen ties between diasporas and people in 
Afghanistan, they are also open to external influences.
As long as the ability of the state to define what is legal and illegal in a socially 
accepted way does not exists, Western policy-makers ought to develop a more real-
istic evaluation of what drives Afghan politics. The state’s weakness is not limited 
to actually enforcing laws; on a more basic level, it also needs to change social 
norms in the heads of people. This points to vital characteristics well beyond a 
state’s functional side – and this, in turn, ought to foster recognition of what ex-
ternal meddling may or may not achieve. The functional side of the state may or 
may not be addressed, but international policy ought to abstain from aiming at the 
mental re-education of non-Western societies.
It is within this template that organized crime is understood as a menace to so-
cieties, neatly defining and demarcating spheres of legality or illegality. This may 
turn out to be a fiction upon closer look, however. For one, criminal structures 
are often well-woven into the economic patterns of Western consolidated state-
hood. The non-Western, post-conflict criminal activity follows logical patterns of 
economic incentives and barriers of regulation. While, in Afghanistan, corrup-
tion and disruptive influences exerted by the one-sided empowerment of certain 
groups that rely on the heavy influx of funds are still seen as undesirable by many 
in Afghan society, the occasional bribe and opportunistic use of economic struc-
tures are regular features of life for most. 
This should not be viewed as cultural flaw, weak character, or backwards men-
tality, as Johnson convincingly argues at the end of his book: “Afghans are not cul-
turally determined in their actions, but are reactive and adaptive. Their operations 
are shaped and influenced by a cultural ‘lens’, but they are also pragmatic” (John-
son 2011, 305). Lacking a lens of European statehood (and also many of its flaws), 
what may look from such a perspective like transnational organized crime may at 
the same time appear acceptable, if not normal, from a non-Western perspective. 
In Afghanistan, the newspaper Cheragh’s assertion that Western efforts to reduce 
opium production was a failure rang true with many: “[b]ecause the British [as 
key partner for opium reduction] cannot reduce the 90% demand of its citizens 
for Afghanistan’s opium in their own country [...] they are trying to find a pretext 
and evade responsibility rather than find a solution” (quoted in Shayer 2008, 8). 
Rather than pointing fingers, Western actors should carefully balance donor pri-
orities and local pressures rising in the face of the prospective decline in rentier 
income (Suhrke 2011, 232). To do that, it might be worth considering transnational 
organized crime and transnational disorganized order as parts of one continuum 
rather than as polar binaries.
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2.2 “MIRED IN DECEP TION” —
 NARCOTICS AND POLITICS IN AFGHANISTAN 
by Christoph Reuter*
I. Introduction
Since the arrival of US troops in Afghanistan in 2001, and later multinational 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops, the production of narcotics in 
the Hindu Kush has increased enormously. It is an amazing contradictory phe-
nomenon that 10 years of well-funded counternarcotics activities have seen un-
precedented levels of poppy and heroin production. Despite declarations to combat 
illegal drug production, the intervention even seems to have facilitated the poppy 
business. Today, Afghanistan is the supplier of more than 90 percent of global 
opium production – a position it only reached after the intervention of interna-
tional troops. This study tries to explain why and how this happened. 
In 2008, Thomas Schweich, a disillusioned former head of US counternarcot-
ics efforts in Afghanistan, summed up his experience: 
At the beginning of 2006, I went to the high-profile London Conference on Afghanistan. It 
was a grand event mired in deception. Everyone from the Afghan delegation and most in the 
international community knew that poppy cultivation and heroin production would increase 
significantly in 2006. But the delegates to the London Conference instead dwelled on the 
2005 harvest, which was lower than that of 2004, principally because of poor weather 
and market manipulation by drug lords like Sher Muhammad Akhundzada, who had been 
the governor of [...] Helmand province and then a member of Afghanistan’s Parliament. 
(Schweich 2008) 
Official statements about narcotics in Afghanistan have often focused on the 
Taliban as being the main beneficiaries of the drug business, claiming a nexus 
between drug money and terror finance. This argument tends to overlook the 
deep involvement of Afghan government officials in the same trade. This study 
draws on classified documents of the US government (published 2011 by Wikile-
aks), “NATO secret” reports of the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif, intelligence 
* Christoph Reuter is a journalist writing for Der Spiegel and other publications.
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reports,1 “province profiles” as well as multiple interviews with experts in Kabul 
to describe the nature of this connection. The drug industry has permeated every 
sector of Afghanistan’s power system. While insurgents are involved mainly in 
poppy farming and the domestic trade, the lucrative heroin refining and cross-
border smuggling are mostly controlled by those forces that control the border 
areas, that is, the border police, powerful militia commanders allied to Western 
troops, governors, or their proxies. 
As this study will show, there is no such thing as an organized effort to curb 
the poppy business. In the cold light of day, many counternarcotics efforts of the 
Afghan government turn out to be fights with rivals over market shares. And even 
the international military forces openly follow a policy of neglecting counternar-
cotics for winning over Afghan powerbrokers as well as peasants. If production 
levels decreased in some of the past years (as was the case in 2009 and 2010), this 
was not due to effective counternarcotics policies, but to surplus production that 
the global consumer market could not absorb.
Today, the issue of Afghanistan’s narcotics industry has practically disap-
peared from the international agenda. It was hardly mentioned, for instance, in 
the Afghanistan conference in early December 2011 in Bonn, Germany – and this 
despite the fact that the narcotics trade remains the biggest single source of in-
come in the Afghan economy. Tackling the issue of narcotics with more integrity 
would not immediately change the situation. But to ignore reality and to intention-
ally mislead decision-makers in parliaments and governments will only lead to a 
further increase in trafficking and the undermining of governmental structures 
in Afghanistan.
Research methodolog y
This study was compiled with the help of researchers in nine provinces. They 
conducted interviews with poppy farmers, drug dealers, and counternarcotics of-
ficials. Further sources are interviews the author conducted with UN, Western 
embassy, and NATO officials, as well as with Afghan government officials. The 
study also draws on extensive research of media reports, academic studies, and 
classified documents of diplomats and the military. 
Some of the 85 prominent figures who play leading roles in the Afghan drug 
business and were identified are mentioned in this study, but their names are 
withheld for security reasons.
Chapters 
The study starts by going back to the historical roots of opium and, subsequently, 
heroin production in Afghanistan. Chapter III gives an overview of the processes 
involved in the drug industry: from farming to trading, stocking, refining, and 
1 | For example, the Swedish NATO secret report “Critical Infrastructure Protection Proj-
ect” from Sept. 11, 2011.
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cross-border trafficking. Chapter IV portraits the main beneficiaries of the drug 
industry and compares the role of the Taliban versus government officials. Chap-
ter V analyses the counternarcotics efforts of the Afghan government and illus-
trates the conflicting agendas of various Western actors in Afghanistan in terms 
of counternarcotics policies. 
II. How it all began — the historic context
Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan dates back centuries, but until the 1970s it was 
confined to a few areas and used only for the local consumption of opium and was 
not to be refined into heroin or trafficked internationally. Large-scale smuggling 
and the processing emerged during the time of the mujahedin resistance to the 
Soviet occupation after 1979. According to US historian Alfred W. McCoy, who 
has published extensively on international drug trafficking, the new business was 
initially controlled by the Pakistani intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI) – and tolerated by its US counterpart, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
Both secret services cooperated during the Cold War in supporting the fight of 
the mujahedin against the Soviet Army and the communist Afghan government. 
With the profits from the trade, the ISI financed “separatist movements in In-
dia and the civil war in Afghanistan” (McCoy 2003, 649). Pakistani army trucks 
brought CIA-delivered weapons to the border and returned loaded with heroin.2 
Hizb-i Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a US ally at the time and now one 
of their fiercest enemies, reportedly was one of the first Afghans to run his own 
heroin laboratories (McCoy 2003, 621). 
The former CIA director of the Afghan operation, Mr. Charles Cogan, later ad-
mitted turning a blind eye on the drug trade. In 1995, he told Australian television 
in an interview: “Our main mission was to do as much damage [as possible] to the 
Soviets. We didn’t really have the resources or the time to devote to an investiga-
tion of the drug trade. [...] There was fallout in terms of drugs, yes, but the main 
objective was accomplished. The Soviets left Afghanistan” (Chossudowsky 2001).
After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989, opium cultivation contin-
ued, as the mujahedin factions financed their civil war with drug money. One of 
the major drug lords at the time was the Jihadi commander Mullah Nasim Akhun-
dzada from Helmand. His son, who became the first governor of Helmand under 
President Hamid Karzai’s government, inherited his drug networks. 
During the time of the Taliban regime (1996–2001), the radical Islamic move-
ment pursued a contradictory policy on drugs: They banned the consumption of 
drugs as haram (sin), but they initially did not object to the cultivation of opium. 
The head of the counternarcotics department of the Taliban in Kandahar, Abdul 
Rashid, argued that poppy – as opposed to hashish – was “only consumed by the 
2 | Documented by Lawrence Lifschultz in The Nation, 1988, quoted in McCoy (2003, 
621).
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Kafirs in the west, not by Afghans and Muslims” and could therefore be cultivated 
legally (McCoy 2003, 657). Presumably, the real reason was the enormous profits 
that could be reaped from the trade. From 1996 to 1999 the annual opium harvest 
increased from 2,250 tons to 4,600 tons. There is also evidence that the Taliban 
collaborated with members of the Northern Alliance – their enemies in the civil 
war – to transport the poppy harvest through enemy territory and up to the Tajik 
border. 
However, Taliban leader Mullah Omar tried to use a ban on poppy as a bar-
gaining chip in exchange for international diplomatic recognition. In July 2000 
he passed a religious edict declaring drug cultivation to be irreconcilable with the 
tenets of Islam. The ban was enforced vigorously and effectively in that season. For 
instance, in Nangarhar province, about 1,000 poppy farmers were arrested and 
jailed until they agreed to destroy their crops. A delegation of the United Nations 
International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) confirmed that cultivation in 
Taliban-controlled areas had come to a nearly complete stop.3 However, the inter-
national community did not grant the Taliban regime the anxiously awaited inter-
national recognition, but only $43 million as “humanitarian aid” (McCoy 2003, 
668).
Apart from politics, there was probably an economic reason for the ban. The 
stores of the poppy traders and farmers were full due to overproduction, caus-
ing a decline in prices. The ban resulted in a tenfold increase in prices (UNODC 
2006a). Thus, the move helped traders and stockholders become rich – especially 
those who had, due to insider knowledge, enlarged their stock at the right time. 
One of them later founded the Ansari Hawala scheme and the Afghan United 
Bank. At the same time, the ban had devastating effects on 3.3 million farmers, 
according to UNDCP estimates. 
After the fall of the Taliban, interim President Hamid Karzai asked for help 
at the Bonn conference in December 2001 to fight the drug trade and finance 
alternative livelihoods (McCoy 2003, 672). Shortly before the donors conference 
in Tokyo in January 2002, Karzai declared a ban on drug production; in 2004 he 
called for a “jihad” against drugs – but seven years on it is clear that all measures 
have utterly failed. 
III. The process
An explanation of the local cost-benefit chain (farming, harvesting, stocking)
Opium is an attractive cash crop for a number of reasons: It needs half as much 
water as wheat, brings several times its profit, can be easily transported, and even 
increases its value when stored. This is what makes any effort to curb it or replace 
it with other cash crops so difficult. Especially in Afghanistan, where large parts 
3 | Author’s interview with a Bernard Frahi, the regional director for the UN program in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Islamabad, July 2002.
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of the soil are only rain-fed, that is, without irrigation, the robust poppy plant that 
needs little water is an attractive choice.4 Still, growing poppy on irrigated land 
is even more profitable despite the higher costs. In the district of Koshka Kohna 
in Herat province, interviewed farmers estimated that they could harvest 7 to 10 
kg of Taryak (opium paste) at a cost of 5,000 afghani on one jirib (approximately 
200 sqm) of rain-fed land, while on irrigated soil they could harvest 15 to 20 kg of 
Taryak at a cost of 15,000 to 20,000 afghani. 
In comparison to wheat, a farmer in Nangarhar estimated that he earned three 
times more with poppy. Other crops such as, for example, strawberries require 
better roads as well as storage and cooling capacity. Roses require a complicated 
technical infrastructure to extract the oil and a highly disciplined workforce to 
harvest the petals immediately after flourishing, which remains a challenge.5 
Other high-value agricultural products often take a long time to mature. A pome-
granate orchard takes between six and nine years, almonds up to four years, and 
apricots up to five. In contrast, poppy takes just six months. 
This also means that poppy cultivation can be easily shifted to other areas, if 
pressure is locally increased. An example of this phenomenon is the district of 
Bakwa in Farah province, where cultivation rose from 39 ha in 2004 to 3,090 ha 
in 2008 (UNODC 2009a, 77). The dramatic increase was initiated by traders from 
neighboring Helmand province who offered advance payments as start-up capi-
tal to persuade farmers to grow opium.6 This points to another factor that draws 
farmers to poppy cultivation: the availability of low-interest credits. Especially af-
ter the Taliban cultivation ban, many farmers were dependent on loans and ad-
vance payments. In some areas such as in Farah province, traders have provided 
so called salam – loans without interest to poppy farmers. Such loans require the 
farmers to sell all their harvest exclusively to the trader who provided the loan – at 
the current market price of the time of the harvest. 
Poppy cultivation is a labor-intensive process. For harvesting, the capsules are 
lanced in the evening and a latex-like opium gum oozes out, which is gathered by 
hand the next morning. This process requires skilled labor. Therefore, apart from 
farmers and traders, a large pool of migrant workers is also part of the poppy econ-
omy. As research for this study shows, laborers in Farah and Takhar province, for 
instance, can earn 300 afghani per day (approx. $6–7), which is much more than 
is paid for other manual work. Many migrant workers travel across Afghanistan, 
following the harvest calendar from the south (April, May) up to Badakhshan in 
4 | According to the Afghan researchers for this report, who worked in nine provinces 
(Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Helmand, Farah, Herat, Kunar, Kandahar), and 
who interviewed farmers, local traders, and Afghan security personnel to get an in-depth 
overview of the local situation.
5 | Author’s interview with the Afghan and international staff of the rose-oil project of 
German Agro Action in Jalalabad, May 2011.
6 | According to local researchers, March 2011.
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the north (June, July) (UNODC 2009a, 95). Also, there seems to be a trend toward 
an increased division of labor, with specialized smugglers delivering the seeds 
from national centers to local markets. 
The profit a farmer or trader can make depends on his ability to stockpile 
opium in order to sell when prices are highest. Since 2001, Afghanistan’s opium 
production has consistently exceeded the entire global demand for opiates, despite 
all international efforts to stamp out the trade. According to the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in 2011 the stockpiled surplus was esti-
mated at 12,000 tons, or more than twice the world demand, which is estimated at 
3,700 to 4,400 tons a year. Since the fall of the Taliban, production in Afghanistan 
has consistently exceeded this demand, reaching 8,200 tons in a peak year like 
2007 (UNODC 2009a, 25). As a result of overproduction, the “farm-gate” price for 
opium paste realized by farmers has seen a dramatic decrease, from $425 in 2003 
to $64 in 2007 (UNODC 2009a, 95). After the crop failure in 2010 due to a blight 
that destroyed large parts of the harvest, the price rose significantly by 250 to 300 
percent within one year.7 
Seeing the obvious advantages of the poppy crop, an important question arises: 
Why are there certain areas with no cultivation? After all, opium is only cultivated 
on about 3 percent of the total agricultural land in Afghanistan (UNODC 2006b). 
According to local sources and counternarcotics officials in Kabul, religious senti-
ments are one of the main factors that discourage farmers from growing poppy. 
Many mullahs tell their constituents that poppy will curse their fields or that pil-
grimage paid with drug money will not be accepted by God.8 But other mullahs 
collect ushr (tax) from poppy farmers and declare it halal (legal), arguing that only 
infidels consume the drugs or that the drug money is used to wage a holy war 
against infidels. Other mullahs abstain from condemning poppy out of fear. As 
one mullah from Koshka Kohna district in Herat said: “It is not halal, but when I 
say this in public, the Taliban will kill me.” 
Transport, refining, and smuggling 
According to Afghan and foreign investigators, police officers, and ex-smugglers 
interviewed for this study, smugglers rarely use trails, mules, and clandestine 
routes, but main roads and official frontier crossing points into Iran, Pakistan, 
and Tajikistan, which are controlled by the police and the border police (UNODC 
2007, 139).9 A 2007 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) study 
on opiate flows concluded that approximately 70 percent of drug trafficking takes 
7 | Asia Times, June 21, 2010.
8 | According to local researcher, April 2011.
9 | As mentioned in the Taliban chapter: “70 percent of drug trafficking takes place along 
the main roads, sustained by the strong support and involvement of the local governmental 
authorities.” 
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place along the main roads, sustained by the strong support and involvement of 
the local governmental authorities (UNODC 2007). 
In some cases, police have even provided uniforms and police vehicles to 
smugglers in order to cover up their operations. This was confirmed, for instance, 
by testimonies against a former commander of the border police in Herat, General 
Malham Norozi Khan, who was arrested in May 2008 and sentenced for drug 
smuggling to 10 years in prison. In the hearing, one of his battalion commanders, 
identified as Gulbuddin, testified that the general provided a regional drug boss 
named Jalil Farahi with border police uniforms and a police pickup truck so he 
could transfer narcotics across the frontier unopposed. He said he had witnessed 
the drug boss giving $30,000 in cash to the general in return.10 In other cases, 
border police officials are bribed to allow smugglers to pass without being con-
trolled. 
While in the past, most of the raw opium was transported unprocessed across 
the border into Pakistan, Iran, and Tajikistan, for a few years now Afghan traf-
fickers have increased their profit share by establishing labs inside the country. 
The UN estimates that two-thirds of all Afghan opiate exports are now refined 
into morphine base or heroin domestically.11 Located in remote, mountainous bor-
der areas, the simple labs can be contained easily in any given compound, which 
makes them difficult to detect. However, the refining process requires a precur-
sor – mostly acetic anhydride is used. The substance has to be illegally imported 
at very high costs, mainly from Pakistan. While the international licit price for 
acetic anhydride is approximately $1–2 per liter, in Afghanistan prices have shot 
up over the past decade from $24 to $350 per liter. Although large quantities of the 
liquid are brought into Afghanistan, interdiction remains limited, as a study of 
the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit notes: “In order to produce the required 
volumes of heroin [380 metric tons per year], as much as 1,000 tons of acetic an-
hydride are needed to be smuggled into Afghanistan in 2008. The interdiction of 
14,233 liters in Afghanistan in 2008 remains marginal at a ratio of approximately 
1 percent” (AREU 2009). 
IV. The main beneficiaries 
As a UNODC report states: “The intermediaries are not only shady characters 
linked to international Mafias. They are also (i.) white collar Afghan officials, who 
take a cut by protecting the drug trade, as well as (ii.) religious fanatics and politi-
cal insurgents who do the same to finance their course.” (UNODC 2009a) This 
chapter looks at both groups of beneficiaries and analyzes their respective roles in 
the drug business. 
10 | According to the Afghan researcher from Herat.
11 | Author’s interview with UNODC officials, Kabul, April 2011.
2. Afghanistan98
The role of government-affiliated powerbrokers
Back in 2005, a team of the former Minister of the Interior, Ali Ahmad Jalali, com-
piled a list (or various lists, this remains unclear) of alleged drug traffickers that 
contained about 70 names, according to one source familiar with the list – while 
another source claimed only 35 names. Shortly afterwards, the minister resigned 
after complaining about the impunity of senior officials involved in drugs and 
corruption. According to US sources, most of the people on the list, if not dead, 
are still involved in the business and are simply too powerful to be arrested.12 The 
list included the president’s murdered brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who was the 
head of the provincial council of Kandahar and the unofficial ruler of the province. 
Other people on the list were Jan Mohammed Khan, the ex-governor of Uruzgan, 
and Gen. Daud Daud, the head of the Afghan National Police in the northern 
provinces – both of whom were killed in 2011. 
Similarly, the attorney general, Abdul Jabbar Sabit, told the then chief US 
counternarcotics official in Afghanistan, Thomas Schweich, that “he had a list of 
more than 20 senior Afghan officials who were deeply corrupt – some tied to the 
narcotics trade. He added that President Karzai – also a Pashtun – had directed 
him, for political reasons, not to prosecute any of these people.”13 Months later, 
Sabit was dismissed. In autumn 2011, he was kidnapped and disappeared without 
any demands for ransom, which indicates that he was probably killed.14 
This wide range of state actors involved in the drug trade is confirmed by the 
research for this study, which identified 85 prominent figures who play leading 
roles in either their province or nationwide. Only such persons have been included 
who were named by various sources. Their names are being withheld for fear of 
reprisal. 
Most of them had one thing in common: Apart from their drug business, they 
were also involved in licit businesses – and often worked as contractors for the US 
troops, ISAF, or the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This seems to be a 
deliberate strategy to protect themselves against prosecution. In Helmand, one 
trafficker,15 who is the biggest trader of the Sangin district, holds a contract to sup-
ply the 215th ANA Corps with all necessary goods as well as the border police in 
Spin Boldak. In the Shinkay district of Zabul province, another trafficker and big 
trader from Sangin is the main contractor for a US-funded road-building project. 
In Kandahar, yet another one holds a contract to supply the 205th ANA Corps as 
well as other contracts with the Ministry of Defense. A trafficker from Kanda-
har owns a construction company that is working on several US-funded projects 
at the Kandahar airport. And in Nimroz, a trafficker who originally comes from 
12 | Author’s interviews with counternarcotics officials from the United States, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, and Afghanistan, February – June 2011.
13 | New York Times Magazine, July 27, 2008.
14 | Interview with international law enforcement personnel, Kabul, November 2011.
15 | Traffickers are being anonymized for the protection of the researchers.
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Uruzgan has contracts to supply the border police and the ANA in Nimroz with 
food and other commodities. All these men have successfully developed an image 
among US and other ISAF officials of key allies in the war against the insurgency. 
Additional reasons to invest in those businesses are money laundering and 
other forms of camouflage: Construction companies, for example, have fewer 
problems importing chemicals needed for processing. Profits from the trade can 
be laundered in large construction projects. Several big smugglers who also have 
businesses in Dubai often use the profits from the smuggling to buy used cars in 
Dubai and ship them to Afghanistan to maintain a legal cover. 
Investigations into the trade are complicated by the fact that most financial 
transactions within the drug business are handled through hawala, an Islamic 
money transfer system that leaves hardly any paper trail. One of the wealthiest 
traffickers established the Ansari Hawala network and later founded the Afghan 
United Bank.16 About New Ansari, as the company was renamed, the US Treasury 
noted, it “used the billions of dollars it transferred in and out of Afghanistan to 
conceal illicit narcotics proceeds.”17
Case study: General Daud Daud, the “wolf in sheep’s clothing”
The relatively well-documented drug business of the deceased General Moham-
med Daud Daud offers a good insight into the linkages between criminal and 
government networks. Born in the northern province of Takhar in 1969, Daud 
was an associate of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the murdered leader of the Northern 
Alliance. Due to the supportive role of the Northern Alliance in the US invasion 
in late 2001, people like Daud were integrated into the new leadership of Afghani-
stan. In 2004, he was appointed Deputy Minister of the Interior – in charge of the 
Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan – despite his name being mentioned on 
an official list of the biggest drug traffickers in Afghanistan.18 
Daud used his new position to eliminate business competitors under the pre-
text of doing his duty to fight narcotics. This, for instance, was the case with a mid-
level trafficker from Daud’s home province of Takhar – the trafficker was arrested 
in 2006. Witnesses from the Ministry of the Interior claim that after his arrest, 
Daud’s family took over his business and he was released for $200,000 shortly 
afterwards. 
Another source who implicated Daud with the drug trade was the then head 
of the anti-drug squad of the Kunduz police. He told the Los Angeles Times in 
May 2005 that he saw traffickers arrested with up to 57 kg of heroin, only to be 
16 | According to the local researchers in Kandahar and Kabul.
17 | Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2011.
18 | According to two persons, one of which was involved in researching and compiling 
the list for the Ministry of the Interior, and the other authored the list; interviews in May and 
June 2011 in Kabul.
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released hours or days later without trial.19 Shortly after the report was published, 
he disappeared. Two sources familiar with the incident said British advisers to 
the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan scrambled to ensure the lieutenant’s 
safety, holding a meeting in which General Daud admitted ordering his arrest. 
In June 2005, a dealer named Sayyed Jan was arrested with 183 kg of heroin. A 
letter signed by Daud, dated March 15, 2005, urged the governor of Helmand prov-
ince to assist the dealer. The governor seemed to have obeyed the counternarcotics 
chief, as investigators found a letter from the governor telling the police chief to 
allow safe passage for said dealer.20 A relative of the dealer recalled a conversation 
in which he confided that he had paid the deputy minister $50,000 for permission 
to run a single convoy through his zone of control.21 Gen. Daud repeatedly denied 
his involvement. 
Western officials high up the chain of command were fully aware of the private 
drug business of the country’s head of counternarcotics police: “Better you have 
someone peeing out than peeing in,” a US official recalls from a conversation he 
had with Zalmay Khalilzad, the former US ambassador in Kabul.22 
In the meantime, Daud’s drug business continued. In 2008, according to 
the local researchers of this study, Daud personally negotiated with traffickers in 
Helmand to have 6,000 jirib of poppy fields exempted from eradication, for which 
he was paid $400,000. 
In 2010, Daud was promoted to become the highest police general in northern 
Afghanistan. Weeks before Daud’s assassination, a Western intelligence official in 
Kabul said that Daud had come clean: “He personally is no longer involved in the 
business. He wants to become a real politician, president if possible, and purge his 
record now. It’s only his one brother who does the smuggling business now and 
another brother who runs the alcohol smuggling from Uzbekistan.”23
The role of the Taliban 
The Taliban are also profiting from the drug business, but it is not the main source 
to finance the insurgency. UNODC officials as well as Afghan and Western coun-
ternarcotics experts all agree that the trade makes up for 8 to 12 percent of their 
budget (UNODC 2009a, 122). Other sources of income such as commissions from 
security companies guarding ISAF convoys, from construction companies, or ushr 
(tax) on other crops, are more important sources of income. 
The Taliban are mostly benefitting in two ways from the drug trade: They col-
lect ushr from the farmers, 10 percent of their harvest, and they take a percentage 
from owners of drug laboratories and smugglers for protecting them – and, ac-
19 | Los Angeles Times, May 28, 2005.
20 | Globe and Mail, March 21, 2009.
21 | Ibid.
22 | Author’s interview, Kabul October 2010.
23 | Interview with international police investigator, Kabul, April 2011.
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cording to one source, to make sure that in Pakistan the business partners pay for 
the shipments, “They function like an insurance company.”24
No one knows the Taliban’s exact income from poppy cultivation. A US Senate 
report estimated an amount of $70 million per year, UNODC puts its estimates 
at $100 to $400 million,25 while a German government report calculates $80 mil-
lion26 – less than 10 percent of the overall business, which amounts to between 
$1.6 and $1.9 billion (UNODC 2009b). 
But for the Taliban, the opium cultivation generates a different profit than just 
money: political support. According to numerous reports, confirmed by the inter-
views conducted for this study, the Taliban use the governmental threat of eradica-
tion to offer protection – in exchange for support and loyalty. They acknowledge 
this openly: “This is a good opportunity for the Taliban to win local support. Our 
Taliban are ready to go anywhere in Helmand to help people fight the eradication 
campaign.”27 Farmers in Helmand confirmed that poppy eradication has played a 
significant role in pushing locals into the hands of the insurgency in order to safe-
guard their income. In the district of Marja, known as the focus of the American 
offensive in 2010, a farmer says: “The Taliban have already promised us that they 
will keep fighting the government and foreign forces until we collect our harvest 
from the fields.”28 
V. Counternarcotics efforts
Counternarcotics efforts were one of the earliest demands of foreign governments 
after the US-led intervention in October 2001, and from the beginning, President 
Karzai declared the “war on drugs” a top priority of his government.29 This chap-
ter analyzes the announcements by international actors and the Afghan govern-
ment to fight poppy cultivation – and why they all failed. 
The role of ISAF and Western government agencies 
Within ISAF as well as among the military and civilian organizations, there were 
conflicting agendas that prevented a coherent strategy from the start. On the one 
hand, there were those who argued for an aggressive campaign against drug culti-
vation, including aerial spraying and even targeted killings of kingpins. After the 
24 | Interview with Afghan counternarcotics official, Kabul, April 2011.
25 | Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 111th Congress second session, 
“U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan,” July 2010.
26 | Spiegel online, October 11, 2010.
27 | Washington Post, January 4, 2011.
28 | New York Times, March 20, 2010.
29 | Karzai reiterated this promise once again at the International Afghanistan Confer-
ence in Bonn on December 5, 2011, whereas the European governments (except for Russia) 
and the United States did not stress this point.
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resurgence on of the Taliban in 2006, this camp emphasized the link between the 
drug trade and terror financing, creating and circulating the pleasant fiction that 
mainly the Taliban were benefitting from the illegal business. On the other hand, 
there were those who saw eradication campaigns as a danger for their “hearts and 
minds campaign,” fearing that affected farmers would turn to the Taliban. And 
there were those who argued against taking on militia leaders and members of the 
ANSF because they were important allies in the counterinsurgency. 
The assumption that drug business and insurgency were two sides of the same 
coin was promoted by the journalist and author Gretchen Peters in her book Seeds 
of Terror (Peters 2009) and became a prominent narrative among US officials in 
Washington. For instance, when US President Barack Obama unveiled his first 
strategy for Afghanistan, he said that the country’s economy “is undercut by a 
booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency.”30
In 2008, US General John Cradock, NATO’s supreme allied commander, 
pressed for a more aggressive counternarcotics approach, saying that NATO had 
“recognized a clear nexus between drug trafficking and insurgency.”31 Cradock 
pushed for a resolution at the NATO summit in Budapest in October 2008, giv-
ing ISAF soldiers the authorization to attack Afghan traffickers. In August 2009, 
50 Afghans who were believed to be drug traffickers with ties to the Taliban were 
placed on the “joint integrated prioritized target list” to be captured or killed.32 
However, Cradock’s approach met with fierce resistance from within ISAF. 
The German General Egon Ramms, head of the NATO command center in 
Brunssum and responsible for Afghanistan, as well as General David McKiernan, 
ISAF supreme commander in Kabul, vehemently questioned the legality of Cra-
dock’s proposal, warning that it would “violate international law and rules govern-
ing armed conflict.”33
Ramms argued against a role of the military in counternarcotics efforts in 
general. He said: “We would infuriate more Afghans against the US and endan-
ger our mission – which is to fight the insurgency, not the drugs.”34 Even the 
US administration in Washington was split over the issue: The State Department 
endorsed it vehemently, Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke argued against it, and 
the Pentagon was divided internally. As the chief US counternarcotics official in 
Afghanistan, Thomas Schweich noted: 
In 2006, Benjamin Freakley, the two-star US general who ran the eastern front, shut down 
all operations by the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] and Afghan counternarcotics police 
30 | Associated Press, March 30, 2009.
31 | Spiegel online, January 28, 2009.
32 | New York Times, August 10, 2009.
33 | For David McKiernan: New York Times, February 12, 2009; for Egon Ramms: Stern, Nr. 
2/2009, interview by the author.
34 | Interview with the author, Mazar-e Sharif, Dezember 2008.
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in Nangarhar – a key heroin-trafficking province. The general said that anti-drug operations 
were an unnecessary obstacle to his military operations.35
The British forces in Helmand went as far as issuing leaflets and bought radio 
advertisements telling the local criminals that the British military was not part 
of the anti-poppy efforts, despite Britain being the lead nation within the counter-
narcotics efforts.36 
When it comes to prosecutions, a number of kingpins have been arrested by, or 
with the help of, US officials. All of them were closely related to the Taliban – or co-
operated with them. However, other powerful business operators like Daud (killed 
in 2011), Commander Raziq, Matiullah Khan, and Ahmed Wali Karzai (killed in 
2011) were left untouched for obvious reasons: The international troops were de-
pendent upon their cooperation, as the same people who trade drugs also operate 
security and construction companies, run police operations, and command proxy 
militias. Brigadier General Jonathan Vance, the Canadian commander of ISAF 
forces in Kandahar province, told a reporter about the then border police chief 
of Spin Boldak (the current provincial police chief of Kandahar) General Abdul 
Raziq: 
We are completely aware that there are a number of illicit activities being run out of that 
border station. He runs effective security ops that are designed to make sure that the busi-
ness end of his life runs smoothly, and there is a collateral effect on public order. Ideally, 
it should be the other way around. The tragedy of Kandahar is that it’s hard to find that 
paragon of civic vir tue. (Aikins 2009)
Afghan government’s counternarcotics efforts
The various counternarcotics approaches of the Afghan government (worked out 
in cooperation with international experts) sounded nice on paper but were never 
meant to function – all their “pillars” were turned into dysfunctional structures 
(judicial reform), into half-hearted measures (alternative livelihood), or into the 
opposite of their intentions (crop eradication, which was used mainly as a tool to 
stop competing farmers without sufficient links to powerbrokers or as a method 
to extract bribes from farmers). 
International money was not the problem – but rather the unwillingness of 
Afghan authorities on all levels to implement counternarcotics measures against 
their own economic interests. The British government, which spearheaded the 
fight against drugs, had pledged more than 850 million pounds, about $1.7 billion, 
for the period from 2002 to 2009.37
35 | Ibid. 
36 | Ibid.
37 | Interviews with the author, 2010/2011.
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Most of the pledged assistance went into the pockets of government officials 
and police officers and never reached its destination. Farmers who tried to plant, 
for example, saffron, wheat, or strawberries were left without the promised sup-
port in terms of fertilizers, financial aid, and seeds. For instance, in 2002 the Brit-
ish government promised to pay $1,750 for each hectare of voluntarily destroyed 
poppy cultivation in Helmand. But, according to Afghan journalists, the farmers 
“never received” the money. Nevertheless, 10,000 hectares were officially account-
ed for and $17.5 million went into the pockets of corrupt officials. “This strength-
ened the enmity against the British troops.”38 The Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting wrote in 2010 that “According to a UN source, almost $500 million have 
been given to alternative livelihood programs over the past two years.” But the 
counternarcotics ministry, whose job it is to implement the programs, denied that 
any such program was in place. A ministry spokesman told the reporter, “Poppy 
cultivation is a crime and we have no plans to reward criminals by giving them 
alternative crops” (IWPR 2010). 
Similarly, eradication campaigns were undermined by corruption and enraged 
the population. This is confirmed by a report of UNODC: 
In an environment of poor governance, weak capacity, and lack of rule of law, the significant 
albeit patchy eradication effor ts [...] are a vehicle for corruption, with farmers being forced 
to pay in order not to have their opium poppy crop eradicated, police confiscating drugs 
and then selling them on and/or returning part of the seizure in return for a payment... 
(UNODC 2006b) 
Eradication campaigns have been limited to a very small total of the poppy-
cultivated land. For instance, in 2008–2009, less than 4 percent of plants was 
eradicated, according to UNODC. The real numbers are likely to be even lower, 
as many government officials tended to report higher numbers to pretend suc-
cess. For instance, the governor of Helmand in 2006 stated that 7,000 hectares of 
poppy cultivation had been eradicated. Western observers estimated the number 
to be around 1,000 hectares.39 A farmer from Nangarhar province describes how 
numbers are being inflated: 
The police come, they destroy the most visible fields close to the main road and say, “We 
have eradicated 10 jirib!” But that is not true, only one jirib was destroyed, the head of the 
village or the militia commander make a deal with them and pay them. The villages even 
make deals with the police to bring in people who pretend to fight so the police have an 
excuse for not eradicating, while the others finish the harvest. This is like a game. 
38 | Local official, according to: die tageszeitung, February 20, 2010.
39 | Interview with former UNODC investigator, Kabul, April 2011.
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While farmers whose poppies were eradicated did suffer losses, many traders who 
still have stocks of poppy paste, benefitted from the campaigns. As a trafficker in 
Helmand declared, “If they don’t destroy poppy, I am afraid the price will come 
down” (IWPR 2007). Ironically, the biggest decrease of production in the past 
10 years was not the result of any counternarcotics efforts, but of a blight that 
destroyed much of the harvest in 2010.40 This resulted in a price hike and a dra-
matic increase in production levels the following year. According to UNODC, at 
least four formerly poppy-free provinces saw a “strong increase.” This shows that a 
temporary slump of production is not sustainable in Afghanistan, as long as coun-
ternarcotics measures are “treated as a parallel policy or strand of activity” and not 
“integrated within the wider process of state building and economic development” 
as demanded by David Mansfield and Adam Pain, two known experts on rural 
economy (AREU 2008). 
Likewise, little has been achieved on the prosecution side for two reasons: the 
complicity of the police and the protection of perpetrators by political networks up 
to the highest levels of government. As UNODC states, “‘The majority of police 
chiefs are involved,’ stated a senior professional police officer, ‘if you are not, you 
will be threatened to be killed and replaced.’ [...] A judge agreed: ‘The top drug 
dealers are beyond the law. No one can touch them.’” (UNODC 2006b)
Two examples: In December 2005 British troops found nine metric tons of opi-
um in the compound of Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, the governor of Helmand. 
Instead of being prosecuted (after he was dismissed due to British pressure), he 
was appointed to the upper house of the Afghan parliament. His younger brother 
was appointed as deputy to the new governor of Helmand, overseeing the family’s 
business. President Karzai also pardoned five border policemen who were caught 
with 124 kg of heroin in their border police vehicle – the five had been under 
surveillance by a special task force, which was established with millions of dol-
lars from the US government. One of the five was a nephew of a close ally of the 
president, who had organized his reelection campaign in 2009.41 
International actors have often claimed that it is hard to prove the involvement 
of government officials in the drug trade, but cables of the US embassy in Kabul, 
published by Wikileaks in 2011, show clearly that as early as 2005, US officials had 
in-depth knowledge of the systematic involvement of government officials in the 
drug trade. 
For instance (excerpts): 
E.O. 12958 N/A: “Since 2003, General Abdul Khalil Andarabi has been leading 
a government condoned drug cartel known as the North and Northeast Highway 
Police Brigade (also known as Second Brigade), controlling the roads and much of 
the narco-trafficking from Faryab to Badakhshan provinces.” 
40 | die tageszeitung, October 1, 2010.
41 | Cable Reference ID 09KABUL2246, 2009-08-06, 05:05, Classification SECRET, Ori-
gin Embassy Kabul.
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“The recurrent theme in the northeast region remains Kabul’s lack of political 
will to remove known warlords and drug traffickers from office, especially police 
chiefs.”42
Needless to say that all officers and other power brokers mentioned in the 
cable still hold prominent positions within the Afghan government. Even when 
successful counternarcotics operations took place, they were often motivated not 
by fighting the drug business per se, but by clearing up the market and remov-
ing competitors. The few people in the Afghan government who seriously fought 
the narcotics business were removed sooner or later: General Sadat as head of the 
counternarcotics department in the Ministry of Interior; General Khodaidad as 
Minister for Counternarcotics. The latter is one of the very few people who agreed 
to be quoted regarding his experience: “The government was never really inter-
ested to arrest or even only to stop the big smugglers – because they were acting 
from within the government or had close relations to the ruling people.”43 
By now, Western support for Afghan counternarcotics has stalled, and the 
topic has been taken off the agenda. As one frustrated Western law-enforcement 
official in Kabul noted in April 2011, “most have given up on counternarcotics, 
since there are no successes to be expected.”44 Jean-Luc Lemahieu, the Kabul rep-
resentative of UNODC, said in early 2011: “In fact drugs didn’t even make it onto 
the list of Afghanistan’s 22 top issues from last year’s conference of the Afghan 
government and donors in Kabul.”45
VI. Conclusion
Afghanistan is not a narco state. It is a narco imbroglio, since the trafficking is 
better organized than the state itself. The business permeates all levels of society 
and all political factions, which, under other circumstances, are in deadly conflict 
with each other. 
The 10-year presence of the international forces in Afghanistan has not helped 
to curb this illegal business. In fact, it has rather contributed to its flourishing – 
due to questionable strategies informed by false assumptions and due to conflict-
ing agendas of various international actors. The false assumption that the insur-
gency is mostly funded by the drug business has drawn attention away from the 
much larger involvement of government actors in the trade. 
This bias is also the result of a dependence of the international forces on 
shady government officials linked to the drug trade. Big drug traders have actively 
42 | Cable Reference ID 05KABUL5181, 2005-12-20, 12:12, Classification UNCLAS-
SIFIED, Subject: “KUNDUZ POLITICS OF CORRUPTION IN THE BAGHLAN,” Origin Embassy 
Kabul.
43 | Interview with General Khodaidad in Kabul, June 2011.
44 | Several interviews by the author in Kabul, 2010/2011.
45 | Interview by the author, Kabul, May 2011.
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sought a protective cover by infiltrating businesses that are central to ISAF and the 
ANSF, such as private security, logistics, and reconstruction services. The bigger 
the presence of international forces in Afghanistan, the bigger their vulnerability 
to attacks, cuts in their supply lines – and thus to blackmail. 
At the same time, selective eradication campaigns undermined by corruption 
and the lack of alternative livelihoods have played into the hands of the Taliban, 
who managed to recommend themselves as protection guards against a corrupt 
police force. In this regard, counternarcotics efforts have undermined state-build-
ing efforts in Afghanistan. 
The opium business contributes more than 50 percent to the Afghan economy. 
The country needs viable economic alternatives far beyond limited alternative live-
lihood programs. The Afghan population is by far too large to be fed with legal ag-
ricultural products only. And to transform Afghanistan’s economy in a way so that 
it can compete with its more industrialized neighbors in the mid-term is some-
thing hard to imagine. To offer a comparable income, Afghanistan either would 
need a competitive industry, or a better infrastructure for agriculture, or a larger 
number of educated migrants who provide revenues from outside. None of these 
factors apply to the situation in Afghanistan so far. Economically, the situation will 
become worse once the international community pulls out its troops, with large 
parts of the legal economy depending on the service demands and employment 
their presence generates.
With the withdrawal of the international troops, the current equation of power 
is likely to collapse. As long as it is not clear who will rule the country in the fu-
ture, no decisive steps against the most lucrative business can be expected. Ironi-
cally though, after the withdrawal, which will reduce the capacity of the traders 
to blackmail the international community, pressure to fight the drug trade can be 
more easily applied. 
Glossar y
ANA: Afghan National Army
ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces, i.e. ANA, ANP, ANCOP, etc.
ANP: Afghan National Police 
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration (US gov. counternarcotics agency)
Halal: permitted by religious standards
Haram: not permitted by religious standards
Hawala: A traditional form of financial transaction without leaving any paper 
trail behind. Agents of a big hawala banker or partners contact each other 
by phone to disburse a payment made to the other contact person
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force of NATO in Afghanistan 
ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s intelligence service
Jirib: unit of land measurement, approximately 2,000 sqm, one-fifth of a hectare
Kafir: infidel
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Malik: local authority
Marab: The person traditionally responsible for coordinating the water distri-
bution in villages
Salam: A common form of advance payment where the amount is provided for 
a future harvest at an already fixed, normally low price
Taryak: the dried opium paste that is later refined into morphine and heroin
Ulama: Islamic religious scholars
UNDCP: United Nations International Drug Control Programme, predecessor 
of UNODC
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Ushr: traditional tax, 10 percent of the harvest or profit
Zakat: obligatory Islamic alms, the percentage varies 
2.3 HOW TO FIGHT CORRUP TION IN AFGHANISTAN: 
 A COMMUNIT Y PROJECT E X AMPLE
Interview with Yama Torabi, 
Executive Director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA)
Q: What is the relation between corruption and transnational organized crime in Af-
ghanistan?
In the past years there has been a policy of patronage and accommodation – of put-
ting former warlords into power. This patronage means that there is an environ-
ment for corruption to thrive. Some of these former warlords are people who have 
been accommodated by the power in order to create a kind of stability and peace. 
Because they feel protected since they are still active in the political arena and 
within the political elite, many would commit crimes such as kidnapping or drug 
trafficking, or other typical organized crimes, in connection with corruption and 
patronage. Patronage per se is not a crime, but it creates an environment where 
the actors who are working for the state or who are involved in the international 
military or aid system can abuse the power they get. 
Q: What is the focus of your anticorruption activities?
In Afghanistan organized crime is widespread, however the typical crimes con-
nected to transnational organized crime, such a human and drug trafficking, are 
already tackled by international agencies operating in the country, such as the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Development Programme, and the UN High 
Comissioner for Refugees. We decided to fight corruption because it had not been 
addressed before, and that although it is a big issue in Afghanistan affecting a 
large part of society.
Q: What is the involvement of people in anticorruption – and in the community-based 
monitoring programs?
We started community-based monitoring programs because the state was absent. 
Such programs provide for citizen oversight over different types of things, service 
deliveries for instance. The implementation of aid is another area. What we basi-
cally do is encourage the community to reduce these gaps in oversight: Instead of 
having the government oversee things, we encourage the communities that are 
present in an area that benefits from a service to go and monitor the projects. This 
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would happen for infrastructural projects such as schools, clinics, roads, but we 
also apply this to justice. People go to courts, they attend trials, and they monitor 
the performance of the judiciary. They look into the very basic procedures a trial is 
supposed to follow. This approach will improve the delivery of justice. 
These programs are pretty effective, because in an environment where there 
is almost no presence of the state in terms of fighting corruption, the community 
can play a very effective role. We have been able to improve 50 percent of the 
infrastructural projects, because people are able to detect problems and address 
them. But the impacts may even go beyond that 50 percent. It is actually difficult 
to measure the efficiency of the programs because we prevent acts of abuse and 
corruption, and we are not able to account for the preventive part of the programs. 
I also personally think that our impact is a lot more than that. These programs 
transform communities and towns into active agents of change – integrity cham-
pions who will move ahead and ask for accountability in other areas.
The program works with communities of the four provinces of Nangarhar, 
Balkh, Herat, and Parwan with the aim of monitoring reconstruction projects. 
This program started in 2008 with 12 communities, and, over the years, has 
grown due to its success in empowering citizens to play an active role in pro-
moting integrity and accountability. Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) instructs 
the community-elected monitors on integrity and engineering. The communi-
ty-based monitoring, although not highly technical, has the advantage that the 
monitors are present during the construction cycle, and they are more capable of 
identifying irregularities.
Typically, 90 percent of development projects are funded by international aid, 
yet they have failed in Afghanistan because there is no meaningful independent 
monitoring. With the country’s security situation being a major problem, donors 
are not able to ensure that the projects that they fund in the provinces will be im-
plented according to plan. What IWA does is to make up for the deficiencies and 
oversights of the donors through accountability measures that are provided by the 
communities on a voluntary basis and are free of cost. We do not pay people, since 
we consider this work to be part for a civic undertaking – a duty for each citizen. 
This program has been very successful. The infrastructural projects we monitor 
are the basis for delivering public services, such as schools, clinics, roads, etc. 
These services are essential for the community, and the infrastructure projects 
need to remain in the best condition for as long as possible in order to reduce the 
costs of maintenance, which are usually paid for by the Afghan state, meaning by 
the communities themselves, and not by the donors.
India has created this model of community monitoring and has disseminated 
it. In Uganda communities monitor the budgets of such infrastructural projects. 
In many places in the world people will monitor the presence of teachers in order 
to prevent phantom teachers. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, people are monitoring 
the delivery of social services, meaning that people get their pension and retire-
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ment money from the state. In case this does not happen, they act at a high level, 
and by doing so they manage to improve the lives of millions of people.
Q: What is the social perception of corruption in Afghanistan?
Corruption is perceived as a problem. People are experiencing it on a daily basis, 
and the issue is that they are not able to effectively fight against it when it is at a 
higher level, like at the national or provincial level, where people of great influence 
and power are involved. Thus, what we do with our programs is to empower the 
communities, give them access and resources, and thus help them to put pres-
sure on some powerful people not to commit of corruption. Technically, it is a 
preventive approach. We are able to make changes because people are aware of 
the problem of corruption. They have empirical evidence corruption, even though 
they do not have the analytical understanding of the issue. And they condemn it. 
This is why we have succeeded, so far, in operating with the communities. Over 
the four years that we have implemented this community monitoring program, no 
community has abandoned the project.
Q: What is the role of the international community in this?
The international community should help Afghanistan in fighting corruption, 
however the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and other UN trea-
ties, such as on Human Rights, still give the responsibility for implementation to 
the national authorities. Therefore, fighting corruption easily becomes a problem 
of sovereignty, and it gives local authorities a pretext for not tackling corruption 
at an international level. I believe the international community should have done 
– and could do – a lot more. The donors fund the development budget of the Af-
ghan government in its entirety, and 75 percent of the aid money that is spent in 
Afghanistan comes directly from donors. The donors face the same corruption 
problems as the Afghan state. We can not just blame Afghanistan. The interna-
tional community has its own responsibilities. The fight against corruption starts 
with accountability and transparency, yet the international organizations operat-
ing here are totally opaque and non-transparent. If you ask for basic information, 
like how they spend their money, or which current projects are going on, it is 
very hard to receive any answers. This is typically the case for most UN agencies, 
which have been active in the country since 2001. Similarly, billions of US dollars, 
donated by US agencies and to be spent in Afghanistan, are unaccounted for and 
we do not know how they have been spent.
If you look at the aid coming from outside, 90 percent of the aid money spent 
in Afghanistan comes from the United States, be it for military or civilian aims. If 
you look at the companies that are being awarded infrastructure contracts, those 
that invested a lot on lobbying the US Congress: These companies have a lot of 
power. In terms of costs, they are more expensive, ten times more expensive com-
pared to local companies. A lot of money is indeed wasted or kept for corporate 
profits, instead of really being invested in the projects. Money is spent on huge 
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salaries for those that oversee employees. I have seen one case of an expatriate in 
Afghanistan who was getting $60,000 a month.
Q: What should be the role of the media?
The media could help a lot because they are the eyes through which we look at 
corruption; they are responsible for informing citizens about these issues. They 
can play a role in terms of transparency. Investigative journalism should highlight 
cases that, otherwise, would remain unknown. At the moment there is a lack of 
capacity because many journalists are very young and do not have the capacities 
to investigate. Moreover, the media are organized in factions reflecting political 
and ethnic divides. Most of the media groups belong to either commanders, or 
political parties, or influential figures, like the patrons of Afghan politics. There-
fore, they cannot independently cover the issue of high-level corruption and often 
the reports are biased. The content in terms of information and the analysis you 
expect from the media is not there. For this reason many people do not watch tele-
vision, do not read newspapers because they cannot expect free information. This 
is a big problem in Afghanistan. We try to work with the few media organizations 
–five or six –that are known for being independent and professional, in order to 
advance the cause of anti-corruption.
Q: Do young people participate in anti-corruption programs?
The younger generations are not involved in anti-corruption. The typical activist 
profile is of a man, although women are starting to play a greater role. Youths face 
corruption but they are not organized to fight it. We are trying to work with youth 
organizations because often the mere denunciation of the problem is not enough. 
There is a need to take action to reduce the space and opportunities for corrup-
tion, but so far the the activism of young people has not been directed toward 
anti-corruption. One good example of involving the youth is the anti-corruption 
race that was launched last year. This increases the awareness of the youth by even 
physically engaging them in this activity.
Q: How about tax evasion in Afghanistan?
Tax evasion is a big issue in Afghanistan, but there is little information on this. 
I see many companies that are not paying taxes because there is no verification. 
For example, construction companies should pay taxes on the import of materials, 
but usually there is no possibility to verify this except by sending an investigator 
or auditor, but until now this has not been done. Companies thus under-declare 
the amount of money they pay to employees or simply declare fewer employees 
than they actually have. In Kandahar Province in Afghanistan, the government 
doesn’t have much control. Moreover, the officials who work at the border in the 
war on terror are allied with the coalition and the patronage network that domi-
nates the region, and therefore customs duties are not being paid. The head of 
2.3 How to Fight Corruption in Afghanistan: A Community Project E xample 113
anti-corruption in Afghanistan recently said that very many people in the region 
do not pay taxes.
If you look at the Afghan economy, you can see that it is mostly based on im-
ports: Around $400 million worth of goods are exported and $8 billion worth 
of goods are imported. It is an urgent problem and it is also underreported. The 
customs offices are the most corrupt institutions in Afghanistan, so people pay 
bribes and everything goes underreported. The former head of the anti-corruption 
unit once gave me the figures from Dubai in the Emirates – exports to Afghani-
stan totaled $2 billion in 2011 and the figure recorded by the Afghan government 
was $500 million, four times less. That means that the importers paid at least 
four times less customs duties than what they were supposed to. And this is an 
example of tax evasion on products coming from only one country, the United 
Arab Emirates.
Cape Town, April 18, 2012
Verena Zoppei
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3.1 BL ACK ECONOMY IN INDIA AND TR ANSNATIONAL 
 ORGANIZED CRIME: UNDERMINING DEMOCR ACY
by Arun Kumar*, **
1. Definitional aspects
Illegality typically leads to the generation of black incomes. The activities in which 
black incomes are generated constitute the black economy. Hence, the size of a 
black economy represents the prevalence of illegality in a country. Illegal acts can 
be committed either through legal activities or illegal activities. Legal activities 
are those that are allowed by law (e.g., agriculture, finance, and construction) and 
produce social “goods.” Incomes from these activities are counted as part of the 
national income. The implication is that they improve the welfare of the citizens 
and make society better off.
Illegal activities are not permitted by law (e.g., smuggling, peddling of narcotic 
drugs, and theft) and are said to produce social “bads,” since they lead to a reduc-
tion in the welfare of society, if not also of the individuals indulging in these activi-
ties. Incomes from these activities are not counted in national income totals. Such 
activities are linked to criminal activities of various kinds (see Government of In-
dia 2011 for data on crime in India). However, not all crime is linked to generating 
an income, for example murder or gender violence. Hence, the black economy will 
not capture such crimes. Furthermore, crime linked to economic activities that 
generate incomes is often connected with organized crime, whether within coun-
tries or across borders – the latter is referred to as transnational organized crime.
The black economy can be understood as broadly reflecting illegality in an 
economy, even if it does not capture all criminal activities within a society (Kumar 
* This paper is based on the author’s two books, The Black Economy in India (1999/2002) 
and Indian Economy since Independence: Tracing the Dynamics of Colonial Disruption in 
Society (2012).
** CESP, SSS, JNU, India: CESP – Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, SSS – School 
of Social Sciences, JNU – Jawaharlal Nehru University.
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1999). In India, the black economy pervades all sectors of the economy. Elite pro-
fessions have also been found to be involved in it, for example businessmen, poli-
ticians, bureaucrats, police, legal representatives, medical personnel, chartered 
accountants, and education professionals, among others.
The size of the black economy has been rising since India’s independence in 
1947. It has been estimated to have increased over the years: it was 4 to 5 percent 
of GDP in 1955/1956 (Government of India 1956); 7 percent in 1970 (Government 
of India 1971); 21 percent in 1980/1981 (NIPFP 1985); 40 percent in 1995/1996 (Ku-
mar 1999); per projections by this author, it was 50 percent in 2005/2006. Thus, 
illegality and crime are constantly on the rise in the country, not only in absolute 
terms but in relative terms. It has grown from being petty and sporadic to becom-
ing more organized (national and transnational).
Organized crime in India operates within a multitude of areas: illegal forestry 
and mining; drug trafficking; gun-running; human trafficking; sex trade; illicit 
liquor making and distribution; encroachment of public land; production of spuri-
ous medicines and fake goods; adulteration of food items; malpractices in medical 
professions, including the sale of blood and organs and other malpractices, such as 
recycling of hospital waste; hawala (an alternative remittance system that operates 
outside of traditional financing structures); flight of capital; illegal financing of 
trade; smuggling of goods, including gold and electronic items; and so on. Under-
lying these illegalities is the “Triad” of the corrupt businessmen, politicians, and 
the executive, which is made up of the bureaucracy, the police, and the judiciary.
2. Causes, histor y, and analysis 
The black economy and illegality have existed in all societies at some point. In 
India, it became systematic during World War II, when shortages appeared, es-
pecially of essentials. Rationing of food was introduced but there was black mar-
keting. To escape detection, perpetrators bribed the bureaucracy and the police. 
Inflation led to increases in the prices of property, so that those without property 
found it difficult to get housing on rent. The government introduced rent control 
laws, which became a source of corruption in the courts. 
The British set up a civil service to administer (keep control of) India. The 
public servant became the public master with enormous power over the public, 
and this was used to extract bribes. However, the bulk of the population was poor, 
self-employed, and worked in agriculture. They had few public dealings, so that 
the level of corruption and the black economy was small. The civil service was 
accountable to the colonial masters who were interested in efficient control of the 
country, so they did not allow corruption to grow. They also paid the civil servants 
high salaries, as compared to the per capita incomes of locals, and gave them many 
privileges to lessen the temptation for corruption.
There was a landlord class ruling over the peasantry that extracted rent from 
the farmers on behalf of the colonial masters. They were a part of the tiny colonial 
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ruling elite and had substantial powers, which were misused to extract money 
from the people they ruled. They were a law unto themselves and could extract 
money from the peasantry.
After independence, a political class came to power and replaced the colonial 
ruling elite. They started the task of development in a very poor country. They 
depended on the civil service for governing the country and did not transform 
it into a public service that was accountable to the people. The political class that 
emerged from the national freedom movement was democratic in its aspirations, 
but its members came from the country’s elite class and had feudal aspirations. 
They thought of themselves as rulers and not as representatives of the people.
Consequently, independent India started with high aspirations but a weak de-
mocracy because the power was transferred from the colonial masters to a rela-
tively unaccountable political class and a civil service that was accountable mostly 
to itself. As the democratic restraint of the national movement weakened, the po-
litical class became more corrupt. The government of India (1956) talked about the 
need to keep the black economy in check so that more resources could be raised 
for development. It found businesses generating black incomes in all sectors of 
the economy.
The Indian national movement understood that colonial rule was the source 
both of the poverty and the helplessness of the common man in dealing with their 
problems of unemployment, illiteracy, and so on. Therefore, it was decided that 
society as a whole had to overcome these basic problems of the people and the 
state was given a large role in economic matters. Furthermore, optimal utilization 
of resources required central planning, which required licensing of capacity in 
industries. This reinforced the role of the state in the economy.
Due to deindustrialization in India during colonial rule, Indian capitalists 
were too small to provide capital for the creation of the necessary infrastructure 
such as transportation and power. They lacked the technology and capital to invest 
in basic goods like metals and petroleum, or in capital goods manufacturing. The 
corollary was that a large public sector was needed to support both the growth of 
the private sector and the planning process. This required the mobilization of sav-
ings in a country that was poor. Consequently, consumption had to be restrained 
through taxation, limiting production, and regarding the import of luxury goods. 
Imports were limited so as to conserve the foreign exchange required to import 
capital goods for development. A strategy of import substitution was adopted to 
boost industry, and high customs duties were introduced for this purpose.
In 1944, the Indian capitalist class drew up a plan of industrialization in 
post-independence India that contained the above-mentioned elements of policy 
(Thakurdas 1944). These plans were also incorporated in the industrial policy 
statements of 1948 and 1956. However, what the capitalists agreed to collectively, 
they undid through their private actions by fouling up policies through illegality. 
They cornered licenses by bribing authorities and creating monopolies to corner 
economic gain. In the various development activities and projects, corruption was 
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introduced to make extra profits. This was not feasible without the connivance of 
the politicians and the bureaucracy – so they were drawn into corruption. Luxury 
goods – or those goods that faced high customs duties – were smuggled in.
As India developed, the size of the middle class increased and shortages of ba-
sic goods – like food, scooters, and cement or basic services (telephone and railway 
reservations) appeared. For each of them waiting lists appeared, and soon there-
after black markets developed. Businesses took advantage of these black markets 
and this spread corruption to the lower levels of society.
Big business in India realized that manipulating policies required close prox-
imity to political power. It started exercising direct control over the political pro-
cess by financing political parties and individual candidates for legislatures. It also 
increasingly interfered in appointments at the senior levels of the bureaucracy 
in key ministries. The Triad proved useful for this purpose and it was mutually 
convenient for the three arms of the Triad. The businessmen could manipulate 
policies, whereas the other two could get the help of businessmen to invest their 
ill-gotten gains.
Another aspect of colonial rule helped to spread corruption – the policy of 
divide and rule. The end of colonial rule left behind antagonisms and instability 
in India’s immediate neighborhood, which helped illegality to spread. There have 
been several wars with Pakistan and continuing communal tension in the coun-
try. With China, there have been border disputes and strategic conflicts. These 
realities have fostered terrorist/separatist movements in India’s border states – 
Kashmir, Punjab, and in the North East. In turn, these areas became sources of 
smuggling, gun-running, counterfeit currency, human trafficking, the sex trade, 
and so on.
India has had historically close relations with Nepal and, therefore, open bor-
ders. Large-scale poverty in Nepal and Bangladesh has spurred illegal activities 
in the border areas. The corrupt monarchy in Nepal and the unstable political 
climate in Bangladesh led to the spread of large-scale corruption. Ethnic problems 
emerged in Sri Lanka between the dominant Sinhala community and the Tamils 
concentrated in the north. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam emerged to fight 
a civil war over three decades. To finance its activities, it indulged in a wide array 
of illegalities. Their links with Tamils in India and across the globe helped in the 
proliferation of illegalities around the world. 
Growing illegality in India was also linked to the oil crisis and the sharp in-
crease in the petro goods prices in the 1970s. The sudden wealth in the oil-export-
ing countries led to large-scale economic activities there, but they lacked the nec-
essary skilled labor (carpenters, plumbers, drivers, teachers, engineers, doctors), 
which they imported from South Asia on a large scale. These migrants started 
sending money back home to their families. This encouraged the spread of hawala 
internationally because the hawala operators provided cheap services and a pre-
mium on the money sent through them. Simultaneously, this service also allowed 
Indian businesses to send their capital abroad.
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In 1991, India changed its policies and made massive concessions to the private 
sector – whatever it had been demanding in the 1980s was granted. Taxes were 
reduced, licensing was eliminated, and imports were liberalized, and so on. The 
role of the public sector and planning was minimized. With the arrival of the 
World Trade Organization in 1995, there was a further opening up of the economy 
to foreign trade and capital. The amount of illegality grew, and the nature of the 
black economy changed – but it grew as well. As the market economy grew, lines 
ended but money determined who would get what. Anything could be imported, 
and the private sector was allowed to produce luxury goods. Thus, shortages of 
telephones, automobiles, televisions, and so on, disappeared, as did the black mar-
kets associated with them.
But, as restraints on business declined with the weakening of the state, busi-
ness indulged in corruption in an even bigger way. The Triad, already in place, 
started functioning differently and shared the gains from corruption differently. 
Many politicians became businessmen – openly or in the name of family mem-
bers. Businessmen also entered politics in larger numbers. Privatization and the 
setting up of infrastructure in the private sector (or in public-private partnerships) 
offered new opportunities for making illegal gains by cornering resources like 
land, forests, and mines. Greater participation by the private sector since 1991 in 
the education and health sectors has created enormous opportunities to indulge 
in illegalities. The number of scams and the amount of money involved per scam 
has grown exponentially since the 1990s (Kumar 2012).
In brief, systematic illegality and corruption in the country has its roots in 
big business and the Triad it created. This has led to the emergence of organized 
crime in the country. The problems fostered at the borders by the neighbors and 
the hawala system enabling the flight of capital have strengthened the linkage 
between local illegality and transnational crime. Finally, the indiscriminate open-
ing up of the economy in 1991 has led to a further spread of illegality and crime.
3. Forms, cases, and interfaces of Indian illegalit y
For the black economy to be 50 percent of GDP, as is currently the case, it has to 
be both systematic and systemic. Laws have to be systematically violated so that 
those in charge of maintaining the law of the land have to be a party to the viola-
tion of the law. For a consideration they will look the other way while businesses 
commit illegal activities. Take, for instance, the way the police and the judiciary 
in India function.
Illegalities are to be checked by the police, and the persons committing the 
illegal action should be brought to justice through the courts. In India, presently 
there are 40 million cases in the courts and they go on for years or decades (some-
times more than 30 years). The time in prison for many under trials is longer than 
any sentence they might have to serve if they are convicted for the crimes they 
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were supposed to have committed. Thus, in many jails, there are more immates 
under trial than people who have been convicted.
The delays are due to the widespread corruption in the courts and the non-
accountability of the judges. Judges postpone hearing cases for frivolous reasons. 
The legal profession is also interested in such delays, since they collect fees on the 
basis of the number of appearances in court. Often, in routine cases, – in which a 
decision should come in less than a year – procedures drag on for more than five 
years. This leads to a fivefold increase in the number of cases pending. The pres-
sure on the judges also increases. They may have to go through 50 cases in a six-
hour working day, meaning that they have an average of seven minutes per case. 
Each case may come up for a hearing after a few months and the judge must refresh 
her memory, thereby taking up precious time and often resulting in mistakes.
To smooth the work of the courts, a bribe might be paid. For instance, a court 
bailiff may charge a party between INR 1,000 (US$20) to INR 25,000 ($500) for 
having a property vacated by the losing party. The local police, who are required to 
accompany the court bailiff, charges separately. For the inspection of files, filing 
papers, and so on, an underhand payment to the clerks may be required. Judges 
have also been caught letting one of the parties to a case see whether the judgment 
suits their need. One cannot publicly talk about these matters due to the fear of 
being hauled up for “contempt of court.” 
The poor are mostly unable to approach the courts, since filing cases is expen-
sive and the laws are so opaque that often the poor, who are not very literate, do not 
understand their complexity. Even if they do go to court against a stronger party, 
the latter is able to bribe their way through the court and delay or subvert justice. 
Often there is a nexus between the judges and the lawyers. The well-off party 
hires a lawyer who is able to manipulate the legal system and who can fix a case 
to appear before a judge of choice. To minimize this kind of manipulation, the 
judge in a case is often changed. This has created its own problems, sometimes 
resulting in situations where up to eight judges hear a case over a two-and-a-half-
year period. This means each of the judges is unfamiliar with the case and often 
postpones the case on frivolous grounds.
Powerful persons in politics, business, organized crime, etc., can get cases 
against themselves spoilt by the prosecution. This is done at the initial stage of 
investigation, when crucial evidence is misplaced or not presented carefully so 
that the case fails in the court. Thus, these people do not even need to use corrup-
tion in the courts to obtain favorable decisions. Judges have often commented on 
the poor preparation of cases by the police. The powerful are known to influence 
witnesses to change their testimony. Threats – coupled with inordinate delays (the 
witnesses also forget what they had seen or heard) – lead to the spoiling of cases 
against powerful people.
The result is that the members of the Triad have contempt for the law and vio-
late it with impunity. In India, laws on paper differ substantially from how they are 
implemented due to the judicial delays and manipulations by those in power. For 
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instance, there are laws against child labor, but these are circumvented in large 
parts of the country, including in the cities. In such violations, the police play an 
important part.
Illegality flourishes because the police connives in it. They collect a weekly 
or monthly sum (hafta) to allow the illegal activities to continue. This money is 
collected from beggars in the streets, street vendors, encroachers on public land, 
businessmen, sex workers, car thieves, pickpockets, those doing illegal construc-
tion, and other kinds of illegal activities. The post of head of a police station (called 
thana) is auctioned. This person sets targets for the collection of money for each 
of the “beat” constables. The more the commercial activity or the higher the level 
of illegality in the jurisdiction of a police station, the more money is collected. The 
money is then shared right up to the top (political bosses) (Kumar 1999). At every 
level, half the money collected is kept and the rest is passed on. Since the pyramid 
narrows steeply, a lot of money goes up to the few at the top.
The hafta from illegal activities is also collected by the local municipal officers 
and the local politicians. Thus, a substantial part of the earnings of a poor person 
is siphoned away by these officials and the politicians. The hafta results in link-
ages between the criminals and the officials. For instance, the pickpocket gets 
protection from the police and no new pickpocket can encroach on their territory. 
Organized crime is part of this payment of hafta and it flourishes because of the 
official protection it receives.
In India, since land in urban areas is expensive, relative to per capita incomes, 
a large number of people migrating annually to the cities cannot afford any kind 
of formal housing. So the migrants either become homeless and sleep under over-
passes, bridges, etc.; or they encroach on public land with the connivance of the 
police and local politicians; or they crowd into existing slums, most of which have 
various degrees of illegality associated with them. Thus, with the illegal tenure of 
their shelter, they tend to fall into the grip of criminals. Since they need income, 
the family members at times get into illegal work, like bootlegging, sex trade, and 
so on. Organized crime uses these migrants’ insecure tenure of shelter and their 
poverty to recruit them for illegal work.
In private professional educational institutions, weak students pay for admis-
sions (called capitation fees). In case of medical education, the capitation fee can 
be up to $100,000. The situation is similar in the case of engineering, manage-
ment, and other professional courses. These institutions are often run by politi-
cians and businessmen. On the pretext of providing social service, these institu-
tions are allotted land at low prices and granted concessions. The involvement of 
politicians guarantees quick government approvals.
Software and information-related services have experienced a boom in India 
since the mid 1990s. These lend themselves to under- and over-invoicing and, the-
refore, to the flight of capital from the country. During the dot-com boom, many 
fake companies floated initial public offerings on the stock market and then disap-
peared with the public’s money. The recent scandal involving Satyam Computer 
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Services (see box on the next page) is instructive in learning about the various 
kinds of illegalities that such software companies can indulge in: under-invoicing; 
registering in tax havens; creating fictitious employment records; diverting funds 
to other companies owned by the same owner; funding politicians; buying real 
estate; and so on. 
As already mentioned, hawala is a reality in India. It is not regulated by the 
Central Bank. It is used to transfer funds within the country and outside of it. 
Since it deals purely in cash, large sums of money are moved from the premises 
where hawala operates. The police and the intelligence agencies know of these 
places, but they do not act because of the high-level political protection available 
to the hawala operators. The top politicians in power also know of them, since 
they use this channel, but they do not act against these hawala operators out of 
self-interest. Thus, what is known privately is not known officially. The hawala 
channels are used by organized crime units to transfer money around the country 
and outside of it. Terrorists, drug dealers, and others use these channels because 
of the anonymity they provide.
In summary, due to existence of the Triad, all kinds of illegal activities and 
crime flourish in India. The common man is helpless in the face of these power-
ful people. 
4. Social processes, global economic flows and routes
Local criminal activities described above have been linked to transnational crimes 
through terrorism; the printing and circulation of counterfeit currencies; the op-
eration of hawala; the production and distribution of narcotic drugs; arms traf-
ficking; and the smuggling of electronic items, gold, and gems. As discussed in 
section II, in all these cases, the neighboring countries – and at times their secret 
services – are involved. The income from these activities help finance terrorism 
and destabilize the nation.
Myanmar has been a closed nation until recently and there has been much 
ethnic conflict. Thus, it was easy to move narcotic drugs through these territories 
into India’s northeast, where separatist movements were active. Similarly, Ban-
gladesh presents another porous border through which human trafficking has 
been taking place and where terrorist movements have found sanctuary. They also 
became conduits for organized crime.
Conflict in Afghanistan since the beginning of the 1970s has led to interna-
tional rivalries. The Western nations armed the Taliban – fundamentalist Mus-
lims – to fight the Soviet forces that entered Afghanistan to help the left-leaning 
regime that came to power by dethroning the King. Soon, Afghanistan became 
the Vietnam of the Soviets and they had to eventually withdraw. But by then, Af-
ghanistan was awash with weapons supplied by the West. Afghanistan was also 
known for its production of narcotic drugs. When the central power weakened and 
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Satyam was one of the high-flying software companies of India and an exem-
plary one, according to the government and the business community. It was 
controlled by the highly respected Raju family of Andhra Pradesh. In January 
2008, Mr. Raju of Satyam, the chairperson, stunned everyone when he admit-
ted to committing massive fraud against the public over the years. Apparently, 
the company was defrauded of Rs 7,000 crore ($1.5 billion) but the final tally 
could be larger. The loss to the shareholders and employees was a multiple of 
this sum.
Mr. Raju claimed that Satyam was operating with margins of 3 to 4 percent, 
when for comparable software companies, they were in the range of 25 per-
cent. Was Mr. Raju lying under the auspices of telling the truth? The puzzle 
is that Satyam should have had higher profit margins, but its owner, Mr. Raju, 
claimed that it had lower margins, thereby willingly implicating himself in 
fraud. Was he trying to cover up a bigger fraud?
In India, there have been concessions in taxation on profits from exports. So, it 
may pay to divert profits from a company that is not entitled to tax concessions 
to another group company that is entitled to tax concessions, and thereby save 
on tax payments. Mr. Raju was siphoning funds from Satyam to sister compa-
nies dealing in real estate.
To take advantage of the provisions for exports, they have to be over-invoiced. 
Hence, more foreign exchange has to be brought into the country than has 
been earned. This way, undeclared wealth held outside the country or profits 
of other companies transferred out of the country through hawala are brought 
back – that is, reverse hawala.
Satyam tried to buy its sister companies at high and inflated prices. So, its ficti-
tious bank accounts, worth Rs 7,000 crores, would have been drawn down and 
money transferred to the owners of the sister companies, that is, to themselves, 
and then there would have been no one to ask where the money went. So, using 
book transfers, the earlier siphoning off of funds would have been covered up 
and the false entries of the bank balances and fixed deposits reversed/set right.
Satyam was forced to reverse its decision to buy the sister companies by the 
investment bankers who approached SEBI (stock exchange regulator) with the 
story of the non-existent balance in the banks. There was little time to bring 
back other undeclared funds, and perhaps due to the global crisis of 2008, they 
became stuck. Since the funds did not exist in the Satyam bank accounts, Mr. 
Raju had to cover up by saying that the actual profitability of Satyam was lower 
and that he had been inflating profits for years.
The Satyam affair points to the practices adopted by crooked Indian businesses 
– siphoning profits, fudging muster rolls, the cozy relations with politicians 
and bureaucrats, and finally, manipulating bankers, “independent” auditors, 
and “independent” directors. Mr. Raju’s admission has brought into question 
the notion of the “respectable” or “honest” businessman.
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regional warlords emerged, the Taliban smuggled weapons and narcotic drugs to 
enrich themselves.
A nexus emerged between the Taliban and the Muslim fundamentalists in 
Pakistan. This impacted the separatist movement in Kashmir and also became a 
major source of financing Muslim fundamentalism in India. In the process, India 
became a route for transnational crime. This was facilitated by a corrupt bureau-
cracy and police force.
An amnesty was given to smugglers in 1983 so that they could come into the 
mainstream. But this led to the entry of criminals into politics, or at least their 
more active participation in politics. Before, they had financed politicians but re-
mained largely in the background. The Triad now had criminals in it – either the 
businessman or the politician in the Triad had criminal backgrounds. As crimi-
nals entered the legislatures, the rule of law weakened. They manipulated the 
police, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary to get favorable decisions and also inter-
fered more blatantly in decision-making.
Smugglers developed links with organized crime abroad to carry on their 
activities systematically. These links also required them to be in touch with ha-
wala operators, who did not distinguish between clean (but illegal) money and 
dirty money. So they transferred the money of terrorists just as often as that of 
businessmen under-reporting exports. In fact, the gold smugglers often needed 
foreign currency to buy gold for smuggling into India, and they got it from drug 
rings that needed to send funds to finance their activities in India. Thus, many 
interlinkages developed.
Smuggling was driven by the chance of making easy money, since custom du-
ties were high for the import of luxury goods, liquor, tobacco products, gold, and 
gems. It required corrupting the customs officials and the politicians. Airports 
and ports turned into dens of corruption with all kinds of illegal activities taking 
place. Very complex importing rules were deliberately set up so that the misclas-
sification of goods and services was possible. The threat of harassment is an im-
portant driver for the willingness to bribe the official machinery.
In India, laws on paper differ substantially from the way law is practiced. Be-
ing in power implies the ability to offer favors for utilitarian considerations. For 
instance, traffic rules are violated with impunity, especially by those in power. 
When the average citizen gets caught, they offer a small bribe to the police to be 
let off. Hence, traffic on the roads is chaotic. A driving license can be obtained 
without taking a test. This is symptomatic of the entire gamut of rules and laws 
in the country. The honest get harassed while the dishonest make money or jump 
the lines.
It is the Triad of corrupt businessmen, politicians and the executive that has fa-
cilitated systematic illegality in the country, and as it has strengthened over time, 
illegality has spread. The citizen is not able to resist it individually and is more 
willing to offer bribes and commit illegal acts. The Triad takes advantage of this 
by pushing for more illegality. In the process, people have moved from collec-
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tive action to individual action and weakened democracy in the country. With the 
Triad operating unhindered, international organized crime gangs have also found 
it easy to penetrate into India and set up operations.
5. Consequences for victims — outlook and impacts on the rule of law
The consequences of the growing black economy have been that development has 
been set back due to widespread policy failure. Kumar (2005) shows that the In-
dian economy has been losing 5 percent of its annual growth rate since the mid-
1970s due to the growing black economy. Otherwise, by today, the Indian economy 
could have become the second largest in the world. Income distribution is highly 
skewed against the poor, and this is having an adverse social impact. India has the 
largest number of the poor people in the world as well as malnourished children 
and women, illiterate people, and sick people. 
The state is considered to be weak and unable to carry out its mandate. The 
institutions of democracy (e.g., legislature, judiciary) have been weakened due to 
all of this, and there is a feeling that the nation lacks social justice. Thus, today, 
every section of society is trying to gain something at the expense of others. This 
has resulted in massive conflicts in society and often chaotic conditions. The po-
litical structures are badly fragmented, meaning there are a few hundred political 
parties, each jostling for its space and share of power, which is exercised not for 
the national good but for the section it represents. Thus, faith in the nation has 
weakened.
The poor face a criminal environment and live insecure lives. Their children 
often engage in various kinds of illegal activities and get into drugs, smoking, and 
other addictive behaviors. Women engage in other kinds of illegal activities and 
have to bear a double burden of taking care of the home as well as working outside.
The black economy leads to both higher costs of production with lower quality 
and to environmental damage. Thus, the rate of inflation is higher than it need 
be and health costs rise due to increased levels of disease and low capacities to 
fight them. Corruption in the medical profession adds to health costs, and as a 
result, the poor often fall below the poverty line when treating a major illness in 
the family.
Tackling the black economy is the key to making a dent in crime, whether 
national or transnational. Since India’s independence, dozens of committees and 
commissions have looked into the problem of the black economy (and its vari-
ous aspects) all around the country. They have made thousands of suggestions 
and hundreds have been implemented: reducing tax rates; reducing controls and 
regulations; demonetization of high denomination currency; voluntary disclosure 
schemes; bearer bond schemes; acquisition of undervalued property; and so on. 
There are already enough laws to check corruption; the problem is that they are 
not being implemented. Intelligence about organized crime exists, but no action is 
taken since top businessmen and politicians are involved. The problem, therefore, 
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is not a technical one, and the size of the black economy has increased in spite 
of the steps taken to check its growth. The issue is one of political will, which is 
non-existent.
It is crucial to have political movements wanting to strengthen democracy and 
bring about accountability among the members of the Triad. Movements on the 
right to information, judicial accountability, the right to education, the right to 
food, and the right to housing are all needed to strengthen democracy and bring 
about accountability in the political process. Movements centered around these is-
sues have emerged in the last two decades and they may eventually change things 
for the better.
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4. West Africa
4.1 ORGANIZED AND TR ANSNATIONAL CRIME IN WEST AFRICA
by Etannibi E. O. Alemika
Introduction
Transnational crime thrives in West Africa due to several factors. Some of the 
major factors and conditions are: weak state capacity and capabilities; weak demo-
cratic culture and institutions; underdeveloped and disarticulated economy and 
lack of norms associated with the penetration of – and assimilation into – cultural 
ethos and practices of globalization; poorly policed borders; absence or ineffective 
boundary demarcation; and cross-border population homogeneity engendered 
by arbitrary determination of national boundaries by colonial authorities. Other 
factors are inadequately resourced border security agencies; poorly trained and 
remunerated border policing agencies with the attendant widespread corruption 
and collusion with transnational criminal actors; and absence or ineffective coop-
eration among the border security agencies of countries in the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS). Generally, there is a weak governance of 
border security in ECOWAS countries, which threatens both national and regional 
security. In this chapter, the sources, manifestations, and effects of organized and 
transnational crime in West Africa are examined with empirical illustrations from 
Nigeria. 
Organized crime and criminal networks: conceptual conversations
The concepts of transnational crime, organized crime, and transnational orga-
nized crime are often (unconsciously) used synonymously. This usage is untidy 
and hinders analysis and appropriate policy responses to issues that, though inter-
woven, are often distinct in terms of motives, clients, practitioners, and victims. 
Transnational, or trans-border, crime refers to criminal activities by an individual 
or individuals, organizations, or even regimes that traverse two or more countries. 
The significant element that distinguishes transnational crime is the breach of 
territorial sovereignty symbolized by state authority, borders, customs and immi-
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gration laws, and border police. By its nature, trans-border crime connects source, 
transit, and destination countries. It involves crimes across or beyond borders. In 
contrast, organized crimes may be confined within a national border. Organized 
crimes that are perpetuated across national borders are referred to as transna-
tional organized crimes and the organizations that are behind them are labeled as 
transnational criminal organizations. 
Transnational crimes are not necessarily organized or perpetrated by orga-
nizations. This may be attributed to fluid borders and substantial control over 
goods distribution or supply networks by informal sectors in West African na-
tions. Organized crime has been variously defined (Lupsha 1983; Cressey 1969; 
Finckenauer and Voronin 2001; Albanese 1989; Abadinsky 1990). Most defini-
tions of organized crime emphasized, (a) its primary aim is profit-making; (b) its 
activities focus on outlawed goods and services; (c) the significance of violence and 
corruption in protecting the illegal operations, enforcing discipline among mem-
bers, and for elimination of competition and competitors; and (d) its hierarchical 
structure and relative organizational permanency (Albanese 1989). 
Albanese rightly points out that “organized crime does not exist as an ideal 
type, but rather as a ‘degree’ of criminal activity or as a point on the ‘spectrum of 
legitimacy’” (Albanese 1989, 5). This implies that organized criminal groups may, 
indeed, simultaneously engage in legal and illegal activities, as is the practice of 
many multinational companies involved in official corruption cases in Africa. Or-
ganized crime has serious negative consequences for individuals, communities, 
and nations. Criminal organizations “have varying capacities to inflict economic, 
physical, psychological, and societal harm. The greater their capacity to harm, the 
greater the danger they pose to society” (Finckenauer and Voronin 2001). 
Transnational crime may be described in terms of the following activities 
across national borders: illegal activities are carried out through illegal means or 
legal activities are carried out through illegal means. The critical point for us in 
this article is that transnational crime may be organized or unorganized and per-
petrated by organizations, individuals, and even regimes (UNODC 2005). Crimi-
nal networks and organized crime groups engage in legal businesses for three 
major purposes. First, it conceals their illegal activities; second, it serves as means 
for “washing the dirty money” from crime; and third, the laundering of profit 
from organized crime serves as a means of gaining respectability in society. 
The characteristics of organized crime as identified in the literature can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. absence of ideological underpinning of activities. This means that activities 
are not driven by political, economic, religious, and ethnic grievances and 
goals. Criminal activities are seen as means rather than ends;
2. an intent to commit, or the actual commission of, substantive crimes;
3. a conspiracy to execute these crimes; 
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4. a persistence of this conspiracy through time (at least one year) or the intent 
that this conspiracy should persist through time; 
5. acquisition of substantial power or money as means for political or economic 
security; 
6. roles are organized in a typical hierarchical structure, with the boss at the 
helm of affairs;
7. roles and positions may be assigned on the basis of kinship affinity, friendship, 
or competence;
8. organization and activities are relatively permanent – organized crime, in this 
sense, is undertaken over a relatively long period by an organization;
9. willingness to use violence or bribery to facilitate and achieve its goals (Aba-
dinsky, 1990, 6; IIT 1971, 264); 
10. complex criminal activity involving long-term planning and multiple levels of 
execution and organization;
11. operations that are often undertaken beyond national jurisdictions; 
12. use of fronts, buffers, and “legitimate” associates to insulate key members 
from risks of identification, involvement, arrest, and prosecution; 
13. maximization of profits through attempts at cartelization or monopolization of 
markets, enterprises, and crime matrices (Lupsha in: Kelly 1986, 33). 
Organized crime may also employ the following means to protect their crimi-
nal enterprises: enforcement of code of loyalty and secrecy; exercise of discipline 
through and loyalty through surveillance, coercion, and violence. They also protect 
their operations against legal constraints by means of inducement; representation 
in government, especially in law enforcement agencies and parliament; alliance 
with armed groups, and provision of service to communities poorly administered 
and served by government (Kenney and Finckenauer 1995, 29).
Analyzing transnational and organized crime
In the past two decades, there have been increasing criticisms of the traditional 
conceptualization of organized crime. Critics argue that the traditional conception 
of organized crime has been dominated by the Mafia-style organization. In the 
new conception, most crimes involving groups at the national and international 
levels do not involve many of the attributes of organized crime as traditionally 
portrayed in the literature. 
Contemporary thinking is that “criminal network” or “crime network” are 
better terms for many of the contemporary criminal enterprises and businesses. 
Many criminal collaborations do not exhibit permanence but transient collabora-
tion; roles are assigned on the basis of capability along the business chain; the 
use of violence is becoming less frequent; and bribery continues to be used to 
secure the cooptation of or protection from law enforcement agents, judicial of-
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ficials, politicians, and other influential figures within the environment in which 
criminal business is transacted. 
The terms “organized crime” and “criminal network” have implications for 
law enforcement. For example, the operations of organized crime can be disrupted 
if the people in the top rungs of the organization can be identified and put out 
of business. Investment in long-term intelligence is therefore worthwhile under 
this scenario. However, in the context of criminal networks, relationships tend to 
be transient or occasional, as “business” may demand. As a result, it is difficult 
to detect organizational structures and leadership of networks. To police them 
effectively, intelligence needs to be secured from different sources using diverse 
technologies and shared among security and intelligence agencies.
Understanding and responding to organized crime in West Africa
A recent seven-page background paper (NYUCIC 2012) for a conference on the im-
pact of organized crime and drug trafficking in West Africa provides some of the 
most insightful comments on the phenomenon of organized crime in the region. 
Some of the critical observations can be summarized as follows.
a. West Africa is “a major transit and repackaging hub for cocaine and heroin 
flowing from the Latin American and Asian producing areas to European mar-
kets.”
b. The significance of West Africa as a transit and repackaging hub is due to “a 
strategic shift of Latin American drug syndicates towards the rapidly growing 
European market in part due to the operational ‘successes’ of U.S. law enforce-
ment agencies in mitigating the flow of drugs into the United States.”
c. “West Africa presented an ideal choice as a logistical transit center: its geog-
raphy makes detection difficult and facilitates transit; the region boasts well-
established networks of West African smugglers and crime syndicates, and a 
vulnerable political environment.”
d. The vulnerable political environment in West Africa “has its roots in the re-
gion’s colonial history and includes endemic poverty as well as a combination 
of weak institutions and systems, instability, and ill-equipped and corruptible 
political party representatives, law enforcement and intelligence officers, and 
judicial authorities.”
e. In some West African countries, “the legacy of civil wars led to diminished 
human capital, social infrastructure and productive national development as-
sets” and also “gave way to a rise in the number of armed groups operating in 
the region and the circulation of small arms and light weapons.”
f. Manifestations of organized crime in the region “include drug trafficking, and 
increasingly, drug consumption, broader organized criminal activity such as 
human trafficking, illicit logging, illicit capture of resources, piracy, money-
laundering, and terrorism.” 
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g. “Intense urbanization and youth unemployment … are having a corrosive ef-
fect on democratic institutions and processes, security and economic develop-
ment across the region and driving violence and reemergence of conflict.”
h. Significantly, “research shows that the evidentiary base underpinning percep-
tions of challenges remains weak, as do mechanisms to assess and respond to 
vulnerabilities, threats and challenges that enable organized crime and drug 
trafficking.”
i. Notwithstanding several and diverse interventions and interests by African 
nations, foreign governments and international organizations, “there is still 
limited evidence of effective, strategic responses to the multi-faceted challeng-
es posed by organized crime and drug trafficking in the region.”
j. Further, current “strategies tend to omit the importance of ensuring that secu-
rity centered efforts are accompanied by efforts aimed at strengthening politi-
cal institutions and processes, justice and health institutions, and responding 
to widespread youth unemployment.” As a result “less focus and investment is 
being placed on developing the capacity of civil society and academia to moni-
tor and analyze trends and effects of organized crime and trafficking across 
the region,” just as “the private sector remains largely removed from current 
debates on the issues.”
This is a highly perceptive analysis of the manifestations and causes of organized 
and trans-border crimes in West Africa and offers responses to the problems. 
One of the most critical hindrances to the understanding of organized and 
trans-border crime in the region and responses to it is the nature of intervention 
by foreign governments and international organizations. This is because foreign 
governments are selective in the types of organized crime whose prevention and 
control they consider a priority. Foreign governments – especially Western gov-
ernments and the US government in particular – exert pressure on West African 
governments to adopt repressive legal and security-centered approaches to curb 
the crimes instead of developing comprehensive social, economic, and political 
strategies and policies. In so doing, they focus on crimes of concern to them 
and their citizens, especially drug trafficking. It is therefore not an accident that 
most discussions of organized crime in West Africa revolve around drug traf-
ficking.
 Until the attacks on World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, 
very little attention was given to corruption, through which African politicians 
and Western multinational companies steal and siphon African wealth and pur-
chase expensive properties and other luxury goods in Western nations. The cur-
rent concern with this corruption and the proceeds from it originates less from the 
implications for African nations about the prospects of such resources being used 
to finance terrorist activities in Western nations. At present, the massive traffick-
ing in arms, psychotropic substances, and the substandard goods that constitute 
a more serious threat to human security in Africa – as well as African politics, 
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economics, and society – does not attract the required interest, attention, and in-
tervention from foreign governments.
The nature of control strategies foisted on Africa governments by foreign gov-
ernments and UN agencies has also created – or engendered – an absence of reli-
able evidence-led policies and strategies. As a result, there is no investment in 
scientific and academic research on the subject of organized crime in the region 
or even the strengthening of public security and law enforcement agencies to de-
velop reliable systems of record-keeping and databases. As a result, most publi-
cations on the nature, extent, pattern, and trend of organized and trans-border 
criminal activities are based on anecdotal evidence and estimates from isolated 
and unique cases of large confiscations. Perhaps, as sociologists might explain, 
this is deliberate, because the absence of reliable evidence and the publication of 
alarming estimates justify the diplomatic pressure on West African governments 
to adopt repressive legal approaches to control selected types of organized crime 
that threaten the interests of powerful Western nations. It is therefore no surprise 
that “there is a broad perception in the region that many of the existing initiatives 
are broadly conceived outside West Africa and that there is limited ownership of 
the existing policy framework and operational responses in the region” (NYUCIC 
2012, 7). 
Pattern of transnational crime in West Africa
Increasing transnational crime in the region has been engendered by several 
factors, including progressive regional integration; globalization; political and 
economic reforms aimed at enthroning liberal democracy and free enterprise; 
political conflicts; instability; and technological advancements in the transport 
and communication sectors. Trans-border crime may be seen as the latent or un-
intended consequences of globalization as well as regional economic integration 
promoted by the ECOWAS Protocol. 
Several forms of transnational criminal activity by organizations, networks, 
and individuals in West Africa have been reported in the literature (UNODC 
2005; Wannenburg 2005). The major forms include: 
1. corruption and money laundering within the West African nations, Europe, 
and the United States;
2. human trafficking between West African countries and from West Africa to 
the Middle East and Europe;
3. drug trafficking – West African countries are used as transit nations for co-
caine and heroin. However, cannabis is produced in some West African coun-
tries and traded within and beyond the region;
4. arms trafficking into and within the West African region;
5. advanced “fee fraud” with propositions emanating from West Africa (espe-
cially Nigeria) to Europe and North America;
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6. Internet fraud, including identity theft;
7. smuggling of used cars, for example used cars are imported from Europe into 
the Republic of Benin and smuggled into Nigeria;
8. smuggling of prohibited or controlled goods such as pharmaceutical psycho-
tropic drugs, chemicals, etc.;
9. piracy, especially in the Gulf of Guinea;
10. armed robbery, especially automobile hijacking; gangs of robbers, for example, 
snatch expensive cars from their owners in Nigeria and take them to neighbor-
ing countries like Benin, Togo, and Chad;
11. smuggling of goods out of West Africa:
a. diamonds from Sierra Leone through Liberia and Guinea
b. oil and precious stones from Nigeria
c. gold from Ghana
d. rubber and timber, for example from Sierra Leone
e. ivory and timber from Equatorial Guinea
12. vices (gambling, prostitution, etc.); 
13. fraudulent trade practices, including dumping of sub-standard products and 
misrepresentation; illicit foreign exchange transactions (including money 
laundering) and stripping of assets from Africa to developing economies (e.g., 
over-invoicing, under-invoicing, abuse of investment concessions, tax and duty 
evasions, etc.);
14. dumping of toxic materials.
The most common forms of transnational crime remain corruption and money 
laundering; drug trafficking; human trafficking; smuggling of both licit and il-
licit goods; fraudulent trade practices; and advanced fee fraud. These crimes are 
committed within the region between countries in the region and other countries. 
Facilitative environment for transnational crime in West Africa
One of the outstanding aspects of the dynamics of transnational criminal activity 
in West Africa is its growth over the past three decades. This development has 
been attributed to several factors. The literature has identified several factors that 
enhance the growth of transnational crime (Finckenauer 2000; Library of Con-
gress 2003). In the context of West Africa, they include the following factors and 
conditions: 
1. the ECOWAS Protocol on regional economic integration facilitated the emer-
gence of region-wide organized criminal syndicates due to ease of movement 
from one country to another in the region with minimum documentation and 
surveillance;
2. civil wars, armed rebellion and banditry in the region bred crimes like arms 
trafficking, war-zone sex slavery, human trafficking, drug trafficking, smug-
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gling of minerals and goods (e.g., alcohol, cigarettes, etc.). The civil wars also 
created refugees, some of which may have engaged in organized criminal ac-
tivities, especially trafficking of persons, weapons, and other goods between 
their country of origin and host countries during and after the war;
3. civil war and political instability is responsible for high emigration and the 
African Diaspora in Europe and the United States. Some of the people in the 
Diaspora engage people back home in transnational criminal enterprises. A 
careful study of the ethnic identities of West African people, especially Nige-
rians, involved in transnational crime indicates overrepresentation of ethnic 
groups that were – or considered themselves – targets of civil wars or political 
violence and who therefore fled to foreign countries. After the civil wars, some 
of the emigrants establish criminal networks that operate between their coun-
tries of origin and residence. Such patterns and relationships can be observed 
between the Nigerian civil war (1967–1970) and political crisis (1993–1999) on 
the one hand, and the ethnic representation in arrests for transnational crimes 
in Nigeria on the other (NDLEA 2008, 2010a); 
4. criminalization of the state – routine criminal practices in governance for the 
accumulation of personal wealth;
5. weak economic regulatory framework; inconsistent import, export, and tariff 
policies; ineffective customs managements coupled with widespread corrup-
tion among border security officials fostered the activities of criminal syndi-
cates in areas like trafficking or smuggling;
6. weak customs and immigration controls due to porous borders as well as inef-
fective border patrols, including aerial surveillance; 
7. poor scanning and intelligence gathering equipment at entry ports (air, land, 
sea);
8. spatial distribution of persons with the same ethno-cultural identities across 
international borders in West African countries, due largely to the arbitrari-
ness of national boundaries created and imposed by the colonizers in the 19th 
century. Local populations relate to people and not boundaries; 
9. weak state authority and capacity, leading to insurgency that thrives in part on 
trans-border criminal activities;
10. ineffective interagency collaboration and coordination; 
11. high volume of trade between countries, which hinders efficient scrutiny by 
law enforcement agencies;
12. economic policies foisted on the country since the 1980s by multilateral agen-
cies like the IMF and World Bank and supported by the governments of ad-
vanced capitalist nations engendered profound socioeconomic dislocation, 
impoverishment, widening inequality; 
13. improved communication technologies, which facilitate both legitimate and 
illegitimate business transactions;
14. advancement and increasing utilization of air transportation systems mini-
mizes scrutiny at numerous national borders;
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15. disputed territories;
16. significant disparity in economic and sociopolitical conditions in neighboring 
countries;
17. high degree of corruption, especially among the ruling elite;
18. weak legislation and corrupt law enforcement agencies; 
19. inadequate training and remuneration of border police and regulatory agen-
cies for the movement of goods and services, leading to connivance with trans-
national criminals;
20. political conflicts and instability; 
21. political and economic transitions that lead to worsening economic depriva-
tions.
These factors represent challenges that need to be addressed through compre-
hensive legal, political, and economic policies and strategies at national, regional, 
bilateral, and multilateral levels.
Organized crime in West Africa: empirical illustrations from Nigeria 
Empirical studies of organized crime are confronted by several methodological 
problems. Cressey argued that the study of organized crime presents serious 
methodological challenges and constraints. He identified some of the challenges 
as secrecy of activities and identity of members; lack of access to available records 
and intelligence on the activities and actors involved (Cressey 1967, 101–112). To 
these may also be added the threat and use of violence by a substratum of orga-
nized crime groups to protect activities and membership or actors, which also 
serve as a deterrence to research in the area. In West Africa, there is a lack of a 
culture and a capability to collect, analyze, publish, disseminate, preserve, and 
retrieve reliable administrative intelligence and investigative information. These 
inadequacies constitute serious obstacles to the study of criminality and criminal 
actors in the region. There must be intervention and investment must be made to 
correct this through a reorientation of law enforcement officials, capacity-building 
in the agencies, and collaboration between researchers and officials of the crimi-
nal justice agencies. 
Corruption as organized crime in Nigeria
The most neglected topic in the study of organized crime in Africa is corruption, 
yet it is the most devastating form of crime that promotes or aggravates other 
crimes, including transnational organized crime. Corrupt government officials 
and politicians constitute an incentive for organized crime and an impediment 
to its control. Corruption in Africa can be classified into two categories: financial 
corruption and nepotism. Both involve actions that contravene morality, laws, and 
rules governing actions in specific contexts. Nepotism is the allocation of resourc-
4. West Afr ica136
es (employment, admissions, contracts, location of infrastructure, services, etc.) 
to associates, relatives, members of one’s community, religious and ethnic groups, 
clubs, etc., as a favor, without following due process, and without regard to merit 
and equity. 
Nepotism is an egregious factor in decision-making within public and cor-
porate organizations as well as communal or civil associations. Its effects are 
destructive. It engenders inequality and also fosters negative and manipulative 
mobilization of ethnic, religious, and other divisive identities in politics with the 
attendant consequences of political instability and an unreliable electoral process. 
Politics and elections are seen as opportunities to put people in office so as to en-
joy favor or patronage rather than as means for ensuring development, security, 
freedom, and justice.
Nepotism engenders inefficiency, the fraudulent use and diversion of resourc-
es, impunity, as well as disincentives for excellence and performance in organiza-
tions. When an individual is appointed to a position for which they are not quali-
fied, the tendency is for them to find means to co-opt, repress, or terminate those 
deemed more competent, as they are considered a challenge and threat. Further, 
such an individual tends to violate, ignore, or modify the rules that are designed 
for effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Nepotism is a major problem in Nigeria, 
and Africa generally. It accounts largely for the ineffectiveness, electoral fraud, vio-
lence, political instability, as well as recurring social and economic crises. It also 
promotes financial corruption as both are usually mutually reinforcing. Adequate 
attention has not been given in the literature to nepotism as a form of corruption, 
nor to its effect on the economy, polity, society, and governance of African nations.
Financial corruption is the form of malpractice and crime that has generally 
attracted the attention of scholars, politicians, oversight agencies, international 
and donor agencies, etc. Its manifestations in Nigeria and other African countries 
are:
a. bribery – an offer of money or favor in return for, or anticipation of, services;
b. embezzlement – use of fraudulent documents to appropriate funds from gov-
ernment agencies or other organizations;
c. kickback – inflation of cost procurement and services and the appropriation 
of the inflated margin by the participants in the scheme. It may also involve 
situations where a contract for procurement or services is not executed, poorly 
executed, or abandoned in order to share disbursed money among the schem-
ers;
d. misappropriation – use or appropriation of funds belonging to government or 
corporate organizations for personal projects, travel, welfare, etc.
Corruption as a crime is perpetrated by individuals, organized groups, and net-
works of individuals. Corruption by individuals takes the form of bribery and in-
flation of costs for procurement and services. In contrast, corruption is also per-
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petrated by non-criminal (corporate) organizations involved in offering bribes or 
kickbacks for contracts relating to procurement and services. Foreign companies 
involved in the execution of major government construction and equipment in-
stallation contracts, including Julius Berger (a German company), Siemens, and 
Halliburton (an American company) have been named in bribery and corruption 
scandals in Nigeria during the past decade.
A common practice in Nigeria is for senior government officials to register 
genuine and bogus companies to which grossly inflated government contracts are 
awarded. Such companies are often registered and operated with the collabora-
tion of relations and business associates. Proceeds from major corruption in the 
country are most often laundered through the purchasing of property in foreign 
countries; deposited in foreign bank accounts; and invested in real estate in exclu-
sive districts of major Nigerian cities (especially Abuja, Lagos, and Port Harcourt). 
Corruption by networks of officials and associates in individual or multiple 
corruption cases is the most egregious form of corruption in the public sectors 
of Nigeria and West African countries generally. In the public sector, corruption 
takes the form of collaboration between government officials and contractors or 
among public officials. Bribery and kickbacks usually involve the head technical 
and financial staff of a department organization responsible for awarding, su-
pervising, and certifying contracts and contractors. Cases of embezzlement and 
misappropriation often tend to involve collaboration among officials in the de-
partment with assistance from individuals who provide forged documents for the 
fraudulent transactions. 
Although there are variations in terms of the extent and responses due to 
historical and structural factors within the countries, corruption in Nigeria pro-
vides an insight into the manifestations of corruption in West African countries. 
Visitors to the region listening to public conversations will frequently hear the 
expression that “corruption is the major problem in this country.” In the past three 
decades, foreign governments, the media, donors, and scholars have repeatedly 
tried to demonstrate that corruption is pervasive and persistent in Nigeria. How-
ever, they often fail to acknowledge that corruption in Nigeria is linked to the way 
that companies from Western and other societies do business in Nigeria. This ap-
plies to most African countries, where the major construction, infrastructure, and 
equipment supply contracts are handled by foreign companies. 
Bribery by foreign companies takes various forms, including cash payments; 
opening of foreign accounts; deposited funds for public officials; sponsorship of 
overseas vacation and medical treatment; as well as purchasing of landed proper-
ties and other luxury goods for public officials. Local contractors also engage in 
this form of corruption, especially cash payment and acquisition of property on 
behalf of their corrupt benefactors. 
The Nigerian government has established two anti-corruption agencies. These 
are the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, and the Independent Cor-
rupt Practices Commission, in 2000 and 2002 respectively. Information available 
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from the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in early 2012 showed that 
the agency had filed high-profile corruption cases in various High Courts across 
the Federation. Persons under prosecution include:
a. three former state governors 
b. six former Ministers of the Federation 
c. six former and serving national legislators
d. several bank chief executives
e. several heads of federal and state ministries, departments, and agencies
f. thirteen Filipinos and six Ghanaians involved in oil theft (bunkering)
g. an Indian businessman involved in corruption and fraud of an estimated at 3.2 
billion Naira (1 USD = 160 Naira in July 2012) 
Due to weak criminal justice institutions and corrupt influences on law enforce-
ment and judicial agencies, only four major public figures have been convicted 
on the basis of charges filed against them by the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission between 2002 and 2011. These were a former Bayelsa State Gover-
nor (Diepreye Alamieyeseigha); a former Inspector-General of the Nigeria Police 
Force (Tafa Balogun); a former Governor of Edo State (Lucky Igbinedion) and a 
former Western Zonal National Deputy-Chairman of the ruling People’s Demo-
cratic Party (Olabode Geroge). Cases involving foreign companies like Halliburton 
and Siemens were abandoned. Corruption, therefore, thrives in the country with 
impunity. This scenario is similar to those in other West African countries, and 
differences are only in terms of scale. 
Drug trafficking in Nigeria
Drug trafficking by Nigerian citizens in different countries across the globe has 
remained a major concern for the government and the citizens. This crime, along 
with the advanced fee fraud (scam), has produced a negative image of the country 
in the international community over the past three decades. As a result, Nigerians 
are subjected to intensive searches at airports and extensive surveillance all over 
the world. Because of efforts by the government to curb drug trafficking, drug 
dealers and couriers continuously adjust their modes of operation and routes. 
With respect to regional trafficking of drugs, the National Drug Law Enforcement 
Agency noted that:
Current trends in the illicit traffic of narcotics and psychotropic substances indicate the 
existence of a thriving illicit drug trafficking route within the West African sub-region. Drug 
traffickers importing drugs into Nigeria fly into neighbouring countries, from where the 
drugs are smuggled through illegal routes along the vast land borders. (NDLEA 2008, 4; 
2010a; 2010b)
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In contrast, the predominant route for outward bound drug trafficking is by air. As 
data from the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) shows: 
Air transportation remains the most common mode of transportation by […] traffickers; 
although large consignments are transported by sea. NDLEA data reveal that 80% of the 
cocaine and heroin traffickers arrested between 1999 and 2006 travelled by air. It is how-
ever necessary to note that large seizures of illicit drugs have also been made at the sea-
ports. For instance, in the year 2001, sixty kilograms (60kgs) of cocaine was intercepted 
at the Tin Can Island Seaport in Lagos. In the same vein, the largest consignment of drugs 
ever intercepted in West Africa was made in May 2006 at the Tin Can Island seaport, Lagos, 
Nigeria where fourteen (14) metric tonnes of illicit drugs were seized. (NDLEA 2008, 4)
The use of courier companies (including internationally reputable companies 
like IMPC, FEDEX, DHL, UPS, and TNT) for trafficking small quantities of illicit 
drugs has also been reported (NDLEA 2010a, 24, 62).
Drug seizures
There is considerable annual variation in the quantity of drugs seized. Nonethe-
less, the quantity of drugs seized remains high (Table 1).
Table 1: Quantity of cocaine and heroin seized in Nigeria by NDLEA
Year
Quantity seized in kg
Cocaine Heroin
1999 15.64 81.35
2000 53.42 56.06
2001 195.82 46.63
2002 35.35 55.62
2003 134.74 87.58
2004 124.47 90.94
2005 395.91 70.42
2006 14,435.88 33.09
2007 393.68 120.69
2008 365.49 11.60
2009 392.05 104.71
2010 706.43 202.08
Sources: NDLEA (2010; 2008)
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Occasionally, there are dramatic seizures involving Nigerians and other na-
tionals. On July 22, 2010, NDLEA intercepted 450.4 kilograms of cocaine aboard 
a vessel from Chile. A Taiwanese, a Chinese, and three Nigerians were arrested in 
connection with the shipment. In November 2010, the agency seized heroin val-
ued at $9.9 million at the Tin Can Island Container Terminal Apapa, Lagos. The 
drugs were meant for the European market (NDLEA 2010b, 5, 20–21). The single-
largest seizure ever recorded in the country occurred in 2006, when 14,000 kilo-
grams of drugs were seized by the NDLEA in Lagos. 
Nigerian ports are used largely as transit. Cocaine and heroin are neither pro-
duced nor widely consumed in the country. Cannabis is produced and more widely 
consumed but not often trafficked beyond West African nations, largely due to 
bulk, weight, value, and demand. The NDLEA (2010a, 25) attributes the use of 
Nigeria as a transit route for illicit activities to the following factors:
1. direct air links with many consumer nations;
2. easy connecting links to the source countries;
3. strategic location of the country between Asia and Latin America (the main 
sources of cocaine and heroin);
4. increased trade and communication links between Nigeria and the rest of the 
world; and
5. large areas with porous land borders, which makes entering and exiting the 
country by land relatively easy.
The NDLEA (2010a, 25–26) classifies Nigerian traffickers as belonging to the fol-
lowing four groups: (a) home-based couriers, who generally work for dealers who 
often reside in source countries; (b) West African couriers, a network of traffickers 
that operate within the region; (c) Euro-American-based couriers, who maintain 
links with couriers from Nigeria and are also involved in distribution networks 
within their host countries; (d) source country couriers/dealers, who are “largely 
connected to local networks in the source countries and procure drugs for other 
couriers based in West Africa or at relay points.”
Trafficking in psychotropic substances: 
A problem unacknowledged by the international community 
Consumption of cocaine and heroin is generally low in the country. For these 
drugs, Nigeria is largely a transit route. Psychotropic drugs are, however, imported 
into the country for local consumption and large quantities are imported annually. 
However, trafficking in psychotropic substances and their local consumption does 
not attract the attention of powerful consuming nations, especially the United 
States, which exerts enormous pressure on Nigeria to repress drug trafficking 
and traffickers. Statistics for seizure of psychotropic drugs by the NDLEA for 2010 
shows 2,550.67 kilograms, compared to cocaine (706.43 kgs) and heroin (202.08 
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kgs). Comparative statistics for 2009 were: psychotropic drug (712.77 kgs); cocaine 
(392.05 kgs) and heroin (104.71 kgs) (NDLEA 2010a, 51). 
Destination and deportation of Nigerian traffickers
Nearly four-fifths (78.5%) of the 190 traffickers arrested in 2010 at Murtala Mu-
hammed International Airport, Ikeja (the nation’s busiest airport), by the NDLEA 
were apprehended at the point of departure. Slightly more than one-fifth were 
arrested at point of entry (NDLEA 2010, 59). Out of the total 190 apprehended 
traffickers, 20 percent (38) were flying to Italy; 14.21 percent (27) to Spain; 12.63 
percent (24) to the United Kingdom; 5.26 percent (10) to the United States; and 
4.21 percent (8) to Germany (NDLEA 2010, 59). The airlines of choice for those 
arrested were Iberia (19.9%), Alitalia (16.23%), Emirates (7.85%), Turkish Airlines 
(7.85%), Qatar (7.33%), KLM (5.76%), South Africa Airways ( 5.24%), Arik – Nigeria 
(5.24%), Air France (4.71), Virgin Atlantic (4.19%), Delta (4.19%), British Airways 
(3.66%), and Ethiopian Airlines (3.14%). Other airlines such as Lufthansa, Ke-
nya Airways, and Saudi Airlines were patronized by very few traffickers (NDLEA 
2010a, 58). In 2010, a total of 87 Nigerians (82 males and 5 females) were deported 
from various countries for drug-related offenses. The majority of the couriers were 
deported from seven countries: United States (38), Spain (13), France (8), Italy (4), 
Thailand (4), Germany (3), and Pakistan (3) (NDLEA 2010a, 61).
Transnational crime in West Africa: 
Implications for development and securit y 
Transnational and organized crime has corrosive and destabilizing effects on the 
politics, economy, culture, security, and development of countries, especially in 
weak states and disarticulated economies, such as those found in West Africa. 
They cause or aggravate several economic, political, and security problems. They 
can result in loss of revenues through tax and duty evasion; weaken legitimate 
government; corrupt the political process, politicians, public officials, and secu-
rity agencies, thereby undermining the rule of law; and distort national economic 
planning through money laundering and illicit foreign exchange transactions. 
Trans-border crime undermines economic development as well as state, national, 
communal, human, and individual security. 
Impacts of organized crime
Organized crime has serious negative consequences for individuals, communities, 
and nations. Criminal organizations “have varying capacities to inflict economic, 
physical, psychological, and societal harm. The greater their capacity to harm, the 
greater the danger they pose to society” (Finckenauer and Voronin 2001). 
Policing organized and transnational crime is very challenging due to the fol-
lowing factors:
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As a form of crime, organized crime is difficult for police to handle because 
of the amount of political power, wealth, and use of violence associated with the 
perpetrators. Criminals deploy these factors against law enforcement agents.
Perpetrators of these crimes use bribes to ensure the cooptation and protection 
of the lawmakers, law enforcement, as well as security, intelligence, and judicial 
officers and those occupying the highest offices in a nation.
The perpetrators infiltrate law enforcement and intelligence agencies in order 
to have prior access to plans of action against them. 
Transnational crime in West Africa: responses
West African nations have adopted and adapted several regional, continental, and 
international legal instruments to combat criminal activities within and across 
their borders. Some of the legal instruments are:
a. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
b. UN Convention against Corruption
c. The African Union Convention against Corruption
d. AU Drug Plan of Action
e. The ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption
f. The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons
g. The ECOWAS Protocol on Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, 1999
h. The Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Af-
rica
i. The West African Police Chiefs Committee
j. The ECOWAS Convention on Assistance in Criminal Matter of July 1992 and 
the ECOWAS Convention on Extradition
Conclusion and recommendations
The prevention and control of organized crime require effective measures against 
the political, economic, and legal factors that engender the growth of trans-border 
crime in a nation or region like West Africa. Such measures should aim at achiev-
ing and sustaining the following conditions:
1. consolidation of democracy and good governance in order to create an environ-
ment in which (a) impunity, political instability, conflicts, and wars are elimi-
nated, or at least minimized; (b) effective conflict resolution mechanisms are 
maintained to stem conflicts; (c) rule of law and accountability are entrenched; 
and (d) citizens energy and will are mobilized against organized and transna-
tional crime and criminal syndicates;
2. economic development strategies that promote, guarantee, and sustain high 
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standards of living and employment; minimize poverty, inequalities, and in-
centives for crimes; 
3. implementation of region-wide legal and diplomatic measures against trans-
border crime, including the effective safeguarding of the provisions in the 
ECOWAS Protocols on the movement of persons and goods and on the resi-
dency of citizens of member countries within the region;
4. effective measures against corruption in the nations generally, and especially 
among politicians and security and judicial officials;
5. state capacity and capability for effective regulation of trade; monitoring of 
economic activities of foreign organizations – especially those engaged in the 
extractive industries and the financial and commercial sectors;
6. effective capacity for surveillance, intelligence, investigation, and manage-
ment by border security agencies;
7. strong, effective, and accountable regulatory agencies (in the financial, trade, 
mining, and industrial sub-sectors of the economy);
8. consistent import, export, and tariff policies; 
9. proper delineation of national boundaries;
10. effective patrol and policing of the borders, including efficient aerial patrol as 
well as scanning and intelligence-gathering facilities;
11. adequate training and remuneration of officials responsible for border patrol; 
regulation of movement of persons and goods at borders and ports;
12. strong collaboration among security agencies of the West African nations; 
13. comprehensive bilateral and multilateral instruments (protocols, treaties, 
agreements, mutual law enforcement assistance, joint border patrol, etc.);
14. reliable record-keeping and comprehensive data collection, analysis, storage, 
retrieval, and publication by law enforcement, judicial, and research agencies 
to aid development of strategies and policies, and to enhance planning, opera-
tions, management, research, and policy implementation and evaluation.
These measures entail the entrenchment of democratic measures and good gover-
nance; strengthening the integrity and capacity of state institutions and officials; 
establishing and maintaining effective cooperation among nations, especially 
those within the West African region; and developing strong economic systems 
characterized by appropriate and effective regulatory frameworks, competition, 
social security for vulnerable groups, efficiency, and equity. 
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5. South Africa
5.1 FROM APARTHEID TO 2020:
 THE EVOLUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIMINAL NE T WORKS 
 IN SOUTH AFRICA
Interview with Charles Goredema, Institute of Security Studies, Cape Town 
Q: What is South Africa’s place within the transnational net of organized crime?
It is very difficult to determine which criminal groups are active in South Africa at 
any given point or time. What we have been experiencing here, at least for the last 
20 years, is that there are criminal networks, rather than criminal groups. When 
I say criminal networks, I mean loose working arrangements involving a number 
of criminals, who tend to shift from criminal activity to criminal activity and com-
prise nationals from various countries, without maintaining a degree of perma-
nence. It is also very difficult to isolate foreign criminal groups from local criminal 
groups, because whatever markets we are describing, invariably the networks that 
are active in each of those markets bring together foreign criminals and local 
criminals. It is more accurate to talk about predominant criminal markets. 
A general distinction can be drawn between predatory criminal activities and 
market-based criminal activities. The first comprises activities that involve depri-
vation of property from victims; the latter are those crimes where we cannot easily 
identify real victims, because participants are willing buyers and willing sellers 
of commodities, such as drugs or marine resources or counterfeit commodities. 
Regarding predatory offenses, armed robbery is among the most visible, with 
the most significant type being the robbery of cash-transporting vehicles. In most 
cases this is not an opportunistic crime, but rather planned and organized by net-
works that are linked and plan in advance what to do with the proceeds. Through 
corruption, the criminals are able to get detailed information so that they can be 
accurate in selecting targets and arming themselves. In some instances, criminals 
are able to predict how much money they can expect from a “job.” The supply side 
of corruption in this case would be the security sector, the private guards. 
In the area of theft and trafficking of motor vehicles, South Africa is pre-
dominantly a supplier and not a destination, even though there are a few vehicles 
brought into the country – mostly luxury models stolen from the United Kingdom. 
5. South Afr ica146
Organized criminal activities concerning the theft of vehicles in South Africa have 
linkages beyond the borders of this country. The same can be said about rhino 
poaching, since there is no market for it in South Africa. In this regard, there ap-
pears to be insufficient cooperation with “demand side” countries, where illegal 
commodities coming from South Africa are destined. For instance, collaboration 
with Vietnam, China, and Cambodia is not up to scratch. A higher level of coop-
eration in tracking routes and culprits through transit and destination countries 
is clearly required.
It is very difficult to determine how widespread human trafficking is in South 
Africa, partly because of delays in criminalizing it. South Africa does not have a 
law against human trafficking, therefore there are no official records and docu-
mentation of the phenomenon. The predominant origin of victims appears to be 
the Horn of Africa, but there are also people trafficked from Mozambique, Zimba-
bwe, Angola, as well as southeast Asian countries. It is known that young women 
are still being brought into South Africa involuntarily from some parts of East-
ern Europe to serve in the entertainment and sex industries. Our research found 
some Zimbabweans in virtual labor bondage on farms adjacent to the border with 
Botswana. The phenomenon is tackled legally through the offense of illegal im-
migration; if victims are not prosecuted, they become witnesses in trials against 
organizers of illegal immigration.
Q: Can you offer a brief historical analysis of organized crime in South Africa?
Organized crime has been known to South Africa since at least 1985. Drugs origi-
nating in India, especially Mandrax and heroin, were coming through Zambia 
and Zimbabwe into South Africa. Within the country, a market was gradually 
established on the Cape Flats, a vast network of residential suburbs in eastern 
Cape Town. The evolution of the drug markets there demonstrates the insidious 
relationships that were established by the apartheid state and organized criminals, 
as part of a political project – in terms of which the state sought to disrupt politi-
cal activism, and delay the liberation process. Some of those relationships have 
survived the formal demise of apartheid and are apparent in continuing police 
corruption. There are still instances of organized criminals obtaining firearms 
from the police. Corruption acts are perpetrated especially in drug-related crimes. 
The relationship between organized crime and the public sector is, however, not 
one-sided.
Transitions are period when the capacity of the state to understand and react 
against organized crime is weak. Transitions facilitate an escalation of organized 
crime because of the uncertainty they create and because some people lose their 
jobs during the transition and become desperate enough to be recruited by orga-
nized crime groups. Parts of the private security industry in South Africa have 
benefited from the transition, but parts have been infiltrated by organized crime.
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Q: How is the level of awareness among people?
The public in South Africa is aware of certain forms of organized crime, but I 
doubt that it is aware of all forms of organized crime happening. Market-based 
organized criminality is perhaps less well known. The media also promotes the 
view that predatory forms of criminality are predominant. 
The media should draw attention to emerging forms of criminality, such as 
cybercrime, which needs to be understood within the broader community in view 
of the phenomenal escalation in the use of the Internet and smartphones. The 
risks have grown immensely.
Market-based crimes have a great impact on South Africa because of the high 
levels of poverty in the country. People are vulnerable to the marketing of counter-
feit pharmaceutical drugs and other commodities. Levels of poverty have worsened 
rather that improved in the last five years. Indications are that by 2020, we will have 
a larger urban population than we have now, which probably means that levels of 
poverty will be worse. It will comprise more people living without a reliable source 
of income. In that scenario, market-based forms of crime can only increase. Drug 
trafficking can be expected to escalate, as the demand for drugs grows with the 
young population that is not in school, nor gainfully employed. Greater demand 
stimulates higher levels of supply. Therefore, increasing levels of employment is a 
priority to contain organized crime in this part of the world.
Q: Which measures have been adopted in South Africa to counteract organized crime 
and money laundering?
South Africa, to its credit, was one of the pioneers in terms of enacting legislation 
against organized crime. As far back as 1998, South Africa adopted the Prevention 
of Organised Crime Act (POCA), which made it a criminal offense to belong to a 
crime syndicate, and made it easier to follow the profits of organized crime and 
to seize and confiscate them. It made money laundering a broad offense, involv-
ing all proceeds of crime and not just the proceeds of drug trafficking; it created 
a dedicated asset recovery unit and an account into which proceeds of organized 
crime could be deposited for possible use to fund law enforcement. Along with 
POCA, South Africa saw the creation of a unit combing prosecution and inves-
tigations in the form of the Directorate of Special Operations, whose members 
came to be known as “the Scorpions.” This unit has been dismantled, but while 
operational it achieved quite a lot of success in targeting organized crime and cor-
ruption. It was dismantled following accusations of lack of accountability. The fact 
that the agency shared investigative authority and power with the police proved 
problematic. It was argued that such a unit should have been housed within the 
police force. Thus, it has been replaced by the Directorate of Priority Crimes in-
vestigation, whose members are often referred to as “the Hawks.” Using proceeds 
of crime for law enforcement purposes raised philosophical issues and triggered 
a political battle. Fortunately, South Africa took the view that it was legitimate to 
utilize proceeds from crime to fight crime.
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Money laundering first become a crime under the POCA in 2000. Subse-
quently, in 2003, the Financial Intelligent Centre Act came into effect, creating a 
repository of data on suspicious financial transactions. Since 2003, South Africa 
has accumulated experience in terms of acting against money laundering. Money 
laundering is a daily occurrence, which is to be expected in a country where drug 
trafficking continues to be a significant and profitable industry. In addition, a 
whole range of predatory criminal activities persist. Money laundering regulation 
has been tightened as far as financial institutions are concerned. South Africa has 
more that 40 banks and the financial center is relatively strict in terms of monitor-
ing and ensuring compliance. 
What remains a point of weakness is the extent to which the non-financial 
institutions – such as car dealers, luxury commodities dealers, and estate agents 
– are regulated. With certain forms of criminality, the trend is that proceeds will 
not be taken to the bank as a first step of inserting the money into the economy. 
Proceeds will rather be used to acquire an asset that generates clean money, which 
is subsequently banked. This makes it quite difficult, if not impossible, for the 
bank – in the absence of additional information – to determine the connection 
between the money and a crime. 
Part of the solution probably lies in reducing the dominance of cash transac-
tions. In addition, the hand of the financial sector can be strengthened through 
incentives for people holding assets to use the banking system rather than resort-
ing to other methods. The continuing dominance of cash as a preferred way of 
doing business will always be a point of weakness in reducing money laundering.
Cape Town, September 27, 2012
Verena Zoppei
6. Mexico
6.1 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DAMAGE 
 CAUSED BY THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS IN ME XICO
by José Reveles*
When we use a very coarse brush, in the way Goya did, to draw the frightening 
face of barbarism that has established itself in Mexico – and to describe the bloodi-
est violence this country has seen in decades – the unavoidable truth this reveals 
may, at the same time, be hiding other crimes. These are the offenses against 
social justice, namely the unpunished looting of natural resources, the abandon-
ment of farmers – leaving them completely on their own – as well as the incapac-
ity of the government to create jobs, provide education, health services, housing, 
drinking water, sewage disposal, and other minimum service requirements for 
most of the population.
Recent government administrations have not even demonstrated the mini-
mum level of efficiency required to stop the advance of poverty, which already af-
flicts more than 52 million people in Mexico (46.2% of the country’s population).
Of course it is necessary, wherever possible, to remember, and to lament, the 
human tragedy brought to Mexico by this war against drug traffickers and orga-
nized crime – a war badly planned and even more poorly executed. A “failed war,” 
some analysts say, and a “faked war,” others believe, because there have been no 
positive results so far. After more than five years of armed combat, current data 
reveals devastating realities.
• The term of conservative President Felipe Calderón (National Action Party, 
PAN) will end on November 30, 2012, with around 70,000 Mexicans having 
been violently assassinated and at least another 10,000 who are missing and 
who have not been found in six years. The costs for civilians are extremely 
high. It is not true, as the government maintains, that the immense majority 
of victims were involved in organized crime or were executed or kidnapped by 
* José Reveles is a journalist in Mexico. 
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criminals. There are several thousand homicides and kidnappings (cynically 
labeled “liftings”) that are increasingly being attributed to the armed and po-
lice forces who are fighting crime. 
• In 2011, more than 1.6 million people were displaced from their original 
homes, which corresponds to 2 percent of the country’s population above 18 
years of age. More than 80 percent of these people who left their houses, their 
land, work, and schools were forced to do so because of violence, according to 
a Parametría poll. The exodus has mainly affected the states of Chihuahua 
(where Ciudad Juárez is situated, the city with the highest rate of insecuri-
ty and violence in Latin America), Tamaulipas, Sinaloa, Coahuila, Durango, 
Baja California, Nuevo León, Michoacán, Guerrero, and Veracruz. These are 
among the 32 states in the Mexican Republic where extremely bloody disputes 
between the drug cartels themselves and fights between them and the federal 
forces have taken place – and still take place. The most vulnerable in the popu-
lation, namely widows, orphans, and old people, were among those who fled 
from their homes. However, this is also true for thousands of violated women 
or indigenous peoples who have been deprived of their land in the south of the 
Republic, as doctor Marcos Arana from the José María Luis Mora Research 
Institute explains. According to the United Nations, the problem does not 
seem to bother the government, which has not even carried out an analysis 
to explain the phenomenon of displaced people. A figure disseminated by the 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre of the Norwegian Refugee Council 
states that there were about 160,000 Mexicans displaced in 2011 – a number 
that is identical to that in Palestine during the same period but lower than the 
number displaced in Columbia (260,000), yet a lot more than the number of 
those displaced in Libya (30,000).
• The cultivated area for marijuana (cannabis) and opiates (opium poppy) is far 
from diminishing – more than 5,000 hectares of new plants have been sown 
in the past five years (almost 40%), which is an obvious paradox in view of the 
violence that has been unleashed by the army, the navy, and the federal police 
against organizations that trade their products in other countries or sell them 
on the internal drug market. Without any official explanation, these planta-
tions were fumigated by airplanes in November 2006, above all in the so-
called Golden Triangle in the north (Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango), but also 
in the mountainous region between Guerrero and Oaxaca on the southern Pa-
cific coast, as well as in other production areas in the Gulf of Mexico and on the 
border to Guatemala. In December 2006, the entire fleet of aircraft of the At-
torney General of the Republic (108 aircraft and helicopters) was transferred to 
the National Defense Ministry. Despite this, the armed forces did not destroy 
the plants from the air, but instead deployed 20,000 soldiers to destroy the 
plants manually – a much slower and less efficient method. Mexican heroin 
accounts for 9 percent of the total world production; this covers 39 percent of 
total consumption in the United States, which procures the rest of its supply 
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from Colombia and Afghanistan, according to information published by the 
International Narcotics Control Board in 2011.
• As such, in the very midst of the “War on Drugs,” with troops invading several 
regions of Mexico – although it is not even officially recognized that an armed 
conflict exists – we have a situation that has brought about the exact opposite. 
The production, bagging, and export of Mexican marijuana and opiates have 
increased. This is also true for the processing of synthetic drugs (methamphet-
amines, “ice,” “crystal”) produced in laboratories that are emerging all over 
the country. This is made possible because tons of ephedrine, pseudoephed-
rine, and other chemical derivates (which are needed to make the drugs) enter 
Mexican ports, where controls are very lax. In line with information also pro-
vided by the International Narcotics Control Board, the Mexican government 
dismantled 21 clandestine laboratories in 2008, and in 2009 such discover-
ies and destructions mutiplied nine-fold (191 total). The Mexican armed forces 
confirm that more than 500 designer drug laboratories were destroyed while 
the present government was in office. Some labs were camouflaged in moun-
tain zones, others were in urban zones, and some were even underground. 
• The cocaine comes from South America, mainly from Colombia, Peru, and 
Bolivia, but almost all of the cocaine that reaches the US market inevitably 
passes through Aztec territory. This even includes the cocaine that traffickers 
now prefer to store in temporary “warehouses” in Central American countries, 
whose governments have fewer capacities for controlling illicit activities, as 
intelligence reports have confirmed. The annual quantity that simply passes 
through Mexico on a transit route has also remained unchanged (“We are the 
springboard and the USA is the pool,” as Mexican President Gustavo Díaz 
Ordaz put it almost half a century ago). We are talking about 300 to 500 tons of 
alkaloid each year. However, the Mexican government is confiscating less and 
less cocaine. In the 1990s, there was one record year with seizures totaling 51 
tons, but in 2009 this amount decreased to only 21 tons; in 2010, it decreased 
further to only 9.4 tons; 2007, however, was a good year for the government, 
as almost 48 tons were seized.
• A growing internal market serving Mexican drug addicts has developed. The 
country has 1 million new consumers of cocaine and 1.5 million consumers of 
marijuana, along with hundreds of thousands of designer drug users, which 
adds up to more than 7 million addicts. In 2008, Federal Public Safety Minis-
ter Genaro García Luna acknowledged that 4.7 million Mexicans were addicts 
of marijuana and cocaine. This was in addition to an excessive consumption 
of methamphetamines, resulting in almost 5 million users who consumed 515 
tons of marijuana, 27.6 tons of cocaine, and 4.2 tons of ecstasy and other de-
signer drugs, as outlined in a document submitted by Luna to the Congress of 
the Union. Some experts think this is a result of the closure of terrestrial and 
maritime borders in the south of the United States, and of employing more 
soldiers and border patrols to prevent the entry of prohibited substances into 
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the territory of the northern neighbor. However, other analysts estimate that 
“payment in kind” – that is, by a certain percentage of the cargo instead of cash 
– is becoming increasingly common, motivating the criminal organizations to 
deliberately create a market of Mexican addicts.
• The detention of around twenty criminal leaders over the past three years has 
had absolutely no impact at all, and has left the operative, armed, economic, 
and financial structure of the Mexican cartels virtually intact. The most impor-
tant among these they are: Sinaloa or el Pacífico, Golfo, Zetas, Juárez, Tijua-
na, Familia Michoacana and Caballeros Templarios, Milenio, and the Beltrán 
Leyva. In addition to these there are a variety of subdivisions and temporary 
alliances that make up an extremely complicated map of organizations that are 
not only involved in the bagging of drugs, but also in the exploitation and traf-
ficking of migrants with no papers, the trafficking of women, the smuggling 
of goods (including fuel theft from the official ducts and installations of Petro-
leos Mexicanos, fuel which is sold to “legal” enterprises in the south of the 
United States), extortion, and protection money (which is an illegal and forced 
“tax” on so-called giros negros, such as bars, discotheques, hotels, restaurants, 
but also companies and factories of any kind). We can also add kidnapping, 
child pornography, and exploitation of children, as well as book, music, video, 
and film piracy to this list, adding up to 22 different crimes, including the il-
legal purchase of votes during elections. 
• Politicians and government officials protecting illegal activities are neither 
investigated nor punished in Mexico, apart from isolated cases and where do-
ing so helps to support manipulation. This was the case, for example, with 
the detention, bail, and subsequent liberation (for lack of evidence) of 36 may-
ors and officers in Michoacán, most of whom were members of the left-wing 
Democratic Revolution Party (PRD). This attack – which politicized justice, 
or judicialized politics, depending on how you look at it – is referred to as “El 
Michoacanazo” in popular slang. The entire act was carried out by the federal 
government against local authorities, conveniently in the run-up to intermedi-
ate elections. The aim was to pave the way for the sister of the president of the 
Republic, Luisa María Calderón, to become candidate for governor. The same 
happened three years later, yet still she lost against Fausto Vallejo of the Insti-
tutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Following her defeat, the president’s sister 
accused drug traffickers of imposing governors on the land where the Calde-
róns were born. This was an unexpected acknowledgement that the “drug 
war” had failed (five years after it was initiated by her brother, the president). 
Felipe Calderón himself backed his sister’s statement and publicly admitted 
that organized crime “threatened and led to the withdrawal of the candidature 
of 50 candidates” in their election campaigns to become mayors in the state 
of Michoacán at the end of 2011. The candidates were told “either you go along 
with us or we will have you disappear,” and so “they withdrew their candida-
cies.” Referring to candidates in the municipalities from all parties, the presi-
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dent said that this was a “serious problem which is neither a personal matter, 
nor a matter of party.”
Criminal reser ve army
It must be emphasized that the armed conflict taking place across much of the 
Mexican territory is causing perverse damage. What is happening there is a far 
cry from what is vaguely referred to as “collateral” and must be taken into con-
sideration when analyzing the most harmful effects of the declared war on drugs 
from social, economic, and health points of view. It is not enough to merely list 
figures concerning cases of violence, as we are talking about murders of civilians; 
concealed graves making up entire clandestine cemeteries; kidnappings and thou-
sands of people missing; a rupture in the very tissue of society in many regions of 
Mexico; and even the development of parallel criminal structures that compete or 
openly manage to take the place of official structures.
Statistical data can give us a clearer picture of the devastation already caused 
to Mexican society, which it will take many years to reverse. We are witnessing the 
irretrievable loss of an entire generation of Mexicans at the worst possible time, 
namely when the country should be benefiting from the so-called democracy bo-
nus, which is, however, being wasted (without any official or private solution in 
sight). According to economics professor Ciro Murayama, it will only end after 
millions of young people have been converted into a “criminal reserve army” due 
to the lack of productive employment.1 He claims that between 2011 and 2020, 
there will be around 20.4 million Mexicans who are 18 years of age. They are of 
full age, meaning they can claim their voting card for the first time, but they will 
also demand work. All of them, who at the present time are between the third 
grade in elementary school and twelfth grade in high school, theoretically form 
the so-called demographic bonus, which is “the unique opportunity of having a 
low rate of dependent population, which means that we have a high proportion of 
Mexicans of productive age in relation to the population to be maintained.” 
The problem is that this “bonus” must be made use of, meaning that all of 
these young people must be brought into education and later into employment. 
Murayama’s conclusions are terrible: This decade will see 11.5 million new citizens 
who have not even finished high school. “The situation is critical: United Nations 
studies show that we must have at least 12 years of schooling to avoid falling into 
a state of poverty ... Thus, the majority of our young people today will have lost 
the chance for productive integration and sufficient income for the rest of their 
lives, because they left school too early.” Mexicans who arrive at an age where 
they can start providing income to their homes “will have to deal with a situation 
of informality and precarious work,” and without any access to higher education. 
This means that “a vast ‘criminal reserve army’” will take shape during the years 
1 | See his ar ticle in issue 409 of Nexos magazine from January 2012.
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in which Mexico is shaken by violence and suffering from the massive early exclu-
sion of children from school, and later from employment. 
From another academic field, the rector of the National Autonomous Univer-
sity of Mexico (UNAM), Dr. José Narro Robles, coined a new word to describe this 
generation of young people who have no opportunity of progressing and a very 
uncertain future: He calls them “ninis” (neither-nors), who “neither study nor 
work,” a term considered to be pejorative and discriminatory by many. This is not 
because they have decided to live their lives this way. Rather, it is because the lack 
of jobs and education in the country is far from good in terms of macroeconomic 
and financial policies. For this, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund have blamed the government of the right-wing National Action Party. 
“Compared with the other countries in the Latin America region, Mexico is 
one of the countries that best manages its monetary policy, interest rates, fiscal 
and inflation control and the balance between revenues and public expenditure,” 
said Augusto de la Torre, chief economist at the World Bank for Latin America and 
the Caribbean, in April 2012. 
However, while comparing Mexico to other countries of the region, he com-
plained that “it is one of the countries that has had the lowest growth over the past 
30 years (average rate 2.5%), which means that Mexico is less vulnerable from the 
macroeconomic point of view, and yet still experiences reduced growth.” It is vital 
that the country finds “the path to boost growth” (Mexico is already very much 
lagging behind Brazil, whereas some years ago its indicators exceeded that of the 
South American country), since Mexico represents a fifth of the Latin American 
economy, the World Bank official noted.2
At the same time, it seems that Mexico – a country with enormous natural and 
human resources – is doomed to make its policies (which should be sovereign) 
dependent on its fatal geographic proximity to the hegemonic world power to the 
north. From corrupt governments that repeatedly emphasized their sovereignty 
(during the reign of the PRI for seven decades), the country moved on to 12 more 
years of similarly corrupt regimes (two six-year terms under the conservative Na-
tional Action Party with an encouraging political change in 2000, which, in the 
end, was overthrown), and all of this put a determined and unlimited appease-
ment policy – with respect to projects from Washington – on the official agenda. 
In the face of this, and being the comfortable neighbor of the United States that 
Mexico is nowadays, the country has gradually become a reliable drug supplier to 
the United States (opium, heroin, morphine, marijuana, methamphetamines, and 
other designer drugs produced on Mexican territory, along with the cocaine that 
comes from the south of the continent, but inevitably passes through the vast ter-
ritory of 2 million square kilometers).
Mexico is a country of just laws and has a history of being committed to social 
justice. But in practice it is a country with one of the highest concentrations of in-
2 | See La Jornada, April 19, 2012.
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come. It is also a reliable supplier of oil and natural gas to its neighbor to the north, 
a haven for foreign investment, and a massive supplier of cheap labor for agricul-
tural production, trade, tourism, hotels and restaurants, the construction indus-
try, and domestic services required in the United States. It provides migrants to 
its powerful neighboring economy, and it also provides Central American citizens 
who – in huge numbers and traumatized – cross through the Mexican Republic in 
an attempt to make the “American dream” come true. 
There is a kind of accepted inevitability that US drug addicts give their noses, 
lungs, mouths, veins and money, while Mexicans deliver the deaths in midst of 
uncontrollable violence, allowing drugs to cross the northern border and satisfy the 
needs of the most demanding – and largest number of – consumers in the world. 
As said above, the traditional division between Mexican supplier and US con-
sumer has changed and the number of Mexicans addicted to cocaine, marijuana, 
and designer drugs has increased substantially over the last five years, making the 
country an important consumer too. 
The wealth of the cartels remains untouched
Organized crime has created a parallel economy that allows its members to buy 
sophisticated weapons, distribute bribes to the police and the army, fund armies of 
gunmen, and dispose of armored vehicles, aircrafts, boats, trailers, and all kinds 
of transportation to traffic tons of drugs. 
The publicized detention of drug barons was not sufficient to achieve a dis-
mantling of the criminal organizations. It did not even deprive them of their eco-
nomic power. This became apparent in the case of two of the most notorious drug 
barons, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén (former leader of the Gulf Cartel) and Benjamin 
Arellano Félix (former leader of the Tijuana Cartel). They were initially detained 
for several years in a high-security prison in central Mexico (La Palma, in Al-
moloya) before being extradited to the United States, where judges benevolently 
sentenced them to 25 years each. Although these syndicates were among the most 
dangerous and bloody in the world, they were only ordered to pay €50 and €100 
million, respectively. These amounts did not cause them any sleepless nights, nor 
did paying them leave their families without money, because both were able to 
keep their multimillion-dollar fortunes intact. Former Mexican anti-drug tsar 
José Luis Santiago Vasconcelos even maintained that the cartels formed an alli-
ance in prison to merge their organizations so that they could confront the very 
powerful Sinaloa cartel, whose famous bosses are Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, 
Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, and Juan José Esparragoza Moreno “El Azul,” who all 
remain at large. What this basically means is that they continued their illicit busi-
ness from prison. (Vasconcelos died in the same air accident that killed the young 
Secretary of the Interior, Juan Camilo Mouriño, on November 4, 2008, when the 
Lear Jet 45 arriving from a short flight from San Luis Potosí crashed into a luxury 
residential area of Mexico City). 
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Although the number of the dead and missing as a result of fighting organized 
crime is insane, Mexico only decided at a very late stage – it was announced in 
2012 – to directly combat the money laundering within the context of organized 
crime, which is said to amount to up to €40 billion annually. 
When, in February 2012, the Attorney General’s Office published data about 
seized assets from organized crime, this initially seemed to impress public opin-
ion, however, when compared to other countries and to Mexican statistics, the 
achievements are actually pathetic. In the five and a half years of Felipe Calderón’s 
government, the Attorney General’s Office seized dollars, euros, and Mexican pe-
sos in cash equivalent to almost a billion dollars (VI presidential Pronouncement/
Informe). The average for 2,000 days was half a million dollars a day, which is 
more or less 7 million pesos a day. But when we divide the estimated earnings that 
Mexican cartels generate from drug trafficking and the whole range of related and 
parallel offenses every day (let us say the amount is $36 billion, although some 
sources calculate more), the daily profit would be at least $100 million, or, con-
verted into pesos, 1.4 billion pesos every day, of which authorities only seize less 
than 7 million pesos daily. This quantity represents only 0.005 percent.
The information that best reveals this official incapacity to deprive organized 
crime of its economic and financial power was provided by Dr. Edgardo Buscaglia, 
who is studying the phenomenon at the University of Virginia, USA, and at the 
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, and who is a United Nations advisor 
to missions in dozens of countries. “These random seizures represent 20 or 25 
times less than those confiscated in the same period in Colombia, whose economy 
is much smaller than that of Mexico,” says Buscaglia. Strangely enough, while in 
Mexico seizures  and detentions take place against the adversaries of the Sinaloa 
cartel, in Colombia, it is precisely the Sinaloa organization that was deprived of 
part of its infrastructural assets and its aircraft fleet. “This is a media show,” Bus-
caglia continues:
After years of open and obscene financial and criminal impunity in Mexico, they are now 
star ting a confiscation show in the media, while entering a new era of general financial 
impunity. They want to convince a poor, subdued, and hypnotized people that they are now 
going to attack the financial backbone of the traffickers. 
Buscaglia insists that these are random seizures and not the result of an investiga-
tion or a specific campaign against money laundering or an attempt to get at the 
economic nerve of the cartels. 
The head of the Financial Intelligence Unit of the Ministry of Finance, José 
Alberto Balbuena, acknowledged at the 13th International Seminar for the Preven-
tion of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, organized by the Bankers’ 
Association of Mexico in 2011: 
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When I am asked at international meetings: “Listen, how much money is laundered in Mex-
ico?” I answer that the figures range from $15,000 to $50 billion. [...] What we now know 
for sure, is that we will no longer seize the $14 billion a year in the Mexican banking system, 
the origin of which we did not know in the past. 
This figure has decreased to $7 billion “and the trend is continuing downward.” 
Mexico is establishing “a robust prevention system against money laundering 
within the financial system” Balbuena boasted. “Maybe there are still many things 
to do, but we have made clear progress,” he added. 
Criminal organizations try to invest their resources in real estate, jewelry, and 
vehicles, or they store them. They also invest in security firms, casinos, and betting 
offices, Balbuena said at the seminar. The Assistant Attorney of the Republic, Pa-
tricia Bugarín, referred to cases in which criminals are returning to a “prehistoric 
scheme” of keeping or hiding the money. “I would not say under the mattress, but 
we have definitely observed that, and we are looking for intelligent mechanisms to 
seize this money and to prevent it from entering the financial system.” 
The Attorney General of the Republic, Marisela Morales, confirmed that the 
government strategy is to curtail the operational, logistic, and financial capacities 
of criminal groups and, in doing so, demolish their capabilities to bribe, acquire 
weapons and vehicles, and hire gunmen to fight opposing groups and even the 
authorities. The government, at that time, still had 15 months in office when Mo-
rales stated that “[w]e will only be able to defeat crime when we deprive criminals 
of the material resources that enable them to buy the means to generate violence 
and achieve impunity.” 
President Felipe Calderón launched an initiative to combat money laundering 
in 2011, which was approved by the Senate committees, but which, as of 2012, 
still had not become law. The National Institute of Criminal Sciences researcher 
Ramon Garcia Gibson estimated that between $25 and $40 billion is laundered in 
Mexico. There is also a great deal of cash-smuggling resulting from drug traffick-
ing, which is difficult to calculate, he added. 
A survey by the Chamber of Deputies on indicators of money laundering and 
government actions estimated that the amount of deposits in the Mexican bank-
ing system that were not justified by a legitimate source was still $10 billion in 
2011. 
There is reliable data that income from organized crime activities in Mexico 
generates between $36 and $38 billion annually, according to Global Financial 
Integrity and the University of Columbia, which say the figure equals to 3.6 per-
cent of GDP. The same source estimates that earnings from drug trafficking in 
the United States amount to $196 billion, which is, however, hardly 1.3 percent of 
GDP. In contrast, the independent organization No Money Laundering calculates 
that the illegal gains of Mexican trafficking groups have reached 5 percent of GDP, 
which would amount to more than $59 billion a year. 
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Are criminal organizations superceding the state?
In Mexico a factually weak civilian government is protected by increasingly re-
pressive armed forces. Add to this emergency the threat of a National Security 
Law that is still being debated in Congress, and which would give absolute pow-
ers to the executive to declare states of the military and the government. All of 
this reveals a fundamental contradiction: On the one hand, is implicitly admit 
the failure of the anti-drug strategy because the government is losing control in 
some regions of the country. On the other hand, the military and the govern-
ment explicitly insist on maintaining the punitive paradigm against drugs. 
General Guillermo Galván Galván is the National Secretary of Defense. In 
some of his most honest moments, he has confirmed that criminal organizations 
have taken over state institutions in some regions where “public security has been 
completely overrun.” He admitted that “we must acknowledge that security is un-
der a serious threat today.” 
Then there is the confession made by President Felipe Calderón at the 6th 
Summit of the Americas in Colombia that organized crime is usurping the func-
tions of the state. He made that statement in a conversation with President Ollanta 
Humala of Peru, who translated the content of this bilateral exchange to the media 
as follows: 
We not only have to find out what measures we should take jointly, but also establish what 
we do not want for the coming years — and this raises the issue of illicit drug trafficking and 
other illegal economic activities which are developing. Some heads of state have noted 
that drug trafficking is about to usurp the functions of the state in some places, as the 
President of Mexico has already maintained: look at the issue of tax levying, for example, 
where such organizations are competing with the state in such areas. 
Calderón did not deny this version, but confirmed and reinforced these comments 
a few days later at the World Economic Forum on Latin America held in Puerto 
Vallarta, on Mexico’s Pacific coast. He maintained that if the functions of a state 
are, among other things, to guarantee security and raise taxes, drug traffickers op-
erate as a “parallel state” because they levy duties as if they were taxes, and impose 
their own rule of law: 
In traditional theories of state and law, the state is defined by its monopolistic characteris-
tics: it has the monopoly of law, the monopoly of levying taxes and the monopoly of power 
[...] Nowadays, the misters (drug barons) have come to a position where they contest the 
monopoly of state power, establish their own power, come to a place and impose their own 
law there, and finally, levy their duties which are like taxes the state does not levy: we are 
talking about a parallel state. 
The Mexican president added: 
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We must ask ourselves: Who rules, the mayor of a place or the drug baron? Who rules, the 
governor of this state, or the boss of the group, or the boss of the Mafia established in that 
state? Who rules in a country, the President and Congress or the laws of the drug barons? 
All these discussions were followed by a repetition of the anti-drug strategy in 
Mexico – despite the fact that it had totally failed. It is a “big mistake” to let the 
criminals do what they want and (allow them) to cause a shockwave in which 
they even dispute territories, Calderón said. “We must fight them, we must arrest 
them, in that we cannot give in.” On the other hand, he recommended establish-
ing more powerful institutions, because those existing in Mexico and throughout 
Latin America “are tremendously vulnerable; the police forces are fragile, corrupt-
ible, poorly armed, and poorly recruited.” 
In turn, the International Narcotics Control Board declared that drug traffick-
ers have succeeded in undermining the state apparatus, including the federal and 
state police, the criminal justice system, and the media, exercising corruption, 
threats, and intimidation. 
To fight crime, the Mexican government employs almost 70,000 soldiers and 
marines, as well as more than 30,000 federal police officers who organize mas-
sive operations to suppress crime in more than half of the states of the Federation. 
The problem is, however, that with the entry of the federal forces (who act like 
an invading army, says human rights activist Gustavo de la Rosa Hickerson in Ci-
udad Juarez), brutal violence has increased dramatically and is far from diminish-
ing. Juarez is a good example, as it was the location of about 150 brutal murders in 
2007. The army moved in massively in March 2008, and in the same year violent 
murders numbered 1,600 – a figure which rose to 2,400 in 2009 and to 3,200 in 
2010. Federal, state, and municipal governments tell us that figures fell in 2011 – 
not compared to 2007, however, but only in relation to the previous year, in which 
the number of murder victims in one border community had multiplied by 20. In 
this community, the phenomenon of “femicides” also shot upwards, which has 
made Juarez a place of notoriety worldwide since the 1990s. By the second half 
of 2012, figures for femicides stood at around 500 victims for the period between 
2007 and 2011, a number higher than in the previous 15 years combined. 
It is almost commonplace to say that the major challenge is to bring the army 
back into the barracks. 
The Mexican case is paradigmatic in this regard. Discussion on a presidential 
initiative on national security has been pending in the Congress of the Union 
for more than two years. This initiative aims to proclaim a state of emergency in 
areas where crime – according to the ruling government’s opinion – threatens the 
stability of the country. Meanwhile, the Penal Code and the Federal Criminal Pro-
cedure Code are being reformed, giving prosecutors and the police the possibility 
to search homes, track people, carry out all kinds of espionage activities, and to 
intercept telephone calls, mail, and emails without requiring a court order. This 
means that the police state, which already exists in the laws and in practice, will 
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be complemented by the ominous force of an intimidating militarized state that is 
repressive and not accountable to the authorities. 
On the other hand, although the Mexican armed forces were still acting as 
their own judges in 2012 in cases where severe human rights violations had been 
committed by them against civilians, the Supreme National Court of Justice de-
clared in August 2012 that provisions in Article 57 of the Code of Military Jus-
tice, which allow for the extension of military jurisdiction, were unconstitutional. 
This means that, in the future, members of the armed forces will have to answer 
to local or federal civilian courts for human rights violations against the civilian 
population.
The controversy was immediate. Civil organizations applauded the decision that 
the Supreme Court judges adopted by an 8–2 vote, while legal experts maintained 
that the decision of the Supreme Court judges was limited to “interpreting military 
jurisdiction” (in force since 1933), because the power to alter laws is an exclusive 
power of the Congress of the Union, which by then had not pronounced itself on 
the issue. It should be remembered here that the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights had urged the Mexican government to reform Article 57 of the Code of Mili-
tary Justice, but that Congress had not reached any agreement on this matter.
There is another article in the Code of Military Justice that has not been re-
scinded – Article 81. In its fourth section, it grants power to the Secretary of Na-
tional Defense to grant pardons, even to soldiers and officials who have already 
been sentenced. Brigadier General José Francisco Gallardo has confirmed that 
during the administration of Felipe Calderón criminal prosecutions ordered by 
the civil courts were stopped in this way in hundreds of cases by the Secretary of 
Defense, General Galván.
In 2012, for the third time, there were highly contested presidential elections in 
Mexico (the others were in 1988 and 2006). They were characterized, for example, 
by the use of many millions of dollars of uncertain origin to secure votes, thereby 
guaranteeing the return to power of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. This 
was preceded by several years of media campaigns – using resources from the 
Treasury – creating the image of an unbeatable candidate who was uncondition-
ally supported by the powerful electronic media. In addition, there were biased 
surveys prior to the election that artificially elevated the electoral advantage of this 
“invincible” candidate for the presidency. Enrique Peña Nieto was finally recog-
nized as winner by the Federal Election Court and will be president of the Repub-
lic from 2012 to 2018. However, at least 15 million voters did not vote for him but 
for Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who had already been denied the presidential 
victory by official institutions and the powers that be on two previous occasions. 
6.2 Extortion in Everyday Life in Mexico
by Marco Lara Klahr*
Social relationships in Mexico can, in many ways, be considered to be “extortion-
ary social relationships.” This is not, unfortunately, a trivial generalization but 
an empirical observation that reveals that the offense of extortion is a common 
and normalized practice in everyday interactions – although its visibility in the 
public is virtually zero. The same applies to its judicial prosecution due to am-
biguous, contradictory, and anachronistic laws. Public prosecutors and judicial 
administrations are corrupt and bureaucratic. Victims prefer not to turn to the 
police authorities or to public prosecutors because of apathy, disbelief, distrust, 
and fear – including the fear that the authorities are accomplices of the criminals, 
or corrupt, or merely inept. 
One truism fueled by the rhetoric of high-ranking officials and politicians – 
whose vision of power focuses on a so-called punitive populism – supposes that 
it is mainly criminal organizations that are engaged in blackmailing. However, it 
is not that simple. There are many documented cases of children who blackmail 
their schoolmates, or of municipal police forces, as in Tapachula, on the south-
ern border, who sexually blackmail children from Chiapas and Central America. 
There are couples who revert to extortionary practices to gain advantage in a di-
vorce or maintenance claim case – for example, bringing unsubstantiated charges 
against the other person for domestic violence or sexual aggression against chil-
dren. There are relatives, colleagues, cellmates, neighbors, tenants, partners, po-
lice and military officers, and public prosecution officers who “select” persons who 
will then be blackmailed by others. There are police and military officers, pros-
ecutors, and judges who are involved in extortionary networks or who allow for 
the impunity of such networks. There are extortionary journalists, civil servants, 
and entrepreneurs. There are corporate conglomerates with financial branches 
that attract extortionary money, and there are organizations, such as The Knights 
* Marco Lara Klahr is a court reporter, researcher, activist, and international trainer for 
court reporters in Mexico and abroad.
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Templar in the State of Michoacán, that are highly specialized in the field – which 
does not mean that they are the only criminal organization engaged in extortion. 
But perhaps the most harmful thing is that there are citizens who consider cer-
tain forms of this criminal practice to be normal, necessary, and even beneficial or 
inevitable – as happens in some places in Michoacán. A senior municipal official 
in Uruapan, a city located in that state, expressed such fatalism toward systematic, 
extensive, and unpunished extortion as committed by The Knights Templar, when 
he stated in an interview for a local study on violence, crime, and the media in 
late August 2012 that: “If it happens to you, it happens to you, and if it happen to 
others, what can you do? The only thing is to tell them, ‘I give you my condolences 
and period, because I cannot do anything.’ It is like that, of this scale, because, 
in addition, to whom do you complain, where do you go?” Six months earlier, in 
Tacámbaro, in the Michoacán zone of Tierra Caliente, a businessman engaged in 
the production and export of avocados to Japan expressed a similar opinion: “They 
[The Knights Templar] have cleared the region of thugs, they provide justice and a 
service for the collection of difficult debts. We are safer and that’s what they charge 
us for, or that is what they tell us.” 
According to Mexican criminal law, extortion is considered to be “serious,” 
if someone forces “somebody else to give, make, cause or tolerate something for 
obtaining a profit for him/herself or somebody else, or causes financial loss to 
someone.”1 In reality, thousands of victims are, first, victims of extortion, and 
then, become victims of harassment and psychological torture, home searches, 
coercion to commit a crime, dispossession, kidnapping, physical torture, and mur-
der, which sometimes extends to their family and friends. 
All this happens surreptitiously without the victims knowing the identities 
– or sensing the powers of – the perpetrators that harm them, and it all hap-
pens without recourse to the police, the military forces, or a public prosecutor. A 
45-year-old lawyer from Michoacán, who twice became the victim of extortion in 
the metropolitan area of Monterrey, reports:
I wanted to go crazy, scream, disappear. We stopped at a public prosecutor’s office on 
Avenida Gonzalitos and I got off screaming like crazy, “Help me, they kidnapped my daugh-
ters, give me the phone number of the navy, talk to the army, please!” No one listened to 
me. The officials laughed at me. “Calm down, Madam, what the hell happened to you? You 
are crazy!” They brought me to an office and told me to sit down so that they could take 
my statement. They had taken my daughters, and I thought I would never see them again! 
Neither the army nor the police or the public prosecutor wanted to listen to me, then, dev-
astated as I was, I cried out to God with all my heart.
1 | Federal Criminal Code, Ar ticle 390. 
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Her husband and daughters survived the kidnappings. Their home was raided 
and looted and today she is still fleeing criminal harassment with their family.2
This testimony, along with hundreds of others, clearly tells us that, unlike 
other crimes, extortion not only produces financial damage but is usually followed 
by a spiral of violence, a damage to psycho-emotional and physical integrity, a re-
victimization, and total neglect of victims by institutions. 
The CIDAC (Center of Research for Development) defines eight offenses (CI-
DAC 2012) that should be prioritized by the criminal police – if the government 
wants citizens to feel safe – because of the severe psycho-social impacts they in-
flict. Unlike other offenses, these eight cause great social upheaval, an extreme 
sense of personal and collective powerlessness, a sense of certainty that the per-
petrators will go unpunished, and a predictable change in the behavior of citizens 
in public spaces because of fear. However, partial responsibility for this also lies 
with a news industry that profits from social fears and refuses to accept its social 
responsibility. 
According to CIDAC, extortion occupies the fourth position among the eight 
most intimidating offenses, followed by kidnapping, murder committed by or-
ganized crime, and willful injury. The federal states of Tabasco, Michoacán, San 
Luis Potosí, Chihuahua, Baja California Sur, Baja California, Quintana Roo, Jalis-
co, Durango, Mexico City, Oaxaca, and Morelos are those that suffer from the 
highest incidences of these crimes. 
CIDAC concludes that something that starts out as extortion can result in kid-
napping, looting, coercion to commit crimes, and murder. It must be taken into 
account that the ability to dispose of the necessary criminal infrastructure needed 
to engage in extortion often leads, in turn, to threats, bribes, blackmailing, mur-
der, and arms trafficking in an atmosphere of impunity, producing a “cascade 
effect” of unpunished crimes, which increases the level of illegality and violence. 
In addition, economic and financial aspects apply: “The strong links between the 
offenses may be, in part, due to the existence of economies of scale within crimi-
nal activities” (CIDAC 2012, 42). 
Viewed in context, this phenomenon leads to the consideration that the Mexi-
can state creates incentives to break the criminal law; it also explains, in part, the 
universalization of extortionary practices with its maelstrom of associated offens-
es. The National Survey on Victimization and Perceptions of Public Safety 20113 
found that, for example, with respect to 87.7 percent of the crimes committed, 
victims did not report them to the competent authority – the public prosecutor – in 
particular because they considered it a “waste of time” or because of “mistrust of 
the authority,” “fear of the aggressor,” “red tape,” “hostile attitude of the author-
ity,” or “fear of being blackmailed” by the public servants themselves. As far as the 
2 | This quote was taken from the author’s report “Extorsión y otros círculos del infierno,” 
which will be published in early 2013 by Grijalbo. 
3 | National Institute for Statistics and Geography Mexico, 2011.
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reported crimes are concerned, only 1.3 percent of those responsible for the crime 
were sentenced by a judge. 
This scenario is already overwhelming, but it must be added that regarding the 
offense of extortion – and even worse, regarding kidnapping – the hidden figures, 
that is, the numbers including those offenses not reported within the criminal 
system, are higher in some federal states than those for all other crimes com-
bined; at the same time, judicial proceedings in which a conviction is obtained are 
fewer in number. According to information provided by the Citizens’ Institute for 
Insecurity Research (ICESI 2011), there is,
almost total impunity for extor tionists in Chihuahua and the Federal State of Mexico, a 
situation which is aggravated by the fact that 69 percent of investigations of extor tion are 
concentrated in Chihuahua and in the State of Mexico. The figures are appalling: of 3,158 
preliminary investigations initiated in cases of extor tion in the State of Mexico, only 2.5 
percent went to trial, that is, 79 cases. In Chihuahua, only 7 (0.9%) of the 764 preliminary 
investigations initiated went to court.
In turn, generalized impunity at a national level – which is even stronger in cer-
tain local areas – and global integration, create an explosive mixture. 
Another truism fueled by “punitive populism” is that of the “drug cartels,” 
which are being presented as highly structured criminal organizations special-
izing in the production, purchase, sale, and distribution of illegal drugs, when 
they are, in fact, opportunistic structures which go far beyond supplying the il-
legal drug market, and are able to develop scale economies and explore the most 
diverse activities, including extortion. Moisés Naím of the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace writes: 
We are used to dividing trafficking into dif ferent product lines [...] But these product lines 
are no longer separate from each other. Those engaged in illegal trade change the product 
line depending on the economic incentives dictated or due to practical considerations. 
[...] We definitely must forget the idea that we can distinguish between dif ferent types of 
illegal business, and must star t thinking of those involved as commercial agents who have 
simply developed functional features without being permanently confined to them. Rather 
than distinguishing between drug traffickers, smugglers, pirates, “coyotes,” snakeheads, 
mules or camels, we should rather, when thinking about those involved in such illegal busi-
ness activities, consider the role they actually play, for example, as investors, bankers, 
entrepreneurs, agents, carriers, storekeepers, wholesalers, logistics managers, distribu-
tors. [...] When we star t to see them as commercial opportunists whose incentive is profit, 
it becomes clear that there is no reason for them to confine themselves to a single prod-
uct. All illegal businesses are profoundly inter twined with legal ones. [...] traffickers find 
strong incentives to combine their illegal operations with legal business initiatives. The 
extraordinary profits they accumulate, exert, for example, a logical pressure towards di-
versification. This often means investing in activities that are legal and have nothing to do 
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with any unlawful business. And whether they are voluntary or involuntary accomplices, 
there are many professions and institutions of all kinds that eventually function as a sup-
port for illegal business, as there are banks, airlines, shipping lines, transport agencies, 
truck drivers, messenger services, jewellers, ar t galleries, physicians, lawyers, chemical 
and pharmaceutical laboratories, international money transfer companies and many more 
that provide the infrastructure which allows illegal trade to operate quickly, effectively and 
inconspicuously. (Naím 2006, 300–301)
This is the reason why the Financial Action Task Force has described 22 categories 
of offenses (Financial Action Task Force 2003) as terrorism, among them smug-
gling, sexual exploitation, and contract killing, as well as trafficking in persons, 
organs, weapons, and stolen property, theft, piracy, counterfeiting, environmental 
crime, illegal restraint, kidnapping, and extortion. The Task Force proposes that 
these crimes be combated in an integrated way. The criminal organizations are 
thought to work in collusion with government officials and entrepreneurs of all 
kinds. They depend on a broad social foundation and function through economies 
of scale that allow and oblige them to diversify their illegal market products and 
services. 
The Knights Templar is one of the criminal organizations that, since its in-
ception as The Michoacán Family, has consolidated itself most efficiently as de-
scribed above. For its leaders, there is no social group or economic activity that 
cannot be subject to extortion, and there are no geographical or market bound-
aries. The organization functions in line with a global logic, in the same way as 
Coca-Cola or any other transnational corporation does. It has a sound social and 
territorial basis in its state of origin and in the neighboring states – Guanajuato, 
Jalisco, Colima, Guerrero, and the State of Mexico – where it has co-opted mu-
nicipal, state, and federal authorities by corruption or terror, and where it em-
ploys hundreds of people in its illegal activities. Thus, the organization is not 
only involved in the sale, purchase, production, import, and export of marijuana, 
methamphetamines, heroin, and cocaine, but also in the trafficking of persons 
into the United States. It charges for “right of way” and collects tolls from trad-
ers, craftsmen, entrepreneurs, civil servants, and politicians. It buys and sells 
weapons. It massively produces and distributes pirated products. It steals and 
traffics fuel, and participates in or “expropriates” businesses, always relying on 
bribed or coerced notaries, in a wide range of industries, including the avocado 
business, mining, and transport, counting on networks both in the United States 
and in China. 
In sum, it is a “criminal syndicate” – as Georges W. Grayson from the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies put it – that at its base commands a popular 
paramilitary force, and at its apex has executives with CEO profiles (Grayson 2010, 
18). All this takes place under a charismatic leadership that not only manages the 
retail market for marijuana in the mid-west of Mexico, but is also responsible, to a 
great extent, for the extraction, transport, and export of minerals to China via the 
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port of Lázaro Cárdenas – a business that is associated with “legal” entrepreneurs 
of various nationalities. 
Legitimized by a belligerent rhetoric, President Felipe Calderón militarized 
public safety as a core element of what he pathetically called a “war on drugs” 
from 2007 onwards – an effective bait for a news industry that is, to a large extent, 
submissive and uncritical toward the authoritarian nature of his public security 
policy. This war has exacerbated lawlessness and violence, which has led to tens 
of thousands of unsolved deaths, victims, massive human rights violations, and 
new spirals of crime and violence. It has also led to entire regions falling under the 
control of criminal groups that are usually associated with members of the state 
security forces, such as is the case with The Knights Templar. 
Despite this public policy – which prejudices human rights, civil security, 
criminal justice, welfare in the public space, and social peace – and despite Presi-
dent Calderón’s justifications of this policy’s tragic social costs, corruption and 
impunity in Mexico allow, encourage, and empower not only organizations with 
the profile of The Knights Templar, but also any other organization opting for 
extortion, even “on a small scale.” All of these activities certainly involve public 
civil servants at all levels, as can be seen from Mexican prisons, police institutions, 
prosecution agencies, and courts, as well as from events like the criminal attack 
against the Casino Royale in Monterrey, Nuevo León, in August 2011, in which 52 
people were killed. Another example is the police operation that cost the lives of 
12 people in the News Divine discotheque in June 2008, which happened in the 
north of the federal district. 
A third truism within “punitive populism” is that security, justice, and peace 
can only be achieved if “violent elements” are exterminated, whatever that means. 
According to this preconception, the violation of human rights may become legiti-
mate, and even vital, if this allows the government to fulfill its responsibility of 
guaranteeing public welfare. 
In the regulatory criminal framework, there is no such criminal type as “vio-
lent.” According to the law, the competent public institutions are obliged to pros-
ecute and punish a person or group of people who have committed a crime – in 
a fair, appropriate, and proportionate manner – and to ensure, above all, that the 
violated rights of the victims are reinstated. In contrast, “punitive populism” pro-
poses in its medieval, reloaded perspective that there are citizens who – because of 
their acts, or alleged acts – must be eliminated, while ignoring victims’ interests 
at the same time. This is a breeding ground for extortion and other crimes that are 
usually committed surreptitiously. Since it is often impossible to effectively pun-
ish those responsible, institutions opt to punish those who are within their reach, 
further encouraging impunity and allowing extortion to continue. The expert 
Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona thinks that the inquisitorial criminal justice system 
“does not seek the one who did it, but the one who pays for it” (Lecuona 2010, 21). 
The detrimental impact such a state of affairs has on the quality of democracy 
is overwhelming. As has been shown, extortion not only damages the victims 
6.2 E x tor t ion in Ever yday Life in Mexico 167
materially and submits them to criminal pressures that might severely damage 
of their physical and emotional integrity, resulting in their complete helplessness, 
it also fails to punish habitual offenders, because, in principle, the crime is not 
even reported. All this causes a permanent state of collective alarm and disrupts 
coexistence in the public space. 
A couple of years ago, the International Bar Association published a revealing 
document about the full observance of human rights as a prerequisite for democ-
racy: In Human Rights in the Administration of Justice. A Manual on Human 
Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers. In this it is stated that: “[I]f the state 
pursues a deliberate policy of denying fundamental rights [...] this will endanger 
the internal security of the state.” While on the other hand, “[A]n effective protec-
tion of human rights promotes peace and stability at a national level, meaning 
both that people may enjoy their rights and basic freedoms, and providing a basic 
democratic, cultural, economic, political and social framework in which conflicts 
may be resolved peacefully” (IBA 2010).
This is not to argue that violence or crime may cease to exist – nor organized 
crime and the violence that is inherent to it – but that respecting human rights is 
an “essential prerequisite for peace and justice at an international level, as it [the 
effective protection of human rights] provides a rooted safeguard, offering people 
ways to reduce social tension at home before it reaches dimensions which create 
a threat of a major scale.” And, moreover, this protection must come about from 
the lowest institutional level, the municipal level, simply because it is “the basis 
for justice, peace and economic and social development throughout the world” 
(OHCHR 2003, 5). 
When explaining his reasons for seeking exile in Poland, with the experience 
still fresh, a Mexican businessman who had been persecuted mercilessly by the 
extortion branch of the criminal organization Zetas in Xalapa (Veracruz), stated: 
“I did not want to waste my life on that damn dream that I could find a place for 
myself in Mexico. Here, I found a way out. Mexico, in fact, did not allow me to have 
long-lasting dreams. All that we were and had is gone. If I had stayed in Mexico, 
I would have had to hide like a rat, a rat with money: I couldn’t be at home, drive 
my car, stay in my office or see a brother because all that would be dangerous, so 
to hell with it!” (Klahr forthcoming).
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6.3 CIVIL SOCIE T Y’S STR ATEGIES TO CONFRONT 
 GROWING INSECURIT Y AND VIOLENCE IN ME XICO
by Ingrid Spiller*
For around the past five years, both public and private life in Mexico have been 
dominated by violence and insecurity to a shocking extent. This can be mainly 
attributed to the influence of organized crime, and in particular to the actions of 
drug cartels. However, the state security forces such as the police and the military 
are often also involved in crime through corruption and nepotism. In turn, they 
enjoy the protection of politicians at almost every level for their illegal – and often 
cruel – activities.
Mexican society has been slow to react to these recent developments. Most of 
the population appears to be paralyzed by this escalation of violence, as if to say, 
“It’s not happening to me, but to other people, and it is best not to get involved.” 
Consequently, the election campaign for the 2012–2018 presidency in Mexico took 
place with almost no mention of the issues of lack of security and violence, al-
though this was perceived as the second most pressing problem after the state of 
the economy.1 
“Enough is enough!”
Despite this general paralysis, there are more and more courageous people who 
refuse to simply accept the current situation and have decided to fight for security, 
justice, and the rule of law. The Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity, 
formed at the beginning of 2011, has gained international attention. The Mexican 
poet and journalist Javier Sicilia set up the movement following the brutal murder 
of his son Juan Francisco and six other people. The murderers were linked to the 
world of organized crime. 
1 | Consulta Mitofsky: México Evaluación De Gobierno, Trimestre 21 de Felipe Calderón, 
February 2012.
* Ingrid Spiller was manager of the Mexico, Central America, and Caribbean regional office 
of the Heinrich Böll Foundation from February 2007 to May 2012. At present, she is Head 
of the Latin America department at the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Berlin.
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Juan Francisco’s murder became a wake-up call for the paralyzed civil society. 
He was a member of “mainstream society” with no suspicion of links to organized 
crime, nor was he connected to the circles of money and power.
Sicilia is held in high regard in Mexico, and his very public display of grief and 
his open accusation of those responsible for his son’s death touched a nerve with 
many people. His call “Estamos hasta la madre” (“we are fed up“) was adopted by 
many as their motto. Sicilia criticized the government and the political classes for 
their complicity in – or their inability to put an end to – the violence and terror. 
The success of President Felipe Calderón’s strategy, introduced at the start of his 
presidency in 2007, of deploying the military to combat organized crime, was far 
less than promised. Indeed, those years saw a literal explosion of violence and 
increasing numbers of people who were not directly involved were caught in the 
crossfire, many losing their lives. Their deaths are brushed off by the government 
as “collateral damage.” Activists and human rights organizations, however, also 
claim that the security forces use their deployment to target inconvenient political 
activists.
Sicilia was also the first to address the cartels directly with his accusations: 
“Sort out your business among yourselves. Why kill us?” Thanks to his privileged 
access to the media and his friendship with many intellectuals, people working 
in the culture and media industries – as well as his own celebrity status and his 
work as a journalist – Sicilia’s message was heard throughout the country. This 
is despite the fact that the large media outlets, in their usual way, were interested 
more in sensationalizing his grief and less in promoting his political message.
Many thousands of people heeded his call for protest marches across the coun-
try; the three-day silent march from Cuernavaca to Mexico City had swollen to 
some 100,000 participants by the final rally on May 8, 2011. Two “Caravans of 
Consolation” across the republic followed. One set off in June of the same year 
from the north of the country, traveling through the cities of Monterrey, Saltillo, 
and Durango to Ciudad Juárez – all of which have been particularly hard hit by 
the violence. The second march began in September and led through the states 
of Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas to Mexico’s southern border. One year later, a 
caravan set off for the United States.
“Protest march in white”
These demonstrations were not the first mass outcry in the country against vio-
lence and crime. In August 2008, almost 200,000 people in Mexico City alone 
heeded the call of businessman Alejandro Martí to attend a protest march in 
white, after his 14-year-old son was kidnapped and murdered. In 2004, an esti-
mated 250,000 people marched in silence through the capital in protest against 
the rising number of kidnappings and the increasing lack of security. The large 
response was due in part to the fact that the major media outlets supported the 
call to protest that was issued by members of the business community. Many from 
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the political left distanced themselves from the actions at the time, believing them 
to be right-wing propaganda; these included the then PRD mayor of the capital, 
Andrés López Obrador, who saw the demands of the protest marches in 2004 as a 
direct political campaign by the right against his government project. In 2008, the 
left also found it difficult to give its support to the “Protest march in white.” The 
calls for a greater presence of the (often corrupt) state security forces and tougher 
punishments for the perpetrators – even including for the reintroduction of the 
death sentence – made these differences appear to be unbridgeable. 
The new protest movement
The new protest movement today is substantially different from the two other dem-
onstrations, which were basically sporadic, if impressive, manifestations without 
far-reaching consequences. Today, Mexican society has changed somewhat. The 
movement – particularly in its infancy – gathered together a very broad spectrum 
of people in spite of their disparate political standpoints: Christians and Zapatis-
tas, feminists, human rights organizations, indigenous groups, the political left, 
young adults, and media representatives. Notably, the movement was the first time 
victims’ relatives also became organized. Until then, such people had been largely 
left to fend for themselves, with little support. Not only had their loved ones been 
killed by criminals, the police, or the military, for a long time the government, in 
its “war against the drugs mafia,” also denounced the victims as involved in orga-
nized crime. This made the death or unexplained disappearance of these people 
seem unimportant, as if to say, they had brought it upon themselves. This also 
resulted in the stigmatization and isolation of their families.
The movement managed to change society’s perception of these events some-
what. The media now increasingly reported on the deliberate or accidental tar-
geting of innocent people by the cartels or the security forces. Family members 
joined together to search for their missing relatives. They received almost no state 
support in their efforts, and eyewitness reports say they were often deliberately 
led astray. The movement began to draw up a register, not only to give the victims 
a name and an identity, but also to keep their cases open and eventually achieve 
justice. Finally, the movement attracted so much attention, both nationally and 
internationally, that government members and President Calderón found them-
selves personally obliged to show they were willing to engage in dialogue. The 
first meeting of the president and members of his security cabinet at Chapúltepec 
Castle, which was streamed live on the Internet, was followed by further meet-
ings, including with members of parliament and with the presidential candi-
dates during the election campaign. The results of these meetings were rather 
meager; many high-profile promises, for example to investigate the fate of family 
members, were not kept. However, some real political successes were achieved, 
although they were insufficient in number. For example, it was possible to stop 
the passage of a security law that would have given the military even more wide-
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ranging powers. Also, a special state prosecution service was set up for the victims 
of violence. The required victims’ law remains under political debate, after Presi-
dent Calderón vetoed a law drawn up jointly with Congress, due to concerns about 
its constitutionality.
Diversit y is not always strength
Political and strategic differences have now caused the movement to lose some of 
its power to mobilize people. Members of the more radical spectrum on the left 
in particular were unwilling to enter into a dialogue with the government and 
parliament. They did not believe there was serious interest in a real exchange, es-
pecially since they held many members of the government and parliament directly 
responsible for the violence; consequently, they had no wish to be utilized for pro-
paganda purposes. There was also disagreement within the movement concern-
ing some core demands. The platform of issues became very broad, weakening 
the movement overall. Agreement was eventually reached on six demands and 
areas, yet these can barely be tackled using the existing human and material re-
sources. They range from demands to investigate the fates of murder victims and 
the disappeared, to fighting corruption and impunity and calls for a participatory 
democracy.
Even if the Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity cannot live up to the 
initial, excessive expectations to instigate political and social change, it has at-
tained a high degree of significance in the fight to tackle the apparently hopeless 
situation regarding violence and the lack of security.
The fight against the “normalization” of violence against women
Numerous initiatives have been set up at the local level that carry out extremely 
courageous and important work in the field – often at great risk to those involved. In 
Ciudad Juárez in particular, as well as in other northern Mexican cities, (women’s) 
initiatives and organizations have formed in response to the insane number of un-
solved murders of women. Activists call this phenomenon “feminicide,” highlight-
ing the specific character of these murders, which are directly related to the gender 
of the victims, and which are often particularly gruesome. They are an extreme ex-
pression of the structural violence against women. The perpetrators are to be found 
mainly in the family environment, but also within organized crime structures. The 
lack of sufficient data makes it impossible to establish a systematic link between 
the cartels and feminicidal murders. Although different motives may lie behind 
each individual case, they are all characterized by the incredibly low esteem, or 
even hatred, in which women are held, which in turn is an extreme expression of 
structures within Mexico’s “macho” society. 
Within these structures, it is then only “logical” that the police and justice 
system, as well as the political system, have little or no interest in investigating 
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and punishing these crimes, and may even display a certain tolerance for them. 
For this reason, activists are also fighting the “normalization” of violence against 
women. Their demands are not only for the state to accept its responsibilities to in-
vestigate these crimes, punish the perpetrators, and to protect women, but also for 
society as a whole to accept its responsibility. In this context, many female activists 
are themselves in the firing line, including for example, Norma Andrade, founder 
of the organization Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa (May Our Daughters Re-
turn Home), who has been the target of several attacks. Another activist, Marisela 
Escobedo Ortiz, was killed in cold blood and in broad daylight by an unknown 
assailant in December 2010 as she demonstrated outside the Governor’s Palace in 
Chihuahua in protest against the authorities’ inaction in seeking the person who 
murdered her daughter, then aged 16. 
No impunit y for the militar y
One of the issues tackled by traditional human rights organizations is that of the 
role of state security organs in the fight against organized crime. In this respect, 
the military has been the focus of observation in recent years. The Mexican mili-
tary has repeatedly committed human rights violations during its anti-organized-
crime operations in the country. These crimes almost always go unpunished, 
since soldiers are subject only to military jurisdiction due to the fuero militar 
(special code of justice for the military), which has generally given cover to the 
perpetrators. Organizations have now succeeded in garnering important interna-
tional support for their demands that the military courts be reformed and their 
remits curtailed; this support came in part from a decision handed down by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. After both Mexico’s Supreme Court and 
President Calderón spoke out in favor of such reforms, it is now in the hands of the 
legislative powers to turn them into law. Human rights organizations and others 
are working to ensure that the new draft law on military jurisdiction is based on 
the American Convention on Human Rights.
Those working to defend human rights in the field face increasing threats as 
a result of their activities. According to the office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, 156 attacks against human rights activists occurred between 
2006 and 2010, of which 98.5 percent remain unpunished. In an open letter to the 
Rapporteur for Human Rights Defenders at the Inter-American Commission for 
Human Rights in August 2011, more than 100 social organizations criticized this 
climate of menace, which had increased notably since the beginning of the “drugs 
war” in 2006. Soldiers or police officers are responsible for many of these attacks.
Since journalists in Mexico who report on the illegal activities of the cartels and 
their links to political and business circles also place themselves in great danger,2
2 | Reporters Without Borders names Mexico as the world’s second most dangerous coun-
try for journalists.
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 both groups have demanded that the state provide guaranteed preventive and pro-
tective mechanisms in risk situations. They were supported in their demand by 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which repeatedly called on the Mexi-
can government to act in this matter. One initial success has now been achieved 
– the Mexican Congress passed a protection law in April 2012. The law’s final form 
will decide how effective it is. However, those affected by such threats and attacks 
believe the best protection lies in effective prosecutions. In view of the fact that 
an estimated 96 percent of all crimes go unpunished, effective action is urgently 
required. 
Migrants are particularly at risk
The individuals and networks who advocate for the protection of migrants are few 
in number but of great importance, since migrants have almost no rights. Most 
of these people originate from Central and South America and intend to pass 
through Mexico en route to the United States. They are particularly vulnerable, 
since they generally travel with little money and no official papers. They have been 
exposed for some considerable time to the terror tactics and unpredictable violence 
of the youth gangs, known as maras, and of the Mexican state security forces, 
who rob them, extort money from them, harass them, and sometimes even kill 
them. Women face the additional threat of rape. This situation has worsened in re-
cent years, since the drugs cartels have begun targeting migrants as an additional 
source of income. The Mexican cartels – and in particular the extremely violent 
Zetas (made up of former members of Mexico’s elite forces) – have specialized in 
kidnapping migrants and holding them for ransom. If the kidnap victims or their 
relatives cannot, or will not, pay the demanded ransom, the victims’ only choice is 
to work for the cartel. Those who are unwilling or unable to do this are summarily 
executed. Repeated discoveries of mass graves bear witness to these brutal crimes.
Support initiatives have been founded – mostly by a range of different church-
es – along the main transit route to the United States. They provide shelter, a place 
to sleep for migrants – for a few hours or a few days at least – as well as food and 
medical care. They are public reminders of what is so often suppressed – that is, 
the huge dangers faced by migrants, their lack of any rights, and the complicity of 
local politicians, police, and migration authorities with organized crime. The case 
of the priest Alejandro Solalinde, which attracted international attention, gives an 
idea of just how dangerous such work is. His shelter, opened in 2007 in Ixtepec, 
Oaxaca, has been the object of repeated attacks. He has also received several death 
threats himself, and had to leave the country for some months in the summer of 
2012.
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Searching for the disappeared
The bloody drugs war in Mexico has claimed many lives over the past five-and-
a-half years, but there is also an increasing number of people who have disap-
peared and about whose fate nothing is known. They may already be dead, buried 
in one of the many mass graves that are regularly discovered. Or they may be 
alive, perhaps kidnapped by the cartels, or even the police or the military. Their 
families receive little or no support from the state. Corruption and the complicity 
of politicians, security forces, and civil servants, as well as a lack of training or 
resources and a lack of interest on the part of the relevant authorities, all conspire 
to make the search for these disappeared people more difficult. Often, the families 
of the disappeared invest a great deal of time and money to find information on the 
whereabouts of their children, parents, or spouses. However, even when they do 
manage to come by important information and pass it on to the authorities, there 
is usually no result. Their only sources of support are organizations like Fuerzas 
Unidas por Nuestros Desaparecidos (United Forces for our Disappeared), which 
began working locally in Saltillo, Coahuila, but which has spread throughout Mex-
ico as the number of new cases has increased. These organizations gather and 
collate information and give advice on how to negotiate around the state’s indiffer-
ence, as well as apply public pressure by means of their public relations operations.
No education, no job: Is organized crime the only alternative?
The groups and initiatives working at the local level who find themselves con-
fronted with organized crime now also include many organizations engaged in 
traditional prevention work with young people. In locations where young adults 
have no prospects for the future, since no education or employment opportuni-
ties are available to them, these people are particularly susceptible to recruitment 
into the drug cartels. These “ninis” (ni educación ni trabajo – neither education 
nor work) may be attracted by the prospect of making a relatively large amount 
of money quickly, and the opportunity to acquire other symbols of power such as 
cars, girls, and respect within their group. Many subscribe to the popular maxim 
that it is “better to die young and rich than old and poor.” 
This can make the work of organizations extremely difficult. They have to 
gain the trust and respect of young adults, who often have no family roots. In 
the industrial zones of the north of the country in particular, which were built 
rapidly to respond to the growing global demand for processed products, without 
considering the need for social infrastructure, many children are left to fend for 
themselves. Often, they are the children of migrants from rural areas of Mexico 
who have to work long hours with no opportunity to arrange childcare for their 
offspring. Today, these children do not even have the prospect of getting a job in 
the same factories as their parents, the world’s hunger for cheap products resulted 
long ago in the relocation of production to other countries with even cheaper labor. 
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All this has led, over the past five years, to an apparently insatiable hunger for 
new members of Mexico’s cartels. The so-called drug war has already claimed 
between 50,000 and 60,000 lives, and most of those deaths occurred within the 
environment of organized crime. But for every member who dies, there are others 
willing and eager to take his place. Prevention work in such a situation is both 
challenging and dangerous. How can young people be offered an attractive alter-
native life path? Many organizations offer sporting or artistic activities as a way of 
boosting self-confidence; they also raise awareness of violence and launch educa-
tion and even business projects. They campaign for state recognition of this social 
group and the corresponding funding. They also campaign to improve the public’s 
perception of young adults. All this work must always be based on a foundation 
of trust from the young people, and this often results in organizations gaining a 
close insight into the structures and crimes in the field. The result can be hazard-
ous, for example when the cartels begin to feel inconvenienced by such work or 
when state institutions assume they are complicit in the activities of the cartels.
Indigenous self-determination
Special mention must also be made of the initiative launched by the residents of 
Cherán, a community in the federal state of Michoacán, where the majority of 
residents are of indigenous descent. In April 2011, after the La Familia cartel had 
allowed illegal loggers to cut down and sell much of their forest over a period of 
three years and for high profits, the residents decided to set up a blockade along 
the transport route through their village and thus stop the illegal logging. Initially, 
the community came out victorious in the ensuing violent clashes with the cartel. 
The route through the village is still patrolled, particularly at night, by guards or-
ganized by the residents themselves. The mayor and his people have been driven 
out of office, since they were accused of maintaining close contacts with the cartel. 
The community now runs itself according to traditional indigenous rules. They 
also boycotted the local and federal state elections of November 2011, as they de-
cided no party was deserving of their trust. Violence and crime rates have fallen 
significantly, and the village is now possibly one of the safest in the entire country. 
However, attacks from the outside have recently increased – the battle for control 
of the natural resources has not yet been won.
The important role of civil societ y
Mexico is a state with weak public institutions. Corruption, unpredictability, and 
impunity all negatively affect their ability to function. Against this background, 
the drug cartels have been able, in recent years, to increase their influence contin-
uously. In some regions, particularly in the north of the country, the state has vir-
tually lost its monopoly on the use of force. In other areas, that monopoly has been 
seriously weakened by the high levels of corruption among the police, authorities, 
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and politicians. In some areas the local population definitely show acceptance of 
the “new rulers” – not only out of fear, but also out of gratitude when the drug 
barons move to improve the social development and infrastructure neglected by 
the state. In such a context, all efforts by the state to combat organized crime and 
the lack of security – as well as the high levels of violence that accompany it – must 
be very limited.
This explains why the many (local) civil society initiatives are so important. 
They are not able to replace the necessary state functions, and must certainly not 
allow the state to shirk its responsibilities. But they remain an important and nec-
essary complementary factor in the establishment of security, justice, and the rule 
of law. They are not only indispensable in the raising of the public’s awareness of 
injustice and abuse and in demanding fundamental reform, they also carry out 
important, real work, for example in prevention and in victim support. At the lo-
cal level in particular, their commitment is admirable, especially in the face of the 
dangers and obstacles they must deal with in order to achieve anything.
It is difficult to make predictions about Mexico’s future. The situation is 
changing constantly and at breakneck speed. Every success achieved by the state’s 
security policy, every gap left, for instance, when a famous drug baron is arrested, 
is instantaneously filled by organized crime structures. The Sinaloa cartel, for 
example, began long ago to turn its hierarchical structure into a network, making 
it much more difficult to pursue and break up.
The answer to the question of whether Mexico will continue devolving in the 
direction of a failed state,3 or whether it will manage to introduce the reforms that 
are urgently needed for the rule of law to be re-established – resulting, partly at 
least, in preventing illegal activities – will depend, not least of all, on whether a 
strong and active civil society will be able to unite on the most fundamental issues.
3 | Mexico currently is in the mid-range of the Failed State Index, at position 98. By com-
parison, El Salvador occupies position 93, Honduras 75, and Guatemala 70. Source: Fund 
for Peace: The Failed State Index 2012 Interactive Grid.
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7.1 VIOLENCE AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN BR A ZIL: 
 THE CASE OF “MILITIAS” IN RIO DE JANEIRO
by Ignacio Cano*
1. The debate on organized crime in Brazil
As in many other countries, the concept of organized crime is widely used by 
the media and in public debates in Brazil, yet in the penal codes it is vague and 
its translation into law has been limited. Even though Law 9034/1995 refers to 
“criminal organizations” and Law 10217/2001 to “criminal organizations or asso-
ciations,” neither defines what a criminal organization is. Without a precise legal 
definition, there is no clear consensus on the meaning of “organized crime.” 
Brazil is a signatory to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
of 2000 – also known as the Palermo Convention – so we can assume that its con-
cepts can be considered part of the Brazilian legal system, despite the fact that they 
have not been translated into national legislation. According to the Palermo Con-
vention, an “organized criminal group” is a “structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of com-
mitting one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this 
Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit.” “Serious crimes,” on their part, are those punishable with a sentence of 
at least four years in prison, whereas a “structured group” is one “that is not ran-
domly formed for the immediate commission of an offence” even when they may 
not “have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or 
a developed structure.” 
According to this broad definition, one could argue that a sizeable proportion 
of all crimes committed in most countries could be labeled as “organized crime.” 
* Ignacio Cano is professor in research methodology at the Department of Social Sciences 
and coordinator of the Laboratory for the Analysis of Violence, State University of Rio de 
Janeiro. 
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As a result, the proposed concept potentially covers many different situations and 
actors, from international networks that command hundreds of members to a few 
friends from the neighborhood who regularly engage in robberies or drug-deal-
ing. The main problem with this conceptual breadth is that the term risks losing 
its specificity and its analytical edge. If “organized crime” can be so many differ-
ent things, one should ask whether it is a useful term for thinking about crime 
and designing public policies. 
Whereas, in legal terms, there is an obvious need for a clear-cut definition to 
decide when special legislation addressing organized crime can be applicable, in a 
broader analysis, “organized crime” should be conceived of as a continuum rather 
than as a specific phenomenon. In other words, rather than ask whether a certain 
kind of criminality is organized or not, one should ask to what degree it is orga-
nized, and then how this organization operates in practice. 
In Brazil, “organized crime” is often employed in public debates to refer to 
either of the two following scenarios. First, it is commonly used to describe the 
activities of local criminal networks in poor communities, such as drug-dealers, 
death squads, or, more recently, militias. These groups typically control small a-
reas and their populations and base their criminal activities precisely on this ter-
ritorial control. As a result, the disputes over these territories between different 
groups can be fierce and can result in very high levels of violence. The vast major-
ity of state interventions against “organized crime” attempt to address these kinds 
of criminal structures. Furthermore, the police are often viewed as one more actor 
within this territorial dispute.
The second scenario is that of the more sophisticated criminal networks, 
which infiltrate the state and carry out criminal actions that the public would 
define as “corruption.” These groups do not have a territorial base and only oc-
casionally resort to violence, acting with more discretion and impunity. They can 
bribe high-ranking public officials or make them part of their organizations, and 
they rarely make newspaper headlines. 
The differentiation between the above-mentioned scenarios is oversimplified 
in several ways. Foremost is that both realities are often connected, whereby drugs 
that are sold by local dealers in favelas (Brazilian slums) may have been introduced 
to the country by international networks that have bribed public officials. On the 
other hand, local criminal groups also tend to pay off corrupt state agents, albeit of 
a more modest rank, so they can operate. Ultimately, one of the main distinctions 
between both realities is the degree of sophistication. Limited though the distinc-
tion may be, it serves the purpose of highlighting the sharp contrasts between 
scenarios to which the label “organized crime” is attached. In other words, some 
types of crime are truly much more organized than others. Hence, some voices 
refer to “semi-organized” or “poorly-organized” crime when they describe local 
criminal gangs in favelas composed of young kids with limited education.
In Rio de Janeiro, the gangs that control their respective slums are affiliated 
with “criminal factions” ( facções criminosas), larger groups that also fight each oth-
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er for territorial control. These factions were created by convicts in jail and then 
extended their influence to the streets. To this day, each jail in Rio typically houses 
members of a single faction to avoid violence between their members. There are 
three main criminal factions in the state. The fact that over the last few years the 
state of Rio has made a priority of fighting the most powerful of them, the Coman-
do Vermelho, has served to fuel the violence, since the others have been trying to 
take advantage of this in order to gain influence and territory. Meanwhile, in São 
Paulo the practical monopoly of crime by a single organization, the PCC, has been 
an important contributing factor in the strong decline of homicide rates over the 
last decades (Dias 2011).
The existence of criminal factions in Rio has consistently raised alarms con-
cerning their ability to mount a direct challenge to the state, particularly after a 
few very well-publicized episodes of attacks against police stations, buses, cars, 
and other public targets, presumably in order to generate fear and intimidate the 
government. These incidents were defined as “terrorist attacks” by some, though 
the label was controversial. Despite these concerns, criminal factions in Rio are 
not structured organizations with centralized command, planning, operations, 
and targets. They could be better conceived of as loose networks of mutual sup-
port that serve local gangs to fend off attacks from the outside or, alternatively, to 
gather resources to invade new territories. Also, they help settle disputes among 
members of the same faction. 
Given that state repression has been centered on these local gangs, the degree 
of organization of these criminal factions has been overstated by the government 
and the media, to the point that they have been equated with “organized crime.” 
While this has served a political purpose for the government and the elites – over-
shadowing the role of the more organized and sophisticated criminal circles in 
which members of these elites partake – the above-mentioned attacks on public 
institutions and public targets has undoubtedly strengthened this view.
If debates on organized crime and statements by public officials on this issue 
are common, the topic has received comparatively little attention by academics. 
Although there are some publications within the juridical realm that deal with 
the legal aspects of organized crime, in the social sciences and in criminology, 
research on this topic is relatively rare and mostly focused on specific manifesta-
tions and examples. An exception is the work of Mingardi (1998), who claims that 
organized crime of any significant scale is impossible without collusion with sec-
tors of the state. He distinguishes two types: “traditional” and “entrepreneurial” 
organized crime. The former could be characterized as comprising a group of 
people dedicated to illegal and clandestine activities, with a hierarchy of their own 
and entrepreneurial planning, which includes division of labor and planning of 
profits. Its activities are based on the use of violence and intimidation, and profits 
originate from the sale of illicit products or services – plus, they are protected by 
civil servants. The traits that differentiate them from any other criminal group are 
a system of clientelism, the imposition of a “law of silence” within their circles, 
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and the control of territories through force. “Entrepreneurial crime,” on the other 
hand, appears to be a more blurred concept, mainly defined by the use of methods 
typical of companies, and by the dismissal of old symbolic values such as honor 
and loyalty. 
The scarcity of studies on organized crime in the social sciences and crimi-
nology contrasts with the relative abundance of research on drug-dealing in the 
slums, mainly ethnographies (Zaluar 1994; Barbosa 1998). This somehow rein-
forces the interpretation that drug dealing in poor communities constitutes the 
central manifestation of organized crime in Brazil. 
2. Historical roots of organized crime
It has been said that the main difference between colonization in North and South 
America was the fact that, while the former was led by people who migrated to 
a new land in search of a new life for themselves and their families, the latter 
consisted of fortune hunters – including the representatives of the monarchy – 
who intended to accumulate riches as quickly as possible before returning to their 
homeland. An economy based on the extraction of precious metals fits very well 
with this aim.
Whatever the precise historical causes, Latin American countries developed 
weak states with a low ability to generate revenue and to impose the rule of law, 
which was mistrusted by their own citizens. Also, authorities were often perceived 
as individuals attempting to extract personal benefits, which further undermined 
state legitimacy. On the other hand, social relations in Brazil were always gov-
erned by interpersonal connections and by the position of actors within the social 
pyramid, rather than by abstract and impersonal rules (Da Matta 1981). As a result 
of all these elements, corruption, which we could conceive of as ignoring or bend-
ing official norms in order to achieve personal gains, was traditionally considered 
as being systemic in the country. Campaigns of candidates based on the principle 
that they “deliver to the people even if they also steal” for themselves (“rouba mas 
faz”) or former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s admission that the alleged 
illegal financing of his party meant that “they did what everybody else did” bear 
witness to the perception that corruption was widespread. 
If, as we have seen, the cooperation of state officials is often thought of as a 
crucial ingredient of organized crime, there is no doubt that systematic corrupt 
practices by officials fall neatly within the concept and also constitute the perfect 
breeding ground for the phenomenon as a whole.
In Rio de Janeiro, leaders of illegal lotteries ( jogo do bicho) have been financing 
Carnival parades and political campaigns for decades. Questioned about illegal 
practices, lower-rank state officials often justify themselves by the fact that their 
superiors carry out similar behavior, only with higher profits. Along the same 
lines, lower-rank policemen complain that the disciplinary system treats them 
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more harshly than officers higher up the ladder, and there is some empirical evi-
dence to support that claim (Lemgruber et al. 2003).
3. The case of “militias” in Rio de Janeiro
Around 2006 the term “militia” was coined in Rio to describe groups of armed 
state agents (policemen, prison guards, firemen, etc.), who took control of small 
territories, charging residents and small business owners a fee in order to “pro-
tect” them, and monopolizing most economic services and transactions. For in-
stance, gas and water could only be bought at designated shops, at a higher price, 
whereas transport or Internet services were provided exclusively by their organi-
zations. Often, a levy was placed on real estate transactions in the community. 
Research showed that this phenomenon had existed for many years in certain 
areas of the city under different names (Cano 2008), even though there had been 
a quick process of expansion during 2006 and 2007, including territories that had 
been traditionally dominated by drug dealers. During those years, these “militias” 
had purported to “liberate” communities from the dealers, which led to an intense 
public debate in which some authorities indeed defended such groups as libera-
tors, or at least as a “lesser evil.” 
Some militia leaders successfully ran for office in municipal and state elec-
tions. Other federal representatives were elected with an overwhelming share of 
the vote in militia-controlled districts (Assembléia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de 
Janeiro 2008), which clearly indicated the existence of coercive voting practices 
(curral eleitoral) in such areas. 
However, the notion of an anti-drug crusade was weakened by the fact that 
there had been no drug-trafficking in some of the areas occupied by militias and 
also by the revelation that a few militias continued to profit from drug sales. Fur-
thermore, it was apparent that the “protection fee” was compulsory, as was the 
control of economic transactions, so that the whole operation could legally be char-
acterized as extortion. Control was guaranteed through violence, and reports of 
threats and summary executions abounded in these areas. 
In fact, coercive domination by militias shared many traits with other groups 
that exert similar pressures, such as drug dealers and death squads, that are cen-
tered around the control of small territories and their populations as a way to 
obtain illegal profits. On the other hand, militias, like drug dealers, also devel-
oped social assistance in the communities, often paying for parties, medicine, 
and burials. 
Yet there are indeed some differences. Militias, unlike other groups, openly re-
sorted to a legitimization discourse (“liberators”) as a way to help their expansion. 
They also represent a more organized enterprise that tries to dominate all eco-
nomic activities. If death squads are supposed to be controlled by local politicians 
and businessmen – to the point that they can sell their services to different bidders 
– militias are self-controlled and respond to the initiative of their members. Also, 
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whereas all criminal groups that exert local control count on the participation of 
corrupt civil servants (e.g., death squads are routinely composed of police officers 
and drug-dealing could not exist without the complicity of sectors of the police), 
militias publicize widely that their ranks comprise state officials, since that is an 
inherent part of their identity and their legitimization discourse. In other words, 
they claim to be not just one more armed gang, but a semi-official iron fist that can 
provide security where the state fails. As a result, they consciously played with the 
ambiguity of being private and public at the same time.
In May 2008, members of the militia in the favela of Batan tortured a group 
of journalists who were investigating their activities undercover. The incident 
became a turning point. After this, the media actively spoke out against militias, 
the legislature began a parliamentary inquiry on this topic, and public officials 
did not dare defend them in public again. The final report of the inquiry listed the 
names of hundreds of individuals allegedly associated with the militias. Public 
prosecutors started bringing charges against some of the leaders of the militias, 
and many of them were sentenced and lost their seats in the State Assembly and 
on the City Council. Interestingly, state interventions against militias followed 
traditional investigative methods against organized crime: wire tapping, intelli-
gence, and arrests. This was a far cry from the way in which the state fights drug 
dealers, that is through militarized operations involving shootouts to repossess 
the territory for short periods of time. Apparently, there have been no widespread 
armed confrontations between the police and the militias. This is due to the fact 
that the police uses a totally different approach and also that members of mili-
tias, many of them policemen themselves, are probably reluctant to shoot their 
 colleagues.  
However, an ongoing research project on militias reveals that militias are still 
very present and widespread. Despite the sentencing of some of their leaders, they 
were hardly ever dismantled and the payment of fees and levies continued. In a 
few cases, where these groups seemed to have been removed, new groups sprang 
up to occupy the vacuum. The main difference with respect to the situation a few 
years back is that militias seem to have renounced the claim to publicly legitimize 
their activities. Admittedly, some of the local residents do support the militias, 
while some others oppose them, but there has been no further public discussion 
of their role. They seemed to have learned that visibility is a risk factor rather than 
an advantage, and few candidates for public office associate their names with them 
anymore. Likewise, residents are very fearful of talking about this issue, so the 
research project found it very difficult to obtain testimonies, even from individuals 
who came out in support for their presence.
A few years ago, it was thought that militias – lacking a centralized organiza-
tion – could end up fighting each other for territorial control in much the same 
way as drug dealers do. Indeed, there has been an escalation of violence arising 
from disputes in the last few years between militia members – both between dif-
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ferent militias but mainly within. In fact, the leadership of some of these groups 
has been wiped out by internal strife.
In short, the intervention of the criminal justice system against the militias 
over the last few years was successful in taking out the most visible leaders of the 
most conspicuous groups but was, by and far, ineffective in the attempt to prevent 
them from operating. One could say that the main impact of these prosecutions 
has been a lower profile on the part of these criminal organizations and a signifi-
cant reduction in their ability to infiltrate the state at the highest levels, such as 
the State Assembly and the City Council. The most modest of these groups – com-
posed of a few policemen that have dominated small communities for decades 
– in all likelihood continue to operate undisturbed, given that investigators and 
prosecutors have focused on the best-known and the biggest groups. 
On the other hand, the state of Rio has been engaging in a new policing project 
since 2009 under the name of Units of Pacifying Police (UPPs). Under this initia-
tive, a number of military policemen occupy a certain slum permanently and try 
to establish a more constructive relation with local residents. The new objective is 
to eliminate territorial control by criminal groups and to stop the shootouts rather 
than to win the unwinnable “war on crime.” By and large, these UPPs appear 
to have been successful in these aims, with a sharp decrease in homicides and 
shootouts in these areas. Doubts arise as to the sustainability of this initiative, 
since it has been applied in around 40 communities so far and there are hundreds 
of slums existing in similar conditions. The level of police saturation applied in 
the UPPs makes it impossible to apply the model to the whole territory, since the 
police force would have to be multiplied.
In any case, it has been suggested that – given the criminal justice system’s 
inability to prevent militias from operating – the strategy of UPPs could be a viable 
alternative against these groups. Police presence could put an end to territorial 
control and stop extortions and the coercive imposition of monopolies. So far, only 
one area formerly occupied by militias has been taken over by a UPP, namely the 
community of Batan, as a result of its symbolic value after the torturing of the 
journalists. Even though the project appears to be successful in this community, 
several elements make it unlikely that the UPP project will incorporate many ar-
eas dominated by militias. First, the UPPs have focused on rich and touristic areas 
in the south of the city and on neighborhoods that will host the Football World 
Cup and the Olympic Games. Second, if criteria were realigned to give priority to 
the more violent regions where shootouts are common, these would probably be, 
for reasons mentioned above, areas connected to drug-dealing factions rather than 
to militias.
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4. Militias from local, national, 
 and international perspectives 
Undoubtedly, the phenomenon that has been defined as “militias” in Rio de Ja-
neiro has deep connections with other types of organized crime in which it finds 
its roots. Indeed, one of the main hypotheses to explain the rapid expansion of 
these groups in 2006 and 2007 was that some corrupt policemen realized that it 
was more profitable to control a community directly and impose a tax on different 
economic activities than it was to take bribes from local drug dealers. Prior to that, 
some evidence (Observatório de Favelas 2006) pointed to the fact that dealers in 
the slums were paying steadily decreasing wages to the youth they employed and 
that, as a result, it was safe to assume that their ability to generate profits was be-
ing eroded. This would fit with the notion of a transformation from the old model 
of taking bribes to a new model of direct territorial control and economic exploita-
tion. The existence of previous connections between the dealers and the members 
of these militias would also help in understanding why the takeover was so swift 
in some communities. Witnesses described how the militias arrived overnight, 
killed a few key dealers, and completely dismantled their network, sometimes in-
corporating some of those who worked for the dealers into their new organiza-
tions. This kind of operation could only be carried out by individuals who had very 
good intelligence on how local dealers operated, who they were, and where they 
could be found. 
Drug dealers, even at the local level, were traditionally considered to be part of 
a wider network that extended beyond national borders. The main reason for this 
is that most drugs and all heavy weapons are made outside of the country. Drugs 
originate in Andean countries, with the exception of some marijuana grown in 
Northern Brazil, and machine guns are mainly brought in from the United States, 
allegedly using the same circuits. Hence, there was an obvious – though perhaps 
distant – connection between kids who sold drugs in the slums and international 
crime.
Nevertheless, militias do not justify this international link. To the extent that 
they do not deal drugs (though some of them do, as we have seen), they do not 
need to import anything from outside. They establish monopolies for the sale of 
national products and services, which ensures that no economic transaction can 
happen without their authorization. Therefore, their main commodity is still ter-
ritorial control, as in the case of drug dealers. But while the latter tend to use it 
for the purpose of processing and selling one single product, that is, drugs, mi-
litias try to incorporate any economic activity that they can extract a profit from. 
This implies that residents have to pay a higher price for many goods, which leads 
to frustration and resentment. While some residents support militias due to the 
social control and “peace” they bring, others would rather have the dealers back, 
since the latter did not interfere with peoples’ lives as long as they did not affect 
their business. 
7.1 Violence and Organized Crime in Brazil: The Case of “Milit ias” in Rio de Janeiro 187
Thus, militias can be conceived of as a genuine adaptation of local organized 
crime to increase their profits. Since 2008, some other Brazilian states have also 
reported the existence of “militias” in their cities. While in some cases, the phe-
nomenon appears to be different despite the common label, some other states do 
describe groups of state agents who impose fees and establish monopolies on cable 
TV, Internet, gas, transport, etc. It is unclear how far these structures will grow, 
but the Ministry of Justice has already launched an initiative to create a group of 
experts to reflect on the problem at the national level.
5. Consequences and impacts of militias as organized crime 
Militias are a particularly perverse form of organized crime. Agents of the state – 
armed and trained to protect citizens – use their weapons, their training, and even 
the dubious legitimacy derived from their official roles in order to extort people. 
Hence, they are an example of the worst face of privatization of security, whereby 
public officers use public means to pursue private gains at the expense of those 
they are supposed to serve.
To accomplish their aims, they prey on the most vulnerable sectors of society 
who lack the means and the voice to defend themselves and who have been sub-
jected for decades – if not centuries – to violent social control by the state and by 
various armed groups. This brutal control is all they have known, to the point that 
many do not believe that any other way to regulate conflicts is possible. 
When criminal groups are formed by members of the state, they are particu-
larly hard to fight because their members know how the police operate and can act 
preemptively to protect themselves. There have been testimonies of people who 
have accused policemen of wrongdoing in connection with such militias, only 
to realize shortly afterwards that the accused were informed of the nature of the 
accusation and the identity of the complainant. It is no wonder that witnesses are 
particularly scared to testify against armed state agents and that researchers find 
it extremely hard to find interviewees who dare speak out on this.
Also, members of such groups may count on the possible reluctance of some 
state officials to take hard action against their colleagues, despite their criminal 
behavior. As explained above, there are no shootouts between policemen and mi-
litia members, even if the latter exert territorial control in the same way as drug 
dealers do. We are certainly not advocating police shootouts as a policy, but the dif-
ference between the treatment of the dealers and the militia is certainly revealing.
We tend to think of transnational crime as particularly threatening and dif-
ficult to eradicate, given the limitations of national states compared to the ease 
with which crime can be perpetrated across borders, legislations, and jurisdic-
tions. Yet one could build the argument that in some cases it is precisely the local, 
fragmented, and adaptive nature of organized crime that makes it all the more 
difficult to eliminate. Without a centralized structure that can be dismantled, and 
preying opportunistically on local conditions, militias in Rio have shown that it is 
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one thing to arrest a few individuals at the top of these organizations and a very 
different thing to stop them from functioning.
On the other hand, to the extent that they do not deal drugs, these criminal 
groups can avoid the attention of the state, which is often focused on the mis-
guided “war on drugs,” and continue their expansion. Likewise, to the degree that 
they operate in degraded and forgotten territories, their visibility is minimized.
This is not the place to address the possible measures that could be taken to 
diminish the influence and the harm caused by these groups – measures that 
would likely entail many different approaches: criminal investigations; regaining 
territorial control; regulation of irregular activities; internal and external control 
of police and other official corporations; reform of electoral legislation to fight cor-
ruption, etc. 
Whatever the measures and whatever the characteristics of the criminal 
groups that currently control the slums (militias, death squads, drug dealers, etc.), 
one thing is certain: It can no longer be accepted that significant sectors of the 
Brazilian urban population live deprived of their basic rights in conditions that we 
could define as neo-feudalism, that is, subjected to the arbitrary decisions of the 
leader of the local armed group who rules over their lives and property.
References
Assembléia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. 2008. Relatório Final da 
Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito Destinada a Investigar a Ação de Milícias 
no Âmbito do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Assembléia Legislativa.
Barbosa, A. R. 1998. Um abraço para todos os amigos. Algumas considerações 
sobre o tráfico de drogas no Rio de Janeiro. Niterói: EDUFF.
Cano, I. 2008. Seis por meia dúzia?: um Estudo Exploratório do Fenômeno das 
chamadas Milícias no Rio de Janeiro. Em Justiça Global (org.) Segurança, 
Tráfico e Milícias no Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Heinrich Böll. 
48–103.
Da Matta, R. 1981. Carnavais, malandros e heróis. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar.
Dias, C. C. N. 2011. Estado e PCC em meio às tramas do poder arbitrário nas 
prisões. Tempo Social 23(2) (novembro): 213–233. São Paulo: USP.
Lemgruber, J., L. Musumeci, and I. Cano. 2003. Quem Vigia os Vigias? Um es-
tudo sobre controle externo da polícia no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Record.
Mingardi, G. 1998. O Estado e o Crime Organizado. São Paulo: IBCCrim. 
Observatório de Favelas. 2006. Pesquisa: Caminhada de crianças, adolescentes e 
jovens na rede do tráfico de drogas no varejo do Rio de Janeiro, 2004–2006. 
Sumário Executivo. Rio de Janeiro: Observatório de Favelas. Mimeo.
Zaluar, A. 1994. O Condomínio do Diabo, Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Revan-Ed. UFRJ.
7.2 ROOTS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE AMA ZON 
by Regine Schönenberg*
Introduction
Crime comes into existence by definition. Consequently, crime correlates with 
values of societies and states as they define and execute rules and formulate laws.
The incorporation of the Amazon into the newly formed Brazilian nation took 
place in cycles that always responded to external demands and had weak institu-
tional links to previously formed local structures. To make such a heterogeneous 
institutional landscape operational for the survival of the Amazonians, a dense 
social web of informal social, political, and economic exchange developed over 
the centuries. 
To get to the roots of modern (transnational) organized crime throughout the 
Amazon region, one has to transcend the outward appearances of state structures 
and of concepts such as corruption and understand processes of transformation 
within the local webs of social reproduction and of economic survival.
I.Perspectives 
In political science the object of investigation is first and foremost the state, its 
relationship with its citizens, and the relations between states. For example, peace 
and conflict studies frames its scope of analysis frequently with reference to the 
role of the affected states and its institutions.1 Since the turn of the century, de-
bates on the changing nature of the state, especially regarding the non-OECD 
world, have grown (Migdal and Schlichte 2005). Increasingly, it became clear that 
societal regulation may not always take the form of an ideal-typical Weberian state 
1 | Cf. Forschungsfelder der Hessischen Stif tung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung: 
www.hsfk.de
* Regine Schönenberg is a political scientist who has been working on transnational or-
ganized crime for more than 15 years. Her research laboratory is the Brazilian Amazon, 
where her current research project for the Latin American Institute of the Free University 
is located.
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but may vary with regard to the autonomy, outreach, and division of powers, as 
well as regarding the formation of social consensus, representation, and financ-
ing. Instead of treating diverging forms as incomplete and deficient, scholars, for 
example, of postcolonial studies (Loomba 2006) tend to describe them as different. 
Additionally, during the last two decades, studies on globalization and unions 
of states such as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
and MERCOSUL, etc., have expanded. Discussions on state sovereignty, represen-
tativeness, and accountability toward its citizens reflect the problematic processes 
within such unions.2
In this context, organized crime is being discussed: as “shadow-globalization” 
(Stares 1996; Kurtenbach and Lock 2004; Naim 2005; Nordstrom 2007); within 
the analysis on the implications of the war on drugs on Latin America (Thoumi 
2002; McCoy 1972; Jelsma and Roncken 1998); as part of US foreign policy (An-
dreas and Nadelmann 2006; Scahill 2007); as the subject of international coop-
eration (Jojarth 2009); and as an integral constituent of the state (Mingardi 1998). 
One crucial debate revolves around the question of whether organized crime is 
intrinsic to capitalist reproduction or a shortcoming of state regulation.
As a political scientist, I consider the above-mentioned discussions as con-
stitutive for the framing of (organized) crime, but I will shift the focus toward 
the analysis of the local entanglement of transformative factors – regarding their 
inclusive or exclusive effects on social cohesion. From that point of view, policies 
– whether they are formulated in Washington, Brasilia, or Belém, or by a more or 
less coherent state – impact on local survival strategies, often with collateral effects 
beyond initial intentions. For example, the declaration of undifferentiated protec-
tion zones that conflict with local reproduction strategies might incentivize new 
systems of state corruption. 
In Brazil, one sees all possible types of organized crime embedded in exten-
sive and non-transparent social and political networks. In this article, I will focus 
on the specific situation in the Brazilian Amazon, where boundaries between in-
formality and illegality are blurred, new laws and regulations become instantly 
incorporated into the local power balance, and where – due to understaffed and 
often corrupt local law institutions – impunity is still the norm.
II. Historic roots and current mechanisms 
 of criminalization in the Amazon
The reasons for transnational organized crime gaining leeway in many regions of 
the world are deeply rooted in history. In the Amazonian case, the known history 
begins with the raptorial occupation by foreign adventurers in the 16th century 
2 | Cf. Forschungsfelder und Publikationen der Forschungsgruppe Globale Fragen der 
Stif tung Wissenschaft und Politik: www.swp-berlin.org/de/forschungsgruppen/globale-
fragen.html
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who were aiming at fast riches based on the extraction of natural resources using a 
cheap labor force. The region and its indigenous inhabitants were confronted with 
alien laws and adventurers with an alien relationship to nature. When possible, 
they hid in far-away places and organized their survival despite the unfamiliar 
activities on their territories. 
In principle, the described practice is still in place – it is just that the situation 
has become increasingly ambiguous and complex over time. Over the centuries, 
more and more migrants arrived and closely connected themselves to the different 
extractive cycles on different frontiers of the Amazon: gold, spices, rubber, nuts, 
timber, iron ore, bauxite, hydropower, meat, and lately, soy. Each economic cycle 
introduced new actors, new habits, and new rules – and more of the apparently 
inexhaustible nature was consumed. With decreasing access to land and natural 
resources, evasive survival strategies became scarcer. Consequently, conflicts re-
garding access to any resource grew, as did the complexity and incoherence of the 
legal framework for regulating such conflicts.
This is where the state comes in. Due to the magnitude of the Brazilian 
territory,3 state formation predominantly took place as a private enterprise: The 
respective colonial representative entrusted a businessman or a soldier4 with the 
occupation of a given territory.5 Such a hereditary assignment included the rights 
to exploit nature and the people, to adjudicate them, to enforce colonial law, and 
to form colonial institutions. It is from this time that the social construction of 
the patrão originates, which describes someone with absolute power to solve all 
problems and to be the master of life and death. The idea of the state thus framed 
the activities of the patrão, if suitable; however, the same state was, and still is de-
nunciated as exercising outward interference in case it collides with the interests 
of the local patrão. 
Over time, the situation became increasingly complex, since the interests of 
a multitude of actors overlap and state regulation remains contradictory and is 
enforced only sporadically. In the Amazon, in principle, the patronage system is 
still in place, which might be due to the fact that the concentration of cultivable 
land is constantly growing. The 2006 national agrarian census undertaken by 
IBGE, documented an increase of the GINI-Index regarding the Brazilian agrar-
ian structure: 0.872 in 2006, 0.856 in 1995, and 0.857 in 1985. That means that 
smallholders with less than 10 ha occupy 2.7 percent of arable lands and owners 
of estates larger than 1,000 ha own 43 percent.6 Current data shows that 3 per-
cent of estates occupy 57 percent of arable land, whereas 4.8 million smallhold-
3 | 8.5 million km².
4 | Always in conjunction with a priest.
5 | So-called capitanias: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitanias_hereditárias
6 | www.estadao.com.br/noticias/economia,concentracao-de-terras-aumenta-no-brasil
-aponta-ibge,443398,0.htm
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ers are landless and waiting for the implementation of the agrarian reform.7 For 
formally powerless peasants without land or without land title, informal institu-
tions like the patrão gain strength.
Either one patrão or a number of competing patronage networks determine 
each locality, region, and issue – they are relatively easy to identify – their well 
established economic, social, and political networks guarantee their power. Those 
persons, and respectively their (family) networks, are involved in everything of im-
portance and cannot be overruled without a major conflict. Conflicts arise among 
such networks or if new elites are introduced due to new economic activities or new 
regulations. Usually, new and old elites negotiate under the roof of common orga-
nizations such as the Freemasons and Lions Clubs. After a while, they find new 
common ground without allowing state interference or advantages for their per-
ceived adversaries, such as organized civil society. With this basic social structure 
in mind, we will now discuss the implications for transnational organized crime.
Since the division of municipalities is ongoing in the Amazon, one can pre-
sume that the penetration of more abstract legislation – accompanied by varying 
state capacities or the will to impose such laws – is underway, too. Often, abstract 
laws do not correspond with the local pattern of socioeconomic reproduction and, 
hence, will lead to the creation of new, informal institutions of mediation between 
abstract legal sets of rules and those that are local and informal. In the better 
case, such mediation happens through negotiation processes between local as-
sociations and state representatives; in the worst case, informal networks are be-
ing transformed into illegal networks by corrupting gatekeepers who manage to 
control state inspectors.
In more general terms, one can correlate the proliferation of organized crime 
in the Brazilian Amazon with the illegalization of local economic activities – the 
latter being a collateral effect of ill-defined state regulation.
III. Social transformation, global economic flows, and trafficking routes 
One great experience while researching organized crime is to learn that all stories 
are interconnected through powerful processes of social transformation that are 
driven by fairly invisible global economic flows with their accompanying cross-
effects (Nordstrom 2007). In the case of the Brazilian Amazon, we talk of the 
accumulation of the following cross-effects, which certainly can be found in many 
post-colonial settings:
• The original purpose of state institutions was the administration of extractive 
activities and not the well-being of the location itself – a history that is being 
incorporated into the practice of current state institutions.
7 | www.sasp.org.br/index.php/notas/75-concentracao-de-terras-na-mao-de-poucos-
custa-caro-ao-brasil.html
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• The post-colonial state has treated the region as a periphery – meaning the 
laws and development plans are directed by the interests of the Brazilian cen-
ter-south, thereby marginalizing the needs of an extremely heterogeneous re-
gion such as the Amazon.
• The global demands for natural resources such as energy, minerals, timber, 
meat, soy, and lately, land, are being met without considering regional devel-
opment.
• On the other hand, the local access to national, regional, and international 
markets and to credit is being blockaded by norms and standards that local 
production forms cannot meet.
• State institutions are too weak (capacity, budget, integrity) to be able to medi-
ate and regulate this increasingly precarious situation – as Amazonians often 
live at a great distance from state institutions, suffer from generalized impu-
nity and the constantly growing importance of informal power structures and 
gatekeepers. 
In the case of the Brazilian Amazon, the fact that it borders on Peru, Bolivia, and 
Colombia – the major coca and cocaine production sites of the world – makes it 
an almost natural trafficking route to Europe. However, two further factors have 
helped to connect the local vulnerabilities described with the international traf-
ficking routes. First, the effects of the US-financed and steered Plan Colombia, 
which closed various preexisting trafficking routes and made it cheaper to uti-
lize the longer and slower Amazonian routes. Second, the fact that the Brazilian 
central government enjoys much greater sovereignty than the Andean states has 
made it almost impossible for US counter-drug measures to penetrate Brazilian 
territory. 
A further local specificity has fostered the interconnection with transnational 
crime routes: It is commonplace for the Amazonian informal economy to incor-
porate new products into existing structures without endangering stable informal 
proceedings, such as, for example, the trading of illegally cut timber or illegally 
produced meat. As a consequence, Amazonian cocaine trafficking happened quite 
peacefully and proved to be a secure enterprise for the clients. The fact that in-
formal power networks dominate the local state and juridical institutions makes 
it easy and cheap to guarantee the smooth transport of cocaine on Amazonian 
routes to the south via Mato Grosso, to Suriname via Amapá, or to Rotterdam via 
Amazonas and Pará.
IV. Internal consequences of the illegalization 
  of economic activit y
Various interconnected impacts of the above-mentioned trend toward a formaliza-
tion of the internal social and economic structures can be observed. The most 
relevant in our context is the growing social vulnerability caused by the exclusion 
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of people from economic activities combined with the steady growth of informal 
power structures and powerful gatekeepers.
In the Amazon, apart from some city dwellers, the majority of economic pro-
tagonists contributes to a type of greater family economy that relies on a mix of 
economic activities. One example for the poorer segment of Amazonian society: 
subsistence agriculture and some cash crops, some cattle, some fishing, some 
gathering, one job in a local factory or industry, one job in the municipal admin-
istration, one pension, etc. One example for the richer segment of Amazonian 
society: cattle farming and/or timber trading and/or soy production, some fam-
ily members own a construction firm, others own a supermarket and/or a petrol 
station, one works in the city administration, one son is a lawyer, one daughter a 
doctor, etc.
The higher the diversity of income sources, the higher the resilience of a 
given locality and family, and vice versa – the lower the diversity of economic 
activities, the higher the societal vulnerability to socioeconomic transformation. 
Case study: Abaetetuba/Pará
One good example is the small east-Amazonian town of Abaetetuba, where the 
sheer number of factors contributing to the social transformation of almost 
all sectors of economic life – without the addition of any significant new legal 
activity – is exceptional: illegalization of the fishing sector via inadequate and 
badly compensated closing seasons; illegalization of the bricks industry via 
labor laws; illegalization of the cachaça industry via labor and sanitation laws; 
combined with cheap food and cachaça imports and ISO standards for local 
products, this has led to the total collapse of the local economy between 1975 
and the mid-1990s.
In addition to the described processes, Abaeté looks back on a 100-year smug-
gling tradition due to its being surrounded by hundreds of islands. It was not 
long before the small town, situated on the route to Suriname, came into the 
sights of drug traffickers during their search for a new route for cocaine-arms 
swaps of Colombian traffickers suffering the effects of the Plano Colombia. 
Knowing about the decay of the local economy, the vulnerability of Abaeté for 
becoming an Amazonian hot spot for drug trafficking was no surprise: Old fur 
and cigarette routes can easily be transformed and, in this case, even the old 
local elites who control the actities of the local state and act in cooperation with 
the local church remain in charge. 
Detailed in: Schönenberg (2002), Drug Trafficking in the Brazilian Amazon, 
chapter 6, in: www.unesco.org/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_4A9457FB7DFF1BF4
E9D03208B7CAD783FA331600/filename/drugs_vol2.pdf
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With the introduction of innumerable new laws and regulations, accompanied by 
new institutions and the people who access those institutions, the whole socio- 
economic equilibrium of the Amazonian hinterlands has been transformed wit-
hin the last 30 to 40 years, leading to a simplification and an ever-increasing so-
cioeconomic vulnerability of its populations.
Since governmental efforts to incorporate local populations into the new ways 
of economic life are almost nonexistent, the capitalization and formalization of the 
region has not corresponded with the growing adherence to the new logic and to 
the rule of law – the latter because the rule of law cannot be implemented due to 
incompetence, ignorance, and the lack of financial resources. On the contrary, in-
formal networks have been monopolized and have become more powerful becau-
se more people began depending on them to be able to organize their economic 
survival. Each license requires negotiating an array of bureaucratic hurdles, and 
that can often only be accomplished informally8 – meaning: by paying a bribe or by 
being owed a favor. “Owing someone a favor” is often the gateway for criminal in-
volvement since it often makes it impossible to say “no.” Regarding the active side, 
we are talking about money laundering and the transport of cocaine. The latter is 
done either alongside the legal transport of timber, fish, agricultural products, or 
using the thousands of non-registered airstrips on Amazonian farms; the former, 
predominantly, by means of public bidding procedures and ghost investments. 
The fact that abundant money is available for bribing impacts negatively on the 
local democratic culture and reconfirms the already widespread impunity of the 
whole region.
V. Outlook 
The assessment of the possible future of criminal involvement within the Ama-
zon region of Brazil will be focused on different aspects of state conduct and the 
reaction, respectively action, of the concerned civil society. People affected by the 
criminalization of their worlds will form part of this balance, too, and new ideas 
of human development that eventually sprout locally and globally might impact 
positively on local history.
Regional development: A great share of the Brazilian Program of Accelerated 
Growth (PAC – Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento9) is planned to be real-
ized in the Amazon. Apart from many undisputed investments such as in sewage 
8 | Due to the fact that the local capitals of the municipalities are often situated hundreds 
of miles away from the affected citizens, a direct contact with state bureaucracy is rarely 
possible in the Amazon; usually such tasks are delegated to powerful gatekeepers of the 
concerned locality.
9 | ht tp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programa_de_Acelera%C3%A7%C3%A3o_do_Cresci
mento
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systems, new schools, and hospitals, the construction of numerous hydroelectric 
dams will cause continuous social upheaval, displacement, and disturbance of lo-
cal economic cycles. The Brazilian involvement in the transcontinental infrastruc-
ture program Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South 
America (IIRSA),10 which aims to integrate the continent from the point of view 
of infrastructure development and to open up export corridors to the Pacific, will 
change the local realities of affected populations – in most cases they will not be 
targeted as part of the infrastructure development and their possibilities for socio-
economic participation will be reduced. At the same time, global environmental 
pressure is constant in many global and national contexts where the Brazilian 
state is taking part. Although the environmental policy field is not as strong as, for 
example, economic policy, the government has to respond to a number of claims 
and will do so by decreeing protective measures – again, without studying local 
socioeconomic impacts or even offering economic alternatives. 
Brazilian climate policy: Two important pillars of the official Brazilian climate 
policy are the construction of hydroelectric dams and the production of agro-fuels 
(soy and corn). In both cases, the government claims that it contributes to the re-
duction of CO2 emissions by reducing fossil energy consumption. The side-effects 
for affected populations are the disturbances in their economic cycles as well as 
their access to basic resources such as fish and land, which are needed for simple 
subsistence. 
Brazilian agricultural policy: The above-mentioned exclusion from local infor-
mal socioeconomic reproduction is reconfirmed by the fact that governmen-
tal safeguarding strategies, tax-incentives, credit lines, and international trade 
agreements target the booming sector of agro-industry and disregard the typical 
Amazonian smallholder without a land title, without venture capital, and without 
access to more profitable markets.
Brazilian implementation of national and global trade rules: The latter is being 
done through norm implementation (labor/sanitation/ISO) and often corrupt en-
forcement (bribing claims) that will further limit the capacity for economic sur-
vival.
Brazilian policy of implementing the rule of law: The presence of Brazilian state 
institutions, which are responsible for the enforcement of predominantly federal 
laws, remains sporadic in the Amazon. Even regions where economic activity has 
been curtailed due to massive deforestation do not have permanent representation 
within the responsible federal environmental institution (IBAMA). Consequently, 
10 | ht tp://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Init iat ive_for_the_Integrat ion_of_the_Regional_
Infrastructure_of_South_America
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impunity remains the norm in the Amazon – although the public prosecutors of 
the so-called Ministério Públicos try to reverse this. In cases where a concerned 
locality is situated next to a cocaine route, the distance between local elites and the 
government is escalated via abundant drug money for bribing representatives of 
the state and the judiciary.
Civil society: Civil society’s capacity to unite and focus a large number of small 
protest issues into a comprehensive claim for a different development model has 
been limited until now due to the great heterogeneity of the involved actors. Those 
who are interlinked with global civil society through project financing and who 
have different access to information and support remain, in most cases, distant 
from the affected populations. Mostly, cooperation efforts are being organized 
around concrete campaigns and disintegrate soon thereafter. Additionally, Brazil-
ian civil society has suffered from the fact that their party formed the government, 
and it has only slowly regained its dynamic as an opposition movement.
Amazonians: Amazonian populations,11 be they comprised of indigenous peoples, 
smallholders, or medium-sized farmers, struggle with a declining patience to-
ward state institutions, new regulations, programs, and even participatory devel-
opment proposals. This is because their experiences, for at least three generations, 
was to be neglected and marginalized as far as their specific economic, social, and 
cultural needs were concerned.
New lifestyles: Recently, consumption patterns and lifestyles in big cities all over 
the world have changed – exotic products, preferably organic and Fair Trade from 
far-away regions – are being incorporated into alternative trade cycles. Addition-
ally, communication technologies have helped to bridge the information and com-
munication gap between like-minded people, no matter where they live. Due to 
this trend, an increasing number of Amazonian products12 are being sold world-
wide and new economic and social networks have been formed – still on a small 
scale, however.
Considering all of these aspects, the tendency toward marginalization, exclusion, 
and, hence, declining resilience of the social fabric of the Amazonians, seems to 
be inevitable. 
Whoever is the first to offer social integration, participation in economic life, 
and a vision for a viable future will gain the support of the network – apadrin-
hamento in Portuguese.13 The following institutions will function as goodparents: 
inefficient, incoherent, and often corrupt state institutions; local power networks 
11 | Approximately 26 million (20 million rural).
12 | Açaí, Guaraná, Brazil nuts, Acerola, rubber, etc.
13 | Meaning: endorsement by one’s godfather, that is, sponsorship.
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of different formats and degrees of informal/illegal/criminal involvement; a 
church; the Labor Party (PT), where it exists; a big NGO; the Freemasons and oth-
ers. The choice is not exclusive and the mix depends on the history of the specific 
location – as does its outcome.
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7.3 IF THE MPF WOULD NOT GO FOR IT, WHO WILL?
Interview with Aurélio Veiga Rios, Brazilian Federal Public Ministry
Aurélio Veiga Rios has been a federal prosecutor since 1987 and a close observer 
of the evolution of the Brazilian Federal Public Ministry (MPF) for the last 25 
years. His law degree was obtained from the University of Brasília in 1984 and he 
received his master of law (LLM) degree from Bristol University, United Kingdom, 
in 1996/1997. 
Since the constituency of the MPF is quite unique in its constitutional guar-
antees and practical outreach, the interview focuses on the role of this institution 
as a safeguard for social inclusion, citizenship, implementation of law, and the 
safeguarding of democratic governance.
Q: Please describe the role of the MPF and, more specifically, your role as a Federal 
Prosecutor for the Rights of Citizens.
The role of the MPF is being regulated under the Brazilian Constitution (Art. 127). 
It is a national institution that acts as part of the judiciary in defense of the legal 
order, of democracy, and the election process. Our department is in charge of the 
defense of citizenship rights like the social inclusion of all citizens in all areas: 
health, security, information, anti-racism, anticorruption, etc. It acts mainly in 
preventive ways and focuses on the mediation of societal conflicts, since the MPF 
has another branch oriented toward prosecution.
The independence of the prosecutors from state and federal governments – 
financially and thematically – is guaranteed by the Brazilian Constitution. This 
is why the prosecution of very well-known corrupt politicians is being promoted 
by the General Prosecutor of the Republic. The latest example for this practice, 
named “mensalão,” has involved former ministers and federal deputies from the 
cabinet of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.1 
For 24 years now, the MPF has been empowered by its visible actions and, at 
the same time, has continually been attacked because of its independence. As the 
Federal Prosecutor for the Rights of Citizens, my opinion is that it is of great im-
portance to stimulate mechanisms for controlling the acts of the government and 
1 | http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mensal%C3%A3o_scandal
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its institutions, especially the police. The MPF acts as a kind of federal ombuds-
man and cannot been arbitrarily removed from any case.
Q: Which kinds of political or administrative limits are imposed on the MPF?
Currently, the MPF is active in the Belo Monte case, where a consensual mediation 
has failed, and now the battle is being fought in the judiciary. Here, the political 
and economic interests are so strong that the government is prosecuting the in-
volved prosecutors personally for abuse of their powers.
Additionally, the government is exercising pressure upon the judges. They are 
independent by law but they need the support of the state governor to be promoted 
– meaning that a judge who is “too independent” would not make career advance-
ments. Here, the limits of the judiciary are to be seen in the personal integrity of 
its members.
The same is true for the General State Prosecutors of the Public Ministries of 
the States, who have to present lists of three candidates for each person to be ap-
pointed – and the State Governor will then make the decision. On the federal level 
of the MPF, there is no such election, but the Brazilian president has to consent to 
the choice of the General Prosecutor of the Republic. Until now it has never hap-
pened that a president interfered, but theoretically it is possible.
A further limit is in the field of criminal investigation – namely, the police. 
Lately, the professional capacities of the federal police have improved consider-
ably – most of them are on the side of law and not on the side of the government. 
But the civil and military police of the states are often not reliable. There have 
even been cases where they act as death squads defending the economic interests 
of groups – there was recently one in Goias that was prosecuted by the MPF. In 
cases like that, the police are directly linked to politics, and politics is linked to the 
economic power of the state. Those problems are not so straightforward as with 
conventional crime, since in cases of white-collar crime, the proximity to local 
power structures of the civil and military police is a real problem. There have been 
some moves toward professionalization – but there still is a long way to go.
Q: How would you describe the role of MPF to bridge the gap between legality and le-
gitimacy, which is so present in Brazil?
Part of the MPF works proactively in the mediation of those conflicts, generally, 
by inviting all involved parties and discussing possible solutions to overcome this 
gap. In the case of Belo Monte, we tried mediation with IBAMA [the environ-
mental agency] because the environmental audit was of such bad quality and the 
new version did not fulfill the legal conditions. Meanwhile, the government had 
already emitted the provisional license without caring about the environmental 
audit, and the construction firms started to “prepare” construction. The govern-
ment signaled that it was not willing to negotiate, and it was trying to create facts 
that would inflate the price of any mediation. For us, the main point is the lack of 
prior consultations with local indigenous populations, namely the Kayapó, who 
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are against the construction. Brazil signed ILO Convention 169 – and consequent-
ly, the government is in contravention of international law – as the human rights 
court in Washington confirmed. With this verdict, the government became more 
aggressive and, consequently, the case had to be solved following legal proceed-
ings. Mediation did not work due to the proximity of politics with economics.
Q: How does the MPF deal with the so-called grand corruption of huge clientelistic 
networks in Brazil?
Each case is a long-term endeavor. First, one has to identify the network: who, how, 
where, etc. In cases where we identify a political leader who is being influenced by 
businesses, there is no space left for mediation or negotiation because the person 
has lost credibility and cannot be a partner at the negotiation table. But in most 
cases, the networks are predominantly invisible. Then I talk to all participants in 
the whole network, starting from the assumption that they are willing to listen. If 
this is not the case, we start to collect proof. For this, we need the federal police, 
the tax administration, and judges to give us bank data and lift telephone and 
email secrecy, for example. Depending on the case, further institutions can help, 
like the federal agency for environmental and land disputes. For the success of the 
operation, all involved have to cooperate and remain silent about the investigation 
– it is complicated and may take a long time.
In the MPF we have a colleague, Raquel Dodge, who is in charge of coordi-
nation of criminal affairs, and she is mostly involved in those cases of network 
criminality. It is a non-conditional obligation of the MPF to combat organized and 
white-collar crimes: “Se não for o MPF quem fará?” [If the MPF would not go for 
it, who will?]
Brasília, August 28, 2012
Regine Schönenberg

7.4 UNHOLY ALLIANCES OR CRE ATIVE PROCESSES? 
 SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACHES POINT OUT 
 NE W WAYS TOWARD LOCAL HARM REDUCTION
by Wolfgang Hees*
The rapid spread of crack and synthetic drugs can be witnessed all over Latin 
America. The cartels systematically push the consumption of cheap drugs or 
the residues from cocaine production into the former production and transfer 
countries. Helpless governments exacerbate the situation with their hard-handed 
politics by killing and criminalizing the victims, and violating fundamental civil 
rights. However, solutions can only be developed in cooperation with citizens and 
communities within their social environments.
There was a great deal of perplexity. While it is true that it had been expected 
for years, it had been repeatedly brushed aside and suppressed. This was no longer 
possible – the reality was too brutal. For so long, people had worked successfully 
and assumed that things would continue as always – a little more professionally, 
but with the old charisma. One had achieved and learned a great deal since Paulo 
Freire and his educação popular had been set up – literacy campaigns for the peo-
ple that actually led to an increase in social awareness among the oppressed. The 
educadores populares in Brazil is a group – which it would be incorrect to translate 
directly as “the people’s educators” – made up of socially committed volunteers, 
students, professionals, grassroots movements, and dreamers, and it has a tradi-
tion of almost four decades of fighting for those marginalized and excluded by 
society. They had come to focus increasingly on street kids and adolescents, under-
aged prostitutes, and young people at risk from the favelas (slums). And funding 
from abroad made it relatively simple to obtain money for the street kids. Organi-
zations, movements, and networks were established. These initiatives led to the 
emergence, in 1990, of the progressive Children and Youth Statute, which in the 
meantime has led to the setting up of local, regional, and national child and youth 
councils with equal representation that are responsible for shaping and control-
ling child and youth welfare policies. The rights of children and youth were being 
* Wolfgang Hees is a freelancer, author, and consultant. Between 1996 and 2012 he was the 
responsible desk officer for Caritas Germany projects in various Latin American countries. 
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guaranteed, also with the involvement of youths themselves. Until the new drugs 
came along.
Drugs were already widespread before and being consumed by the young peo-
ple living on the streets and in poor districts, like all over the world – perhaps even 
more so, considering how diminished their prospects in life were. Cheap sugar 
cane spirits are cheaper than milk, sniffing glue banishes hunger and stress, and 
marijuana allows you to dream. But tobacco, alcohol, glue, and marijuana never 
had the same effects on young people as crack and the new synthetic drugs. Until 
they appeared, the usual practice in youth programs was to simply ban drugs 
within the organizations and during common activities – sniffing, drinking, and 
smoking weed was to be done only on the streets. Of course, attempts were made 
to prevent youths from consuming outside of the institutions, but soft drugs con-
tinued to be used and accepted without comment. The “No to drugs,” “Nobody is 
allowed in who is carrying drugs,” and “Zero drugs” campaigns represented a not 
very well-reflected position that differed little from the hardline “zero tolerance” 
policies of the state, its police force and legislation. 
A serious shortcoming became apparent later. With the emergence and fast 
spread of crack – a residue left over during the production of cocaine (cocaine 
salt plus baking soda) – and synthetic methamphetamines (meth, crystal), it was 
already too late to change course. There was no longer time for drug prevention, 
education about the effects of drugs, or for practicing “functional” and responsible 
forms of consuming drugs, because these two new drugs have such a high and 
fast potential for addiction that the NGO employees – who had little training and 
hardly any experience in such matters – were like rabbits in the headlights of a 
fast-approaching vehicle and, in the beginning, they had no strategies for action.
Their clientele began disappearing rapidly. Guilty consciences and addic-
tive habits that had to be fed were among the reasons why young people no 
longer came to the meetings or to the institutions. There was an increase in 
how much drug-dealing was happening as well as in the number of shootings 
among one another. There was fighting over the new profits and fighting with 
the police, who reacted with heavy hands, resulting in many deaths and the 
imprisonment of youths, who were increasingly becoming organized in gang-
like structures. 
The wave of violence and the willingness to use it literally exploded. Brazil 
became the country with the third highest murder rate in Latin America. Particu-
larly affected are young black males from the slums. With 95.7 murder victims 
per 1,000,000 inhabitants, Recife is right at the top of the country when it comes 
to such statistics. Violent death has become the most common cause of death for 
youths between 12 and 18 years of age.
As the consultant responsible for Latin America in the foreign division of the 
German Caritas Association, I experienced this process up close with our part-
ners. At that time, we supported the Tecendo Parcerias (interwoven partnerships) 
network, which we had been involved in setting up. We did this in cooperation 
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with around a dozen organizations that carried out youth welfare work with a focus 
on youth protagonism, which aims to make young people capable of taking care 
of themselves, and of assuming responsibility in the youth councils and in their 
own environments (school, city district, youth centers). As different partners in the 
network were involved in different tasks, activities like the following could be of-
fered and promoted: proactive social work on the street; a reintegration into family 
and school; homework help; preventive action against sexual violence; cultural and 
sport leisure activities; support for criminal youths outside of the prisons; vocation-
al training and integration into employment. Self-organization, participation, and 
emancipation for youths were the primary objectives, and a great deal of attention 
was given to peer education, with youths supporting other youths.
It was an approach in line with current trends and was marked by various 
innovative features, which continued to be based on the partner’s traditional ap-
proach of individual orientation. It became apparent that this “subject-related ap-
proach,” which was also firmly established in Caritas’ concept, could not cope 
with the massive emergence of highly addictive drugs. Individual solutions such 
as withdrawal and therapies were not sufficient responses to the phenomenon, 
which had taken hold of almost the entire community and therefore required a 
collective response.
The search for new approaches and a reorientation in the work being carried 
out was a drawn-out process. It was not until the first exchange projects took place 
with those active in Columbia and Central America – where parallel programs 
succeeded in involving extremely violent youth gangs (maras, pandillas) in the 
community – that a willingness to discuss and initiate a socio-environmental, 
process-oriented approach emerged. Attempts to convince people of the method-
ological approaches (MeCom and Eco 2) behind this were first viewed with skepti-
cism and only accepted because of the lack of alternatives. A realignment from 
“clients” – with their subject-oriented supportive approaches – to a social environ-
ment with a great number of stakeholders and the active minorities fighting for 
change meant a paradigm shift for the educadores populares. This meant having 
to think in terms of new structures and to go down a completely unfamiliar path. 
Nevertheless, the practice of contextual analysis with a self-initiated diagnosis of 
the social environment and the questions this gave rise to – as well as a prioritiza-
tion of the necessary changes with the population and, in particular, the active 
minorities – made a considerable contribution toward an understanding of com-
munity life. However, above all, it led to an exchange and to the development of 
essential knowledge about that local community life.
A stakeholder analysis, which clearly shows the different spheres of influence 
in a visualization presented in one of the method modules, helped most to achieve 
a mental breakthrough. It became clear to them in whose hands the power was 
concentrated, on what this power was based, with whom he/she was connected to, 
as well as how an own lack of relationships and/or lack of diversity in relationships 
had led to marginalisation and a lack of influence.
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Thanks to the protagonism program and the processes of active participa-
tion, they became active in their comunidades (= their social environments) and 
were also better networked with other groups and stakeholders via their peer 
groups. However, it turned out that they hardly used this “wealth” in relation-
ships to strengthen their positions. Without further-reaching goals and without 
corresponding strategies, they were exploited within asymmetric relationships 
and, in the process, drawn into the structures of drug-dealing as dealers or as 
so-called “airplanes” (avaio/couriers). In the short term, they were able to earn 
money, power, and respect. But, in most cases, their own consumption got in 
the way.
As part of the methodical training courses, they quickly came to understand 
their deficits – faster than most of their educadores – at the same time recog-
nizing their potential and their possibilities, which opened up new perspectives 
for action for them. After having largely overtaken their “instructors” conceptu-
ally, they also managed increasingly to build up new contacts – to stakeholders 
within their communities, who can be described as key figures. These are people 
– sometimes officials – who take their roles seriously, whether they are mayor, 
head of a cooperative, teacher, head of a police station, or health facility, priest, 
public prosecutor, etc., and who are interested in the social development of their 
communities. In addition, there are citizens who also have the same interests: the 
baker, the hairdresser, the widow, the young person, the retailer, the midwife, etc. 
These committed key figures, who are referred to as the “active minority” in the 
methodology, have a great number of contacts and knowledge, especially inside 
of, but also outside of, the comunidades. They are therefore in a position to activate 
both endogenous and exogenous potentials for change. In this understanding 
of the social environment as a relational space or environment of relationships, 
which goes beyond mere geographic space, the paradigm shift away from tradi-
tional community work in areas with social problems – the favelas – also becomes 
clear: It is not the deficits or problems that are prioritized, but rather the poten-
tials and relationships among one another and toward the outside. The active 
minorities are, by definition – and in the project reality – willing to, and in a posi-
tion to, activate this relationship potential when this is necessary for the benefit 
of the common welfare.
In a common effort by the educadores, the youths, and the additionally mobi-
lized minorities, the situation and context of the community was diagnosed – dis-
cussed in detail and independently – over a period of several months in talks with 
citizens and officials, following a one-week introduction. Other active minorities 
came on board during this period, while some who had expected fast solutions 
and financial support left, because the process was taking too long for them or 
was organized too openly. It became clear to the youth welfare organizations that 
– in a context in which more than 3 percent of the regional population of north-
eastern Brazil were crack consumers, a figure that easily rose to 15–20 percent in 
the deprived areas – clientele-related and subject-related social work was no longer 
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in keeping with the times and that the challenges facing them could only be met 
with concentrated and networked community approaches.
What is more, in the diagnoses, the varied changes that had come about as a 
result – fear, mistrust, parents, schools and police unable to cope, hopelessness, a 
withdrawal into the family sphere, people leaving the district, etc. – and that had 
intensified in the city districts when drugs moved in and the ensuing violence 
emerged were accentuated differently within the respective comunidade, depend-
ing on the particular context. However, when the topic “origin of the community, 
the present situation and perspectives” was linked in the discussions to the analy-
sis of the stakeholders, it became apparent to those involved what their roles were 
with respect to change and how much power they had in this respect. Instead of 
waiting for someone else to do something, the community itself got moving in 
order to demand change and then decide what form this change should take. They 
defined and prioritized their needs, weighted them between necessity and prac-
ticability by analyzing their potential and their corresponding power to act, and 
began carrying out the process of change.
Despite the stakeholder analysis carried out beforehand and with a heightened 
awareness coming from the discussions about questions of influence and power 
as well as structural violence, the active minorities were treading new ground 
by establishing contact to the stakeholders and creating new local network struc-
tures. This new ground, however, was mined territory, because not every police 
president, drug boss, leader of a youth gang, or even mayor was enthusiastic about 
this initiative and, in the beginning, many were not even willing to take part in 
the dialogue. However, this made it increasingly apparent what other money and 
power interests – as well as mutual dependencies, agreements, and corruptive ele-
ments – had established themselves in a vacuum devoid of state and civil society 
presence. And yet, in the medium term, the community-family environment al-
lowed hardly anyone involved to escape the discussion taking place, because that 
meant isolation, a loss of face, and loss of power. The more consolidated the net-
work became, the more important it was to participate in it. At the beginning, 
straw men and informants were sent to the meetings and training events. They 
did not take part in the actual happenings, but rather looked for opportunities 
to restrain the new movement. However, in most communities, the numbers of 
those taking part increased and they became more active, both in making sugges-
tions and in putting these into practice. 
And so, in 8 out of 12 communities participating in the project, it was actually 
possible to enter new processes of negotiation and create a new scope for develop-
ment. This “success rate” is strongly dependent on the dedication of the active 
minorities, the strength of the opponents, the intensity of the support for these 
processes, as well as on the implementation of initial steps and achievement of 
small successes. These “successes” are the projects that the stakeholders have de-
veloped from their analyses of their social environments and jointly put into prac-
tice. They do not have to concentrate primarily on the drugs, but should act, above 
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all, to reinforce the shared social life of the community. These projects arise out 
of the respective context, they are varied, and they are owned 100 percent by the 
respective community. They include activities such as getting rid of rubbish and 
litter; improving the water and electricity supply or sewage systems; planting ini-
tiatives to make the district greener; repairing and improving the roads; building 
community meeting rooms, a chapel, or a neighborhood football pitch; providing 
mutual childcare; improving school buildings; and they can go as far as organiz-
ing a collective bakery, community gardens, and so on.
The creativity of the communities knows no bounds. The examples mentioned 
here are only a small sampling of those that methodologically trained communi-
ties in our project environment have put into practice – on their own and with only 
local financing.
Of course, there are also activities that work directly within the drug context. 
As such, “gun-free periods” have been negotiated with the drug bosses, so that 
the children can play outside during these times. Police have been trained about 
human rights and how to deal respectfully with drug users. Protected community 
spaces for drug users have been set up to take drug use out of the public arena. 
Shop owners were persuaded against and prevented from employing death squads 
to “get rid of” drug-dependent street kids. Due to intervention by the community, 
healthcare facilities undertook classic harm-reduction measures by handing out 
needles and condoms – all small measures and every single one a matter for de-
bate. 
However, the communities have a response to this: What is fundamental are 
the measures for social survival oriented toward the respective context and not 
the provision of help in individual states of hardship. It is not the drugs that have 
priority, but rather social relations in the community, for example, on how to deal 
with the drugs situation.
It is clear that these steps will not do away with drug use or drug-dealing; 
this will only happen when all drugs have been legalized and then controlled, are 
pure and of consistent quality, and can be sold on the market without the illegality 
surcharge. Only then will the severe and expensive collateral damage caused by 
the “war and the heavy hand against drugs” cease and a self-determined and func-
tional conviver (cohabitation) with drugs and addiction become possible. The key to 
this and the path toward it lies within the comunidade, in the social environment.
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Caritas international, the foreign department of the German Caritas Associa-
tion, has been working since 1998 with a Latin American program to develop 
alternatives in the “War on Drugs” and has developed and tested socio-spatial 
procedures for prevention and harm reduction as well as projects to empower 
and include drug users, working together with Latin American partners and 
using the ECO 2 methodology and community-based treatment. Today, more 
than 600 organizations are in contact with the RAISS network, which was 
the result of this work. There are five specialized drug colleges that train peo-
ple in Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Brazil, and Chile as well as a great 
number of Latin American governments – from the local communities to 
the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), an agency of 
the Organization of American States. The partners are in close contact with 
one another and use the new approach to influence the policies in their coun-
tries.

8. The Balkans
8.1 A “BL ACK HOLE” IN EUROPE? 
 THE SOCIAL AND DISCURSIVE RE ALIT Y OF CRIME 
 IN BOSNIA-HER ZEGOVINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
 COMMUNIT Y’S TACIT COMPLICIT Y
by Berit Bliesemann de Guevara*, ** 
1. Introduction: The Balkans’ “black hole” image
The Balkans is deemed to be a stronghold of transnational organized crime (TOC). 
This is not without reason: During Yugoslavia’s violent demise in the first half of 
the 1990s, large-scale trafficking of drugs, human beings, cigarettes, alcohol, fuel, 
and weapons was widespread in Southeast Europe. The region figured both as an 
important transit corridor to Western Europe and as a destination for global illegal 
trade. It is this image of “states in the grip of organised crime” (Mappes-Niediek 
2003) that has shaped much of the region’s perceptions by the Western European 
public up to the present day.
It was thus a surprise for many when the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) published a report in 2008 that proved otherwise.1 It showed 
that the level of conventional crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, and theft was, 
on average, below that of Western European states (UNODC 2008, 9–10, 35–43). 
Furthermore, the level of classic organized crime, which had dominated the re-
gion during the years of crisis and violent conflict, had decreased significantly 
(UNODC 2008, 12–16, 55–85).2 What was seen as much more problematic than 
TOC was economic crime and corrupt state institutions: Practices at the interface 
of politics, the economy, and organized crime – like tax evasion, smuggling of le-
1 | Compare Anastasijevič (2010).
2 | This said, it has to be clarified that a decrease in organized crime in the Balkans does 
not mean its absence. Although in decline, the retail value of heroin trafficked by ethnic
* Berit Bliesemann de Guevara is a political scientist and senior lecturer in peacebuilding, 
and transitional justice at Aberystwyth University, Wales. 
** I am grateful to Sunita Hasagić for her excellent support in preparing this ar ticle.
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gal goods, and misappropriation of public funds – were even judged as potentially 
hindering the Balkan states’ political and economic stabilization (UNODC 2008, 
17–20, 85–107).
The discrepancy between the Balkans’ persistent perception as the “strong-
hold of organized crime” and the empirical evidence provided by the UNODC is 
illustrative of the way in which the bigger part of the discipline of International 
Relations has dealt with TOC over the last two decades. Fighting TOC is part of 
an extended understanding of security that evolved as a guiding concept in the 
post-bipolar era and eventually led to concepts of human security.3 In these lat-
ter approaches, which put the individual at the center of security thinking, TOC 
– often in relation with transnational terrorism – is believed to destabilize the 
international order and to harm individuals in the states harboring the criminals 
(Benedek 2010).4
Linkages between state weakness and bad governance, on the one hand, and 
the occurrence of TOC, on the other, are often taken for granted, while there is 
less reflection on the deeper logics of illegal practices and their connections to the 
legal sphere. Most importantly, external actors’ roles in creating enabling condi-
tions for crime are not taken into account to the same extent as the presumable de-
fects of “local” structures and actors. Interestingly, in dominant security thinking 
the world tends to be imagined as highly globalized when it comes to the threats, 
which states in the “zone of peace” are facing, while causes for transnational activi-
ties such as organized crime and terrorism are imagined to be rooted rather in 
non-Western states or regions, which belong to the “zone of turmoil.”5 This disre-
gards that illegal practices are embedded into the same structures of world society 
that encompass the legal sides of politics and economy, and that both spheres are 
indissolubly tied together.6 
Using the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) – which in the Western 
mind is frequently imagined as at risk of becoming a “black hole” in (Southeast) 
Europe7 – this article sets out to challenge stereotypical views on TOC in the re-
gion. Taking into consideration historically and sociologically informed state and 
society practices, the aim is to offer a more nuanced picture of organized crime, its 
roots, and logics. This includes the effects that the “black hole” discourse has on 
Albanian smugglers to Western Europe – by far the highest value contraband flow in the 
Balkans – was still higher in 2008 than the (low) gross domestic product of some countries 
in the region (UNODC 2008, 12–14). 
3 | For an overview, see Daase (2010a).
4 | For a nuanced discussion of dif ferences between TOC and transnational terrorism, 
see Daase (2010b).
5 | Compare Buzan and Little (1999); van der Pijl (2002); Geis et al. (2007).
6 | Compare, for example, Lock (2001); see also Jung (2001).
7 | For example, Financial Times (2011), Le Monde diplomatique (2008); The Independent 
(2009); von Sydow (2011, 7); WorldNetDaily (2002).
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social realities. Throughout the article, a special focus is put on the role of inter-
national actors in enabling the conditions of persistent economic crime and state 
corruption. It will be argued that “the international community’s”8 involvement is 
in this regard best understood as tacit complicity.
2. Historical roots of crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Historically, crime is anything but an unknown in the Balkans. Going back to 
pre-communist times, romanticized imaginations of the military-historical fig-
ure of the hajduk, the “Robin Hood of the Balkans,” are part of regional popular 
culture (Allcock 2000, 390 et seq.; Bougarel 1999a). During communist rule, 
the smuggling of consumer goods thrived, and the fact that the citizens of non-
aligned Yugoslavia could travel freely to countries in East and West put organized 
criminals from the SFR Yugoslavia into an ideal position as smugglers (UNODC 
2008, 48). Communist leaderships, and especially their secret police and intel-
ligence services, also contracted criminals as informants or to liquidate dissidents 
abroad (ibid.). These roots are important, as historically established functions and 
linkages might hint at certain path dependencies in the relationship between state 
representatives and criminal actors (ibid.).9 However, to understand and explain 
organized and other forms of crime and their political linkages in the region to-
day, it is crucial to look at the more recent causes and functions of illicit activity 
that boomed before and during the Balkan wars of the 1990s.10
It was during the 1980s, when the role of illegal economic activities became 
significant for large segments of Yugoslav society. The reason for this was the 
rapidly deteriorating economic and political situation in the Federal Socialist Re-
public. During the 1950s and 1960s, Yugoslavia’s economic model of the “Third 
Way” between a market and command economy had gained international atten-
tion and seemed, at first, to bring about economic modernization and prosper-
ity. Yet this economic strategy had two main pitfalls. On the one hand, economic 
growth depended to a high degree on public investment financed by international 
aid and credit, which led the state into a severe debt crisis in the early 1980s (Kiza 
2003). Credit-financed mismanagement of industrial assets in the republics sub-
8 | The catch-all phrase “international community” is used here and there for readability. 
Throughout the text, I will explain in more detail which actors and dimensions are meant by 
it. On the dif ferent notions of the problematic concept of “the international community,” 
see critically Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn (2011).
9 | The authors of the UNODC report argue, for instance, that due to these historical link-
ages between state agents and criminals, TOC in the Balkans is not accompanied by the 
high levels of violence known from other world regions, especially Central America (UNODC 
2008, 47).
10 | For a detailed account of the relationship between stateformation and economic de-
velopment in Yugoslavia and BiH, see Bliesemann de Guevara (2009, 107–166).
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sequently caused a breakdown of production and rising levels of unemployment. 
This situation was further aggravated by waves of returning guest workers from 
Western Europe.
On the other hand, the so-called workers’ self-management, the core pillar of 
the Third Way model, did actually little to democratically empower workers (Kiza 
2003, 200–201).11 Rather, this decentralization of the industry enabled elites in 
the republics, provinces, and municipalities to seize control of industrial assets 
and establish local spheres of power, which built on the vertical ties with workers 
and local communities: “Society was permeated by vertical patron-client relation-
ships as well as nepotist networks of mutual favours, originating in self-manage-
ment workers’ collectives, local communities, revitalised rural-urban ties, and the 
widespread black-market economy” (Schierup 1998, 229). Clientelist redistribu-
tion, subsistence farming, and black-market trade became the backbone of many 
families’ everyday economic survival in view of unemployment, unpaid salaries, 
and dwindling remittances in the 1980s.12 13
Economic decentralization in the republics was paralleled by political centrifu-
gal developments on the national level. In the early 1970s, an extensive transfer of 
state functions from the central government to the six republics left the Yugoslav 
central state weak, while “republican etatism” grew. In this situation of a dire na-
tional economy and a highly fragmented sociopolitical landscape based on vertical 
ties between local elites and their clientele, the international financial institutions, 
that is, the World Bank Group and IMF, prescribed reforms in the late 1980s that 
were aimed at economic and political liberalization and financial austerity of the 
state. While the reforms led to improved macro-economic indicators, they also 
fundamentally challenged established structures of rule, causing severe struggles 
among elites over ever-scarcer power resources.14 The reforms meant cutbacks in 
an already weak federal state, yet, paradoxically, it was expected that this very state 
would provide for stability and order during political and economic liberalization 
(Woodward 1995, 17).15 Some scholars have thus argued that the Balkan wars of 
the 1990s were, above all, a product of the internationally determined transforma-
tion from a socialist society to the model of a market economy and democracy.16 
Along the same lines, we can argue with regard to TOC that it was international 
11 | Cf. Dominik (2001); Lampe (2003).
12 | For BiH, see Bojičič and Kaldor (1997, 156); Andjelič (2003, 51–56).
13 | In the case of Kosovo, illicit economic activities were tied much closer to the dete-
riorating political situation of Kosovo-Albanians, who were steadily excluded from public 
institutions and built up underground political and social institutions in reaction to Serbian 
politics. The illicit economy finally played a crucial role in the decision for war as a state-
building strategy; see Sörensen (2012) for more detail.
14 | Compare Pugh (2002, 469–470).
15 | Compare Pugh and Cooper (2004, 152–153).
16 | Especially Woodward (1995, 1996).
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orthodox-neoliberal policies that, although they may not have caused TOC direct-
ly, at least created perfect enabling conditions for a boom in informal and illicit 
economic activities in the region.
It is against this background of severe crisis that the state of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina came into formal existence in 1992. Multi-ethnic BiH was particularly 
affected by Yugoslav fragmentation. Due to a lack of horizontal stratification, new 
political parties were deeply divided along ethno-nationalist lines in their struggle 
for power. They soon started to carve up the political, economic, and social insti-
tutions of BiH among them, creating three parallel ethno-nationalist systems of 
rule. In a referendum on the question of BiH’s political future, Bosniaks and Bos-
nian Croats supported the creation of an independent state. The Bosnian Serbs, by 
contrast, boycotted the referendum and declared the separation of Serb-inhabited 
areas. In spring 1992, war broke out between the two sides. In April 1993, with the 
declaration of an independent republic by the Bosnian Croats, a second conflict 
emerged. This Bosniak-Croatian “war within the war” ended with the Washing-
ton Agreement in March 1994, which established a federation between the two 
groups. Finally, in December 1995, the war between the federation and the Serbs 
came to an internationally brokered end with the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement.17
Throughout the war, the smuggling of weapons and small arms, fuel, ciga-
rettes, and essential goods thrived. Economic production in the three ethno-na-
tionalist para-states declined due to the fighting, while the importance of illicit 
activities – from asset-stripping and theft to extortion, irregular taxes and tariffs, 
and large-scale smuggling – grew in importance, as did international forms of 
financing by neighboring countries, diasporas, and humanitarian aid agencies 
(Bougarel 1999b). Illicit trade thrived regardless of ethno-political divides, turning 
the war into “a continuation of business by clandestine means” (Andreas 2004a, 
30). The war economy served a double purpose: On the one hand, it (poorly) fi-
nanced the war parties and their systems of rule; on the other hand, it privately 
enriched those in control of illicit trade.18 The effect was a profit-oriented creation 
of rent and mafia structures at the local level, which did not correspond with politi-
cal and military conflict lines (ibid., 40–41). Due to these profit-driven dynamics 
of privatization and criminalization, the Bosnian war was taken as the primary 
example, with reference to which the disputed “new wars” hypothesis of the 1990s 
was formulated.19 
Yet organized crime was more than the expression of war profiteers’ greed. 
Criminal actors and activities had very different and often ambivalent roles. 
Smuggling was a way to organize weapons for defense in view of an international 
arms embargo that especially affected the Bosniak war government, which, com-
17 | On the war see, for example, Burg and Shoup (1999); Calic (1996).
18 | Compare Ehrke (2003, 133–136); Pugh and Cooper (2004, 153–157).
19 | For example, Bojičič and Kaldor (1997).
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pared to the Bosnian-Serb war party, was militarily heavily underequipped (ibid., 
38–39; Bougarel 1999b, 196). In the besieged capital, Sarajevo, criminals evolved 
into kinds of guardians of the Bosnian rump state at the beginning of the war, as 
it was only due to their help and weapons that the city could be defended against 
the militarily superior Bosnian-Serb attacks. It was only much later that the war 
government took steps to contain criminal activities (Andreas 2004a, 2008). Most 
importantly, however, in many places, and especially in enclaves and besieged 
cities, smuggling guaranteed people’s everyday survival. In this sense, the crimi-
nalization of the economy by war profiteers, on the one hand, and the processes 
of informalization and subsistence-orientation among the broader population, on 
the other, were but two sides of the same coin. The small group of war profiteers 
comprised both powerful persons from pre-war times who had managed to pre-
serve their power, as well as parvenus whose social advancement was based on 
their criminal or violent competencies (Pugh 2002, 470; Pugh and Cooper 2004, 
156). Most importantly, the war created and strengthened relations between po-
litical and economic elites and criminal actors,20 whose networks and interests 
persisted in post-war times (Andreas 2004b).
With the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, the “international community” as-
sumed the task of guiding the peace process. During the first four years of the 
intervention, the international agencies focused on reconstructing the destroyed 
infrastructure, democratizing the political structures, and liberalizing the re-
mainders of the socialist economy. This approach was built on the liberal idea that 
democracy and market economy are the ideal basis for sustainable peace and that 
these reforms would marginalize peace spoilers. Reality looked different, how-
ever. Wartime ethno-nationalists triumphed in the elections because the elector-
ate regarded them as being the strongest safeguards of their interests (Manning 
2004; Gromes 2007). 
The intervention furthermore strengthened the old elites economically. BiH 
was swamped with aid money (Suhrke and Buckmaster 2006, 343–345), most 
of which was distributed in decentralized ways, evading the central state struc-
tures that were seen as lacking the capacity to channel the resources (Hertić et al. 
2000). Local politico-economic networks used this arrangement for rent-seeking, 
that is, the illegal siphoning off of large amounts of public funds (Ehrke 2003, 
141–142; ESI 2000, 15). The privatization process, which started in 1997, was an-
other measure that unintentionally played into the hands of wartime elites and 
their networks of profit. Privatization was hoped to contribute to a moderniza-
tion of the country’s industrial assets and to a depoliticization of the economy 
(Donais 2002, 2; Pugh 2002, 474). Factually, however, the hasty privatization 
20 | Often such a neat dif ferentiation between elites and criminals is impossible, as sin-
gle actors personify dif ferent of these roles, for example when politicians heavily engage 
in economic activities and use connections to criminal networks or misappropriate their 
positions in order to gain profits or power. 
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process enabled influential politicians and their cronies to appropriate socially-
owned companies and apartments in dubious, sometimes criminal ways, and to 
make considerable profits.21 Through its politics of liberalization, the intervention 
thus strengthened the very politico-economic networks that had already profited 
from war, while neither a modernization nor a considerable depoliticization of the 
economy took place. At the same time, the institutions of the Bosnian central state 
remained weak and proved unable to counter the politico-economic networks with 
state regulation. Many of the relations between political and economic entrepre-
neurs – legal as well as illegal ones – and of the informal channels established or 
strengthened in the first phase of the peace process are still effective today (Blie-
semann de Guevara 2009, 139).
In view of the shortcomings and limits of the liberalization strategy, the inter-
national actors decided upon a policy shift by the end of the 1990s: The aim of the 
new “statebuilding” strategy was to build up and strengthen (central) state institu-
tions (PIC 2000). A permanent pacification of society was now seen to depend on 
a state framework that was able to regulate societal interaction.22 The “rule of law” 
was a central part of this strategy: Reforms of the police and justice sectors were 
meant to render the state capable of acting against crime. Firstly, reforms were 
aimed at countering the war-related ethnicization of state agencies, that is, their 
illegal alignment in favor of one ethnic group. This problem was minimized: State 
officials were vetted with regard to war crimes, ethnically mixed police patrols were 
created, and policemen, judges, and prosecutors received better training and pay.23
The second reform aim was depoliticizing the rule of law agencies, that is, 
strengthening their autonomy from powerful elites. This, however, proved to be a 
more obstinate problem that, to date, has not been solved. It is against this back-
ground that today’s links between politics, the economy, and organized crime have 
to be assessed.
3. Organized crime and corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina today 
Current practices of organized crime in BiH include different interlinked dimen-
sions, which will be illustrated and discussed with reference to the following three 
episodes.
Episode 1: In August 2011, the trial against Zijad Turković – the alleged ring-
leader of a notorious criminal gang – and nine other gang members commenced. 
Turković was charged with “organized crime, drug trafficking, founding a crime 
organization, robbery, extortion, money laundering, murder, and unlawful arms 
dealings” (BH-News 2011a). His group, which is believed to have a reach “well 
21 | For detailed accounts, see Donais (2002); Pugh (2002).
22 | Compare Paris (2004).
23 | For more detail, see Bliesemann de Guevara (2009, 190–194, 245–271); on police 
reforms, see also Collantes Celador (2006).
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beyond BiH” (SE Times 2010), is said to have murdered – or attempted to murder 
– several persons in drug-gang rivalries (OCCRP 2011). Turković’s gang is also 
allegedly responsible for a “string of spectacular robberies, including the theft of 
1.3 million euros from Sarajevo Airport’s cargo center in 2007” (SE Times 2010).
Episode 2: In 2010, the police of the Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-controlled 
area of the two Bosnian political entities, dismantled a cigarette smuggling net-
work that had operated throughout the country. Among the more than 60 detained 
persons were 22 active policemen from the municipalities of Stolac, Trebinje, and 
Čapljina. Stolac and Čapljina are situated in the southwest of the Federation of 
BiH, the Bosniak-Croatian controlled entity, bordering Croatia. Nearby Trebinje, 
which is in the southernmost corner of the RS, borders Montenegro, the country 
that became infamously known for its thriving, state-tolerated cigarette smug-
gling industry in the 1990s and early 2000s.24 The detained police officers were 
“suspected of selling information about police patrols in certain locations, which 
helped the criminal network transport non-customs cleared commodities from 
Montenegro to BiH through the Bileca border crossing” (SE Times 2010). Next to 
cigarettes, this allegedly also included other high-tariff commodities, weapons, 
and cash (ibid.).
Episode 3: In May 2011, Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, traveled to BiH to hold “crisis talks” with 
Bosnian-Serb President Milorad Dodik in Banja Luka, the capital of the RS. The 
reason for the talks was that, following a proposition by Dodik, the RS parliament 
had decided to hold a referendum, asking voters “whether the federal court and 
prosecution – Bosnia’s only central judicial institutions – ought to be abolished” 
(European Voice 2011). The parliament also planned to ask for voters’ stance on the 
international High Representative’s authority in BiH. The referendum would not 
have been in conformity with the Bosnian constitution, yet RS officials justified it 
by pointing to an alleged bias of national courts against Bosnian Serbs. The talks 
between Ashton and Dodik resulted in the RS authorities calling off the refer-
endum and the EU pledging to establish a justice reform commission to review 
BiH’s judicial institutions (RFE/RL 2011).
What do these three episodes tell us about the intertwined situation of TOC, 
economic crime, and corruption in BiH and the region? The first episode is a clas-
sic story about a ruthless criminal gang involved in different types of lucrative il-
legal activities and deeply entangled in violent rivalries with competing organized 
gangs. The Turković case is thus illustrative of the existing rings of organized 
crime in BiH and the wider region. According to the UNODC, drug trafficking 
from Afghanistan via Iran and Turkey to Western Europe on the so-called Balkan 
route is “the highest value criminal activity in South East Europe” (UNODC 2008, 
12–13). While especially the heroin trade is mainly controlled by ethnic Albanians, 
the Turković case suggests that other gangs in the region also look for their share 
24 | Compare Mappes-Niediek (2003, 48–61).
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in the business and do so, if necessary, with violent means. Money laundering is a 
necessary activity for all criminal organizations, since their businesses are mainly 
based on cash, the origins of which have to be concealed (UNODC 2008, 94).25 
Arms dealing, by contrast, is supposedly losing attractiveness, as demand has 
shrunk significantly since the end of the wars in the region (UNODC 2008, 16). 
The same applies to human trafficking: Migrant smuggling has lost relevance due 
to the EU’s eastern enlargement and its Stabilisation and Association agreements 
with countries in the region, and trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation 
has also declined in view of saturated markets and higher risk-awareness among 
the potential victims (UNODC 2008, 14–16). 
The Turković episode thus highlights some of the major traits of TOC in the 
region. Yet, there is little evidence that such activities are more “endemic” to this 
region, as suggested by the “black hole” discourse, than they possibly are to other 
parts of Europe.26 There also seems to be a trend that “Balkan organised crime is 
[…] diminishing in importance” (ibid., 16). Last but not least, the episode also hints 
at some positive developments in the Bosnian police and justice system: The fact 
that a ringleader such as Turković is detained and brought to court testifies to the 
increased capacity of the state’s law enforcement agencies, a finding that is in line 
with other sources.27 
The second episode only seemingly contradicts this latter observation, al-
though it involves corrupt police officers. The dismantled cigarette smuggling 
network is a typical example of an economic crime involving licit goods – in this 
case, tariff evasion for cigarette imports – that was enabled and backed by corrupt 
state agents who serve as border-crossing facilitators and get their share of the 
profits at the cost of the state’s income. Just like in war times, the cooperation is 
profit-oriented and takes place across the supposed political and ethnic divides 
that guide political rhetoric at the national level.28 
The improved general performance of the police and its persistent corruption 
are no contradiction. The former is basically a result of international reforms, 
training programs, and oversight as well as of the successive creation of federal 
security services since 2000, above all the State Border Service, which ended the 
entities’ exclusive control of the borders, and the State Investigation and Protec-
tion Agency, which is in charge of investigating organized crime and war crimes. 
Furthermore, the very fact that RS police dismantled the cigarette smuggling net-
25 | Throughout the ar ticle, the UNODC data is used because it is grounded in the most 
comprehensive database as compared to other accounts of TOC in the region. Other 
sources that discuss the topic are, for example, Anastasijevič (2010), Randoux (2010), 
Stojarová (2007); on BiH especially, see Smajič (2010).
26 | Think, for example, of the role of the rivaling biker gangs Hells Angels and Bandidos 
in Germany.
27 | For example ESI (2007).
28 | Compare episode 3.
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work and stopped the police officers involved testifies to a general capacity of BiH’s 
police to perform their duty.
The persistent levels of corruption, on the other hand, can be attributed to low 
and/or belated salaries and a dire economic situation in general.29 Police and cus-
toms officers have found many illicit ways to cope with this situation – including the 
cooperation with organized and economic crime networks – and other illicit activi-
ties such as the creation of an informal traffic fee system. Smugglers of licit goods – 
especially cigarettes, oil, goods from China, and counterfeit products – make a profit 
by evading customs duties and taxes on the smuggled products; the state’s customs 
and police agents are thus in strategic positions regarding these activities. With its 
400 border crossings, BiH is difficult to control in this regard, and smugglers have 
used long-established routes and networks to bring in black-market goods (UNODC 
2008, 85).30 Different taxation systems in the region, too, are said to favor forms of 
economic crime. Ironically, it was only after the international agencies introduced a 
single value-added tax in BiH, that the country evolved into an interesting market for 
transnational value-added tax fraud (the so-called carousel fraud) – one of the biggest 
economic crime problems in the EU at the time (Bliesemann de Guevara 2008, 155).
As corruption surveys show, low-intensity state corruption is widespread in 
BiH and “is most pervasive at the local (municipal and particularly cantonal) lev-
el,” that is, where citizens’ interactions with state agents mainly take place (Divjak 
and Pugh 2008, 376).31 However, “the incriminating trail of activities such as the 
misappropriation of public funds, the mismanagement of public companies, and 
irregularities in the privatisation process, does lead to the top levels of power” 
(ibid.). This is where the third episode comes in.
The Dodik episode is least obviously connected to the questions of TOC, yet 
it is actually the most interesting case, as it contains an underlying story of high-
level economic crime and impunity that points to deep structural problems of the 
Bosnian state. The surface topic of this episode is political struggles over the insti-
tutional and power arrangements in BiH, especially the transfer of competencies 
from the entity to the federal level (here: judicial powers). Such power struggles 
have accompanied the peace process in BiH from the beginning and involve both 
local politicians and international agencies.32 Speaking in broad terms, a repeating 
29 | Compare Divjak and Pugh (2008, 379–383).
30 | Customs duty evasion is a known problem in BiH, and although the amount of smug-
gled goods seems to have decreased with the establishment of the federal State Border 
Service (cf. ESI 2007, 3, 5–6), the episode suggests that the centralization of border con-
trol alone has not been enough to eradicate the problem.
31 | Compare Chêne (2009); Transparency International (2006); Transparency Interna-
tional BiH (2004).
32 | Since December 1997 the High Representative of the “international community” in 
BiH has the power to decree legislation and reforms and to remove politicians and other 
state agents from office – and thus to inter fere deeply with the political process.
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pattern of such struggles has been the convergence between international actors’ 
and Bosniak politicians’ interest in centralization. The Bosniaks have the stron-
gest interest in a unitary state and would profit most from proportional represen-
tation in centralized state agencies, as they are the biggest ethno-national group. 
Bosnian Serbs, by contrast, have tended to oppose any centralization efforts. As 
they dominate politics in the RS, they have little interest in weakening the entity 
by transferring prerogatives to the central state. The Bosnian Croats – the small-
est among the three constituent groups in BiH – have usually accepted reforms as 
long as these did not aim at abolishing the cantons of the FBiH, two of which are 
Croat-controlled. Occasionally, however, they have also called for the creation of a 
third, Croat-dominated, entity, which would give them a formal status equaling 
that of the other two ethno-national communities.
In such a “political power” reading, the struggle described in the third epi-
sode centers around questions of institutional settings and/or reforms, which aim 
at changing a precarious political power arrangement in a context that is highly 
sensitive to questions of ethno-national interests and prerogatives and vulnerable 
to destabilization. In this reading, Dodik threatens with a referendum because he 
fears a loss of political power for the RS and its elites and because he takes seri-
ously the fears among his voters, who see their ethno-national interests threatened 
by growing Bosniak influence over state institutions such as the judiciary.
In a “political economy” reading, however, there is more to Dodik’s frequent 
referendum rhetoric, which has included threats of separation. As an article on 
corruption in BiH summarizes, Dodik’s
…two terms in 1998 and 2006 led to a number of embezzlement and corruption scandals 
surrounding his cabinet ministers, but no investigations or prosecutions were pursued. […] 
Even recent findings of highly non-transparent public contracts issued by the Dodik gov-
ernment involving hundreds of millions of euros-worth of undisclosed deals have provoked 
little reaction by any law enforcement agency. Yet in reporting this news, pressure was 
exercised against the media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other watchdogs 
to the point where many democratic advances may have been reversed.33 (Divjak and Pugh 
2008, 378)
The Dodik case, among others,34 is a prominent example of the persistent politi-
cization of Bosnian state agencies, which allows powerful elites to pursue their 
33 | In 2008, for example, the NGO Transparency International temporarily closed its BiH 
office due to hostilities and accusations by Dodik, who blamed TI staff for being involved in 
extor tion and organized crime.
34 | To be sure, the Bosnian-Serb Dodik is only one example out of many; the Bosniak war-
time prime minister, Haris Silajdzič, provides a very similar example of high-level impunity, 
as does the head of the main Bosnian-Croat party, Dragan Č ovič (Anastasijevič 2010, 163; 
Divjak and Pugh 2008, 378). Čovič was supposed to stand trial in the cantonal court in Sa-
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political and economic interests. Although economic crimes and corruption by 
high-level politicians are known and sometimes (though seldom) prosecuted, 
this usually has few effects on the powerful perpetrators of such crimes. The in-
ternational agencies have blamed the political and administrative fragmentation 
of BiH into the two entities RS and FBiH, the latter of which is further divided 
into 10 cantons, for enabling the misappropriation of public positions and funds.35 
Consequently, the centralization of state functions evolved as a mantra of the in-
ternational community. Yet, reforms have either failed due to local resistance or 
were unable to live up to their goal of depoliticizing the Bosnian law enforcement 
agencies.
The police reform process, initiated by the international agencies in 2004, 
is a prime example for the former case of local resistance (Bliesemann de Gue-
vara 2009, 218–224). Creating a centralized police that would not be under the 
oversight of the ministries of interior in the entities and cantons constituted a 
primary issue of the international statebuilding agenda. Centralization was meant 
to foster the police’s efficiency, budgetary sustainability, multiculturalism, and 
accountability. While Bosniak politicians welcomed the reform, the plans found 
little favor with political elites in the RS. After a successful military centralization, 
the police had evolved into the “last bastion” of their control over the state’s secu-
rity apparatus. Even the EU’s tactic of declaring successful police reform as being 
one of the prerequisites for the convergence process between the EU and BiH was 
unable to break local resistance, but rather contributed to a deep political crisis. In 
order to avoid the reform’s complete failure, international actors finally accepted 
a compromise, which was mostly cosmetic; factually, police in BiH remain under 
the control of the state’s political elites.
In the justice sector, too, there was only limited reform success, despite the 
international community’s deep involvement and successes in the centralization 
of functions (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009, 260–271). The Bosnian justice sys-
tem earns good grades when it comes to the criminal prosecution of conventional 
crime. Yet in the areas of organized and economic crime, that is, in those areas in 
which powerful actors are concerned, the state’s prosecution is usually ineffective 
(Chêne 2009, 4–5). Cases in which any charges were brought against powerful 
political or criminal individuals usually involve the commitment of international 
rajevo for abuse of authority during his time as minister of finance. In May 2012, the charge 
was dropped and Čovič was acquitted due to a lack of evidence; observers commented, 
however, that the trial had been a farce from the beginning. Another case concerns Zlatko 
Lagumdzija from the multi-ethnic party SDP, who, together with another SDP politician, 
was accused of trying to extor t money (2.2 million BAM) from Sarajevo businessmen in 
exchange for building licenses. In June 2011, the investigations ceased despite an audio 
recording, which documented “SDP’s racketeering” (BH-News 2011b, 2011c).
35 | Compare Chêne (2009, 3); Randoux (2010); for a critical discussion, see Divjak and 
Pugh (2008, 374).
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jurists deployed to BiH’s courts. However, since 2009 the latter only have advisory 
functions, and it is highly questionable whether Bosnian courts will be able to do 
their job in a politically independent way without external help. Our third episode 
rather hints at difficult times for federal justice agencies in prosecuting organized 
crime and war crimes. 
What is more, although possessing the power to intervene, international ac-
tors at times prefer to turn a blind eye to high-level economic crime. In the case 
of Dodik, for instance, international actors can be said to have empowered him in 
the first place, as “Dodik was first installed in 1998 with the significant support of 
the international community, who kept him in power as interim prime minister; 
his government was the largest recipient of donor funds in post-war RS” (Divjak 
and Pugh 2009, 378). This might explain why up until the present international 
agents in BiH have been reluctant to adopt harsher means against Dodik.
Summarizing the observations from the three episodes, it can be said that the 
activities of organized criminal networks and the everyday corruption of state of-
ficials enabling criminal activities are the most visible aspects of organized crime 
in BiH. People come into contact with them, for example, when buying low-priced 
goods such as smuggled cigarettes from the many black-market traders at local 
markets, or in their everyday dealings with state officials, for instance when ap-
plying for a business license or dealing with traffic police. High-level corruption 
and economic crime of political and economic elite figures, by contrast, are only 
partly visible. Although local media, NGOs, and international observers keep de-
nouncing these sorts of criminal activities, rendering them prime issues of public 
debate, the accused have thus far been able to evade any form of serious prosecu-
tion by Bosnian law enforcement agencies. The three aspects (and actor groups) 
of crime and corruption in the country are not neatly separated but highly inter-
linked; yet, while TOC gangs and low-level state officials are increasingly becom-
ing objects of state prosecution, political elites have thus far successfully hindered 
a complete clarification of their involvement in Bosnian crime – sometimes, as 
shown, enabled by and with the tacit complicity of international actors.
4. Enabling conditions for persistent crime and corruption
In a post-war society that has witnessed tremendous transformations since the 
late 1980s, phenomena such as smuggling, corruption, and a weak police and 
judiciary would not come as a surprise, was it not for the ongoing international 
intervention with its manifold reform projects explicitly aimed at fighting crime 
and corruption and strengthening the rule of law. Why is it that these problems 
have persisted despite the international community’s comprehensive statebuild-
ing agenda that is meant to curb them? 
The apparent analysis would seek the answer to this question in local elites’ 
particularistic interests and their resulting resilient behavior, as illustrated by the 
Dodik case. However, a complementary answer to this question is that the eco-
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nomic intervention itself has created enabling conditions for the persistence of 
organized and economic crime and corruption. This “tacit complicity” is the invis-
ible side of crime in BiH.
The war only constituted a short break in the economic liberalization process 
that had started in the 1980s. After 1995, the international agencies tied in with 
the earlier neoliberal policies. The efforts to privatize socially-owned assets, which 
played into the hand of war-time elites and thus enabled persistent economic 
crime, have already been discussed above; they laid the foundations for the endur-
ing role of socioeconomic elite networks in the country. Since the strategic shift 
to statebuilding, the international complicity in providing enabling conditions for 
persistent crime has been less visible. Over the last 12 years, the international 
community’s economic strategy has been geared toward the creation of a condu-
cive business and investment environment and the promotion of macroeconomic 
stability as the basis for economic growth. Strict budgetary discipline, effective 
taxation, and structural adjustment have been further aims. 
These economic strategies have brought about some of the wished for effects 
with regard to macroeconomic and fiscal indicators; yet they also have been unable 
to fight the high levels of unemployment and poverty that plague BiH – thus leav-
ing the socioeconomic push factors for low-level corruption and smuggling activi-
ties unaltered.36 Although real growth between 2001 and 2007 reached an average 
of 5.4 percent (with peaks of almost 7 percent in 2006 and 2007), the unemploy-
ment rate was still more than 47 percent in 2006 (UNECE 2009) and 44 percent 
in 2012 (Sladojević 2012).37 Activities in the informal sector were estimated at 43 
percent of total employment in 2004 (Krstić and Sanfey 2006). The poverty rate 
in Bosnia was nearly 20 percent in 2004 (Council of Ministers of BiH 2004), and 
the United Nations Development Programme found that around 50 percent of the 
Bosnian population was socially excluded in one way or another, with women, 
pensioners, and young people being those most affected and vulnerable (UNDP 
BiH 2007).38 In 2008 nearly two-thirds of young people between 18 and 35 years 
of age said they would emigrate if they could due to the lack of socioeconomic 
prospects (Early Warning System 2008, 47). For many families, the most impor-
tant cushion has been money transfers from relatives who live and work abroad. 
Officially, these remittances amount to around 20 percent of the gross domestic 
product, with actual numbers probably much larger (World Bank 2007).
On the one hand, the high percentages of unemployed and poor citizens and 
the precarious employment contexts in the shadow economy boost the group of 
(young) Bosnians without job prospects who could possibly seek their income in 
36 | Compare also Smajič (2010).
37 | The ar ticle reports that the official number of people looking for work by mid-2012 
was 519,160 – that is, more than one-fourth of the total population of the small country 
with its estimated 3.8 million people.
38 | Compare also Cenic (2011).
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illegal activities in the future.39 In this sense, the international economic strategy 
can be seen as “tacitly complicit,” in the sense that it is geared toward business 
interests, not social welfare.40 On the other hand, the indicators also hint at deep-
ening problems of the already weak Bosnian state, which is deprived of income 
taxes and faces costs for social service provision. This is one reason why the state’s 
possibilities to actively deal with economic problems and to regulate the negative 
effects of economic liberalization are severely limited (Bliesemann de Guevara 
2009, 150–166). 
The other reason is that, although the level of international budget aid has 
decreased significantly since the early 2000s, direct interference by the “interna-
tional community” into the state’s economic and social policies has not ceased. 
Under the headings of “partnership” and “political ownership,” the international-
ization of Bosnian economic, fiscal, and social policies has changed in form rather 
than in substance: Bosnian representatives remain under international oversight 
and thus are unable to formulate alternative economic programs (ibid., 146–150). 
This deprives the state of an important source of (output) legitimacy, prolonging 
its disputed status among Bosnian citizens. In this sense, too, the intervention 
could be said to be “tacitly complicit” in maintaining a situation of uncertainty 
about the future that may be conducive to persistent crime.
5. Conclusions and outlook: 
 The unintended effects of the “black hole” discourse 
In terms of the transition from war to peace, Bosnia has come a long way since 
the end of the war in 1995, not least because of the comprehensive international 
intervention. Nonetheless, there seem to be limits to the possibilities of external 
actors to shape state institutions and enforce the rule of law, due to which eco-
nomic crime and corruption have shown marked persistence. However, what we 
see in BiH is not case-specific, but rather a general dilemma of statebuilding: 
External interventions may be able to establish state institutions that look like 
their Western counterparts. Yet interventions are usually unable to anchor these 
39 | The relation between the dire economic situation and illegal economic activities is as 
yet unexplored in the case of BiH. We can thus only assume, though with some plausibility, 
that the high levels of unemployment and poverty constitute enabling conditions for orga-
nized crime and corruption. 
40 | The question of whether the recent global financial crisis has deepened this problem 
can only be answered with an informed guess here. Although the Bosnian finance sector 
was not deeply affected by the “casino collapse” due to its limited integration into the 
global financial market, the trade and service sectors experienced the effects of recession 
in the form of falling demand. Remittances were also expected to fall. These developments 
may have deepened the tense economic situation in the country and thus contributed to 
the potential push factors of illicit economic activities.
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institutions locally. The political logics behind the façade continue to conform to 
local rules and logics, which can hardly be shaped by the intervention. Statebuild-
ing thus creates what could be called “Potemkin states” (Bliesemann de Guevara 
and Kühn 2010). 
The gaps between the façade of these states and their “content” open up possi-
bilities for illegal business activities. The country’s elites have profited most from 
these gaps, especially the de-facto impunity, and the economic strategy behind the 
intervention has done little to either foster the state’s rule of law agencies or over-
come the enabling socioeconomic conditions for persistent illegal activities in the 
country – the majority of which concern (low-level) corruption and the smuggling 
of licit goods. As argued above with regard to the first two episodes, it is not that 
Bosnian rule of law institutions completely lack capacity; they have, in some cases, 
been very effective in fighting TOC and corruption. Furthermore, civil society 
actors such as Transparency International BiH and different media outlets have 
repeatedly named and shamed TOC, economic crime, and corruption in the coun-
try, thus creating awareness of the problems and putting those involved under 
public pressure.41 In general, however, anticorruption and anti-crime strategies 
have not been able to live up to their goals, due to a lack of political will and the 
politicization of rule of law institutions.42 
NGO activities and media coverage are not the only reasons why TOC, eco-
nomic crime, and corruption – and especially the linkages between them, that 
is, the criminalization of politics and the politicization of crime – are among the 
most discussed issues in Bosnian public discourse. Since the late 1990s, interna-
tional actors have held that these issues are a main problem threatening the suc-
cess of statebuilding and that tackling them and creating public awareness of the 
problems should thus be central concerns (Chandler 2006, 143 et seq.). Although 
international accusations targeting ties between state agents and criminal actors 
have not been without substance, the international approach has been criticized 
for the way in which the charges were used to further the general statebuilding 
project. For instance, Chandler (2006, 160) has argued that the international an-
ticorruption discourse led to what could be called “corruptionization” (following 
the Copenhagen School’s idea of “securitization”): Defining an issue area as cor-
rupted enabled the international actors to exempt it from local political processes 
and to put it under their direct jurisdiction. 
This international strategy, which heavily relied on the “black hole” rhetoric, 
contributed to a high visibility of issues of crime and corruption in the Bosnian 
public. Yet, although this definitely contributed to the intended problem-aware-
ness, it also had unintended effects that overshot the mark: Western discourse 
41 | On September 14, 2004, for instance, the Banja Luka-based newspaper, Nezavisne 
Novine, published a special issue under the title “Crna Bosna” (Black Bosnia), with ar ticles 
on crime, corruption, drugs, terrorism, and related issues between 2002 and 2004.
42 | Compare Divjak and Pugh (2008, 376); Chêne (2009, 5–6).
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about the Balkans as a “black hole” in Europe and a “stronghold of crime” also 
resulted in low levels of citizens’ general trust in public institutions and a cli-
mate of anxiety. Despite low ordinary crime rates in the region, the citizens’ 
fears of becoming crime victims was – and is – higher than in Western Europe 
(UNODC 2008, 18, 99–100). Such an unjustified climate of anxiety runs contrary 
to both sinking crime levels and growing state capacities, and it is little suited 
to consolidate young democratic institutions. Rather, it plays into the hands of 
ethno-national elites, who in past elections have regularly profited from people’s 
perceptions and anxieties. This way, however, the “black hole” rhetoric ironically 
strengthens the same actors who profit from economic crime, cooperation with 
organized crime, corruption, and impunity.
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8.2 TR AFFICKING IN ORGANS, TISSUES, 
 AND CELLS IS SOME TIMES PART 
 OF HUMAN TR AFFICKING
Interview with Ivana McIlwiane, Police Officer and Scientist in Serbia
I am working as a police officer and as a scientist. With the police, I work for the 
anti-trafficking unit and I am engaged in overall police work regarding the traffick-
ing of human beings (criminal investigation) and illegal migration, where there 
is a reemerging connection between smuggling and trafficking in some phases.
I am a medical doctor, as well – therefore my special interest and expertise is 
in this area.
As an academic, I am currently writing my thesis about the trafficking of or-
gans as one form of trafficking of human beings. Methodologically, this involves a 
lot of research into official documents (from the EU Council, Organisation for Eu-
ropean Economic Co-operation, the police, UN, etc.) to be able to map the routes 
of human trafficking.
I think we should address this problem in a more structured and more public 
way in order to take advantage of the existing global political will to address the is-
sue of organ trafficking. The focus of my academic activities is on the global level. 
Within our police institution, the issues of organ trafficking and the abuse of the 
legal framework for preserving stem cells as well as in vitro fertilization proce-
dures created a new area for white-collar criminal activity and it is still quite exotic. 
Currently, we are structuring a small unit to work on it with the approval of our 
superiors. In this context, we initiated cooperation with the Ministries of Interior 
and Health and are planning to include the Ministry of Finance.
Q: Within the field of human trafficking, how do you classify organ trafficking and how 
do you describe it?
Regarding the legal definition, organ trafficking is a part of human trafficking, 
they are addressed jointly. At the same time, the Republic of Serbia has adopted a 
lex specialis regulating the transplantation of human organs and transplantation 
of cells and tissues. In Articles 79 and 99, respectively, the sale of organs, tissues, 
and cells is punishable by law – be it for the person who offers them in exchange 
for reward, or the person who accepts them.
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From my perspective, this is not to the point, since it is part of organized crime 
and is tied to the hardly controllable legal regulation of transplantation, which stip-
ulates that the person who offers an organ on a commercial basis commits a crime, 
too. On a practical level, organ trafficking seems to be one visible effect of an eco-
nomic situation in which desperate people offer their organs for sale. This seems 
to be similar to some other countries where this phenomenon has been detected. 
On the other side, one can presume that there are organized rings that mediate 
the jumping of the transplantation waiting lists as well as the illegal exchange of 
organs. 
Unfortunately, there is no police evidence on this issue in Serbia yet. We also 
have some information via international channels about people being trafficked 
for that purpose from Bosnia and Montenegro to Italy – but again no police evi-
dence.
There is a third area, in which organ trafficking is overlapping with war crimes 
in Kosovo. In September 2012, parts of the statement of a protected witness were 
made public, in which he stated that he was part of a gang that was killing people, 
mainly Serbs being abducted from Kosovo to Albania, to extract organs. The wit-
ness reported that he was forced to take out the heart of a young guy without anes-
thesia – and he was not even a doctor. This case will be classified as a war crime. 
At the moment, colleagues of mine are having a series of meetings with Serbian 
officials, including the chief prosecutor for war crimes.
A regular organ-trafficking procedure could happen, or will happen, as fol-
lows: Two parties meet in a third country and the hospitals perform the act. In that 
you have different classes: First class is least dangerous for the victim and for the 
recipient; business class: the standard is a bit lower; economy class: you have two 
victims – the donor and the recipient, since there is not enough medical expertise 
on both sides. Therefore, infections happen and both sides end up damaged. My 
personal stand is that in those cases, we have two victims and acts against hu-
manity have been committed against both. From literature we have documented 
examples of such problems in Moldova, India, and Pakistan.
Q: Concerning the Balkans, how frequent is organ trafficking?
On the Internet you can find many ads of people offering their kidneys, but only a 
few ads that state, kidneys required. Such ads originate from Serbia, Bosnia, Croa-
tia, and Montenegro.
Q: How are the medical personnel involved?
There must be a couple of rings, which also include medical personnel – but 
again there is no police evidence yet. No one is making an appointment directly 
with a doctor; it is more subtle, with talk about “speeding up the process,” and 
the involved actors have something to gain from it. It is a grey zone: There is the 
form of jumping the list for money – here we talk of corruption; a second form 
would be the actual purchasing of an organ; and the third form, the killing of a 
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person to obtain organs, is perhaps not so common in the region, apart from that 
case in Kosovo. Montenegro is heavily involved in those practices. Forms one 
and two exist all over the region, plus the personnel who help with the match-
ing and operations – there is a lot of money involved. Even regarding the second 
form, they would still represent it as being a humane act, although it is immoral 
and illegal. 
In case of blood donations, the problem is slightly different: Often, people do 
not know that blood is a commodity and that their blood will be traded on a very 
badly controlled market. This lack of information is unethical, too.
There is a general lack of ethical approaches to the matter. In Serbia you can 
find doctors treating terminal cancer cases against good practice, taking money 
from the relatives, playing on their hopes. I guess in times of war, the yardsticks 
are modified: You deal with triage and approaches to contain the damage on a dai-
ly basis. Thereby, the whole conception concerning the human body has changed. 
Therefore, people think: Yes, I can live without my kidney and the doctors do not 
think that this is a critical act. Morals shift during a war. People who are criminals 
think of themselves as acceptable. This explains as well why, for example, South 
Africa is such a good territory for illegal transplantations – this is why they do not 
see the problem.
Q: You mentioned that you have developed a strong interest in the issue of trading in 
stem cells?
The field of use and procurement of stem cells in Serbia is regulated by legisla-
tion adopted in September 2009, and that came into force on January 1, 2010. It 
regulates the whole field: definitions to medical procedures, relevant bodies, use, 
transportation, safe-keeping, treatment, and there is a section regarding criminal 
penalties (art. 99, 100, and 101).
My point is that lack of precise procedures about who can take blood from 
the umbilical cord and sample tissues, which are both rich in stem cells, facili-
tates criminal activity. Also it is against the law to advertise the service of taking 
samples, transporting it to the so called “private banks,” and preserving it there. 
In Serbia you do not have any bank, so everything is taken abroad and also the 
state does not require feedback info what has happened to it. Patients pay approx. 
€2,000 per sample, and yet they do not always receive complete and exact informa-
tion about the course and costs of possible treatments – therefore it is if nothing 
else than a fraud.
The most active companies are Cryosave, and there is also a very active Ger-
man company called Seracell GmbH. On the “market” here in Serbia, there are 
about eight very active companies and approximately 5,000 samples per year are 
taken and exported; most of them have the required paperwork, but as I men-
tioned before, procedure is not good and there is space for criminal activity, be it that 
services are publicly advertising via Internet – something that is against the above-
mentioned law.
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Regenerative medicine is probably the market where some of the cells end up 
for commercial use without knowledge of the donors. Interesting is the fact that 
when the samples are exported, the declared value for customs is only €10 per 
sample. As we do not have a cell bank in Serbia, the samples are not traced by the 
state. The whole business is in the hands of so-called private reps of foreign com-
panies, and the doctors who perform the procedure after delivery receive money 
for it, which again is against the law.
Q: How would you describe the impact of such practices on society and on democracy?
When I see those systems from the impact-side, I think it really undermines 
democracy because it determines who will live and who will die. The rules that 
determine this field are international; they have incorporated a human rights 
perspective and rely on the scientific judgment of the doctor. Those rules are well 
known and there is no excuse for doctors who deviate in their judgment of choos-
ing candidates for transplantation and for donation. Also, for shipping organs 
there are strict laws and regulations. If you shift sides in such matters, you go 
directly against democratic principles and are violating human rights. Corrup-
tion in organ transplantation definitely goes against basic democratic principles 
in all countries involved. 
Q: In the future, what should international cooperation look like?
It would be very helpful to streamline regional and international teams. This 
should include specialized police officers with additional medical knowledge as 
well as knowledge of the financial flows involved. Close cooperation with prosecu-
tors is essential here, since the medical documentation has its own privacy rules. 
Such teams would have to collect evidence on very high standards, because any ac-
cusation might damage the carriers and even the lives of those involved and might 
shift the image of a whole profession. 
In addition, the revision of all legislation regulating transplantation of organs 
is vital; loopholes have to be closed. When corrupt medical teams gather to under-
take illegal acts, for example on tissue-matching or organ transplantation, they 
can do so because medical documentation is rarely checked. For example, if the 
focus is on matching tissue, and it is assumed that the doctor is acting on ethical 
grounds, the status of alleged relatives is not checked. To stop illegal matching, 
this status would have to be checked thoroughly. 
When I raised the issue of medical documentation in the Ministry of Health, 
they panicked because they had not been aware of the possible loopholes in the 
procedure for obtaining the positive identification of the donor and the recipient 
and in the monitoring of the process. I know how documentation is being done, 
for example after a tricky and tiring surgery or in cases of death.
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When it comes to organized crime, it is certainly interlinked and organ trafficking 
needs a special unit. Pharmaceutical industries are involved, too, and there are 
many possibilities one could follow up with a professional team: For example to 
correlate the documentation of official transplantation with the documentation of 
anti-resistance medicines provided to hospitals.
Belgrade, September 2012
Regine Schönenberg
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9.1 ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUP TION —
 NATIONAL AND EUROPE AN PERSPECTIVES
by Wolfgang Hetzer*
I. Introduction
In the declaration issued on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signing 
of the Treaties of Rome (“Berlin declaration” of 2007), the European Union (EU) 
promises to act together on countering terrorism, organized criminality, and il-
legal immigration. However, this promise can only be fulfilled if a wide range of 
demanding conditions are met, including a clear concept of organized criminality 
valid throughout Europe as well as moving away from a narrow understanding 
of the forms of criminality. Until now, certain keywords have been associated – 
almost instinctively – with it: drugs, red-light districts, human trafficking, smug-
gling of goods, foreigners, violence, and mafia.
Terms like this lead to a specific form of stigmatization. Organized crime, 
especially the “Mafia,” means always other people, foreigners, outsiders, an odd 
threat that comes from elsewhere. A glance at any daily newspaper will, however, 
open up other views. The news on criminal events at all levels of business, govern-
ment, and politics may and must lead to a fundamental change regarding notions 
of the phenomenon of “organized criminality.” 
Changes must be made to the criminological and criminalistic interpretation 
of organized criminality. The extremely attractive opportunities for crime pre-
sented by the size of the funds available within the EU and in public budgets, and 
the ongoing change in terms of the economy and regulatory policy have led to in-
creasingly sophisticated methods of criminal activity. The particularly dangerous 
proponents of organized criminality adopt a far-sighted, businesslike approach, 
making commercial calculations and identifying the highest profit margins and 
* Wolfgang Hetzer worked at the European Anti-Fraud Office as Head of the Intelligence 
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the lowest risks. Not least due to these reasons, organized criminality has made 
a number of qualitative steps forward over recent years. This has allowed for the 
increase of its systematic exploitation of the welfare system within the EU, the 
increase of the control of deficits typical for a liberal internal market, of the diver-
sity and complexity of legislative acts, and of the corruptibility of factions of the 
economic, political, and administrative elites in all states.
II. Statistics and no facts
The government of the Federal Republic of Germany has believed for many years 
that the difficulties are rooted in the very nature of the matter (organized crime) 
itself.1 This is defined as a complex, ramified, often diffuse field of structures, 
partnerships, and acts that affects many areas of criminality. There is, however, a 
lack of reliable information based upon empirical evidence. The “law of silence” 
(omertà) frequently impedes the gathering of reliable empirical data. Further-
more, the practice frequently adopted by those involved in organized criminal-
ity, whereby they have a “foot in both camps” – one foot in the illegal camp and 
one foot in the legal camp – makes it more difficult to pursue a prosecution with 
adequate efficiency. In this context, it must be understood that organized crimi-
nality, in its developed form, is not just about planning and committing criminal 
offenses. The personal relationships, connections, and networks mentioned exist 
and operate outside concrete fields of criminality. Organized criminality is charac-
terized by social networks within a residential area, a town, a region, or a country. 
This also makes it easier to disguise illegal activities.2
The government of Germany believes that organized criminality is more a 
matter of professionally organized groups of offenders and networks than of hier-
archical structures, firmly established, throughout the country or even through-
out the whole Federal Republic, with an acute influence upon legal markets and 
social and political structures. It believes this to be a “thoroughly reassuring find-
ing in terms of criminal policy.”3 Although it is recognized that a differentiated 
approach must be adopted toward assessment of the situation in Europe, the con-
clusion reached was that the “Mafia” or other endemic structures did not have the 
state, business, or society in thrall to such an extent as to justify any suggestion of 
a direct risk to the people or to the common democratic good. 
1 | Zweiter Periodischer Sicherheitsbericht vom 15. November 2006 (2. PSB) Available at: 
www.bmi.bund.de/nn_122688/Internet/Content/Broschueren/2006/2_Periodischer_ 
Sicherheitsbericht_de.html 
The “Organised Criminality” and “White-collar criminality” chapters in the First Periodic 
Security Report (2001) provoked critical responses: Hetzer, Kriminalistik (2001), 762 ff.; 
767 f f.
2 | 2. PSB, pp. 442, 443.
3 | Ibid., p. 445.
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Germany does actually have a directive on countering organized criminality, 
but it does not include a sufficiently precise definition of organized criminality.4 
In fact, it describes a phenomenological field of criminal activities.5 The principles 
set down in the directive are intended to help German criminal prosecutors to 
interpret organized criminality as a sub-category of “normal criminal” conduct, in 
order to condemn specific activities, not generally confined to a single offense, and 
their effect in terms of presenting a threat to society. 
The police criminal statistics cannot be used to obtain either detailed or con-
clusive evidence on the amount of offenses with a clear link to organized crimi-
nality. Nor do the criminal prosecution statistics fit the bill in this respect. It is 
acknowledged that the statistical categories are inadequate to determine the threat 
posed by organized criminality, since they do not account for interconnectedness. 
The investigations do no more than scratch the surface. 
There are structural reasons for this situation:
• lack of or late disclosure of offenses, because legal persons are involved as 
injured parties
• identity between those with information and accomplices
• lack of social controls
• high proportion (50%) of collective victims (e.g., state, social institutions)
• lack of a sense of victimhood among collective victims
• reduced awareness of loss
• reduced willingness to report an offense
• high proportion of companies among individual victims
• risk of damage to one’s own interests if an offense is reported (holder of un-
taxed earnings as victim of a capital investment fraud)
• preference to resort to civil law methods
• interest in exercising discretion, with a view to possible damage to reputation
However, there is hardly any well-founded knowledge even outside the undetected 
areas, that is, on the extent and structure of – and trends in – registered white-
collar criminality. The current format of the official statistics either does not per-
mit white-collar criminality to be recorded at all, or, at best, gives an incomplete 
picture.6 
White-collar criminality is always characterized by a high degree of damage to 
society, in particular because of the material losses it causes. The government of 
Germany would like to emphasize, however, that there is no reliable information 
available on this. It states that in the past, global estimates were made that were 
not backed up with sufficient data, either in terms of amount or in terms of the 
4 | This is more or less a “mantra of criminal policy”: Hetzer, Kriminalistik (2007), p. 251.
5 | For details see 2. PSB, pp. 447, 448.
6 | See, overall, ibid., p. 221.
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increase in the losses claimed. There is a correspondingly large variation between 
the losses estimated for individual areas of the economy. And it believes that the 
intangible losses arising from white-collar criminality are even more serious than 
the material losses. These include:
• distortion of competition
• turning competitors into accomplices
• associated criminality by way of assistance by third parties
• risk posed to law-abiding business partners as a chain reaction after economic 
collapse
• hazards and damage to health
• reduced confidence among competitors and consumers in the honesty of cer-
tain professions and trades and/or even in the functioning of the prevailing 
social and economic systems
It goes without saying that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to put a fig-
ure on the losses arising from a loss of confidence.7 All in all, the government of 
Germany’s analysis of white-collar criminality in Germany reaches a number of 
conclusions and makes a number of recommendations8:
• variety of forms of white-collar criminality
• offender profile significantly different from the average
• essential significance, for the sake of an effective market economy, of preven-
tion and combating of white-collar criminality
• high degree of public interest in effective prosecution of white-collar crime
• requirements for sufficient police and legal resources
• institutional development and combination of specialized knowledge
• involvement of auditors in the siphoning off of profits
• rigorous development of cooperation with the branches of affected industries
• prevention by transparency specifications within business circles
• improved “corporate governance” (information provided to control bodies, 
guaranteed independence of these bodies, early warning system, internal con-
trolling, assessment by auditors)
• special allowance for international links and for the globalization of markets
The term “organized criminality” is almost unique in the extent to which it is sur-
rounded by myths, conjecture, and speculation. Nevertheless, organized criminal-
ity is even referred to as a “form of business.”9 Our context is not just “the Mafia,” 
as a concrete historical – but unfortunately still current – version of organized 
7 | Ibid., p. 232.
8 | Ibid., pp. 218, 245.
9 | Hetzer, wistra (1999), 126 f f.
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criminality in Italy; it is in fact a globalized system of uncontrollable power. The 
term must be interpreted as a metaphor for various forms of abuse of power. Or-
ganized criminality is not just found in societies with weak structures. Today, it 
has become established in all economic orders and political systems. No level of 
hierarchy in trade, government, or politics has escaped unaffected. 
Tax evasion, corrupt practices, and systemic illegality in commercial enterpris-
es operating worldwide have resulted in functional and structural overlaps with 
organized criminality. It is not actually possible to say that certain companies, 
governments, and authorities are all covering the same ground. However, there is 
already evidence to suggest that there may be dangerous clashes between parties’ 
funding requirements, politicians’ power interests, corporate groups’ profit orien-
tation, and the vulnerability of leading members of trade unions. 
Corruption has actually become one of the most important functional princi-
ples of the globalized economy.10 It helps organized criminality along the way. The 
use of force is becoming obsolete. This may be due to the quiet efficiency, the fact 
that white-collar criminality is a “capital” risk, which is increasing all the time, in 
terms of its national importance and in its international links and organization, 
which tends to be overlooked. 
The instruments of criminal law alone are not sufficient to combat either con-
ventional organized criminality or white-collar criminality with the degree of nec-
essary effectiveness. The requirements include stable guidelines and institutions, 
for example, clear guidelines on “compliance” and “corporate governance,” which 
lend themselves to practical implementation. Ultimately, this is one way in which 
an effective governance of companies can be defined and compliance with statu-
tory provisions and internal standards can be made more straightforward.11 
The findings and assessments to date have resulted in the following conclu-
sions:
• It is not possible to use those methods applied in the official reports to make 
a sufficiently realistic quantitative or qualitative assessment of the threat that 
organized criminality poses to society, business, and the state.
• The established official term of “organized criminality” is insufficiently pre-
cise, not least because it has at least two functions, as a means of discrimina-
tion and as legitimation.
• Social inertia and economic profit-seeking may condense into structures that 
are, in part, identical with organized criminality.
• Political parties’ funding requirements and the corrupt complicity of state bu-
reaucracies provide organized criminality with opportunities to exercise an 
influence with the maximum leverage.
10 | Hetzer, Kriminalistik (2007), pp. 251, 255. On the international aspects of combating 
corruption: Korte, wistra (1999), 81 f f.; Wolf, NJW (2006), 2735 f f.
11 | Leyendecker, loc. cit. p. 13.
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• Organized criminality is also a consequence of the egomaniacal-asocial ener-
gies developed by those with status in business, government, and politics in 
order to obtain and to defend their positions of power.
• Efficient prevention and prosecution of organized criminality by the police au-
thorities also often fails simply because, in all states, it is “simply” a radical 
expression of the balance of administrative, economic, military, and political 
power.
• Organized criminality reflects the ethical-moral contradictions in social sys-
tems and the living lie of middle-class respectability.
• White-collar criminality is often a sophisticated and particularly damaging 
form of organized criminality, the perception of which is also impaired be-
cause of failings in terms of definition and because of empirical failings.
• Crime in the world of business reflects the special features of the particular 
economic systems, technological developments, and the level of international 
integration and culminates in groups that operate across borders, some of 
which have become nothing more than a refuge for systemic illegality.
• Even more so than with conventional organized criminality, prompt preven-
tion and effective prosecution of white-collar criminality is an obligation of 
social justice, which is frequently not fulfilled, because the individual and col-
lective powers-that-be – in business, government, and politics worldwide – at-
tach more importance to self-interest and presumption.
III. Questions and no answers
In Germany, the reputations of heads of big businesses have fallen lower than in 
any other member state of the EU. According to a survey by the German Banking 
Association of April 2008, only 15 percent of Germans consider the members of 
this professional group to be trustworthy. The dramatic loss of credibility is largely 
attributable to white-collar crime. The subject of “corruption” features prominent-
ly under this heading. 
“Slush funds” and bribes have become part of company policy. This is more 
than remarkable because corruption is, in fact, extremely detrimental to the mar-
ket economy. It is also against the law and contrary to legal certainty. Even bribes 
have to be financed, for example through inflated bills. This frequently leads to the 
misuse of development aid or European aid. European taxpayers are footing the 
bill. Corruption flourishes in the shadows and often feeds the powerful. 
Many states have ignored corruption at home for a long time, while others 
even promoted bribery undertaken by national companies abroad. During the 
Cold War, Western governments used to give unconditional support to corrupt re-
gimes in developing countries. In fact, corruption was seen as part of an advisable 
political strategy, while increasing global competition hiked up the value of bribes 
in international procurement. 
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It is not only for these reasons that everything must be done to prevent cor-
ruption in international business and government affairs. In trying to define the 
necessary measures, we should not perceive of corruption as an isolated phenom-
enon. Indeed, it involves all aspects of society as it interrupts the decision-making 
process at all levels, it restrains economic development, it disturbs social politics, 
and undermines the stability of entire countries. At the same time, we should not 
think that legal transplants alone can cure social diseases such as corruption. 
It would be a serious analytical mistake to deal with corruption primarily ac-
cording to criminal law guidelines. The complexity of the topic cannot be covered 
by the crude conceptual framework of criminal law. Corrupt interrelationships re-
flect changed corporate and business practices, the effects of which may be indica-
tive of a change of awareness with dramatic repercussions. For quite some time 
now, it has become increasingly difficult in various parts of the world to distin-
guish between political parties, governments, business enterprises, the judiciary, 
the police, the army, and organized crime. The funding requirements of political 
parties, the power demands of individual politicians, and the profit expectations of 
companies clearly overlap more and more frequently. At the relevant points where 
they intersect, there is “white-collar” corruption that cannot be tackled by the rela-
tively primitive categories of criminal law. 
1. Do we know what we mean?
There is still no sufficiently unambiguous and generally recognized definition of 
corruption – not even in the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Many 
attempts have been made. The spectrum includes moral, ethical, criminological, 
political, economic, and regulatory perspectives. From one academic perspective, 
corruption is seen to be the abuse of a public office, a position in commerce or 
industry, or a political mandate for the benefit of another – at the instigation of 
the latter or on one’s own initiative – with a view to obtaining an undue advantage 
for oneself or a third party, with the occurrence or expectation of damage or dis-
advantage to the general public or to an enterprise. According to another defini-
tion, corruption covers all forms of abuse of power aimed at obtaining unlawful 
advantages. In short: 
Corruption is an attack on the proper performance of duties through an unlawful rela-
tionship of exchange between giver and receiver.
There is no uniform and fully recognized definition of corrupt conduct in the 
whole European legal and judicial arena. The term is used to describe a multi-
tude of situations. One reason for this problem is that traditional designations and 
terms, which differ from one language to another, cannot always be reconciled. 
For example, in the EU treaties and documents, the English term “corruption” 
was translated as “Bestechung” in German, although the latter (English: “bribery”) 
in no way includes all aspects of the phenomenon of corruption. “Corruption” 
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means, among other things, bribery, patronage, nepotism, and misappropriation 
of common property, and the illegal financing of parties or election campaigns.
The different terms and legal systems give rise to differences both in the leg-
islation governing the bribery of members of parliament, party financing, and the 
distinction between corruption in the public and private sectors and in the level 
and type of penalties available. 
Nevertheless, in one special area (protection of the European Communities’ 
financial interests), there are the beginnings of a legal definition. According to 
the Convention on the Protection of the Communities’ Financial Interests, the 
deliberate action of an official, who, directly or through an intermediary, requests 
or receives advantages of any kind whatsoever, for himself or for a third party, or 
accepts a promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in accordance 
with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his official duties in 
a way that damages the European Communities’ financial interests constitutes 
passive corruption.
Each member state must ensure that the acts referred to are criminal offenses. 
The uniform combating of corruption in the private sector within the EU is to be 
ensured by means of the Framework Decision of July 22, 2003, on combating cor-
ruption in the private sector, which also includes an attempt to define the term.
Whether such definitions are practicable is open to debate. The situation is 
further complicated by the fact that corruption ceased, some time ago, to be con-
cerned solely with the “classic” offenses of corruption on the part of public officials 
and now also relates to unlawful conduct in the private sector. In this context, the 
term “economic corruption” has gained currency. This is not a term of law but is 
commonly used in penal policy, criminal science, and criminology. Essentially, 
it describes dishonest conduct in the private sector that is more than ostensibly 
comparable with conventional corruption by public officials. 
Economic corruption is said to exist where a private economic operator, se-
cretly or covertly, receives or requests advantages for himself or another in return 
for economic conduct by another private economic operator, or grants or offers 
such as advantages to the other party, in contravention of generally recognized 
standards and with adverse effects on individuals or the general public.
If the foregoing is correct, economic corruption is therefore a kind of unwel-
come competition in non-performance. Finally, one thing which economic corrup-
tion certainly has in common with corruption by public officials is that they both 
involve an unlawful exchange of advantages.
2. Do we know where we are?
The problem of definition is not only theoretical – it also has practical consequenc-
es. The quantitative reality of corruption-related crime is influenced by the under-
standing that each state brings to that term in the first place. In Germany, the ac-
tual extent of criminally corrupt conduct cannot yet be defined as accurately as is 
desirable, and this is even more true for the other 26 member states of the EU. To 
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judge by a standard legal commentary on the German Criminal Code, corruption 
cases do not figure largely in criminal prosecution in this country. The number of 
cases is low, and only a small proportion of those that come to light result in the 
bringing of charges. The number of unrecorded cases is very high because there 
are offenders on both sides of a corrupt relationship. Nevertheless, the damage 
caused by corruption is “unquestionably” very extensive. 
It is even more difficult to give a reasonably realistic, comprehensive, and 
useable assessment of the situation across Europe. Such an assessment should, 
logically, be based on meaningful processes to monitor implementation of the rel-
evant provisions. This is, however, a pious hope. The contribution of international 
organizations to the implementation, in sovereign states, of the rules developed 
by them is naturally limited. Nevertheless, incentives for regulatory compliance 
can be provided. This can be achieved through international evaluation of the 
implementation of international provisions. Three models have been established:
• monitoring by the executive body of the relevant international organization
• evaluation by a special group of experts
• monitoring by some or all of the member states of the relevant regime (“peer 
review”)
It is not all that surprising that the implementation of international recommenda-
tions on evaluation does not lead to a reduction in corruption itself. Firm conclu-
sions cannot readily be drawn in this regard because, in practice, corruption is not 
even remotely measurable. This is true despite the various sets of case statistics 
and corruption-awareness indices. Whether one of the reasons for this immeasur-
ability is that bribery is (allegedly) a “victimless” crime in which none of those 
involved has an interest in detection, is open to question. 
Be that as it may, in contrast to the Council of Europe and the OECD, the EU 
has decided not to set up a specific committee to monitor its anticorruption rules. 
Nor is there any intensive monitoring of the rules that – particularly in the field of 
private-sector corruption – go beyond the mandatory provisions of the Council of 
Europe and the OECD. Even the EU Convention on the Fight against Corruption 
makes no provision for implementation review. The 1st Protocol to the Convention 
on the Protection of the Communities’ Financial Interests does at least require 
member states to transmit to the Commission the texts of their laws concerning 
implentation.
It was against this background that the Commission adopted its First Report 
on the implementation by member states of the Convention on the Protection of 
the Communities’ Financial Interests and its protocols on October 24, 2004. Even 
at that time, there were complaints about various shortcomings in the implemen-
tation of the provisions on bribery in the 1st Protocol. These included the fact that 
member states were very hesitant in ratifying the Convention and its protocols 
and showed no interest in considering the Commission’s proposal for a directive 
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on the protection of the Communities’ financial interests under criminal law for 
many years. The directive would transfer the fundamental provisions of the Con-
vention and the protocols to the first pillar of the structure of the Union and allow 
the Commission to bring an action against defaulting member states before the 
European Court of Justice for failure to implement – an approach which, in light 
of the Lisbon Treaty, may need to be discussed.
In its aforementioned Second Report, the Commission comes to the conclu-
sion that the harmonization objective of the instruments on the protection of the 
Communities’ financial interests has still not been fully achieved for all 27 mem-
ber states, either formally or materially. De facto the current system of protection 
creates a multi-speed situation. It results in a mixture of different legal situations 
in terms of the binding effect of the instruments on the protection of the Com-
munities’ financial interests in the individual member  states’ internal legal or-
der. Formally, this situation does not produce the desired effective and dissuasive 
penal protection. Many of the responsible parties in certain “old” member states 
should remember this when it comes to assessing the situation in new member 
states such as Romania and Bulgaria.
Nevertheless, the Commission has made impressively clear statements and 
delivered resolute assessments. In its reports to the European Parliament and the 
Council, published on July 23, 2008, on progress in Romania and Bulgaria un-
der the cooperation and verification mechanism, it points out that both countries 
faced serious challenges in the year of their accession, 2007, that is they needed to 
set up a functioning judiciary and to take effective action to tackle corruption and 
organized crime. At the time, the Commission and the other member states con-
sidered these challenges to be surmountable. In particular, there was agreement 
that concerted action against corruption and organized crime was absolutely nec-
essary. The reasons for this are clear: Bulgarians and Romanians must be able to 
exercise in full their rights as citizens of the Union. They must be able to take full 
advantage of the opportunities created by membership in the EU. At the time, it 
was also generally acknowledged that the fundamental principles of the EU (rule 
of law, recognition and cooperation on the basis of mutual trust) would only be 
meaningful if the aforementioned problems were tackled at the root.
The cooperation and verification mechanism set up by the Commission is 
used to monitor progress and to provide support in remedying shortcomings. 
The European Anti-Fraud Office of the Commission (known more commonly as 
OLAF) plays an important role in this regard. The above-mentioned reports are 
the third in a series of reports to be produced on a six-monthly basis. Although 
initial successes have been recorded, it can nevertheless be observed that the Bul-
garian and Romanian authorities are finding it difficult to make real progress in 
the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organized crime. 
There is little evidence that the system is functioning correctly. Progress is slow-
ing and therefore proves to be less than expected. The following can be listed as 
successes for Bulgaria:
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• amendment of the Constitution and adoption of a Code of Civil Procedure, a 
Law on the Constitution of the Courts, and the related implementing provi-
sions
• establishment of a national security authority (SANS), which has been exercis-
ing its investigative powers since the beginning of April 2008
• restructuring of the border police
• closing of shops and petrol stations selling duty-free goods
It is beyond dispute that those two new member states have made extensive ef-
forts to establish relevant institutions and procedures. However, there is still a lack 
of satisfactory results. The priorities now are to ensure that the institutions are 
able to function properly and that legislation is effectively implemented. However, 
there is unfortunately a whole raft of lacunae, as the example of Bulgaria shows. 
The situation in Romania is similar. The situation can be described as follows:
• overloading of the justice system as a result of deficiencies in the rules con-
tained in the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure
• inefficiency of the preliminary investigation procedure
• lack of certainty as a result of the unclear allocation of duties between the judi-
ciary, the police, and other authorities
• unnecessary referral of cases back to the investigating authorities because of 
minor procedural errors
• delays in proceedings
• lack of procedural guarantees to prevent the reluctance of courts to deal with 
cases
• lack of an appropriate administrative apparatus within the prosecuting author-
ities and the judiciary
• lack of staff
• training and equipment deficiencies
• failure to investigate the suspicion of corruption and vote-buying in the local 
elections of 2007 and the by-elections of June 2008 in at least two towns
• inadequate efforts to combat corruption at the highest level and organized 
crime
• unreliability and inconsistency of the statistical data submitted
• little progress in the freezing or seizing of assets acquired through criminal 
activities
• insufficient proof of the capacity to administer EU funds properly
• obstruction of the prompt and effective prosecution of corruption and fraud 
cases through the creation of procedural barriers, delays in court proceedings, 
information leaks, and the suspected exertion of influence on the administra-
tive and judicial authorities.
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Up to now, Bulgaria and Romania have failed to provide evidence that the justice 
system is operating in this way. However, they should manage to dispel these 
doubts as to their abilities to combat corruption and organized crime rigorously. 
This would also have long-term positive effects on the economies of both coun-
tries. Bulgaria and Romania have a responsibility towards other member states 
not only in the sphere of judicial and home affairs but also in the joint administra-
tion of EU funds.
The Commission takes the view that aid is more effective than sanctions. 
Up to now, therefore, it has refrained from applying the safeguard clauses in the 
accession treaty. It has now become clear that the cooperation and verification 
mechanism must remain in place for some time to come. For that mechanism 
to succeed, it is essential that the recipient state is granted access to information 
and uses the advice given strategically so that appreciable progress is made on the 
reforms necessary. 
3. Do we know where we come from?
As several observers point out we are confronted with an extreme susceptibility of 
the EU to corruption. This is based on the following facts and hypotheses:
• Subsidies, which are particularly attractive targets for criminals, account for 
over 90 percent of the EU budget.
• The area involving one of the greatest expenditures, the Common Agriculture 
Policy, is organized by an extremely complex web of regulations, rather than 
by free competition. This agricultural protectionism offers great opportuni-
ties for corruption, while the impenetrability of the web of regulations makes 
control more difficult.
• Only a small proportion of the EU budget is managed by the EU institutions 
themselves; about 80 percent is administered by the member states. This in-
tertwining of administrations makes control more difficult.
• When it comes to the perception of – and importance attached to – corruption, 
there is a North-South divide in the EU. As a result, attempts to combat it at the 
EU level tend to be based on the lowest common denominator.
• Scandalous cases of “political corruption” at the EU level (e.g., legalized fraud 
involving donations, legalized nepotism, and legalized moonlighting by MEPs) 
undermine the credibility of attempts to combat corruption in the administra-
tion and world of business.
Other arguments are brought into play as well: The key aspect of the EU budget, 
it is claimed, is that the better part of it is disbursed as subsidies. However, so 
the argument, subsidizing tends “inherently” to encourage people to fabricate the 
prerequisites for receiving subsidies or conceal details from the taxman in the case 
of concessions. The complexity of the rules governing how subsidies are awarded, 
which is often not justified by any sensible market requirements and appears to be 
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misused through targeted lobbying, further increases the temptation. In the final 
analysis, the public seldom perceives EU budget funds as taxpayers’ money. This 
makes it easier to view the budget as a “self-service store” and encourages the view 
that misappropriating funds from the budget is a mere peccadillo. 
It is true that the prices of EU agricultural products are kept artificially high, 
often at many times the price that would otherwise be paid on world markets. If 
EU farmers sell their products on the world market, they can claim “refunds” to 
cover their “losses.” Time and again, this leads to large fraud involving exports of, 
for example, dairy products, beef, and cereals. Reforms will have to change this 
system. At the same time, the EU’s external customs duties are determined by a 
whole host of criteria – which makes it difficult to prove compliance. The problem 
of control is exacerbated by the fact that agricultural lobbies in the member states 
tend to be particularly influential, which makes it impossible to implement effec-
tive rules in the manner desired. 
The peculiar intertwining of member states’ and supranational powers and 
duties with regard to implementation and control, it is claimed, also increases 
susceptibility to corruption. The member states are said to have no great incentive 
to combat corruption effectively, as it is “only” the EU that pays the price of cor-
ruption that may have an effective “functional” value for the local economy. What 
is more, claim procedures may prove counterproductive. Which is, of course, a 
classic dilemma. 
4. Do we know where we go?
Corruption is one of the oldest and most effective means of social, economic, and 
state self-organization. It is now depicted even as a “growth sector.” The idea that 
there should be a Europe-wide sense of what is and is not fair, of what eases or 
threatens our co-existence, lies at the interface between naivety and despair. It is 
ultimately a paradox. We have corrupt structures in society, business, and politics 
that the crude framework of criminal laws is entirely incapable of accommodat-
ing. The same is true of objective structures. Social institutions, political parties, 
democratic and undemocratic governments, the judiciary, the administration, but 
also the police, the army, and business enterprises have created “productive” asso-
ciations in a number of countries around the world. Their potential capacity easily 
outstrips that of conventional criminal organizations. 
As indicated earlier: The proposition that a distinction between spoils and prof-
it can be drawn is sustainable only in fairy-tales (“The emperor’s new clothes”). Be 
that as it may, the fact that the profit-making intentions of economic agents, the 
ambitions of politicians, and the financing requirements of parties and the greed 
of public officials are increasingly interconnected can no longer be ignored. This 
leads to a particularly “high-powered” corruption with which the comparatively 
simple terminology of criminal law cannot contend. 
The day-to-day business of politics offers a broad spectrum of possibilities 
for the emancipation of entrepreneurial spirit, expertise, and democratic control. 
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The toolbox is overflowing and contains well-paid jobs, favors, legislative initia-
tives, subsidies, and promises of pensions. In a world in which material prosperity 
has become the meaning of life, and there is no longer any discernible connec-
tion between work and income, corruption is everywhere. It has a crucial pivotal 
function. Observance of the law is no longer a modus vivendi for communities as 
mutually supportive associations. Criminal-law provisions to combat corruption 
may result in a dual paradox: In principle, their ability to steer behavior cannot be 
guaranteed to the extent necessary because of the undefeatable human constants 
of greed, openness to temptation, and ambition for power. Criminal law is ap-
parently supposed to appeal to our morality, but it can do nothing to change the 
basic principles of institutions and individuals. Criminal justice does not replace 
upbringing. It cannot condition the morality, of citizens, business leaders, and 
politicians. Ideally, it protects legal interests through prevention and punishment.
In the case of corruption, however, something else, something much more 
important might be at work. The influencing of human behavior that it seeks to 
achieve is always connected with humiliation. As long as those involved will not 
or cannot understand that conducting a corrupt relationship puts their self-respect 
at risk, all debate on the fight against corruption remains futile. A lack of respect 
for individual dignity will lead to the devaluing of all relationships, the hallmarks 
of which should be work and loyalty. Nevertheless, the corruptive acceptance of 
money is an attack on self-respect.
IV. Conclusions
The Commission has a serious interest in combating corruption effectively but 
lacks the powers to do so. The member states have the powers but are often not 
interested. While corruption is becoming increasingly transnational, as critics ar-
gue, penalties and law enforcement systems are still organized nationally, with 
the result that the risk of prosecution and conviction is relatively small. Anti-cor-
ruption policy tends to be made up on the fly because it is usually a reaction to 
scandals and crises. Consequently, it is often hurried and not thought through. 
Political corruption in the EU is generally seen as particularly rife. It is a wide-
spread perception that Members of the European Parliament are legally defraud-
ing millions in the form of donations, employing spouses and other relatives at the 
taxpayer’s expense, and receiving more than one salary. 
Proposals for far-reaching reforms (for example, standardizing the VAT rate, 
harmonizing criminal law, or abolishing subsidies) are thought to have no chance 
of success, and therefore the tendency to engage in corrupt practices at the EU 
level is not expected to decline significantly. Suspicions have even been voiced 
that the lack of scope for control and imposing penalties at the EU level is due to a 
secret plan on the part of each individual member state to ensure it has the same 
possibilities to engage in fraud. 
However, as of yet there is no reliable evidence for such a strategy, which would 
be tantamount to a special form of conspiracy. Nevertheless, it is debatable wheth-
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er the historical background and current objectives of the EU budget have created 
specific risks and whether the budget’s political implications and characteristics 
have not helped to create an environment that attracts crime. Nobody should look 
for quick and easy answers. In the next few years in particular, the EU is facing 
some highly complex tasks. The effective protection of its financial interests will 
determine whether the EU’s taxpayers and voters will retain or regain their faith 
in the historically necessary continuation of European integration. 
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9.2 TR ANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND EUROPE AN UNION:  
 ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS
by Vincenzo Militello*
1. The fight against criminal organizations and their ability to carry out illegal 
activities that reach beyond national boundaries has long since signaled the need 
to go beyond a type of European integration that is confined to merely economic 
aspects. Amongst the objectives of the European Union – implicitly dealt with in 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, and then expressly in the 1999 Amsterdam version – 
there is the intent to create not only a shared space for goods and citizens, but also 
for “justice, freedom and security” (today art. 3, in the TEU post-Lisbon).
The fight against organized crime in particular represents a “bridgehead” in 
the European campaign to harmonize criminal laws in the member states. The 
peculiar ability of criminal organizations to expand beyond national borders, fa-
cilitated by the abolition of the barriers once restricting the movement of people 
and goods within the EU, has gradually affected the traditional national author-
ity in the field of criminal law. Formerly, such national sovereign authority had 
prevented any European interventions in this area and, even when the need for 
greater European cooperation in the fight against transnational crime had been 
acknowledged, it still influenced the guidelines developed by the European Union. 
The reason was not only resistance against giving up part of one’s national sover-
eignty, but also the need to reconsider the consequences of such a new transna-
tional dimension on the traditional guarantees given under national systems of 
criminal law.
After explaining what role the harmonization of criminal law plays in the cur-
rent European Union treaties (2.), we will discuss how the difficulty of defining 
the concept of transnational organized crime may lead to European interventions 
that go beyond the limits of “reasonableness” (3.). In order to avoid such a risk, it is 
useful to refer to other relevant international sources, such as the 2000 Palermo 
UN Convention (4.). Nevertheless, the more recent European decisions on the 
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matter (in particular, a resolution by the European Parliament of October 25, 2011) 
seem to have paid a lot of attention to the main problems involved (5.). 
However, the effectiveness of normative instruments in tackling organized 
crime highlights a more general problem. The European Union’s action con-
cerning criminal law shows the need to rethink the traditional guarantees and 
fundamental principles developed within the political context of nation states: In 
order to maintain the criminal law system as a means to protect all citizens, it is 
necessary to reconsider traditional guarantees within the framework of the new 
European dimension. This difficult topic will be addressed in the final sections 
of this essay – with reference to the European Court of Human Rights (6.) and 
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights as counterweights meant to avoid 
unbalanced European action against organized crime (7.).
2. Over the last decade, the competencies of the European Union in matters of 
criminal law have progressively grown. The Lisbon Treaty extended the rules re-
garding a harmonization of criminal offenses and their penalties to up to ten areas 
of “particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension” (art. 83.1.1 TFEU).1 
A EU intervention is also granted in cases where “the approximation of criminal 
laws and regulations of the Member States proves essential to ensure the effective 
implementation of a Union Policy in an area which has been subject to harmoni-
zation measures” (art. 83.2).2 Lastly, a special area is defined regarding offenses 
against the Union’s financial interests (art. 325 and art. 86.2).3
1 | A dif ferent view is propounded by Satzger, Internationales und Europäisches Straf-
recht, Baden-Baden 2010 (4. ed.), p. 117, who holds that the Lisbon Treaty has narrowed 
the scope to harmonize questions of criminal law. However, the Treaty does not seem to 
limit but rather enhance possibilities for harmonization, as it specifies areas that may be 
integrated (see below).
2 | See Bernardi, La competenza penale accessoria dell’Unione Europea: problemi e pros-
pettive, in www.penalecontemporaneo.it, 2 s.; Grasso, Il Trattato di Lisbona e le nuove 
competenze dell’Unione, in Studi in onore di Mario Romano, Napoli 2011, 2326 s.; Sicurel-
la, Questioni di metodo nella costruzione di una teoria delle competenze dell’Unione Euro-
pea in materia penale,” ibid., 2626; Siracusa, Il transito del diritto penale di fonte europea 
dalla ‘vecchia’ alla ‘nuova’ Unione post-Lisbona, in Riv.trim.dir.pen.ec. 2010, 796 s. See 
also Heger, Perspektiven des Europäischen Strafrechts nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, in 
ZIS 2009, p. 410.
3 | The autonomy of this specific area is claimed by Sieber, Einführung, in: Europäisches 
Strafrecht, Sieber et al. (cur.) Köln 2011, n. 175; Sicurella, “Prove tecniche” per una me-
todologia dell’esercizio delle nuove competenze concorrenti dell’UE in materia penale, in 
L’evoluzione del diritto penale nei settori di interesse europeo alla luce del Trattato di Lis-
bona, Grasso etal. (ed.), Milano 2011, 42 s. See also Grandi, Riserva di legge e legalità 
penale europea, Milan 2010, 125 s. The three dif ferent juridical grounds for European in-
tervention in criminal matters are also highlighted by the European Commission in a recent 
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The tendency to expand the EU’s competencies regarding criminal law and to 
diversify areas of intervention reflects the ever-greater role played by the European 
Union and its institutions. After all, the EU’s citizens have supported European 
action in the fight against crime, which is perceived as one of the EU’s main objec-
tives, as shown by Eurobarometer data (in issue nos. 74 and 75, Autumn 2010 and 
Spring 2011).
In this respect it seems curious that, in par. 83.1.2. TFEU, organized crime 
is listed last among the sectors that can be subject to harmonization, as this 
seems to neglect the fact that organized crime, as a clear example of transnational 
crime,4 has very much accentuated the need that member states coordinate their 
national criminal policies both within the EU and within the wider context of the 
United Nations.5
Since 1997, organized crime, along with terrorism and drug trafficking, has 
been named in European Treaties as a possible subject for the harmonization of 
criminal law (par. 31.1.e EUT Amsterdam version, already referred to by par. 61.1.a 
ECT).6 Harmonization of criminal legislation is aimed at “developing a close coop-
communication [COM(2011) 573 of 20.11.2011] “Towards a European Union’s Criminal 
Policy: Ensuring the Effective Implementation of EU Policies Through Criminal Law”, 5-6. 
On this aspect, see Klip, European Criminal Policy, (2012) 20 Eur.J.Crime Cr.L.Cr.J., 6 s.
4 | Along with terrorism, especially after the 9/11 attacks: see Marauhn/Meljnik, Völker-
rechtliche Massnahmen zur Bekämpfung von organisier ter Kriminalitat und Terrorismus, 
in Organisier te Kriminalität und kriminelle Organisationen, Gropp-A.Sinn (Hrsg.), Baden 
Baden 2006, 479 s.; Kress/Gazeas, Terrorismus, in Europäisches Strafrecht (cit. nt. 136), 
349.
5 | On this matter see Herlin-Kernell, The Treaty of Lisbon and the Criminal Law: Anything 
New Under the Sun?, in Eur. J. Law Reform 2008, 331; Hegler, Europäische Strafgesetzge-
bung, in ZIS 2009, 340; Bernardi (quoted in note 2), 2 nt. 7; A. Centonze, Criminalità or-
ganizzata e reati transnazionali, Milan, 2008, 25 s., 367 s. For a critical assessment see 
Elholm, in Does EU Criminal Cooperation necessary mean Increased Repression?, (2009) 
17 Eur.J.Crime Cr.L.Cr.J., 191 s., 219 s. For United Nations documents see A compilation 
of UN Document 1975–1998, Bassiouni-Vetere (eds.), New York 1998. See also Fijnaut, 
Transnational Crime and the Role of UN in Its Containment through International Co- 
operation: A Challenge for the 21st Century, (2000) 8 Eur.J.Crime Cr.L.Cr.J., 119 s., 124 s.; 
Mueller, Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts, in Combating Transnational Crime. 
Concepts, Activities and Responses, Williams/Vlassis (eds.), London 2001, 13 s.; Micheli-
ni/Polimeni, Il fenomeno del crimine transnazionale e la Convenzione delle N.U. contro il 
crimine organizzato transnazionale, in Criminalità organizzata transnazionale e sistema 
penale italiano. La convenzione ONU di Palermo, Rosi (ed.), Milan, 2007, 2 s., 6.
6 | For the link between these sectors see, for instance, Zeder, Mindestvorschrif ten der EU 
in materiellen Strafrecht: Was bringt der Vertrag von Lissabon Neues?, in Era forum 2008, 
211 s.; and also, Militello, Agli albori di un diritto penale comune in Europa: il contrasto al 
crimine organizzato (The dawn of a common criminal law in Europe: the contrast against 
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eration in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs,” something beyond the scope of 
the original intent of the European Economic Community (art. B EUT, Maastricht 
version of 1992). In the 1990s, the importance of cooperation against cross-border 
crime, including its organized forms, led to a two-fold intervention strategy: The 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions and an approximation of criminal law. 
These two approaches will have to be integrated in order to overcome differences 
between the criminal justice systems of individual member states (as highlighted 
in art. 67.3 and 82.1 TFEU).7
Within this general framework, the European Union has adopted many regu-
lations to fight criminal organizations. Even before the Amsterdam Treaty came 
into effect (May 1, 1999), this was regarded as one of the first “European duties of 
incrimination”8: At the end of 1998 the Council passed a “joint action” concerning 
the involvement in criminal organizations in the EU’s member states.9 This inno-
vative point was also included in the 1997 Action Plan against Organised Crime,10 
which has long represented a European policy program on criminal matters.11
organized crime) in Il crimine organizzato come fenomeno transnazionale (Organized crime 
as a transnational phenomenon), Militello-Paoli-Arnold (ed.), Milan, 2000, 34 s.
7 | For recent studies see M.Harms/P.Knauss, Das Prinzip der gegenseitige Anerken-
nung in den strafrechtlichen Regelung der EU, in FS-Roxin, Heinrich et al. (eds.), Berlin 
2011, 1479 s., 1486; Suominen, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters, Antwerpen 2011, 51 s., 56 s. The lack of consideration for the connec-
tion highlighted in this ar ticle characterizes the radical criticism on the principle of mutual 
recognition made by Schünemann, for instance in Ein Kampf ums europäische Strafrecht 
– Rückblick und Ausblick, in FS-Szwarc, Joerden et al. (Hrsg.), Berlin 2009, 109 s. 119 s. A 
contrary opinion is held by Klip (quoted in note 3) 5, who points out that the European ar-
rest warrant was successful in a context that lacked the harmonization of domestic legisla-
tions. – Actually, this proves quite the contrary: The dif ferences between national criminal 
law systems the basis for the resistance against the European arrest warrant in several 
countries (e.g., Germany and Italy).
8 | Even if, originally, the concept had a weaker meaning as there was no judicial control 
in case of non-fulfillment by the member states. For an in-depth examination of such a 
delicate issue see Paonessa, Gli obblighi di tutela penale, Pisa 2009, 10 s., 14 s.
9 | Joint Action of 12.21.1998, in OJECL351 29.12.1998, which accompanies the other two 
joint actions dealing with illicit proceeds and corruption in the private sector, respectively 
3.12.1998, in OJEC L 333 of 9.12.1998, and 22.12.1998, in OJEC L 357 of 31.12.1998.
10 | The plan was published in OJEC C 251 of 15.8.1997. An updated list of other European 
actions and documents relating to organized crime can be found in Kress/Gazeas, Orga-
nisier te Kriminalität, in Europäisches Strafrecht, 327 s.
11 | The first Action Plan on the topic was followed by a similar document (in OJEC C124/1 
of 3.5.2000) on the Prevention and Control of Organized Crime at the Beginning of the 
Millennium. References to organized crime are also contained in the wider “The Hague Pro-
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However, the outstanding importance thus accorded to the topic of organized 
crime is not reflected in article 83.1.2 of the Treaty, where, as pointed out earlier, 
the reference to organized crime is only to be found at the end of a long list of 
criminal activities requiring harmonization – a list on which terrorism is named 
first (unlike art. 31.1.e of the Amsterdam version of the TEU, where terrorism was 
only mentioned after organized crime).12 Such a marginal placement of organized 
crime, together with the traditional vagueness of the concept, carries the risk that 
the scope of the legal provisions of article 83.1.2 will be widened excessively, so 
as to (ideally) include any form of crime among the fields of possible European 
harmonization.13
This risk has to be avoided, in order to prevent a definition of organized crime 
so wide that, although it is endorsed by art. 83.1.2, TFEU, will be nothing but 
a worthless duplicate concerning many of the criminal activities named in the 
same article. In particular, the trafficking in human beings, drugs, and arms, 
but also money laundering and corruption, are all activities that share the charac-
teristic that they are “normally” carried out in organized forms, especially when 
performed transnationally.14
gramme: strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union”(in OJEC C 
53/1 of 3.3.2005), especially par. 2.3, 2.6, 2.7.
12 | This impression is strengthened by the lack of reference to organized crime among 
the priorities named by the European Council in relation to matters referred to by ar t. 83.1: 
see The Stockholm Programme, an Open and Secure Europe Serving the Citizen, adopted 
by the EU Council on 3.3.2010, in OJEC C 115 of 4.5.2010, par. 3.3 (where the priorities are 
as follows: trafficking in human beings, terrorism, drug trafficking, sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography, cyber-crime). Appropriately, the European Parliament has 
nevertheless pointed out the non-exhaustive character of “these objectives… and that the 
order of priorities could have been better structured” and, at the same time, it also accu-
rately highlighted how “the fight against terrorism and organized crime is and must remain 
a key priority within the framework of internal security strategy”: Committee on Civil Liber-
ties, Justice and Home Affairs, Report on the European Union’s Internal Security Strategy 
[2010/2308 (INI)] rep. on 24.4.2012 (Rapporteur Rita Borsellino).
13 | This argument is expressed by Grandi, Riserva (quoted in note 3 – Rule of Law), 120 at 
fn 25. On the spaces of uncertainty of the concept of organized crime in the previous 2008 
Framework Decision (mentioned below in this ar ticle), see e.g. Calderoni, A definition that 
could not work: the EU Framework decision on the fight against organized crime, (2008) 16 
Eur.J.Crime Cr.L.Cr.J., 270 s.; Pasculli, Una umanità una giustizia. Contributo allo studio 
della giurisdizione penale universale, Padova 2011, 92.
14 | See Sanchez Garcia de Paz, Per fil criminologico de la delincuencia transnacional or-
ganizada, in Serta – In memoriam A. Baratta, Madrid 2004, 641 s. See also the Europol 
Reports on the phenomenon, compiled annually since 2000, Europol (ed.), 2000 European 
Union Organised Crime Situation Report, Luxembourg 2001, in specie 10 s.; on this topic 
see A. Sinn, Das Lagebild der organisier ten Kriminalität in der EU - Tendenzen, rechtliche 
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In order not to lose sight of the real meaning of organized crime, it is neces-
sary to identify its typical characteristics. A definition of organized crime is even 
more important if we consider that, even before the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, 
many criminal activities now enumerated in article 83.1.2 had already been the 
object of European decisions. These measures established minimum standards 
concerning both illicit conducts and corresponding penalties.15 Therefore, the fact 
that the Amsterdam Treaty only referred to organized crime, terrorism, and drug 
trafficking did not hamper the further inclusion of several of the sectors, now 
expressly contained in the list referred to by art. 83.116 as areas of European har-
monization.
Besides, the current Treaty on the Functioning of the European Treaty envis-
ages the possibility to extend harmonization measures to forms of crime that are 
not explicitly listed in art. 83.1.2. This will happen with regard to the evolution 
of crime, for example, when new criminal activities surface that are similar to 
those that are already the object of a possible harmonization of criminal law (art. 
83.1.3). Nevertheless, two characteristic elements are necessary a particular “seri-
ousness” and a “cross-border dimension” of the crime. Therefore, future efforts to 
harmonize criminal law may not exploit the vague definition of organized crime. 
In particular, formal procedures (unanimity of the Council and consent of the 
Initiativen und Perspektiven einer wirksamen OK-Bekämpfung, in Organisier te Kriminal-
ität (quoted in note 4), 503 s. Lastly, a confirmation of the connection pointed out in this 
ar ticle can be found in the  Internal Security Strategy for the EU, approved by the Council 
of Europe on 25 and 26 March 2010 (Internal Security Strategy for the European Union – 
Towards a European Security Model, Luxembourg 2010, 14).
15 | The following framework decisions go in the same direction: the decision of the 
Council of 29.5.2000 on protecting the euro against counter feiting (2000/383/JHA); 
FD of 28.5.2001 combating fraud and counter feiting of non-cash means of payment 
(2001/413/JHA); FD of 26.6.2001 on money-laundering and confiscation of crime-related 
proceeds (2001/500/JHA); FD of 13.6.2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA); 
FD of 19.7.2002 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings (2002/629/
JHA); FD of 28.11.2002 on the strengthening of the legal framework to prevent the facilita-
tion of unauthorized entry, transit and residence (2003/568/JHA); FD of 27.1.2003, on 
the protection of the environment through Criminal Law (2003/80/JHA) (annulled by the 
Court of Justice–Great Chamber, 13.9.2005, case C-176/03); FD of 12.7.2005 against 
ship-source pollution (annulled by the Court of Justice–Great Chamber, 23.10.2007, case 
C-440/05); FD of 22.12.2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography (2004/68/JHA); FD of 24.2.2005 again on confiscation (2005/212/JHA); FD 
of 28.11.2008 amending the framework decision 2002/475/JHAon combating terrorism 
(2008/919/JHA).
16 | See ar ticles 29 and 31 (e) TEU, Amsterdam version, according to which all areas of 
“organized and non-organized” crime may be the object of criminal harmonization mea-
sures. See Satzger (nt. 1) II ed. 2008, 114–15.
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Parliament) may not be taken as the sole basis to extend areas that are subject to 
harmonization. On the contrary, it will be necessary to verify that each new form 
of crime that is to be the subject of harmonization meets the two above-mentioned 
conditions (“seriousness” and “cross-border dimension”) referred to in the Treaty.
3. However, the reference to the transnational dimension of a specific crime may 
turn out to be rather useless when it comes to determining which new criminal 
phenomena should be subject to a harmonized legal reaction by the European 
Union. In fact, in the Lisbon Treaty system, the transnational dimension is not de-
rived solely from the “nature” and “impacts” of the offenses discussed, that is, the 
objective fact that criminal activities affect different states, there is also reference 
to the “need to combat” particular types of crime “on a common basis.” Such a 
perspective is no longer objective, as it expresses the wish to harmonize criminal 
law across a number of states – and such a definition will not be able to limit an 
(over-)extension of legal harmonization.
In order to avoid this risk, the above-mentioned indications included in art. 
83.1.3 should not be considered the only elements that define the transnational 
dimension of European harmonization in criminal law. Here, it is useful to refer 
to the concept mentioned in art. 3(2) of the 2000 UN Convention of Palermo that 
was also signed by the EU. This document refers to criminal offenses occurring 
in more than one state and involving organized criminal groups and views the 
involvement of a criminal organization as a particularly serious offense, because it 
makes it more difficult to ascertain the liability of individual participants.
Provided that European harmonization follows the standards set for its exten-
sion to new forms of crime and respects the principle of subsidiarity, this will 
legitimate further European interventions, especially as action by individual states 
will not produce results (art. 3ter TUE). It is precisely this difficulty to fight trans-
national criminal groups that establishes a “special need to combat them on a 
common basis,” as referred to by art. 83.1.3; otherwise such a requisite would ap-
pear empty or dangerously vague.17
4. The reference to organized crime in the above-mentioned European treaties is 
not to be interpreted as a merely criminological concept, with an inevitably uncer-
tain definition.18 Rather, the concept of organized crime as object of action by the 
Union has to be derived from supranational measures with defined legal characte-
ristics, at least on the international level.
17 | The wording appeared problematic in the decision of 20.6.2009 on the Lisbon Treaty 
of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2009, 2288 n. 
359).
18 | This opinion is maintained by Ambos/Rackow, Erste Überlegungen zu den Konse-
quenzen des Lissabon-Urteils des BVG für das Europäisches Strafrecht, in ZIS 2009, 402.
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There are three different international regulatory frameworks: the above men-
tioned European Joint Action of 1998; the Palermo UN Convention of 2000 on 
transnational organized crime; and the more recent Framework Decision of the 
Council of 2008 on the fight against organized crime (2008/841/JHA of October 
24, 2008).
In all of these texts criminal organization are being described using natural-
istic and normative elements, both of which require further definition. Among 
the naturalistic elements, the most recent formulation in the 2008 Framework 
Decision stresses the participation of more than two people in a crime and its 
persistence over a period of time. The requisites concerning the “seriousness” of 
the offense and the existence of a “structured association,” on the other hand, are 
normative and need to be evaluated. Generally, the references here are too narrow 
in one case and too vague in the other.
The “seriousness” of the relevant “offenses” is defined as follows: The crimes 
in question must be punishable by detention of at least four years (art. 1.1). In this 
way, however, the law ends up including criminal activities that are viewed very 
differently by individual criminal law systems. Thus, the reference to a specific 
penalty neglects to address the still very considerable differences between crimi-
nal law systems in different EU countries.19
On the other hand, the definition of “structured association” does seem to ap-
pear vague: Excluded from this are only groups “randomly formed for the imme-
diate commission of an offence.” Subsequently, however, it is specified that “the 
group does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of 
its membership, or a developed structure” (art. 1.2 FD 2008).
The wording of this provision is overly general, and it fails to draw a distinction 
between organized crime and other cases, in which a number of people commit 
a single offense. In order to define such a difference, elements of criminal orga-
nizations, such as a division of tasks involving at least three people and with the 
intent of committing multiple offenses, will have to be included.
The unclear approach adopted by the Framework Decision was probably caused 
by the need to find a compromise with criminal justice systems based on Com-
mon Law. Within these systems, the offense of “conspiracy” encompasses both 
the simple agreement to commit an offense, and the commission of one or more 
offenses by an organized group. This same model is to be found in international 
documents (art. 2.1.a-b) FD 2008).20
The first such definition of “conspiracy” describes the subjective and objective 
factors that justify prosecution for the participation in a criminal organization. On 
the subjective level, it is stressed that the perpetrator must have had knowledge of 
19 | For an example see Militello, Partecipazione all’organizzazione criminale e standard 
internazionali di incriminazione, in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen. 2003, 188 s.
20 | On this dual model see Maliević, Participation in a Criminal Organisation and Con-
spiracy, Freiburg-Berlin, 2011, 123 s.
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the criminal group’s illegal activities or at least of its illegal aims; on the objective 
level, it is pointed out, that he/she will have to have actively participated in the 
group’s criminal activity. This is followed by a long list of examples (art. 2.a).
The second definition of “conspiracy” describes the agreement, even with just 
one other person, to commit a serious offense with the aim to directly or indirectly 
obtain a financial or other material benefit. Here, the derivation from the Anglo-
Saxon concept of conspiracy is very clear, and includes precisely the agreement 
between two or more persons to engage jointly in an unlawful act or a lawful act 
carried out by illegal means. The specific dangerousness of criminal organiza-
tions – as different from the simple complicity in a crime – is thus lost.
This problem cannot be solved by reference “to aims of benefit” agreed upon 
before the crime was perpetrated. The intent to illegally acquire material benefits 
is typical for a great number of offenses – it is a necessary condition, but it is not 
sufficient to justify prosecution for participating in an organized criminal group.
The criminalization of the agreement to carry out a particular offense conflicts 
with the traditions of criminal systems that punish only criminal acts that have 
been perpetrated. In this regard, the European Framework Decision recognize the 
possibility that state parties agree that an act of furtherance of the unlawful agree-
ment is needed in order to justify prosecution for the participation in a criminal 
organization. Such an approach, although it may jeopardize the process of harmo-
nization, would be in line with the “harm principle.”
A whole system of rules defines liability for the participation in a criminal or-
ganization. The 2008 Framework Decision mentions terms of imprisonment (art. 
3); the possibility to consider the commission of a serious offense within the 
framework of a criminal organization as an aggravating factor (art. 3 co. 2); the 
possibility that crown witnesses may receive reduced sentences or none at all (art. 
4) and the liability of legal persons for offenses established in art. 1 and 2, with 
corresponding penalties (art. 5–6).
 
5. The European Parliament, in an important resolution on organized crime, re-
cently adopted by a large majority, seems to have become aware of the problematic 
nature of some of the European regulations mentioned.21 The Parliament calls for 
greater harmonization and demands clearer definitions of the offenses. Moreover, 
it points to the need to go beyond the current dual approach regarding liability 
(membership/conspiracy) (par. 7).
Particular attention is given to the fight against the proceeds of crime. The 
Parliament stresses that, besides the “extended confiscation” and the seizure of as-
sets registered in the name of third parties, there is a need for legislation allowing 
the use of confiscated assets for social purposes (par. 8–9). Specific attention is 
also given to the protection of witnesses and informers (par. 12) and the creation 
21 | Resolution of EU-Parliament P7_TA(2011)0459 (Rapporteur S. Alfano) approved by 
the Plenary Assembly on 25.10.2011.
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of a special Committee of the European Parliament (par. 15). This Special Com-
mittee on Organized Crime was set up in March 2012 with the task of analyzing 
and assessing the implementation of the Union’s legislation on organized crime, 
corruption, and money laundering. The resolution also calls for the extension of 
the remit of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to include cross-border or-
ganized crime and corruption, and it stresses the importance of strengthening 
agencies such as Eurojust, Europol, and OLAF (par. 18–23).
Beyond the individual measures tackled in the resolution, it is worth highl-
ighting the scope and organic structure of the document. It expresses an integ-
rated approach to the phenomenon similar to that to be found in theoretical ana-
lyzes of organized crime.22 The European Parliament has adopted other similar 
documents on this topic: for example, the Action Plan of 1997,23 the Joint Action 
of 1998 on the participation in a criminal organization,24 and the proposal for a 
Framework Decision on the same matter.25 The added value of the more recent 
resolution lies in that it is not bound to a specific precedent. The resolution was 
adopted by the Parliament in its autonomy, and it may encourage further initiati-
ves by the Parliament and the Council. 
The document, however, also has some weak points. Firstly, it does not devote 
adequate attention to prevention, which is indispensable in the fight against orga-
nized crime. In order to tackle the phenomenon effectively, it will be necessary to 
develop social prevention measures and to heighten the regard for legality in our 
societies. Such an integrated approach has been highlighted, for example, in the 
Memorandum on the Prevention and Control of Organised Crime (2000).26
An additional weakness of the 2011 Resolution is its inadequate focus on the 
harmonization of penalties. This aspect is especially pertinent, as there still are 
considerable discrepancies between the legal systems of the member states.27
Lastly, the mechanisms to combat organized crime are not balanced by refe-
rences to a need to harmonize legal guarantees, something that is needed to trans-
late them into the different legal systems. In this respect, the rather general refe-
rence to basic rights and fundamental freedoms, included in the opening remarks 
22 | Recently, e.g. see Spapens, Macro Networks, Collectives, and Business Process: An 
integrated Approach to Organized Crime (2010) 18 Eur.J.Crime Cr.L.Cr.J., 185 s.
23 | EU-Parliament, Comm. On Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, Report on the Action 
Plan against organised Crime, doc-it\RR\331\338487 – PE 223.427/def., n. 17 (rappor-
teur. Cederschöld).
24 | EU-Parliament, Report on the 1998 Joint Action against Organised Crime (rapporteur. 
Orlando).
25 | EU-Parliament, Comm. LIBE Resolution 28.09.2005 (rapporteur Dunn).
26 | Prevention and Control of Organized Crime at the Beginning of the Millennium (see 
nt. 11).
27 | See e.g. Bernardi, L’armonizzazione delle sanzioni in Europa: linee ricostruttive, in Per 
un rilancio del progetto europeo, Grasso/Sicurella (cur.), Milano 2008, 381 s.
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of the Framework Decision of 2008, is just a “style clause,” that is, something that 
cannot be translated consistently into the different national constitutional traditi-
ons. What is really needed is a supranational framework of guarantees.
6. The fight against illicit proceeds, particularly through confiscations and penal-
ties, is a crucial field. This aspect of organized crime is not explicitly discussed in 
the 2008 Framework Decision, yet it is the object of many harmonization mea-
sures laid out in previous Framework Decisions, and it is forcefully addressed in 
the above-mentioned resolution of the European Parliament.28
Here, especially for Italian  scholars, the most problematic point regarding 
the protection of the rights of individuals, concerns confiscation undertaken as a 
preventive measure. On this topic, the ECHR has stressed the need for guarantees 
(in particular, Sud Fondi SRL c. Italia Jan. 20, 2009). However, the overall validity 
of the seizure of proceeds of crime was not denied, something that has become 
crucial in Italy’s fight against organized crime (recently, see Bongiorno et al. c. 
Italia Jan. 5, 2010).
Nevertheless, although Italy has recently improved its compliance with the 
rulings of the ECHR, the actual impact of the relevant case law is still limited 
to a few areas – areas that are undoubtedly important, yet this is not sufficient to 
overhaul a whole legal system as needed in the fight against organized crime.29
7. A firmer basis to achieve such a goal may be found in the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, which is now legally binding and has the same status as 
the EU Treaty. The Charter contains a long list of rights that aim to expand and 
harmonize the overall level of justice in Europe, and it thus runs counter to an 
uncritical increase of the use of repression at a national level.30
28 | See the Framework Decision of 26.6.2001 on money laundering and confiscation 
(2001/500/JHA) and the Framework Decision of 24.2.2005 on confiscation of crime-re-
lated proceeds (2005/212/JHA). In the European Parliament Resolution see, especially, D 
and points 8–10.
29 | On this aspect, see the recent collection of essays edited by Manes/V.Zagrebel-
sky, La convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo nell’ordinamento penale italiano, Mi-
lan, 2011, and also Militello, Der Einfluss der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerich-
tshofes für Menschenrechte auf die italienische Strafrechtsordnung, in Strafrecht und 
Wir tschaftsstrafrecht - Festschrif t für K. Tiedemann, Sieber et al. (Hrsg.), München 2008, 
1421 s.
30 | Militello, I diritti fondamentali fra limite e legittimazione di una tutela penale euro-
pea, in Ragion pratica 2004, 139 s. On the importance of the Charter, see the recent and 
precise analysis by Manacorda, Carta dei diritti e CEDU: una nuova topografia delle garan-
zie penalistiche in Europa, in La convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo (quoted above in 
note 29) 147 s.; see also Maugeri, I principi fondamentali del sistema punitivo comunitario: 
la giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia e della Corte Europea dei diritti dell’uomo, in Per 
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The expansion of EU action into the area of criminal law has long been critici-
zed, and even the end of the Rule of Law has been predicted should this continue.31 
However, there are also many attempts to explore new directions: from corpus juris 
to Euro-crimes, from the European project for combating organized crime to the 
recent Manifesto on the European Criminal Policy.32
Today, the framework offered by the Treaty of Lisbon seems to have largely 
overcome many of the disadvantages produced by the lack of democratic legitima-
tion for a European intervention in matters of criminal law. The Treaty provides 
legislative procedures, including the co-participation of the European Council and 
Parliament, in order to safeguard democratic values. Nevertheless, the EU may 
still get involved in areas to do with criminal law without intervening too much 
in areas of national sovereignty. The principles of proportionality and subsidiarity 
that have to guide interventions in criminal law can draw important lessons from 
the values enshrined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
constitutes, at the same time, the limit and the foundation of the new Criminal 
Law of the European Union.
un rilancio del progetto europeo, 88 s.; Cortens/Limborgh, Grondrechtenbeschermingna 
het Vertrag von Lissabon, in Universalis.Liber amicorum C. Fijnaut, Antwerpen 2011, 41 s.
31 | See e.g. Albrecht/Braum, Defizite europäischer Strafrechtsentwicklung, Kritische 
Vier teljahreschrif t für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 1998, 465 s.; Hassemer, 
“Corpus Juris”: Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Strafrecht?, ivi 1999, 133 s., 136; 
Braum, Das “corpus juris” – Legitimität, Er forderlichkeit und Machtbarkeit, in Juristenzei-
tung 2000, 493 f.; P.A. Albrecht et al.,11 Thesen zur Entwicklung rechtsstaatlicher Grund-
lagen europäischen Strafrechts, KritV 2001, 279 s.; Moccia, L’involuzione del diritto pe-
nale in materia economica e le fattispecie incriminatrici del corpus juris, in Bartone (ed.), 
Diritto penale europeo, Padova 2001, 34, 54; Kaiafa-Gbandi, Bemerkungen zur Entwick-
lung rechtstaatlicher Grundlagen europäischen Strafrechts, KritV 2001, 290.
32 | Cf. The implementation of the corpus juris in the member states, Delmas-Marty/Ver-
vaele (eds.), Antwerp 2000; Towards a European Criminal Law Against Organised Crime. 
Proposals and Summaries of the Joint European Project to Counter Organised Crime, Mi-
litello/Huber (eds.), Freiburg 2001; Wir tschaftstrafrecht in der Europäischen Union, Tie-
demann (Hrsg.), Berlin 2002; Schünemann, Alternative Project for a European Criminal 
law and Procedure, in Bassiouni/Militello/Satzger (eds.), European Cooperation in Penal 
Matters: Issues and Perspectives, Padova 2008, p. 119 ss.; amplius Id. Ein Gesamtkon-
zept für die europäische Strafrechtspflege. A Programme for European Criminal Justice, 
Köln 2006. Lastly, the Manifesto sulla politica criminale europea, in ZIS 2009, 737 (on 
this, see Satzger, La carenze della politica criminale europea. Appendice al manifesto del 
gruppo scientifico internazionale “European Criminal Policy Initiative”, in Riv. it. dir. proc. 
pen. 2010, 127 s.).
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10.1 CIVIL SOCIE T Y’S ROLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST   
 THE ’NDR ANGHE TA
by Claudio La Camera*
Introduction
This paper presents the role played by Italian civil society in the prevention of and 
fight against the ’Ndrangheta – a Mafia organization whose roots are in Calabria 
(a southern region in Italy) but which nowadays has expanded its presence across 
the whole country and all over the world. Using a critical approach, the paper aims 
to describe the work conducted by civil society organizations in the field in order 
to give an overview of the social engagement against the Mafia, and to assess its ef-
fectiveness. Firstly, some background information on the presence of the ’Ndrang-
heta will be provided; secondly, the social reaction and level of awareness of the 
phenomenon will be discussed; subsequently, a list of civil society organizations 
will be presented; in conclusion, the author shares challenges and perspectives 
about the topic.
The presence of the ’Ndrangheta
In September 2009, in Reggio Calabria, the capital city of the Calabria region 
located in southwest Italy, the Special Operations Department of the Carabinieri 
police force (which intervenes during the investigations under the orders of the 
Prosecution Service) managed to film a secret meeting taking place at the sanc-
tuary Madonna di Polsi, one of southern Italy’s most impressive places of wor-
ship. The event was the annual meeting of the ’Ndrangheta bosses, in which they 
* Claudio La Camera is the Director of the “Observatory on the preventive measures against 
organized crime” Reggio Calabria, Italy; He was Manager of the Museo della ’Ndrangheta 
between 2007 and 2012. 
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make decisions about the tasks and roles for all the Locale1 distributed in Italy and 
around the world, about who should live and who must die, and about alliances 
and agreements. The existence of these legendary meetings had been known for 
about 40 years, but it had never been possible to obtain any direct evidence before. 
On October 31, 2009, in Lombardy in northern Italy, another meeting was 
filmed by the police. The heads of the Locale of Lombardy gathered for a conviv-
ial meeting at a community center for the elderly, “Falcone and Borsellino,”2 to 
elect the new representatives of the ’Ndrangheta in Lombardy. On this occasion, 
the orders that had come from Calabria had to be observed. A few months later, 
through the police operation “Reale,” the existence of a network of complicity and 
collusion was discovered. This network linked the ’Ndrangheta with very impor-
tant institutional clubs of politicians and judges. Thanks to this investigation, the 
perpetrators of a number of attacks on judges and prosecutors, as well as the au-
thors of a strong intimidating threat against the president of the Republic, Giorgio 
Napolitano, could be identified.
These investigations highlighted that the ’Ndrangheta remains the most pow-
erful criminal organization in Italy and one of the most dangerous in the world. 
Indeed, in the province of Reggio Calabria, there are towns where 300–400 out 
of 10,000 inhabitants are full members of a Locale of the ’Ndrangheta – a ratio 
which, nowadays, would hardly be reached in a city like Palermo in Sicily.3 The 
criminal density index (based on the percentage of the population involved in dif-
ferent forms of criminal activities) has been estimated at 27 percent of the Cal-
abrian population, compared to 12 percent in Campania, 10 percent in Sicily, and 
2 percent in Puglia (a region in southeast Italy where the organized crime group 
Sacra Corona Unita originated). 
There are many reasons why criminal density in the Calabria region is so high: 
family ties between ’Ndrangheta members, which strengthen the criminal bonds; 
the respect for a number of traditions and rituals, which eliminate the possibility 
of pentiti (members turned state informants); the extraordinarily pervasive control 
over the territory and over many aspects of Calabria’s administration, society, and 
economy. Above all, the ’Ndrangheta is a secret society. There are great difficulties 
in identifying its real structure and presence because its identity is in constant 
evolution. Unlike the Sicilian Mafia, there has been little attention given to the 
1 | The Locale is an organizational unit of the ’Ndrangheta comprising a number of fami-
lies of the same geographical area.
2 | Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, magistrates of the Anti-Mafia Prosecution 
Service of Palermo, are symbols of the fight against Cosa Nostra. Falcone, his wife, and 
his police escorts were killed on May 23, 1992. Borsellino was killed on July 19, 1992. The 
murders were part of Cosa Nostra’s strategy to challenge the Italian state. 
3 | For data on the criminal density index in the province of Reggio Calabria, see the an-
nual report of the anti-Mafia prosecutor, Giuseppe Pignatone, for 2010–2011. Published in 
“Vincere la ndrangheta,” Aracne editrice, Roma 2011.
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study and knowledge of the ’Ndrangheta. The first official report of the Italian 
Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission was published only in February 2008.4
Four months later the US Treasury Department put the ’Ndrangheta on the black 
list of organizations engaged in money laundering in the United States (Forgione 
2009, 368). 
Social reaction and awareness
The first signs of a presence of this criminal organization in Calabria date from 
the second half of the 19th century (Ciconte 2008; Cingari 1982) – a lengthy period 
during which the ’Ndrangheta came to penetrate all levels of civil society, as well 
as the culture and mentality of the people. Indeed, it is important to remember 
that the ’Ndrangheta has a century of history behind it and is structured accord-
ing to a system of family transmission. Over time this resulted in the assimilation 
of Mafia behaviors and values, a process of enculturation that has been operative 
for several generations (Satriani 2012, 172). For this reason, change will only be 
achievable through the formulation of alternative values, which are to be passed 
on to future generations with the support of educational institutions, such as 
schools and universities.
Throughout its history, the ’Ndrangheta has continually encouraged social mi-
mesis and camouflage, as well as the construction of useful stereotypes. The most 
recurrent stereotypes are those that represent the Mafia boss as a god-fearing man 
and charismatic figure. The instrumental use of religious symbolism and the con-
struction of heroic tales of the Mafia through folk music are two concrete examples. 
All the Italian Mafias make instrumental use of religious symbolism. When 
Bernardo Provenzano, one of the most cut-throat Mafia bosses, was captured, his 
hideout yielded: 91 images of saints, 72 images of Jesus, two wooden crucifixes, 
two Bibles, one copy of the Gospels, and various other sacred images.5 Pietro Agl-
ieri, the Cosa Nostra (Sicilian Mafia) boss, even had a small altar in his hideout, 
where twice a week a priest celebrated Mass. Italian mafiosi reconcile murder with 
the Bible. Sure of God’s approval, they consider themselves good Catholics and 
trust that Jesus and the Virgin Mary are by their sides.
Another very frequent stereotype is the representation of the ’Ndranghetista as 
a hero fighting against the injustices of the state and as a protector of traditional 
values. This stereotype is principally spread through Mafia folk music. In fact, 
the production in Calabria of Canti di malavita (songs of a life of crime) and in 
Campania of Canti neo-melodici o musica nera (neo-melodic songs or black music) 
enjoys great popular success, especially among young people. These songs feed all 
4 | Annual report on the ’Ndrangheta supervised by Francesco Forgione and approved 
by the Commission in the session of February 19, 2008. Published February 20, 2008.
5 | For an in-depth analysis of the Mafias and religion, see Sales (2010) and Cavadi (2009).
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aspects of Mafia mythology: the glorification of violence, the power of money, the 
submission of women, and the fight against the state.
The songs of the ’Ndrangheta describe the rituals of the ’Ndrangheta: initia-
tion, vengeance, the code of silence, blood, respect, honor. They repeat the styles 
and clichés of the organization’s written and unwritten rules, simplifying them. 
The most enduring stereotype is the romantic image of the ’Ndrangheta as an as-
sociation of pure and courageous knights, ready to assist anyone in need. These 
songs draw strength from popular music and are often exhilarating and powerful. 
They reinforce the sentiment of belonging and the group identity. The language is 
simple but rich in symbolism and in double meanings, full of religious references 
and a powerful sense of mystery.6 
Despite the reactions of civil society to the violence and intimidating force of 
the ’Ndrangheta, there has been an absence of true knowledge of the phenomenon 
in all its complexity. The existing awareness stems from emergency situations, 
from alarming or sensationalist news in the media, and from the information 
provided by judicial inquiries. There is no real knowledge because schools and 
universities have seldom carried out serious research and educational work on the 
matter, and the few serious anti-Mafia associations that exist are unable to reach 
the masses. On top of that, scientific study on the ’Ndrangheta always lags well 
behind the speed of the phenomenon’s evolution.7 
In recent years, various public agencies of the Italian state have responded 
with stronger repressive actions that have led to important results.8 The true dan-
gers of the ’Ndrangheta have been revealed for the first time, its presence in many 
foreign countries (Canada, Australia, United States, Argentina, Brazil, northern 
Europe) has been ascertained beyond doubt,9 and it has become clear that decisive 
change can only be based on a reaction by civil society.
The ’Ndrangheta, like all other Mafia-like organizations, derives its strength 
from the consensus of important sectors of the economy, of the political class, of 
state institutions, of the church, and of the population. Taking away that consen-
sus would mean reducing the ’Ndrangheta to a common criminal organization, 
thus to a problem that would not require more than repressive state action. 
6 | See the essay of Santoro and Sassatelli (2001, 505–514).
7 | On the problem of knowledge about the ’Ndrangheta, see Librandi (2012).
8 | According to the official data of the Anti-Mafia District Directorate of Reggio Calabria, 
in the course of the last four years, assets worth more than €2 billion have been confis-
cated and around 3,000 crime prevention measures (misure cautelari) have been taken 
against the Mafia. This figure is double that of the largest Italian Prosecution Service. Fur-
thermore, 10 city administrations have been dissolved due to Mafia infiltration. These sta-
tistics may be consulted in: La Camera (2012).
9 | Official 2012 data of the Anti-Mafia District Directorate of Reggio Calabria, pub-
lished in La Camera (2012). 
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Civil societ y organizations involved in the fight 
against the ’Ndrangheta
Since 2008 the Anti-Mafia District Directorate of Reggio Calabria has been led 
by investigators and magistrates of the highest level. They have achieved impor-
tant results, even discovering the more secret aspects of the ’Ndrangheta. The 
success of the judicial inquiries has increased the spread of knowledge and has 
contributed to a reaction from civil society with the birth of new anti-’Ndrangheta 
movements.
These experiences are partly similar to those of the Italian anti-Mafia move-
ment, with its strong evolution since the massacres in Sicily in 1992: the murders 
of the prosecuting judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, and of their body-
guards. The period of the massacres is a dividing line in the history of the anti-Ma-
fia movement in Italy (Dino 2004; Tessitore 2003),
 
even if only a certain number 
of groups remain engaged in activities that are fragmentary and discontinuous.10 
These kinds of activities are typically carried out by individuals or groups that 
are not structured as organizations and who only spring into action after indi-
vidual cases of injustice or tragedy. Such initiatives do not succeed in overcom-
ing the logic of events and do not contribute much to creating a concrete change 
in mentalities. These actions of civil society, however, have activated important 
mechanisms of change, mostly coming from associations and structured move-
ments that can be classified under the term “social anti-Mafia.”11 Associations that 
are most significant in terms of their activities and their social presence in the 
area are presented below.12 
These associations mostly carry out their activities in the province of Reggio 
Calabria, considered to be the heart of the most powerful ’Ndrangheta families. 
This territory is characterized by a very high fragility of its productivity struc-
tures, owing to its lack of industrial development and strong economic depen-
dence on other Italian regions. In social terms, the fragility of the region’s pro-
ductivity structures has resulted in one of the highest levels of unemployment in 
Europe (19.8%),13 a very high level of unofficial employment, little investment, and 
strong migratory movements toward the northern regions of Italy. These social 
10 | For a historical analysis of the anti-Mafia movement, see Santino (2000). 
11 | For an analysis of the “social anti-Mafia” from peasant movements through to the 
anti-globalization movement, see Santino (n.d.).
12 | A census of these organizations has recently been carried out as part of preliminary 
research into the anti-Mafia movement in the Province of Reggio Calabria, supported by 
the Social Policy Department of the Provincial Government. The research was carried out 
on behalf of the ’Ndrangheta Museum, Reggio Calabria, by Viviana Frisina, and its findings 
can be consulted in the museum’s documentation center.
13 | Official data provided by the Dati ufficiale dell’Istituto nazionale di statistica, Au-
gust 2012.
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structures lead to a transmission of behavioral patterns and a mentality that fore-
grounds individualism or an overly strong focus on the family, at the expense of 
the common good and the rule of law. 
Common features of the associations mentioned below are regular cultural ac-
tivities, through which people are brought together and which help to raise aware-
ness among individuals and groups. Their shared aim is to take consensus away 
from the ’Ndrangheta as a prerequisite for a true change in mentalities. The fol-
lowing is a brief list of these associations and a short description of their activities. 
Reggio non tace14 
On January 3, 2010, the movement Reggio non tace was born, following a very seri-
ous bomb attack against the Prosecution Service of Reggio Calabria. Its aim is to 
create a continuous program of initiatives. Based on a firm belief in the persuasive 
power of non-violence and dialogue, Reggio non tace actively denounces malprac-
tices in society and organizes meetings dedicated to social justice, regularly mo-
bilizing large numbers of people. The movement creates and supports initiatives 
of social solidarity and resistance in search of social justice, not limiting its scope 
only to actions against the ’Ndrangheta. Furthermore, Reggio non tace denounces 
instances of non-transparency in public administration, advocating democratic 
participation and active citizenship.
Libera. Associazioni, nomi e numeri contro le mafie 15 
Libera is a coalition of groups established in 1995 that links more than 1,500 orga-
nizations, grassroots groups, schools, etc., throughout Italy. These are all commit-
ted to building local political-cultural collaborations that will promote a culture of 
legality. Libera is present in Calabria in the management of seized assets (e.g., ag-
ricultural land confiscated from the ’Ndrangheta) and in offering support to citi-
zens who take legal action against extortion and other forms of intimidation by the 
’Ndrangheta. The great inspiration of the founders of Libera was to bring together 
many different actors, each with their own ideologies and political leanings, but 
all sharing the aim of defeating the Mafias. Among the various Calabrian groups 
and cooperatives that are members of Libera, the cooperative “Valle del Marro” is 
particularly important (organic farming on confiscated land). Another important 
factor is Libera’s commitment to holding workshops, seminars, and meetings in 
schools, parishes, and other places in an effort to revive or inspire anti-Mafia com-
mitments everywhere. 
14 | “Reggio doesn’t shut up”; see www.reggionontace.it
15 | “Free. Associations, names, and numbers against the Mafias”; see www.liberareggio.
it
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Associazione daSud 16 
daSud works on communication, culture, research, memory, and identity through 
practical projects that create alliances between citizens, artists, intellectuals, or-
ganizations of different kinds, and good policymakers. The main objective of the 
association is to raise awareness of the phenomenon through journalism-based 
forms of investigation coupled with creative-artistic forms of expression. daSud 
aims to enhance the understanding of the phenomenon by reconstructing the 
anti-Mafia history written by “anonymous”: ordinary citizens, trade unionists, 
workers who through their work have opposed the presence of the ’Ndrangheta 
(Chirico 2010). This is nothing less than a bid to make the anti-Mafia movement 
a popular movement, a widespread battle that is open to participation by all. It is 
a method that helps to reach everyone in society and that transforms knowledge 
into an instrument of real change in society. These kinds of activities are inspired 
by the examples of Peppino Impastato, a well-known journalist, politician, and 
activist who was murdered by the Mafia in Sicily in May 1978, and Danilo Dolci, 
an equally well-known sociologist, poet, educator, and advocate of non-violence.17
Anti-racketeering associations
These associations offer assistance to individuals who have taken legal action as 
a result of crimes such as extortion and usury. The associations help to solve the 
many problems that arise in almost all cases where businesses decide to report 
extortion activities by the ’Ndrangheta. Recently, a “network for ethical consump-
tion” has been created, with the support of the Italian Ministry of the Interior 
and with funding from the European Community. This network consists of both 
traders and consumers, and it provides direct participation possibilities for con-
sumers in the fight against racketeering. The network also aims to establish an 
ethical market, mounting a challenge to Mafia-run businesses. In Calabria there 
are nine associations of this kind that are officially registered with the Ministry of 
the Interior (in Sicily there are 51). Many other cultural associations take action in 
individual cases of racketeering and usury.
Stop ndrangheta.it 18
This organization and website was created with the objective of recovering the 
historical roots of Calabria and the south, thereby contributing to the creation of 
a new southern identity. It is a network of creative young people who, through 
different forms of expression, show the south’s best side. It was founded on the 
16 | “From the South Association”; see http://www.dasud.it
17 | For more information on Danilo Dolci, see his large bibliography; specifically Capi-
tini (1956).
18 | See http://www.stopndrangheta.it
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initiative of the Associazione daSud. The editorial team is made up of activists 
and young professionals from the world of communication and the social sciences 
who have experience in the anti-Mafia movement and, more generally, in the field 
of civil rights and social issues. It has strong expertise in journalism, working 
within structured networks, and maintaining close relationships with those parts 
of Calabrian civil society that are committed to anti-Mafia work and social rights.19
Associazione Riferimenti 20 
This organization was founded in 1995, among others by family members of 
victims of the ’Ndrangheta and magistrates such as judge Antonino Caponnet-
to, head of the first anti-Mafia pool comprising the murdered judges Giovanni 
Falcone and Paolo Borsellino. The name “References” refers to the stories of its 
founders, victims of the Mafia, as well as first-hand witnesses of civil commit-
ments and reactions. Since the death of judge Caponnetto, the association has 
divided its work into two distinct areas of activity: coordination of anti-Mafia work, 
and work for civil society. The association’s work is mostly carried out through 
activities in schools and universities throughout Italy.
Il Museo della ’Ndrangheta 21
The project of the ’Ndrangheta Museum was created through a cultural agree-
ment linking the most important public institutions in Calabria (the regional gov-
ernment of Calabria, the province of Reggio Calabria, and the City Council of 
Reggio Calabria) and two important universities (the University of Calabria and 
the Sapienza University of Rome). It is a hybrid structure with the aim of getting 
public bodies to assume responsibility for continuous programs with the support 
of schools and universities. 
The museum’s overall goals are: (a) to increase rational knowledge of the 
phenomenon of the ’Ndrangheta through educational programs that have the 
strength to counter the educational strategies of Mafia- and non-Mafia families; 
and (b) to historicize tragic events and turn them into questions so that knowledge 
can become personal conscience. 
The museum is also a physical place in the city of Reggio Calabria – a villa that 
formerly belonged to an ’Ndrangheta boss. Inside this state-confiscated villa, a 
museum has been designed with the aim of delegitimizing and demystifying the 
legendary figures of Mafia bosses and Mafia symbols in their various incarnations 
(religious, cultural, social). For the ’Ndrangheta Museum, creating programs for 
cultural change means trying to meet a society that, in part, is unaware of the prob-
lem, or only knows certain aspects of it, and is, in any case, not prepared to take 
19 | See www.stopndrangheta.it
20 | “References Association”; see www.riferimenti.org
21 | The ’Ndrangheta Museum; see www.museodellandrangheta.eu
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responsibility for it. The museum does not so much promote an anti-’Ndrangheta 
model, but rather tries to promote a model of participatory democracy.
Conclusions
Despite the valuable activities carried out by these associations, it is important 
to remember that nowadays it is difficult to mobilize people around themes of 
social and civil rights. People fear the widespread presence of the ’Ndrangheta 
and they are disillusioned by the repeated failures of anti-Mafia repression by state 
agencies and by the political decisions underpinning these. In past years, in Italy, 
we have seen many legislative initiatives and decisions that have undermined the 
power of repressive actions against criminal organizations. Examples include the 
removal of a number of crimes from the law codes, unfavorable changes to court 
proceedings,22 reduced possibilities for supervised phone and communication in-
tercepts (telephone tapping), and limits to the law governing the protection of ex-
mafiosi prosecution witnesses.
On top of that, a number of Mafia crimes cannot be properly prosecuted be-
cause there is a lack of adequate legal provisions. One case in point is the convo-
luted legislation on the seizure, confiscation, and re-use of Mafia assets for social 
purposes. This legislation was the result of an important successful battle by civil 
society,23 but its ultimate inefficiency gives the impression that the Mafia organi-
zations have won.
Clearly, weak state agencies (even more so when they are directly complicit) 
send a symbolic message that contributes to a feeling of fear and resignation in 
22 | One of the most important laws in this sense was law 194/2009, the so-called Mil-
leproroghe (Thousand extensions), which reopened access to the “fiscal shield” (Italian 
tax amnesty) to facilitate the repatriation or regularization of financial and property activi-
ties illegally performed abroad before December 31, 2008.
23 | A bloody Mafia war raged in Sicily between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 
the 1980s. On April 30, 1982, Pio La Torre, parliamentary deputy and regional secretary of 
the Italian Communist Party, was killed in an attack in Palermo. On September 3 of the same 
year, Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, the prefect of Palermo, was killed. The state reacted with 
the introduction of two laws which changed the fight against the Mafia definitively: the law 
of October 12, 1982, n. 726, “Urgent measures for the co-ordination of the fight against Ma-
fia crime,” instituted by the High Commission for the coordination of the fight against Mafia 
crime; and law n. 646/82, which introduced article 416-bis into the Codice Penale (Italian 
Criminal Code). With article 416-bis, the organization of a Mafia-type association was de-
fined for the first time as a punishable crime. The Rognoni–La Torre law, furthermore, intro-
duced measures of property crime prevention intended to combat the illicit accumulation of 
property. Following this, thanks to the commitment of the anti-Mafia association “Libera,” 
more than a million signatures were collected, which permitted the passing of law 109/96, 
establishing the possibility of allocating confiscated Mafia assets to social purposes. 
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many people, and thus reinforces the conviction that it is useless to work against 
the Mafias. Southern Italy, like most modern states, is experiencing a great crisis 
of the concept of the rule of law, understood as a shared heritage of ethical values 
and a trust in the overall functioning of an accountable state. 
It is absolutely necessary to oppose the presence of pervasive Mafia organiza-
tions with the combined critical strength of all layers of civil society. For state 
repression of the Mafia to be effective, it has to be accompanied by individual acts 
of consciousness. It will then be possible to create a broader change in mentalities 
with long-term perspectives. This is the role that a large part of the anti-Mafia 
movement has played, with a certain success. 
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10.2 AN ALTERNATIVE ME THOD TO COMBAT THE MAFIA:  
 CONFISCATION OF CRIMINAL ASSE TS
by Lorenzo Bodrero*
With their profits having totaled $2.1 trillion globally in 2001 (about 3.6% of global 
GDP), organized crime syndicates pose a serious threat to the financial, cultural, 
and social development of our world. However, with the exception of a few coun-
tries, efficient and supranational countermeasures are still far from being adopted. 
From blood to laws
Italy represents an exception. Although perceived worldwide as being a country 
heavily influenced by the Mafia, Italy has developed effective responses – both 
judicial and social – to counter the infiltration of organized crime into its social 
and economic apparatus. Italy, for instance, has implemented the crime of “Mafia 
association” into its penal code (the famous “416 bis”) in 1982, with which crimi-
nals recognized to be members of a wider network can be prosecuted with tougher 
charges. Without going into all the judicial norms in place in Italy, special men-
tion should be made of the possibility to confiscate criminal properties and to use 
them for social purposes.
Contemporary criminal organizations are nothing but illegal enterprises 
whose goal is the multiplication of capital. So what better threat to their profits 
than a legal instrument that – through a juridical order – results in the seizure 
of property? Confiscation of criminal proceeds has a twofold value: It reduces the 
risk of financial destabilization and corruption while at the same time working as 
a deterrent of crime by making it unprofitable. Beyond being a sanction, the con-
fiscation of criminal assets is also a preventive tool that shows potential offenders 
that they will not be allowed to enjoy their illicit wealth.
* Lorenzo Bodrero is author and freelance journalist in Italy. Between 2008 and 2012 
he was the manager of the communications department of FLARE (Freedom Legality and 
Rights in Europe). 
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The law that enables confiscation of criminal proceeds is named after its two 
authors, Virginio Rognoni and Pio La Torre. But Italy paid a high price for the 
“Rognoni–La Torre” law. In 1982, after gaining fame for promoting innovative 
Mafia-combating measures in parliament, La Torre died in a hail of bullets. His 
assassination was followed by the killing of another anti-Mafia crusader, General 
Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, who was murdered in Palermo later that year. The 
deaths prompted parliament to adopt the Rognoni–La Torre law along with other 
emergency measures.
For a decade, however, the legislation languished – until the early 1990s, when 
there was a resurgence in Mafia-related killings of government officials and inter-
nal feuding. The 1992 slayings of activist judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Bor-
sellino, most notably, shook the nation to its core and galvanized public opinion.
The killing of Falcone and Borsellino also led to the founding of Libera, a na-
tion-wide association that represents all strata of society – from police and lawyers 
to social workers, politicians, youth activists, and ordinary citizens. Libera’s first 
act was to collect signatures for implementing the possibility of giving confiscated 
assets to civic groups according to the Rognoni–La Torre law. More than one mil-
lion signatures were collected throughout the country, which gave parliament the 
impetus to strengthen the Rognoni–La Torre law and allowed for confiscated Ma-
fia assets to be turned over to community groups for socially beneficial purposes.
As of January 9, 2012, about 12,000 properties (real estate as well as compa-
nies) had been confiscated, of which more than 700 are now used to run social 
projects: shelters, youth hostels, cooperatives, as well as fruit and vegetable farms 
stand on grounds that once belonged to ruthless criminals. 
This is a heavy blow to the Mafias. Many Mafia repentants stated to authori-
ties that they would rather go to jail than see their assets used in such a way. It is 
humiliating for them and an incredible sign to local communities that says “the 
Mafia has been defeated here.” Once the only rulers of a territory, they are now 
perceived as a conquerable beast. In fact, Mafia bosses and criminals count very 
much on the social consensus of populations to freely run their illegal businesses 
and provide illegal labor. The social use of confiscated properties undermines this 
prospect. 
Europe’s role against organized crime
In past years, the European Union has shown genuine interest in enhancing its 
fight against organized crime. Mafias need to be fought using supranational coun-
termeasures that are capable of harmonizing all EU members states’ national leg-
islations into a single legal framework. Organized crime syndicates have been 
benefiting greatly from the inefficiency of linking law enforcement measures be-
tween countries, whereas they have no difficulty in connecting with other interna-
tional criminal groups or laundering money abroad. 
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The use of confiscation as a tool in the fight against organized crime had ini-
tially been conceived within the EU as a useful measure in the fight against drug 
trafficking. Once the great offensive potential against criminal wealth was real-
ized, it was quickly extended to non-drug-related crimes, especially to criminal 
proceeds.
For more than a decade, the EU had considered confiscation. The EU Ac-
tion Plan to combat organized crime of April 1997 states: “The European Coun-
cil stresses the importance for each Member State of having well developed and 
wide-ranging legislation in the field of confiscation of the proceeds from crime.”1 
Three years later the Millennium Strategy reiterated this by stating as fundamen-
tal “that concrete steps are taken to trace, freeze, seize and confiscate the proceeds 
of crime.”2
After those initial declarations, concrete steps were made to introduce the 
confiscation of criminal assets at the European level. With the 2001 Framework 
Decision on Money Laundering, the Identification, Tracing, Freezing, Seizing and 
Confiscation of the Instruments of and the Proceeds from Crime,3 member states 
are obliged to introduce systems of value confiscation, meaning the confiscation 
of a sum of money that corresponds to the value of the criminal gain. This means 
that instead of confiscating the specific assets derived from crime, states are mere-
ly required to confiscate a sum of money equal to the value of these assets, thereby 
facilitating the process. Where the confiscation of money is not feasible, the claim 
may be realized on any property available.
Furthermore, member states are required to ensure that all requests from oth-
er member states relating to assets identification, tracing, freezing, and confisca-
tion, are processed with the same priority as is given to such measures in purely 
domestic proceedings. The 2003 Framework Decision on Mutual Recognition of 
Orders Freezing Property or Evidence4 extends the mutual recognition to pre-trial 
orders, thus accelerating the execution of freezing orders between member states. 
The 2006 Council Decision on the Application of the Principle of Mutual Rec-
ognition to Confiscation Orders5 applies the principle of mutual recognition to 
confiscation orders. This is intended to strengthen cooperation between member 
states by enabling judicial decisions to be executed immediately, obviating the 
need for the decision to be reviewed by the requesting state.
1 | 1997 Council Action Plan, Political Guideline No. 11.
2 | Council Strategy on the Prevention and Control of Organised Crime: a Strategy for 
the Beginning of the New Millennium (EU), May 3, 2000, O.J. (C 124).
3 | Council Framework Decision on Confiscation of Crime- Related Proceeds, Instru-
mentalities and Property (EU), June 26, 2001 (2001/500/JHA).
4 | Council Framework Decision on Mutual Recognition of Orders Freezing Property or 
Evidence (EU), July 22, 2003 (2003/577/JHA). 
5 | Council Framework Decision on Confiscation of Crime- Related Proceeds, Instru-
mentalities and Property (EU), February 24, 2005 (2005/212/JHA).
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A 2007 Council decision6 obliges member states to designate at least one na-
tional Asset Recovery Office (ARO) and to ensure effective and simplified coopera-
tion. The AROs are to share best practices, thereby improving confiscation proce-
dure all over Europe. Whether the ARO is established as an administrative, law 
enforcement, or judicial body is left to the discretion of the member states. But not 
all member states of the European Union have established AROs – and those that 
exist are equipped with varying powers, structures, and practices.
The main legal instruments used by the European Union are the above-men-
tioned framework decisions, which are to be adopted unanimously by the member 
states and which are used to approximate the laws and regulations of the nations. 
Framework decisions are binding for the member states in terms of results to be 
achieved, however they allow national authorities to choose the forms and meth-
ods. 
The downside of this system is that huge differences persist and some mem-
ber states might only do the absolute minimum to comply with the European 
framework, thus affecting the efficiency of Europe as a unified entity against or-
ganized crime.
A potential milestone?
On March 12 2012, a crucial step was taken by the European Commission in the 
fight against organized crime by publishing a law proposal7 – a so-called Directive 
– to confiscate criminal assets around Europe. 
During the official press conference, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, 
Cecilia Malmstrom, said: “We need to hit criminals where it hurts, by going after 
the money, and we have to get their profits back into the legal economy, especially 
in these times of crisis.” She also added that the new legislation will simplify ex-
isting rules and fill gaps in judicial member states’ legislations. The aim is to 
harmonize more efficient tools for the fight against criminals and to retrieve the 
profits and assets acquired through illegal activities. Such an initiative could prove 
to be even more important in times of crisis, as the money may be invested in the 
welfare sector, healthcare, schools, or it can be returned to victims. “Law enforce-
ment and judicial authorities must have better tools to follow the money trail,” 
concluded the Commissioner. 
There are many norms included in the law proposal. One of them is based on 
the experience of both Dutch and Italian legislation, and offers the possibility to 
expand the measure to cybercrime and corruption-related crimes. The originality 
6 | Council Framework Decision concerning Cooperation between Asset Recovery Of-
fices of the Member States in the Field of Tracing and Identification of Proceeds from, or 
other Property related to, Crime, December 6, 2007 (2007/845/JHA).
7 |  http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/20120312/1_en_act_part1_v8
_1.pdf#zoom=100
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of the legislative proposal is its call for non-conviction-based confiscation, which 
applies in the following cases:
• assets that are not linked to a specific crime, but clearly result from similar 
criminal activity (extended confiscation)
• assets transferred by the criminal to a third party who should have realized 
that they were derived from criminal activity
• when the suspect is deceased, permanently ill, or has fled
• allowing law enforcement authorities to freeze assets that risk disappearing.
Enhancing the EU directive
Aggressive actions taken against criminal wealth constitute, one of the key issues 
in the fight against organized crime. Organized crime – and in particular Mafia-
style organized crime – does not represent a mere “gangster” phenomenon any 
more. Indeed, it embodies a real (counter)power system, to which the accumula-
tion of assets, properties, and monetary and financial resources offers a significant 
incentive to exist and ability to flourish. Aggressive action to retrieve such riches 
is therefore essential for neutralizing the strength and vitality of organized crime.
Therefore, the elaboration of legislation might improve the pre-existent nor-
mative scheme on confiscation and recovery of the proceeds that criminals draw 
from serious cross-border crimes. On the other hand, the proposed text has some 
deficiencies that – if not properly addressed – risk markedly reducing the impact of 
the initiative and, ultimately, could undermine the overall efficacy of the Union’s 
action in this area.
Two issues stand out in this regard:
• the need to avoid the adoption of substantive rules on confiscation, which rep-
resents a backward step if compared with the acquis communautaire
• the choice to focus on just one of the pillars comprising the so-called European 
confiscation system.
1) The need to avoid the adoption of substantive rules on confiscation, which repre-
sents a backward step if compared with the acquis communautaire.
A first problematic issue is raised by the proposal’s content. On some points, in-
deed, the initiative falls short of the EU acquis on confiscation measures.
In general terms, it is necessary to underline that the proposed norms are 
drafted in quite general terms. This reflects, on the one hand, the manifold nature 
of confiscation measures, which vary from state to state. On the other hand, it 
entails the perpetuation of past and current shortcomings, as regards the mutual 
recognition of jurisdictional decisions.
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A key issue in this regard is represented by the “extended powers of confisca-
tion.” Article 4 of the proposal qualifies these measures as an ancillary instrument 
complementing the “ordinary” confiscation of the means and proceeds of crime. 
However, Article 4 allows for extended confiscation only if the judge considers 
the condemned person’s assets to have derived – more probably than not – from 
offenses similar to those the sentence has been issued for. Therefore, Article 4 
sharply differs from the provision set out in Article 3.2 of the Framework Decision 
2005/212/JHA on the confiscation of goods, proceeds, and instruments of crime, 
since it does not permit extended confiscation when the value of goods is dispro-
portional to the convicted person’s legitimate incomes.
This is a troublesome gap. Experience shows that it is difficult – if not impos-
sible – to collect evidence (even just in terms of probability) on the illicit origin of 
criminal organizations’ wealth. In the majority of cases, this wealth is the sum 
of both illegal activities and reinvestments in the ordinary and legal economic 
circuit. In such a situation, determining a gap between the value of assets and the 
legal incomes turns out to be a fundamental criterion to ensure a more efficient 
fight against crime. In the meantime, this does not entail any violation of con-
cerned individuals’ rights, because the fundamental right to defense in criminal 
proceedings implies the possibility to provide evidence – or even just the serious 
and verifiable allegation – that this wealth, even if disproportionate, has a lawful 
origin.
A second weakness affecting the proposal’s content concerns the “value confis-
cation,” provided for by Article 3.2, which allows for confiscation of assets amount-
ing to a value equivalent to that of the proceeds of the crime. This type of confisca-
tion aims at neutralizing the effects of maneuvers of dispersal and concealment 
of the crime’s economic advantages. The provision under consideration, however, 
excludes “value confiscation” in relation to the instruments used to commit the 
crime. This is a gap that must be filled in order to safeguard the proper function-
ing of the system. In fact, organized crime benefits from huge liquid assets and 
material resources, such as warehouses, means of transport, houses, and compa-
nies, mostly located in different states and often used to commit criminal offens-
es. In this respect, “value confiscation” is an effective tool if these goods cannot be 
directly seized through judicial measures because they have been sold, reinvested, 
or concealed.
2) The need for a holistic approach toward a proper “European confiscation system”
In the report accompanying the proposal, the Commission rightly put great em-
phasis on the need to establish a “more effective and diffused system of confisca-
tion of crime proceedings.” Nonetheless, the choice to focus only on minimum 
substantive rules concerning confiscation seems inadequate to achieve such 
a grand objective. Indeed, it is necessary to set up a more comprehensive legal 
framework, articulated on (at least) four complementary levels:
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(i) The substantive provisions on confiscation
All member states shall adopt common minimum rules about the conditions for 
utilizing seizures (provisional measure) and confiscations (definitive measure), as 
well as about their legal nature and effects
(ii) Judicial cooperation
Seizure and confiscation, when ordered by a state’s judicial authorities, must be 
promptly executed in the state(s) where the assets are located; any delay might 
frustrate the effectiveness of such measures, considering that criminal organiza-
tions are capable of transferring and/or concealing these goods, especially mov-
ables and financial assets
(iii) Investigative cooperation
Prior to seizure and confiscation, assets must be sought out and found by special-
ized investigative services
(iv) The destination of confiscated assets
Once seized and confiscated, assets must be entrusted to special administrative 
services, which should be equipped with all the necessary resources to face the – 
often delicate – financial, legal, and administrative tasks that the management of 
these goods entails.
However, the Directive’s only aims at a minimum harmonization of member 
states’ substantive rules on the matter. The Commission’s initiative, albeit cer-
tainly praiseworthy, may lead to the adoption of an isolated instrument with a 
limited capacity to attain the objectives it declares to pursue. 
Therefore, it is essential to widen the scope of application of the proposal by 
also taking into account the other three pillars of the European confiscation sys-
tem. This may greatly enhance the chance to achieve, in the near future, a com-
prehensive corpus of coherent acts that touch upon all the different levels of the 
system. 

11. Germany
11.1 THE MAFIA AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN GERMANY
by Jürgen Roth*
“What has happened in Italy is repeating itself all over the 
world, in Germany as well. The Mafia transforms economic 
power and influence into political power and influence.” 
– Roberto Scarpinato, Attorney General in Palermo
1. 
In the early hours of August 15, 2007, six men from the Italian region of Calabria 
leave the restaurant Da Bruno in Duisburg, where they have been celebrating the 
18th birthday of a friend. Shortly after leaving the restaurant, they are gunned 
down in their car: At least 70 shots are fired. The job is finished off by a bullet to 
the head – nobody is to survive. One of those shot was 16 years old. And the motive 
for this bloodbath? A “faida,” as they say in Calabria, a vendetta between different 
clans from the Calabrian village of San Luca who otherwise cooperate harmoni-
ously in the crime business. Whether victim, killer, or the party responsible for 
ordering the kill, all of them not only have family ties to, but also business relations 
with many men and women living in Germany who belong to the Calabrian Mafia, 
the ’Ndrangheta. Politicians of all complexions hastily jumped on the bandwagon 
of indignation against the “evil” Mafia, which dared to show its presence so openly 
here. After the bloodbath, many asked what exactly the Mafia is. And does it really 
exist in Germany? Once again, talk was rife about the influence of organized crime 
in Germany, as if it had never – or only rudimentarily – existed here before. 
When Wilfried Albishausen, a courageous and experienced criminalist and 
regional chairman of the Association of Germany’s Criminal Investigators (BDK) 
in North-Rhine Westphalia, pointed out the dangers of the Mafia in connection 
with the massacre on August 15, 2007, in Duisburg, he was heavily criticized by 
the Ministry of the Interior. When, one year later, he also spoke critically of serious 
errors made during the dragnet investigation following the August 15 murders, he 
* Jürgen Roth is an author and journalist living in Gemany. 
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made himself even more unpopular with the Ministry. During one event in which 
the Minister of the Interior at that time, Ingo Wolf (FDP), took part, Albishau-
sen spent some time talking to Wolf’s Secretary of State. Ingo Wolf joined them, 
greeted Albishausen, and then “asked the Secretary of State why he was talking to 
me, an enemy of the government.” 
Politicians’ attempts to ignore the situation already jarred with police infor-
mation received from Italy long before the Duisburg massacre. Luciano Violante, 
president of the Italian Anti-Mafia Commission, had already reported in 1993 what 
was said in a taped telephone conversation by a known Italian Mafioso a few hours 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall. “He ordered his relations in Germany to buy up 
everything in East Germany as soon as it came onto the market.”1 In December 
1989, Mafia experts in Palermo and Naples already estimated that sums between 
$100 and $200 billion had been pumped as illegal funds via German front men 
into the east of the country. 
At the end of 1990, the head of the criminal law department at the Italian Ministry of Jus-
tice, Liliana Ferraro, put the real investments and/or Italian Mafia and Camorra group 
funds that had gone into the East to be laundered at 70 billion deutschmarks in the former 
German Democratic Republic alone. Some projected figures by the German Federal Crimi-
nal Police Office (BKA) even go as far as estimates of over 170 billion. (Raith 1996, 43) 
All of this was either repressed or put down as a figment of the Italian imagination.
The Attorney General in Palermo, Roberto Scarpinato, by comparison, de-
scribes the situation today as follows: 
The real danger for Germany is not the presence and residence of several hundred criminals 
from various Mafia clans on its territory who come to public attention now and then in high 
profile murder cases. The real danger lies far more in the billions of euros with Mafia origins 
that have been invested in national economies, meaning that an increasing number of state 
sectors are being gradually and inconspicuously infiltrated.2 
A representative of the ‘Ndrangheta in Germany is located, for example, in Hesse 
and is mainly active in the restaurant and agricultural industries. He is respon-
sible for the import and export of typical Calabrian products and supplies the 
restaurants in the areas that are “controlled” by the Frankfurt “locale.” At the same 
time, he also has close ties to a Sicilian businessman in Frankfurt am Main. He 
has invested a great deal in Hesse using the money of the Calabrian, Milanese, 
and ‘Ndrine of the Genoa locale. The companies in question include more than 
10 real estate firms in and around Frankfurt am Main. A report drawn up by the 
Italian Carabinieri in Genoa stated: 
1 | Luciano Violante, quoted in 1993 by the newspaper Neue Züricher Zeitung, 4.
2 | Lecture from December 5, 2007, specialist seminar by the BDK in Bensberg.
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It would be impossible for D to do his business if he did not have the solid support structure 
behind him that consists of people who know him and his criminal activities, and who are 
prepared to invest illegal funds with him and in the name of their clients. What is more, 
these people are also very familiar, not only with the legal situation in Germany, but with 
business and local politics in which they are integrated and/or involved and they earn 
enough to continue to investing with D.
After all, since the year 2000, more than 40 Italian citizens have been arrested 
in Germany who are members of a Mafia organization, and some of them even 
hold positions of importance. This arrest record may sound good on paper, but it 
has done nothing to impair the influence of the Mafia in Germany because, since 
September 11, 2001, politicians, the media, and law enforcement agencies have 
focused on the alleged danger posed by Islamic terrorism. It was a wondrous thing 
to see how financial and personnel resources suddenly began to flow, and every 
law that feigned to protect the citizens was rushed through parliament in the wake 
of 9/11. At the same time, the fight against the Mafia and organized crime was 
pitifully neglected, despite the fact that crime experts issued repeated warnings 
about the power and influence of criminal syndicates. Nobody wanted to hear this, 
neither in Germany, nor in Austria, Switzerland, or even Italy.
However, the criminal market is not only controlled by Italian Mafia groups, 
but also the Albanian Mafia, the Turkish Mafia, the Chinese Triads and, in par-
ticular, the outlaw motorcycle gangs Hell’s Angels and Bandidos. Throughout 
Germany, Italian organized crime occupied third place in 2009 behind German 
organized crime and organized crime of Turkish origin. In the capital city, Ber-
lin, Italian organized crime only occupied 13th place in 2009 behind the Ger-
man, Turkish, Lebanese, Vietnamese, Polish, Commonwealth of Independent 
States, Lithuanian, and West African groups of organized criminals. However, 
apart from a few regional exceptions, in Germany no historically developed, so-
cio-cultural basis yet exists like the one that bolsters Italian organized crime in 
Italy.
2. 
Organized crime in Germany today is characterized by these generally accepted 
features:
• Major significance of individual crimes and/or crimes in their entirety. 
• There are at least three people involved.
• The crimes are executed according to a plan: The crime is committed in co-
operation and the tasks are divided up among the group involved, and this 
cooperation is for an extended or unlimited period.
• Mainly commercial or businesslike structures are apparent and these are 
marked by an extreme pursuit of profit and power.
• Violence or other means of intimidation are usual practice.
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• Influence on politicians, the media, the public administration, the judiciary, 
and the economy is an essential feature of organized crime.
• Terrorist crimes, however, are explicitly excluded. 
This understanding of organized crime not only affects discussions about crime-
fighting policies in Germany, but is also fundamental for the BKA when drawing 
up corresponding reports about the situation. The three components (business 
structure, violence, exercise of influence) are not linked to one another cumu-
latively, but are rather alternatives. What remains unclear, however, is what role 
these three aspects play proportionally with respect to the crimes committed by a 
group. At the same time, there has been criticizm that the term “organized crime” 
often refers to things other than the professional form of crime characterized by 
elaborate criminal tactics and techniques. The breadth of the definition has also 
been the focus of criticism, and many experts dealing with organized crime feel 
that one particularly problematic factor is that nearly all elements in the definition 
require interpretation. Criticism is aimed at various main components.
On the one hand, the difference between the purported dangers of organized 
crime and the “generous” definition is criticized, as this does not provide us with 
a definition that allows organized crime to be clearly differentiated from other 
forms of crime (multiple perpetrator/gang crime), nor does it serve the principle 
of proportionality in criminal proceedings. Apart from that, the lack of proof that 
a special danger exists for which law enforcement agencies need to gain approval 
to take substantial measures has been criticized.
One of the most important points of criticism refers to the insufficient dif-
ferentiation between organized crime and other phenomena that are apparent in 
traditional business activities, with the only difference being that the former is 
characterized by the fact that criminal acts are committed. With the exception of 
“committing illegal acts,” the catalog of criteria actually refers to activities that are 
a part of normal legal business. 
Other points of criticism are: a failure to reconcile the vague definition given 
with criminological findings or with the significance of organized crime in terms 
of national security; the failure of the definition to provide an effective tool with 
respect to the quality of the intended means to fight organized crime consistent-
ly; the lack of a differentiation between it and other forms of “multi-perpetrator 
crime”; the insufficient definition of those elements of crime that are prerequisite 
to justify interventions; the fact that the new dimensions of the quality of orga-
nized crime have been neglected and there is a focus only on the quantitative 
increase compared to previous criminal activities. This means that society does 
not have any useful indicators concerning the new quality of the threat facing it. 
By too readily defining crimes as organized crime and due to the inflationary use 
of this term, the result is a trivialization of the actual and real danger. This is ul-
timately down to the lack of an empirical foundation and precision when defining 
organized crime as a “terminus technicus.”
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Critics maintain that these deficits make it considerably more difficult to iden-
tify functioning organized criminal structures, meaning that specific findings 
are often not made until the end of an investigation, instead of at the beginning. 
3. 
In addition to the Italian Mafia, the Hell’s Angels and Bandidos, and/or the Alba-
nian criminal clans in particular – all of which have certain structural differences 
– are the most powerful forces in organized crime in Germany. Take the Hell’s An-
gels, for example. Crime experts know of cases where entire villages let themselves 
be financially supported by the motorbike gang. And in some towns and cities, 
they know that the Hell’s Angels have replaced the Albanian pimps who used to 
dominate the red light districts there, and that they control entire districts, dividing 
up both the regions and the fields of crime. In those districts and areas where the 
motorbike gangs are active, there is apparent calm. Ulf Küch, the regional chair-
man of the BDK in Lower Saxony, thinks it is “a scandal that Germany was more or 
less divided up between the two motorbike gangs, Hell’s Angels and Bandidos, in a 
lawyer’s office in Hanover in May 2010, while the whole scene was filmed by televi-
sion cameras and broadcast to the public at large.” He went on to say that criminal 
motorbike gangs are increasingly joining forces with Italian Mafia clans. There 
are similar links between the Albanian criminal organizations that are highly ac-
tive here, especially in northern Germany. In January 2000, they even assisted in 
setting up a political party, the so-called Partei Rechtsstaatliche Offensive (Law 
and Order Offensive Party). In Hamburg’s city parliament elections on September 
23, 2001, the party even managed to win 19.4 percent of the votes, played a role in 
the governing coalition, and gained seats in Hamburg’s Senate, while party chair-
man Roland Schill was appointed Hamburg Senator of the Interior. The governing 
party, the CDU, which formed a coalition with Schill’s party in Hamburg at that 
time, had nothing against this unholy alliance. Police investigations were suddenly 
stopped. The coalition no longer exists and the Law and Order Offensive Party has 
also disbanded. However, this was not because the majority party, the CDU, no lon-
ger wanted to share its position in government with a criminal outcast that main-
tained close ties to the Albanian crime clan, but because Minister of the Interior 
Roland Schill tried to blackmail the CDU boss with his homosexuality.
And today, one insider from the criminal scene told me:
In the middle of a residential area where the Kurds have their drug nests, there was a disco 
that was regularly frequented by guests who arrived in black limousines as well as East 
Europeans and Yugoslavs. And then, after 20 years of stabbings and drug dealings, it was 
finally closed down. The neighborhood was happy. And now, an East European man who 
wasn’t even able to pay the rent on his first business six months ago has been granted the 
concession to the disco for €500,000. He’s a barman, we’ve known him for 20 years. We 
burst out laughing when we heard about the €500,000. He’s only a front man and soon 
nice young Italians will be arriving in their big cars from Palermo to sell wine. Nobody says 
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a word. How come the local authorities approve the concession? Nothing happens in the 
local authorities without the compliance of those in political circles.
How do the Albanian criminal clans differ from other organized criminal groups? 
They are not built up in a pyramid structure like the traditional Mafia-like groups, 
but are organized around strong family ties or clan structures (patriarchal social 
groups). They are mainly family clans, although there are also city, district, and 
regional clans. In the past, they have been compared with so-called clustered 
hierarchies – on the one hand, due to their specific characteristics, and, on the 
other, because of their characteristic flexibility resulting from their family/clan 
connections. According to information from Europol, they can nowadays be seen 
as “goal-oriented groups,” that is, as individual criminal groups/clans that do not 
act in an isolated manner but pursue common goals and criminal intentions and 
have access to jointly available resources. These individual groups are controlled 
– or at least coordinated – from joint centers of power that are usually located in 
their home country or somewhere abroad. Some clans are well structured, while 
others are loose and inconstant groups. In network structures, the hierarchy be-
tween the linked cells is not always apparent. What is more, the great number of 
contacts between the people involved and the cooperation between the different 
criminal families/clans blur any clear view of the structure and the composition 
of the Albanian Mafia. Within a cell, agreements are reached to make sure that 
tasks are reallocated if normal operations are interrupted (for example, because 
of arrests). The different cells consist of a limited number of members, each of 
whom is responsible for his own tasks. However, there are larger groups of about 
50 members that, in turn, can be divided between different countries.
Because of the different ways in which the criminal organizations operating 
in Germany have developed and are developing, it seems strange that, despite 
evidence to the contrary, both politicians and the press doggedly maintain that 
organized crime is a “quantité negligeable.” 
At a podium discussion organized by the BDK, Senior Chief of Police Jörg 
Ziercke, president of the German Federal Criminal Police Office, vehemently de-
nied that the Mafia even existed in Germany. “Are district administrators and 
members of parliament bought in Germany like they are in southern Italy?” he 
asked. “No, we do not have Italian-like structures, which is why we do not have a 
Mafia in Germany.” And Alexander Alvaro, member of the Federal Executive of 
the FDP (Liberals) and specialist for matters of law and national security in the 
European Parliament, backed him up as follows: “In the economy in particular, 
we do not have Mafia-like structures.”3 And at the press conference of the German 
Federal Criminal Police Office on August 27, 2008, in Berlin – which dealt with 
3 | Podium discussion “At a loss before the wall of silence – How those in politics and law 
enforcement prevent an effective fight against the Mafia,” special conference of the BDK, 
Munich, June 4, 2008.
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developments taking place in serious and organized crime – BKA President Jörg 
Ziercke once again underscored the statement that there are no cases in Germany 
in which criminal groups have corrupted or control large parts of the public ad-
ministration or in which entire local councils or police authorities in a town or 
city had been arrested because of Mafia associations. This, he continued, is why 
the position of Italian organized crime in Germany cannot be compared with the 
situation in Italy.4 A plausible explanation for such statements, which differ fun-
damentally from the general findings, has not been given. 
4.
It is therefore high time to take a realistic look at the Mafia and organized crime 
in its setup today, to look at what exactly it is, and to establish how and whether it 
is being fought against. With figures for the German shadow economy set at more 
than €500 billion in total, the Financial Action Task Force estimates that €43 to 
€57 billion (at least) is generated from criminal activities in Germany every year 
(cf. Fiedler 2010, 14). The OECD puts profits from organized crime in Germany at 
€50 billion annually. As financial investigations and asset recovery measures that 
are only possible to a limited extent in Germany, it is possible to regularly secure 
half a percent of these profits. However, extortion, fraud, robbery, bribery, bal-
ance sheet and investment fraud; politicians, trade union bosses and bureaucrats 
who can be bought; nepotism and political horse-trading – all of which are typical 
for the Italian Mafia and transnationally organized crime – are just as present 
in the German-speaking countries as they are in southern Europe. “Germany,” 
says Klaus Jansen, national chairman of the Association of Germany’s Criminal 
Investigators, 
has nowadays become a region where organized crime is both inconspicuous and flour-
ishing, carrying out its activities largely undisturbed. What we see are phenomena such 
as money laundering, typically disguised as real estate transactions, investments in the 
restaurant and hotel industries, corruption, economic subsidy fraud, and the shadow econ-
omy, things that we have always tended to associate with Italy alone. (Jansen 2008, 4)
It is patently obvious that tax fraud, the misallocation of capital as tax avoidance, 
abuses of tax law by legal companies to the detriment of the general public, and 
corrupt practices in companies that operate internationally have led to a struc-
tural and functional overlap with organized crime. Some estimates put the annual 
damage caused by organized white collar crime in Germany at well beyond €100 
billion. Not exactly helping the situation is the fact that the various federal states 
in Germany no longer even have special offices dealing with organized crime. 
And in other areas, resources have been cut massively because of the current gen-
eral financial situation. In Saxony-Anhalt, crime experts say, “Offices are starting 
4 | Press release by the BKA, August 27, 2008.
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to be renamed: No longer ‘organized crime,’ but ‘general and serious crime.’ In 
the criminal police departments, it is now referred to as ‘gang crime.’ Changing 
names is only the start.” 
One leading criminalist from Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania has said, 
When you only have a certain pool of personnel, you can’t fight biker gang crime and Mafia 
crime at the same time. Hardly any light is being shed on organized crime structures in the 
area of white collar crime. Identity theft, for example, is a phenomenon of organized crime 
that is not being dealt with.
In Lower Saxony, one chief superintendent said, 
Certain things are no longer doable. The problem is not that we in the police force are doing 
nothing, the problem is a political one. You can do your best, but still fail when those pulling 
the strings are doing so from abroad. You might be the best police officer in the world – you 
still won’t manage to sor t out the situation. Our police system can do nothing about it.
Money laundering plays a special role. The Financial Action Task Force confirmed 
that, in 2010, Germany was especially vulnerable to money laundering, among 
other things. Germany is a particularly attractive country for money laundering, 
because it has enormous importance in its role as a financial center and because 
of its economy. The EU’s 3rd Money Laundering Directive was only recently imple-
mented in German national law, and supervisory authorities in the federal states 
and/or the municipalities often do not know how to detect money laundering and 
practically carry out their investigations as a kind of secondary activity. However, 
the question of money laundering is sometimes ignored for the sake of gaining 
new customers, even in large German banks. One typical example, for instance, is 
the case where the Board of Management of a large German bank could not even 
be prevented by the bank’s compliance department5 from accepting a dubious na-
tional of Uzbekistan as a customer. This “Uzbek,” a well-known oligarch from 
Russia, was a money launderer and banker in the 1990s in the Russian criminal 
organization Solnzevskaja, and it has been proved that he still maintains close 
contact with the leading representatives of the so-called Russian Mafia. The cor-
responding evidence of this was presented to the Board by the bank’s compliance 
department. However, their attempts were futile. The bank employee responsible 
for Russia, a former Stasi officer, had put in a good word for the “Uzbek.” It did not 
matter how strongly the compliance department protested. This is also why the 
bank employee responsible for dealing with money laundering at another large 
5 | The term “compliance” was coined in the United States at the end of the 1980s. 
Companies undertake, in the form of a self-obligation, to set up a system that ensures that 
all employees comply with the legal frameworks. It af fects corruption, insider trading, and 
money laundering in particular. 
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bank said that, after working in this area for more than 10 years, he was no longer 
able to say who was actually the bigger danger for the democratic constitutional 
state, the capo from Moscow, Reggio Calabria, and Palermo or the bank chairman 
of the board and investment bankers who give such people the chance to carry out 
their business worldwide in the full knowledge of who they are dealing with. As 
such, it is no wonder that “some companies have become strongholds of criminal 
activities in which the typical patterns of organized crime characterize the day-to- 
day business practices” (Hetzer 2008). 
5.
We must bear in mind that the Mafia system has been – and still is able to – 
spread wherever specific interests override the common welfare, thus giving rise 
to murky political environments, where social injustices prevent people from en-
joying decent lifestyles and where citizen participation in the political decision-
making processes at all levels is either impossible or rests on very shaky founda-
tions. This is something that links – in a highly differentiated way in terms of 
quality and quantity – the political systems of Russia, Italy, and many European 
states, including Germany and Austria. Mafia organizations can carry out their 
activities to a greater or lesser degree depending on the individual situation.
It is perhaps no longer possible today to establish to what extent and at what 
time there are overlaps between (still) legal companies and organized crime. How-
ever, it is already clearly apparent that the financing needs of political parties, the 
power interests of politicians, and the profit orientation of companies are coming 
ever closer together in an ominous manner. Corruption has already developed 
to become the most seductive and most dangerous guiding principle in modern 
times. This allows organized crime in particular to do away with conventional 
types of armed violence, which they no longer necessarily need to achieve their 
ends. Not only does money corrupt, it also silently paves the way for certain people 
to follow.
It has been clear for a long time that both the Italian Mafia and other large 
criminal organizations are systems of uncontrolled power. “Mafia” is synonymous 
with a pathological abuse of power. Organized crime is a feature of structurally 
weak societies and has spread in various forms into all political systems. We might 
console ourselves with the notion that intact political systems with a function-
ing legal system, parliamentary opposition, and freedom of the press might be 
effective defense mechanisms against criminal infiltration. “But how great and 
how sustainable would this consolation be, if we were forced to see that organized 
crime has already established itself in some communities as an economic form 
and as a ‘political’ principle?” asks Wolfgang Hetzer, former consultant to the 
director of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), Franz-Hermann Brunner. 
How should we react then, if organized crime has actually only “radicalized” the 
economic principle? And, is organized crime not merely the quintessence of the 
capitalist principle, and thus reflects the corrupt link between economic and po-
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litical power and criminal forces? The more the democratically legitimated state is 
hindered from executing its protective function by powerful individual interests, 
and state institutions are privatized and/or constricted by a shortage of funds and 
personnel, the weaker this protective function is for the individual. In this way, 
the state leaves itself wide open to infiltration by organized crime or those political 
systems (Fascist or authoritarian) that are very similar to the Mafia. A civil society 
collapses when the citizens lose faith in state institutions.
Organized crime and the Mafia today are internationally operating criminal 
groups that have managed – from their regional locations – to combine economic 
power with the highest degree of criminal energy. They threaten to become part 
of our political system and our society. Infiltration through merging is the stra-
tegic alignment of organized crime, because, without a corresponding political 
and society-based Mafia-like biotope, organized crime could not exist or expand 
as rapidly as it has in the past years in Germany. In connection with tax dodges 
by German millionaires and the attitude of Switzerland’s banks, SPD Chairman 
Sigmar Gabriel has already accused Swiss banks of being involved in organized 
crime.6 The symbiosis between respectable German – or, in this case, Swiss – top 
bankers and highly criminal but financially well-off individuals sheds light on the 
typical face of organized crime today. However, it is precisely here that no punitive 
standards under law and therefore no investigative approaches exist. And yet this 
is exactly – both in Germany and worldwide – where the most dangerous form of 
organized crime is heading. Nevertheless, this remains a taboo subject, also when 
analyzing the extent of the danger posed by organized crime today and in the 
future – at the global level.
References
Fiedler, S. 2010. Beschreibung des Status Quo der deutschen Geldwäschebekämp-
fung – Wer mit dem Verbrechen Nachsicht übt, wird sein Komplize. der krimi-
nalist 6: 14.
Hetzer, W. 2008. Kapitulation vor der Korruption – Plädoyer gegen die Straf-
barkeit der Bestechung. Lecture. Budapest, September.
Jansen, K. 2008. Mafiabekämpfung. Kripo Inter 2008, special issue. June, 4.
Raith, W. 1996. Das neue Mafia-Kartell. Reinbek, 43.
6 | Süddeutsche Zeitung, August 13, 2012.
IV. Outlook 
The question whether TOC is an intrinsic feature of a globalized economic life or 
an indicator of its collateral conflicts will remain a polemical one. However, from 
our point of view, which is backed up by the articles in this book, transnational 
organized crime profits significantly from the legal proceedings of global trade; 
the preponderant ignorance or even consent of political actors on all levels and of 
all parts of the world regarding the proliferation of criminal networks; the secrecy 
and lack of regulation of the financial sector; the still quite unknown possibilities 
of cybercrime; and the materialistic and individualistic philosophy of our age.
It is especially the broader debate regarding the interwovenness of legal and 
illegal economic activities and the underlying normative conflicts about the legiti-
macy of action that makes TOC politically relevant. If one assumes that transpar-
ency, accountability, and participation are preconditions for a democratic life, we 
see actors of transnational and national crime networks absorbing political struc-
tures – and even decision-makers – through secrecy, non-rejectable offers, and 
open threats. John Christensen elaborates in his interview the role and the power 
of secrecy. Marco Lara Klahr describes in his article on extortion in Mexico the 
social naturalization of threats, which is becoming a threat to democratic society 
itself. 
Currently, the state and its institutions are being challenged on different fronts 
since they are competing with alternative networks offering often faster and more 
promising survival strategies. In this context it should not be underestimated how 
the prevailing gold-rush mood characterized by the scramble for maximum prof-
its in society as a whole primes the field for extra-legal actions.
In Europe, the state is increasingly losing its ability to provide security and 
well-being via public policies to private providers. Additionally, uncontrolled fi-
nancial markets compete for the money of the taxpayers, leaving the communities 
without resources for the most necessary investments into public infrastructure. 
In many countries of the global South, state institutions never were in the posi-
tion to dominate public life. As described, for example, in the articles on Afghani-
stan or the Amazon region, belonging to a certain network is almost natural since 
it corresponds with family, regional, and/or ethnic affiliations. Starting under 
such conditions, creating a type of democratic political culture and correspond-
Transnational Organized Crime — Analyses of a Global Challenge to Democracy296
ing institutions would need the support of transparent and accountable global 
structures instead of the “everything goes” mentality that currently shapes global 
trade relations. Against that background, sporadic anticorruption campaigns re-
veal their cosmetic and false character. All those tendencies together undermine 
the dwindling legitimacy of the state and open up corridors for alternative survival 
strategies – be they religious, patrimonial, or criminal networks.
It is not only in weak states or war-torn countries that the fine line between 
legal and illegal is becoming increasingly more diffuse. As long as, for example, il-
legal labor conditions for construction workers on public construction sites in the 
German capital of Berlin are the norm – with responsible police officers stating 
that they can only engage in surprise raids, because otherwise corrupt colleagues 
would sell the information to corrupt subcontractors who profit from the German 
bidding legislation – it will remain impossible to locate organized crime outside of 
our everyday lives. Additionally, Western Europe and the United States profit from 
cheap, sub-human labor conditions and the non-observance of environmental reg-
ulations all over the world that are incorporated into the majority of our prevalent, 
often surprisingly cheap, consumer goods.
The multi-facetted manifestations of transnational organized crime can be 
classified according to their political and personal consequences.
Personally, we hope that this book stimulates reflection on the fine line be-
tween legal and illegal activities in everyday life – especially regarding the far-
reaching effects of the lack of transparency, accountability, and civic participation 
on the political cultures of our countries. We hope that, for example, the inter-
views concerning these issues with activists and people from public institutions 
or business – like Claudio la Camera from the Museo della Ndrangheta; Aurelio 
Rios from the Public Ministry of Brazil; or Steffen Salvenmoser from Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers – will help to create visions and ideas on how to deal with these 
challenges, also perhaps in similar contexts.
Regarding political action, we aim to inspire everybody in the legal, political, 
and economic arenas to stand up for transparent and accountable structures – 
even though this might lead to the loss of short-term profits.
We wish to continue and to intensify the dialogue on the topic, possibly through 
the formation of an exchange network of experiences, especially those regarding 
organized crime, as described so well by various contributors to this book.1 
1 | See list of authors and their email addresses at the end of this book.
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Those who hold political and economic power have very little to win by dis-
mantling criminal networks. On the contrary, cutting back illegal practices often 
equals loss of power and profits, whereas those who suffer from organized crime 
all over the world can only win with every move that is made toward the contain-
ment of organized crime networks and structures.
Regine Schönenberg
Annette von Schönfeld
January 2013
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EU European Union
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FDP Free Democratic Party (Germany)
GDP Gross Domestic Product
ICT Information and Communications Technology
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRC Internet Relay Chat
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ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
IWA Integrity Watch Afghanistan
MPF Federal Public Ministry (Ministério Público Federal, Brazil)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDLEA National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (Nigeria)
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLAF European Anti-Fraud Office of the Commission
(Office de Lutte Anti-Fraude)
RICO Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
RS Republika Srpska
TI Transparency International
TOC Transnational Organized Crime
UN United Nations
UNDCP United Nations International Drug Control Programme
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UPP Unit of Pacifying Police (Brazil)
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